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ABSTRACT 
 
 Emerging conversations within oncology have drawn more attention to cancer among 
young adults (ages 18-45). Recent research has illuminated many of the psychosocial difficulties 
young adults face as they go through the many trials and tribulations of chronic illness. However, 
a subject still understudied, much is unclear about the personal as well as the cultural 
implications of being diagnosed during this period of time. In a book of cancer stories, performer 
and young adult cancer patient Kairol Rosenthal (2009) expressed her frustration with what she 
saw as “stereotypes” promulgated by the limited public discourses that exist on the subject (p. 7). 
She sought to counterbalance these representations with stories capturing the “complexities of 
our real daily lives” (p. 7). 
Indeed, in oncological discourses young adults tend to be cast in oversimplified terms, 
based upon cultural expectations about what young adulthood should be and pressures to 
conform to those standards. Intersecting with dominant discourses within narrative identity 
development, two imperatives are placed upon young adults’ stories: integration of different life 
experiences and selves into a coherent narrative and developing a sense of self-authorship in the 
direction of one’s life. What seems to be lost in these imperatives within the existing research is 
what is at stake for individual lives (a phenomenological perspective) and how those stakes are 
negotiated or contested with hegemonic trajectories of life (a critical perspective).  
Receptive to Rosenthal’s critique of dominant discourses around cancer and young 
adulthood, the purpose of this thesis was to explore the complexity and diversity of young adults 
living with cancer. More specifically, I intended to interrogate some of their existential and 
biographical challenges as expressed in their narratives of cancer, as well as their engagements 
with ideological constructions of young adulthood, namely, the expectations of narrative 
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coherence and self-authorship. This research marked a departure from most studies on the 
subject in its qualitative methodology (i.e., narrative analysis) and in its explicit evaluation of the 
effects of cultural discourses on young adults’ attempts to make meaning. More generally, this 
research shows the importance of language—in discourses, narratives, and metaphors—in 
constructing and communicating illness experiences. 
For this project, I gathered a mix of written and oral narratives (through semi-structured 
interviews) from 21 participants from across Canada. The foci of analyses were on what could be 
called narrative ‘moments of meaning’ and ‘moments of being,’ that is, situated expressions of 
how they made sense of their worlds and themselves. Many of these were critical moments in the 
sense of questioning and resisting dominant discourses of cancer and young adulthood. Their 
moments of meaning often expressed negotiation of personal desires and innovative intentions 
with familiar cultural narratives or “prototypical plots” (Good, 1994)—including stories of 
battling cancer, embarking on a life journey, nearing recovery, encountering unpredictability and 
mystery, and living with chaos. These moments of meaning served an array of purposes well 
beyond the expected function of constructing a coherent narrative. 
When telling of identity disruptions and the liminality of cancer, participants produced 
both more orderly moments of being (e.g., survivor, patient, or warrior identities) and more 
liminal moments of non-being (e.g., victim, phoenix, or trickster identities). Self-authorship 
seemed to be present among the former, while the latter expressed less control and certainty of 
being—which was not always seen as a problem. These moments of being and non-being were 
collaborated and contested within the intersubjective spaces of their clinical relationships, local 
worlds, and cancer patient communities. More specific to their age group, their moments of 
being and non-being often related to what may be understood as developmental identities, 
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including the ‘traditional milestones’ such as individual autonomy, family (i.e., marriage and 
parenthood), and vocation (i.e., getting an education and building a career). In their struggles 
they sometimes reaffirmed these cultural ideals toward identity integration and other times 
resisted them as “normalizing ideologies” (Becker, 1997) of young adulthood.  
As part of these larger negotiations of meaning and being, the participants expressed 
struggles to understand the moral significance of their illnesses. Confronted with what may be 
called “causal ontologies” of suffering (Shweder, 1997), they spoke of different etiological 
models of cancer’s origins as well as reconciliatory models for living with cancer in the future. 
Their narratives sometimes led toward “remoralization” (Kleinman, 1988)—couching 
experiences of suffering in terms of a moral order (narrative coherence) and personal 
responsibility (self-authorship)—and sometimes led away from it, depending on whether they 
believed their illnesses originated from events in their personal and social lives.    
 Overall, the participants in this study communicated complex and potentially chronic 
existential challenges. In many ways their narratives resisted dominant representations of young 
adults with cancer—and of cancer patients in general—suggesting that such representations need 
to be rethought. Their critical moments of meaning and being may serve as counternarratives to 
the stereotypes of concern to Rosenthal and many other cancer patients. Specifically, their 
narratives revealed the merits and limits of the ideological construction of young adulthood as a 
time of narrative coherence and self-authorship. This study has important implications for future 
health research and psychosocial support in the field of oncology; building upon a “narrative 
medicine” (Charon, 2006), sensitivity to how language is used among young adult cancer 
patients may lead toward more inclusive clinical practices.  
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CHAPTER 1: CONTEXTS AND CONCEPTS        
 
Young Adult Cancer 
 “Survivorship stories [have] created a stereotype of cancer patients…I aspired  
to rip young adult cancer patients from the confines of these limited  
descriptors and perceptions…I wanted to reveal who we are, not in simple  
definitions but in the complexities of our real daily lives” 
 
—Kairol Rosenthal, Everything changes, p. 7 
Introduction 
 The stage was set for actor, director, and former cancer patient Kairol Rosenthal’s 
interview project on young adult cancer. Through directed attacks at prevailing assumptions 
about survivors—their inherent strength of character, enhanced awareness of moral living, and 
humbling wisdom about the meaning of life—she endeavoured to break down the hardened 
caricatures of younger cancer patients as imagined within popular discourses. With so many 
spirited, ribbon-waving efforts to generate more awareness of cancer, Rosenthal believed what 
was needed most was a few accenting threads to add more colour to the fabric of public 
perceptions. The best way to do this, she concluded, was to gather and publish stories of cancer.  
 Rosenthal’s (2009) subsequent book on young adult cancer is for me both an enduring 
source of inspiration and a sobering memento. It is a stinging slap to the face, jerking me out of a 
comfortable reverie wherein I dream I can know the totality of illness experience. Her book 
challenged me in my research to question dominant discourses around cancer and young 
adulthood, under which I am influenced as well, by showing how they oversimplify life in 
transition.  
 Yet, I did not want to deny the sway these discourses have in the lives of young adults 
with cancer; as Rosenthal noted, these “limited descriptions” of cancer patients often come out of 
  
! 2 
patients’ own stories of survivorship. There is no clear-cut distinction between popular images 
and self-images of people living with cancer, who may integrate, defuse, and/or manipulate 
discourses as they tell their stories of illness. Like Rosenthal, I sought to understand young adult 
life in its complexities and nuances, while attending to shared meanings, stories, and identities 
between people of differing diagnoses, treatments, and challenges.  
 The title of Rosenthal’s book helps us to imagine just how profoundly the onset of cancer 
can transform people’s lives; I tried in my research to work out what ‘everything’ meant for each 
person. One way to get at ‘everything’ is to ask the question, ‘What is at stake here?,’ a line of 
enquiry often posed within interpretive social scientific research (e.g., Jackson, 2005; Kleinman, 
1988; Turner, 1981)1. To go further, ‘Which visions of life, which aspects of their selves, which 
moral values, which social worlds do they see as most endangered by illness? Which unanswered 
questions seem most unbearable? Which meaningful ways of living seem possible?’ These 
questions tap into what have been called the “biographical disruptions” (Bury, 1982) and 
“existential disruptions” (Little, Paul, Jordens, and Sayers, 2002) of illness experiences—
ultimately, the destabilization of storied identities and meanings.  
I asked a second question, ‘How are discursive conditions affecting the stakes in 
question?,’ in order to place biographical and existential challenges within important linguistic 
registers of cultural meanings. Some of the most prominent discourses drawn into my research 
include mythic allusions to cancer ‘battles’ and ‘journeys,’ images of young adult development 
and its ‘arresting’ in chronic illness, and moral prescriptions of where cancer comes from. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 “What is at stake?” is both research question and rhetorical device, affirming that people’s stories communicate 
particular needs and values, however implicit, disputable, or insignificant they may appear to be. Much of the work 
of interpretive research is to understand the major stakes of a story in their personal and social contexts. 
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I hoped to perform two tasks in my dissertation project. First and foremost, I wanted to 
explore what is of most importance to young adults with cancer2. Young adult cancer is 
relatively invisible within medical communities compared to pediatric or geriatric cancer, in part 
because out of an estimated 187,000 new Canadian cases of cancer each year, young adults make 
up just over 7000 (Canadian Cancer Society, 2013). I found that the scant research conducted 
with young adults was often summarily detailed, brief overviews of common themes or surveyed 
concerns. Though they are comparatively few, young adults living with cancer are likely more 
complicated than what I saw as ‘ideological’ depictions of them within the research. As with 
older cancer patients as well (e.g., Hammond, Teucher, Duggleby, and Thomas, 2012), their 
stories are thick with nuanced and multi-layered meanings produced out of messy everyday lives, 
and although it is harder to explicate these, both our understanding and our care of people with 
cancer suffers without them.  
 Second, in a critical move, I wanted to open up the space of possibilities for young adults. 
I recognized both the values and limits of certain discourses in illuminating illness experiences. 
While respecting that current dominant images about cancer and young adulthood can help 
patients and their families to make sense of their experiences, I wanted to problematize the 
origins and effects of such ideas. For instance, claims that unflinching positive thinking, strict 
diet, and daily exercise will both prevent and cure cancer are hard for me to take; I find in them 
not just practical advice but also more sinister moralized judgments about individual 
responsibility and self-surveillance. I worked to question the ‘naturalness’ or ‘inevitability’ of 
certain ways of talking about cancer by recognizing the diversity of individual stories and 
meanings of illness.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Definitions vary of young adulthood, but for this project a frame was chosen between 18 and 45 years of age. I 
explain the difficulties and reasons around defining young adulthood in the following chapter. 
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Dissertation Overview 
 The remainder of this introductory chapter develops my reasoning behind choosing the 
above two tasks among many candidates. Some personal biases require insertion into my 
reasoning, as illness and death are not foreign subjects to my life history. I also carry with me 
professional horizons of understanding, conceptual tools that may spark flashes of illumination 
onto the foggy territories of illness. Accounting for these interpretive lenses demands a foray into 
ideas and circumstances beyond young adult cancer specifically, into broader debates about what 
is meant by experience, narrative, and discourse in the context of illness. 
 My fundamental argument throughout this dissertation is that how language is used has 
significant impact on people’s experiences of suffering and healing. This perspective builds upon 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s (1986) understanding of language as an event or act: “something 
happens when someone speaks” (p. 77), he or she projects a “proposed world” that implicates the 
life of the person speaking as well as those who are listening (Riceour, 86-87). What is at stake 
for people in times of crisis is revealed within this narrated world along with its many manifest 
and latent (or metaphorical) references (Ricoeur, 1984, p. xi). Furthermore, both people’s stories 
and the metaphors within them “belong to the same basic phenomenon of semantic innovation”; 
they produce “meaning-effects,” they construct representations of selves and worlds in attempts 
to “redescribe a reality inaccessible to direct description” (p. ix-xi), in this case, lived 
experiences of cancer that may be difficult to comprehend or communicate. In these innovative 
uses of language, people may project a wide range of meanings and identities around illness—
what I will call ‘moments of meaning’ and ‘moments of being’—to which the audiences of 
health researchers and care providers must be receptive if they wish to understand what is most 
important to people with cancer.  
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 I have postponed until chapter 2 a more focused literature review and discussion of 
representations of young adult life and how chronic illness is perceived to affect it. I evaluate and 
criticize select discourses that operate within oncological contexts, especially biomedical 
discourses about the ‘distinctness’ of young adult cancer and psychosocial discourses about its 
disruption of ‘developmental tasks.’ Most relevant to my project is the normative trajectory of 
narrative order and self-authorship within discourses that intersect psychosocial oncology and 
theories of narrative identity development. In sum, I challenge these “normalizing ideologies” 
(Becker, 1997) of young adulthood for their common omission of potentially valuable and 
relevant information on personal histories, social worlds, and cultural shapings of experience. In 
order to complement these discourses, I propose a more critical psychosocial oncology aimed at 
recognizing the multiplicity of cancer stories and the complex biographical and existential effects 
of chronic illness signified by them.  
 Chapter 3 begins by addressing the lingering interpretive issue among illness researchers 
of the ‘crisis of representation,’ followed by what I see as my own interpretive task in this study. 
Herein I indicate my preferred theoretical perspective, critical phenomenology, as a dialogic 
approach between structures of lived experience and structures of power. Following my 
theoretical perspective are my philosophical assumptions about knowledge (i.e., social 
constructionism) and reality (i.e., weak realism). Given my interest in narrative constructions of 
selves and meanings, I take on a narrative analysis methodology from Catherine Riessman 
(2008). In the chapter’s remaining pages, I provide an overview of the participants of this study, 
including some germane characteristics about their work, home, and oncological lives. 
The remainder of the dissertation consists of three analytic chapters, each addressing 
biographical and existential issues within young adults’ narratives of cancer and critically 
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evaluating the possibilities and limits of narrative order and self-authorship within this context. 
Across the chapters I engage with what literary theorist and physician Rita Charon (2008) called 
“narrative medicine,” studying the relevance of stories to understanding illness experiences and 
directing care. What she identified as clinically relevant features of illness narratives (i.e., time, 
frame and form, character, ethics, and the teller-listener relationship; p. 40) I adapted and 
expanded into my thematic division of the chapters (i.e., narrative genres, identities, and 
moralities). Some features, like plot and time, are integrated into the whole report, for a staple 
practice of narrative analysis is to keep the causal and temporal movement of stories “intact” 
(Riessman, p. 53). I introduce more review of the literature as it pertains to the subject of the 
chapter (including paradigmatic analyses of illness narratives like Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993) and 
bring different perspectives into dialogue with the narrative analyses. 
 Although this is not a sequential thesis, the analytic chapters share an overarching thread 
in the sense that they each approach the issues of narrative order and self-authorship from three 
different angles. To begin with, chapter 4 includes discussion of the dominant genres young 
adults used to frame their stories and make meaning of their experiences. The question here is 
whether narrative forms serve the imperative of narrative coherence. I lean upon some 
contemporary literary work on illness narratives to explore a variety of genres adapted and 
manipulated in young adults’ accounts: battle stories, recovery narratives, journeys, mysteries, 
and chaotic narratives. Interested in going beyond categorization of narratives, I explore how 
people innovatively employ multiple genres in their stories, producing what we may think of as 
particular ‘moments of meaning.’ I conclude that while these creative moments sometimes lend 
more order to illness narratives , they may also produced more chaotic narratives that expose the 
limits of narrative order and reveal some the other stakes involved in young adults’ stories.   
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 In chapter 5, I shift focus to the possibility of narrative identities to provide a sense of 
agency, which could be read as an avenue toward self-authorship. Narrative identities are 
analyzed in four interrelated ways. First is an extended look at the liminality of cancer 
experience, including the period of ‘separation’ brought on by symptoms and diagnosis, the 
‘struggle’ period of treatment, and the tenuous as well as sometimes unattainable 
‘consummation’ period of post-treatment. From there, I build upon the previous chapter by 
looking at the influence of mythic figures—often linked to prototypical plots—in shaping 
people’s narrative identities. As part of my critical evaluation of self-authorship, I analyze the 
extent to which young adults used these myths to construct themselves as agentic actors within 
the lifeworld of illness and who have moved on from the liminality of cancer. I find in this 
appropriation of myths numerous ‘moments of being and non-being.’ I then show how these 
identities are negotiated and contested in interactions with other actors involved.  
As an extension of analyzing mythic identities, I look at the young adults’ developmental 
identities through and against dominant expectations about young adult identity, emphasizing 
career, family, and independence. No matter which myths were used, it seems that they served 
more than just the function of affirming agentic and re-integrated selves. Sometimes mythic 
identities helped young adults express the liminality and fragility of selfhood in illness. Based on 
participants’ resistance to reducing meaningful and generative living to achievement of these 
identities, I propose that we could recognize the legitimacy of these diverse and alternative ways 
of (non)being by redefining development in this context as “changing participation” in dominant 
discourses (Rogoff, 2003).  
 Chapter 6 is framed within the context of “remoralization” (Kleinman, 1988), often 
perceived as a necessary condition of making meaning of suffering and establishing personal 
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responsibility for healing. Herein I speak to the existential questions that participants asked 
themselves, their struggles to understand the origins of their illnesses, and their ideal images of 
the future. I found that the young adults worked toward and against remoralization, sometimes 
resisting moral explanations of cancer and often suggesting overdetermined moral origins. 
Considering their “subjunctive” explorations of morality (Good, 1994), it became clear that there 
were many different ways the young adults confronted the moralization of their cancers and the 
call to take personal responsibility for recovering from disease.  
I draw my dissertation to a close in chapter 7 by, first, summarizing the knowledge of 
young adult cancer experiences developed out of this project. Basically, the ideological 
construction of young adulthood finds its limits in the lived realities of young adult cancer. From 
there, I provide two major implications from the research project: a) the complexities and the 
chronicity of psychosocial concerns demand us to reconsider our expectations of young adults 
with cancer, and b) what I call ‘critical witnessing’ offers a useful and complementary narrative 
approach to medicine directed toward “therapeutic emplotment” (Mattingly, 1998) and 
“agentivity” (Bruner, 1990). I end my dissertation considering some important limitations of the 
study and future directions for further research in this area. 
My dissertation is like a dance with the young adults’ stories—admittedly clumsy 
sometimes—meant to show within them both moments of structural rhythms and creative 
improvisations. Through various twists and shifts of direction, I try to show their stories were not 
entirely their own, yet they could not be simply reduced to external categories, themes, or types. 
This delicate pendulum of negotiated meanings, I hope, reveals young adults in the complexities 
of their lives and stories. 
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What’s at Stake for Me? 
 I would be deceptive if I claimed to have no stakes, graduation excepting, in the 
knowledge produced in this research project. Though in some schools of thought the following 
may be seen as an admission of clouding biases and unprofessional prejudices, I see my own 
stakes in this project as primed fuel for rigourous study and as a requisite care for the suffering of 
others. We all have our “prejudices,” according to philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(1960/1989), and though they may be limited they enable sight, they are our eyes, they open the 
world to us from a particular angle (p. 267-270). Surely my own personal background has shaped 
my perspective on the world and, therefore, to speak of it is to disclose some of the conditions of 
my understanding.  
 What draws me to my current study of young adult cancer is what, at earlier points in my 
life, initially repelled me away from it: my own witnessing of family members dying of chronic 
illness. Particularly pertinent were the painfully evasive silences within my family, silences that 
precluded conversation with and about those who were ill. One might say these were times of 
non-witnessing, for according to medical sociologist Arthur Frank (1995) the “reciprocity of 
witnessing requires not one communicative body but a relationship of communicative bodies” 
(p. 143). 
 My desire to talk about illness and suffering now comes out of a squelched craving to be 
present for family members who were severely ill. While a teenager, I had witnessed an 
unwillingness to engage the subjects of illness and death when my dearest relative, my uncle 
Jack, died of terminal leukemia. More recently, I was absent at a great uncle’s funeral partly 
because I was not told of his death until the day before the procession and partly out of anger for 
such slow and weak communication in an age of cell phones and email messaging. I was not 
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even aware until later he had been living with terminal cancer for the last six months. For a time 
I was enraged and in furious despair. Regardless of whether telling me my great uncle was dying 
would have distressed me, or would have been an awkward subject to raise, or would have run 
counter to Uncle Bob’s own wishes to conceal his illness, I was deeply incensed by what I saw 
as utter failures to communicate.  
I wanted to be there with and for him, as I was while my grandmother, Josie, was dying 
of coronary heart disease only four months earlier. She and I were able to talk, I was able to say 
goodbye, and her death consequently weighed like a feather on my heart in comparison to my 
great uncle’s death. I felt that I could do no better service to those I loved then to bear witness to 
their suffering, to talk with them about their fears, to try to understand what they were 
experiencing (if only from the distance afforded by good health). I felt deprived of the 
opportunity to establish that connection with my great uncle, and given the absence of speech 
around me I was immensely doubtful that he had such companionship from anyone else during 
his last days.  
 I eventually accepted that I could not talk about illness and death with my family. I 
quietly pursued these matters on my own, taking an interest in my undergraduate years in issues 
related to loss, grief, and death. I studied existentialist critiques of cultural practices of denying, 
avoiding, even forgetting about death and suffering. With the supportive encouragement of my 
undergraduate supervisor, Dr. Ulrich Teucher, I brought my professional interests to bear on 
personal passions in an Honour’s project on existential concerns of dying cancer patients.  
 Looking back on it, I may have held an unfairly critical image of my family, or of the 
larger social practices of palliative care. I see my former self as taking a radically iconoclastic 
approach to common attitudes toward illness and death. I saw many illness discourses and 
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healthcare practices as processes of encryption whereby the truth of human suffering and 
mortality is shrouded; a truth that philosopher Simone de Beauvoir (1973) saw was “crushing” 
her dying mother and!"when she needed to escape from it by talking, we were condemning her to 
silence; we forced her to say nothing about her anxieties and to suppress her doubts” (p. 59). 
These sentiments about the inability of families or health professionals to talk with patients about 
the human condition surely emerged from my own sense that the muteness within my family did 
more harm to my heart and mind than the deaths it kept hidden.  
 Over the last five years, from the beginning of my Honour’s Project until now, I have 
been humbled to rethink my crass iconoclasm. I have come to question what right I have to 
pontificate about others’ dealings with distress. I have come to appreciate that any efforts to talk 
about human suffering are fraught with difficulty, including my own. It is rarely an easy or a 
blunt conversation to speak of the most difficult events in our lives, and it was rather naïve of me 
to believe only a candid discussion would provide some understanding. Whether patient or 
family member, it is not always a failure to keep quiet.  
 I have come to see that, as the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1988) has said, “silence is a 
moment of language; being silent is not being dumb; it is to refuse to speak, and therefore to 
keep on speaking” (p. 38). In other words, even in moments of total quiet can suffering be 
communicated and shared. My family’s silence around dying relatives spoke, not just to a 
crippling dread of death, but also (or alternatively) a practice of care through stoical anguish and 
soundless presence. Perhaps it was also an angry show of resistance, denial not of death’s 
existence but its authority. Perhaps the resistance was directed toward language and the dangers 
of putting incommunicable suffering into narrative order. I did not consider the possible ethics as 
well as the love expressed through their silence.  
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 I have not entirely shed my iconoclastic leanings; I still feel that important aspects of 
illness are sometimes kept behind a veil by dominant discourses, and I do worry that the culture 
of illness in North America has serious flaws3. During sharply felt moments of injustice to 
patients, I sometimes make bold assertions as though they are indubitable truths. But, for the 
most part, I write primarily for the more temperate purpose of engaging the questions, “What is 
being ill like, what shapes the experience, and what can be done to understand those involved?” 
What’s at stake for me in my research is ensuring that illness experiences continue to be talked 
about and to be witnessed, which at least within my family do not always amount to the same 
thing.    
Conceptual Tools 
Negotiations of Meaning and Being 
 I engage with an interrelated set of concepts without which my research project would 
make little sense and would not likely be carried out. The following pages serve as introductions 
to the major concepts that I use in my analyses, to be elaborated on and added to in later chapters 
when it is pertinent. My disciplinary roots and interests are anchored in the psychology of illness; 
however, due to the complex nature of illness I have had to venture out of my home discipline to 
acquire other useful tools and perspectives. The resulting eclectic mix of concepts is theoretically 
grounded especially in interpretive but also phenomenological and existentialist traditions of 
psychology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and literature.  
Above all, these traditions share a common space in highlighting: a) the lived experiences 
of illness; b) narrative constructions of meaning and being; and c) the participation of narratives 
within larger cultural and political discourses of illness. Out of negotiations between lived !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For example, institutions that isolate patients from society, medical discourses that dwell only on bodies and not 
minds or relations, and moral judgments that individuals are responsible for the emergence of and recovery from 
their cancers. 
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experiences, narrative constructions, and cultural discourses emerge what I continually refer to as 
‘moments of meaning’ and ‘moments of being,’ placements of the biographical and existential 
challenges of illness within specific representations of life. I flesh out these conceptual tools in 
turn and illustrate how analyzing negotiations of meaning and being in language may assist in 
understanding young adults’ most important concerns.  
A) Lived Experiences of Cancer, Being-in-the-world, and Liminality  
 One of the primary premises of my work, inspired by Rosenthal, is that our understanding 
of what is at stake for young adults is weak without delving into the complex and concrete issues 
of their intimate lives. Knowledge of young adult cancer may be informed by a “thick 
description” of the personal and social lives of participants, enabled by “experience-near” 
research (Geertz, 1973). Yet, it can be problematic to talk about ‘experience,’ as it is and has 
been a subject of much debate. What does it mean, for example, to study ‘experiences of illness’ 
as a unit of analysis? How do we, as researchers, get ‘near’ experiences of cancer when we are 
relying upon retrospective narratives?  
 Illness experiences, as I understand them, are on-going transitions, subject to the flux and 
flow of days, months, and years since the onset of symptoms. However minute for some and 
ground-shaking for others, cancer can be a transformative or disruptive experience that may 
require reinterpretation of bodies, selves, relations, and worlds (Bury, 1984; Little, Jordens, Paul, 
Montgomery, and Philipson, 1998). The concepts of lived experience, being-in-the-world, and 
liminality discussed below serve as interpretive tools for understanding how lives may be 
transformed by illness. But, before we get there we need to consider various ways in which 
‘experiences,’ as a theoretical concept, may be understood. 
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1. ‘Experience’ in Philosophical Discourses 
 Let’s take a moment to think about experience on a philosophical level. It cannot be 
overstated that ‘experience’ as a concept is quite contested and multifarious within academic 
discourses. For example, the Dictionary of philosophy and religion: Eastern and Western 
thought, written by philosopher William Reese (1980), presented seven different dominant 
theories of experience (pp. 164-165), ranging from John Locke’s empiricism to John Dewey’s 
pragmatism. The Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1901), edited by philosopher and 
early psychologist James Mark Baldwin, submitted a discontentedly critical perspective on the 
matter. Receiving contributions from John Dewey as well as William James, both known to write 
extensively about ‘experience,’ the book presents the concept as a knotted term within 
philosophy. Baldwin and co-contributor philosopher George Stout wrote, “The word is used so 
vaguely and ambiguously by writers on philosophy that definition is difficult” (p. 360). Their 
frustrations seemed to stem from the mosaic of meanings of experience within philosophy. 
 However, this critique of philosophy is unjustified. Ambiguity is a sign not of the failures 
of philosophy, but of the rich diversity of ways in which the term ‘experience’ may be 
interpreted and analyzed. From my perspective, what is more disconcerting is when this diversity 
is disengaged. For example, the fact that neither James nor Dewey provided any defence, or even 
supplied their own theories of experience—which are written in other texts of theirs—suggests 
an unwillingness to engage the subject, which seems anathema to the very process of philosophy 
(or, at least, to a Socratic dialogue toward knowledge). More recently, the Cambridge dictionary 
of philosophy4 (Audi, 1999) and the Oxford dictionary of philosophy (Blackburn, 2005) did not 
even include a section on ‘experience,’ an absence that may not have been an unintended !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!The Cambridge dictionary does have limited descriptions of two specific concepts of experience from within 
phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions, Erlebnis and Erfahrung, which will be brought up in a few pages. 
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oversight. Surely such theoretical evasion cannot help us to understand the concept or, for my 
purposes, to apply it within research endeavours. Researchers depend upon philosophical 
discourses in order to critically reflect upon such a complex and elusive concept; the way toward 
this reflection is not to shy away from the multiplicity of perspectives but to share and invite 
dialogue between them, in the way many philosophers—Reese (1980) among them—have done. 
It is in this spirit of multiplicity that I discuss different understandings of experience below 
within the health and social sciences. 
2. ‘Experience’ in Medical Discourses 
 Let us look at experience as it relates more specifically to discourses of chronic illness. 
Medical oncology typically conceptualizes cancer experiences in terms of bodily happenings 
(e.g., Buckman, 2006). Above all is the process of cancer itself, which is described as a 
“disorderly and uncontrollable” division of cells, often ‘experienced’ through symptoms 
including lumps on the body, blood in excretions, or acute pain in localized areas (Buckman, 
2006, p. 26-30). Other major ‘experiences’ are discomforting side effects from treatments like 
radiation rashes and chemo-induced nausea, and medical signs of remission or relapse such as 
white blood cell count (Alschuler and Gazella, 2010; Buckman, 2006). These experiences can 
range from short-term occurrences like hair loss, fatigue, and burning sensations to permanent 
conditions like infertility, amputation, and death.  
It may sound redundant to say the body figures importantly into an adequate definition of 
cancer experiences. The account above constructs experience biomedically, with attention to 
biological processes going on in the body that may or may not be felt by the person. Whatever 
else may be going on in the world of cancer, what is most important is within the patient’s skin, 
often at molecular levels. 
  
! 16 
However, is experience only bodily in nature? Or, perhaps more accurately put, is the 
body only biological? Medical oncologist Robert Buckman (2006) argued that the mind has no 
effect on the emergence or course of cancer, disputing what he saw as popular ‘myths’ about 
cancer being psychogenic. Laudable though his defence is, he seems to divide mind and body in 
an absolute way, where one is hardly related to the other. His argument, like many medical 
discourses on cancer, seems to assume a Cartesian concept of mind, as an “inner theatre in which 
mental events can be observed to come and go” (O’Murchadha, 2003, p. 93) and where some 
homunculus overseeing the workings of the show notes the ‘experiences’ of the body. In other 
words, the extent of their connection is that the body experiences cancer while the mind 
interprets the body.  
 This ‘medical Cartesianism’ has some grounding in the perceptions of people who fall ill. 
Sometimes people who suffer severe illness talk about a division between their bodies as sites of 
what is happening and their selves as an outside observer (e.g., Carel, 2008; Good, 1994; 
Middlebrook, 1998). However, this felt distance does not necessitate an ontological distinction; 
according to some traditions of understanding illness, to which I now turn, it does not make 
sense to hold the body as a neutral object of experience and the mind as a distant, interpreting 
subject of experience.  
3. ‘Experience’ in Phenomenologies of Illness 
Some more phenomenological traditions within injury and illness studies challenge the 
mind-body dualism as a fabricated distinction, one derived from rather than proved by alienating 
and disruptive experiences of pain and ailment (e.g., Leder, 1990; Scarry, 1985: Svenaeus, 
2009). Body-self splits often experienced by people who are ill may be explained as instances of 
“dys-appearance” (Leder, 1990, p. 141-142), in which ruptures to the familiarity or integrity of a 
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person’s body (as due to pain, irregularity, or exhaustion) partition it from the person’s everyday 
experience of well-being (see also Csordas, 1994; Svenaeus, 2009). What phenomenological 
approaches to illness experience restore is a notion of selfhood. People are believed to be a 
bridged ‘body-self’ even if temporarily disjointed by bodily disturbances.  
 Within these perspectives, Cartesian dualism is replaced by a qualitative distinction 
between the material, objectified bodies (Körper) and phenomenological bodies (Leib) that are 
part of subjective, experiencing selves (Heidegger, 1987/2001; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002; Ots, 
1994; Overboe, 1999). On the one hand, material bodies are objects, imposed upon by external 
forces from their environments (e.g., carcinogenic materials corrupting metabolic processes) and 
reacting via mechanical inner processes (e.g., uncontrolled malignant division of cells). On the 
other hand, phenomenological bodies possess subjective and “intentional” (or active) relatedness 
to the world around them; illness becomes part of a person’s life, influencing how they see the 
world (e.g., as fair or unjust) as well as their actions in the world (e.g., making it to work in the 
morning).  
Leib, a German word that is not by happenstance quite close to Leben, meaning “life,” is 
often seen as intersecting with what we might call “lived experiences” (Erlebnis). The 
Cambridge dictionary of philosophy (Audi, 1999) indicates that Erlebnis is used to refer to 
experiences as lived, while Erfahrung is reserved for thematized or objectified experiences (p. 
279-280). Lived experience “refers to an active self, to a human being who not only engages in 
but shapes an action” (Bruner, 1986, p. 5). There seems to be no account of action or self in 
medical definitions of ‘experience,’ or in medical perceptions of bodies as passive vessels of 
disease and treatment; when we study lived experiences, we study the manifold intentional ways 
in which a given event is responded to or “lived through” (Bruner, p. 3). 
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A parallel distinction can be made between disease as a biomedical object of enquiry and 
illness as a patient’s subjective experiences (Kleinman, 1988). The former concept usually 
entails reified divisions between the patient and the diagnosis (or subject and object) while the 
latter affirms that people live with their condition. In a sense, cancer is ‘personalized’ through 
this different interpretive lens. Phenomenological studies of illness observe how lived experience 
is subjective and embodied, how bodies and worlds affect one another. Agitating aches can 
rupture relationships just as social isolation can instigate further feelings of pain. Furthermore, 
differences in illness experiences are accentuated to a much greater degree than in medical 
discourses5, as people have many different selves within a variety of local worlds.  
 Some may mistakenly see the collapse of subject and object as a defence of reductionism, 
in which the mind is reducible to physical material. However, phenomenologists are sternly 
against reductionism. Neither is mind seen as the amalgamation of neurons, nor is the lived Leib 
seen to be strictly bound to the material Körper. Mind and body go beyond physicality because 
they both relate outside themselves to the surrounding social and physical worlds, interactions 
that coalesce into what is often described as our “being-in-the-world” (Csordas, 1994, p. 10; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, p. 183; Svenaeus, 2003). In this context, being may be understood as 
‘ways of existing’ that people act out ‘in the worlds’ they inhabit6. ‘Being-in-the-world’ 
broadens the contours of mind and experience beyond a particular object (i.e., the squishy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 It is important to recognize that medical practices do not necessarily emulate medical discourses. In her studies of 
physical therapy, anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly noted that although official medical doctrine tends to ignore the 
“phenomenological side of disease and disability,” health professionals who work directly with patients sometimes 
(implicitly or unofficially) engage in this unrecognized model of care (p. 21). To go further, philosopher Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka (2001) respectfully wrote that medicine and phenomenology are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and if brought into dialogue can be “cooperative and complementary” (p. ix). 
6 The term “being” has many permutations within the history of ideas and I do not intend to get lost within them. Of 
special note, however, is the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) because of his influence on how 
the term is used in phenomenological traditions. His notion of Dasein (“being-there”) emphasized that our being is 
located ‘there,’ in particular historical and cultural worlds, and is something we constantly question and negotiate. I 
am deeply indebted to the tradition spurred on by Heidegger, as the argument that being may be always situated and 
interrogated are two key assumptions built into my uses and analyses of the term throughout my dissertation. 
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interior of the brain) while avoiding abstraction from the person’s world (i.e., in an ethereal 
Cartesian soul). 
4. Being Healthy and Being Ill 
 Health and illness are two notably different forms of being-in-the-world. The primary 
difference between the two, it may be argued, has to do with the nature of relating to one’s local 
worlds of meaning. In particular, health is characterized by what medical philosopher Fredrik 
Svenaeus (2000) referred to as “homelike” being-in-the-world, when one is comfortable in one’s 
body and in social settings, finds it easy to get around, and takes many assumptions about life for 
granted. “Unhomelike” being-in-the-world can indicate illness or another disruptive experience, 
when body and world seem strange, in tension, or uncooperative (Svenaeus, 2000). I adopt this 
framework for interpreting the structure of illness experiences.  
“Unhomelike” estrangement in cancer can occur in many different ways. Philosophers of 
medicine Evandro Agazzi and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (2001) wrote of a “global” sense of 
disruption in illness: “we feel wounded ‘as a whole,’ it is our whole life that is affected, we have 
the impression of an adverse ‘destiny’ that is hitting us” (p. xii). Medical anthropologist Byron 
Good (1994) expanded this global sense of disorientation into several related unhomelike 
experiences. To begin with, he wrote of precarious relations formed between bodies and selves 
(as already mentioned) as well as distracted awareness and fatigue from irritable pain (Good, p. 
124-127). Examples abound in the research literature of cancer patients experiencing 
unfavourable changes to ability, embodiment and/or identity (Blinderman and Cherny, 2005; 
Carter, MacLeod, Brander, and McPherson, 2004; Halldorsdottir and Hamrin, 1996; Little et al., 
1998; Little et al., 2002; Sand and Strang, 2006; van Manen, 1998).  
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Good also observed altered time perceptions and fears about lost time, death, and dying 
(p. 126-127), which are quite prevalent among many studies of cancer patients (Blinderman and 
Cherny, 2005; Fife, 2005; Griffiths et al., 2002; Klem, Miller, and Fernsler, 2000; Landmark, 
Strandmark, and Wahl, 2001; Moadel et al., 1999; Morita, Tsunoda, Inoue, and Chihara, 2000). 
In particular, people may start to place doubt upon their assumptions about time (e.g., how much 
of it they still have, when certain life events are supposed to happen), most often feeling they 
were overly generous in their previous estimations. 
 Another set of unhomelike and alienating experiences have to do with meaningful 
activities and social interactions. In some situations of cancer, everyday routines and 
responsibilities can be subverted by unavoidable symptoms and unwanted time commitments 
(e.g., frequent follow-up tests, long resting periods) that preclude completion of other daily tasks 
(Good, p. 127). Many people worry about the effects of cancer and treatment on personally 
meaningful projects, and feel unable to perform actions that used to be effortless (Carter et al., 
2004; Halldorsdottir and Hamrin, 1996). These changes to everyday reality may produce a rift 
between patients’ lived worlds and the lived worlds of their loved ones. The resulting social gaps 
can be flooded with suffocating detachment and misunderstanding (Good, p. 125), repeatedly 
reported by people with cancer (Blinderman and Cherny, 2005; Halldorsdottir and Hamrin, 1996; 
Little et al., 1998; McKenzie and Crouch, 2004; Morita et al., 2000; Sand and Strang, 2006; 
Thompson, Jensen, and Bonde, 2007).  
The extent and longevity of unhomelike being obviously varies. Writing about shifting 
perspectives during illness, sociologist Kathy Charmaz wrote that the sense of change depends 
on “the meanings that [people] attach to their illness, they way that they experience it, their ‘life 
structure’ (Levinson et al., 1978), their age, and whether or not they can merge the illness into 
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their daily routine” (p. 283). She reported that young adults are more likely than older adults to 
see illness as an interruption (p. 58-62), a “temporary crisis” in which recovery will occur “soon” 
(p. 13). That said, regardless of age or expectation, some cancers may become more “intrusive” 
into people’s lives (p. 42-48), even becoming “immersed” in their daily routines and perceptions 
of self (p. 76-97). Serious illness may perpetuate unhomelike being indefinitely, a daily obstacle 
that is never truly overcome.   
We may trace the origins of unhomelike being to a number of different sources. In an 
essay on ‘falling ill,’ Svenaeus (2009) argued that above all it is one’s body that causes the 
disruption: “illness makes us feel our own bodies: it reveals the body to us in different ways, 
through making it heavy, stiff, hot, nauseated, plagued by pain, twists, jerks, shivers, etc.” (p. 
59). He contrasted his position against that of Jean-Paul Sartre, who he read as saying illness is 
more of a social judgment, wherein the “gaze of the other” (especially a physician) imposes 
“outside” interpretations on one’s body (Svenaeus, p. 58). Arguably, unhomelike being may 
emerge from felt discomforts as well as suggestions from one’s social world. Contested illnesses 
like chronic fatigue syndrome serve as an excellent example, for frequently in such cases there 
are multiple, contradictory sources; patients often insist upon recognition of what they feel as 
physical ailments while more skeptical physicians apply mental or psychosomatic diagnoses 
upon them (see e.g., Banks and Prior, 2001; Cohn, 1999; Dumit, 2006)7. The source and meaning 
of their unhomelike experiences are thus in dispute.  
Sartre (1960/1968) recognized multiple origins of illness in an insightful footnote to his 
Search for a Method: “in one respect, illness is social” as “society…decides its sick and its dead. 
But in another respect, it is a certain manifestation—a particularly urgent one—of the material !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 This example is also relevant to young adult cancers. As will become evident throughout the analyses, 
unfamiliarity with young adult cancers among participants’ general practitioners led to a period of contestation over 
whether their symptoms represented physical illness. 
  
! 22 
life, of needs, and of death” (p. 103-104; original text). Alienation in illness, he observes, may 
come from an entanglement of embodied and social sources and, it is implied, may produce an 
array of different effects; some illnesses are socially recognized while others are made invisible, 
and the ‘disability’ of the latter are in part due to internalized feelings of invisibility and lack of 
access to public spaces (e.g., Chouinard, 1994; Clark and James, 2003). We may thus say that 
illness is unhomelike being-in-the-world to varying degrees instigated and defined by bodily 
happenings, self-perceptions, and social relations. 
5. Illness Experiences as Existential Disruptions 
Unhomelike experiences can cause existential disruptions, in which the “assumptive 
worlds” (Attig, 2001) that frame our everyday experience are ripped from their seams and 
shredded; in a word, our selves and meanings are “unmade” (Scarry, 1985). It is the movement 
between unmade and remade lifeworlds that interests me. Existential disruptions are quite 
common among cancer patients and can lead to various forms of physical, psychological, and 
social distress (e.g., Henoch and Danielson, 2009; McKenzie and Crouch, 2004; Williams, 
2004). For some people the uncertainties around how to understand themselves and their worlds 
can be more potent, more fundamental, than the physiological trials of cancer symptoms and 
treatment. For example, young adult Kairol Rosenthal reported “existential funks,” along with 
“nail biting and temper tantrums,” as the “bedrock moments” of her time with cancer (p. 146).  
Psychosocial oncology research has been bringing the existential challenges of cancer 
and their clinical effects to the attention of care providers since at least the 1980s (Rowland, 
1990). In contemporary discourses they are often defined as reflections, queries, fears, or doubts 
about significant, universal aspects of human existence. Some concerns that are typically 
categorized as existential among cancer patients include death awareness and anxiety, 
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perceptions of time, and experiencing a sense of (lost) freedom, hope, and/or meaning (Bolmsjö, 
2000, 2002; Jacobsen, Jørgensen, and Jørgensen, 2000; Moadel et al., 1999; Morita et al., 2000). 
Others within the field have, perhaps more accurately, identified existential disruptions as the 
destabilization of a sense of being and meaning, and subsequent efforts to reconstruct them 
(Blinderman and Cherny, 2005; Breitbart and Heller, 2003; Carter et al., 2004; Coward, 1997; 
Fife, 2005; Griffiths et al., 2002; Halldorsdottir and Hamrin, 1996; Klem et al., 2000; Lee, 2008; 
Tang et al., 2007; Vickberg et al., 2001).   
 Research on existential concerns has been conducted in a variety of different settings in 
Canada (e.g., Lee, 2008; Mount, Boston, and Cohen, 2007), Japan (e.g., Morita et al., 2000), 
Great Britain (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2002), Sweden (e.g., Ramfelt, Severinsson, and Lützen, 2002; 
Sand and Strang, 2006), Israel (e.g., Blinderman and Cherny, 2005), and many others. Despite 
the diversity of socio-geographical locations, many health researchers tend to presume a 
homogenous nature to cancer patients’ existential concerns, such as their fears of death. These 
assumptions may be grounded in some existentialist traditions of anthropology and psychology, 
wherein existential concerns get constructed as lonely, individual struggles between finding 
one’s own significance in the world and facing one’s inevitable biological destiny (e.g., Becker, 
1973; Frankl, 1946/1984; Yalom, 1980, 2008). Although these are helpful ways of thinking 
about cross-cultural concerns when confronting mortality, issues of being and meaning get taken 
out of the worlds within which they take form (similar to that of medical Cartesianism).  
More critical and context-attentive studies of illness place existential challenges within 
cultural constructions of self and social systems of meaning (e.g., Becker, 1997; Kleinman, 1988; 
Good, 1994). Sociologist Beverly Rosa Williams (2004) emphasized that, “because humans are 
social creatures who construct meaning from encounters with others…existential distress, like all 
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experiences of suffering, is rooted in incoherence and disruption of relations with self and 
others” (p. 27). In a medical setting, these local relations include a host of people who may or 
may not provide support, understanding, care, and resources (e.g., family members, friends, 
physicians, nurses, social workers, insurance agents, etc.), as well as the larger milieu within 
which a person’s community interprets, talks about, practices, and makes policies for healthcare. 
The critical side to these studies entails: a) exposing culturally received or sedimented meanings 
that serve to limit the available ways of being by ‘naturalizing’ only a few, and b) listening for 
instances of resistance to those sedimented meanings in people’s narratives.  
Existential concerns may address broader (perhaps even universal) issues, what 
existential anthropologist Michael Jackson (2008) referred to as “recurring symbolic motifs” 
such as “the need to be recognised, healthy, loved, happy, or free, to have security, wealth, an 
identity, a fulfilling job, a family or friends, and to do well in life” (p. x). However, they also 
emerge from within particular social and cultural contexts and, therefore, may require research 
and support that is attentive to those contexts (Jackson, 2008; Kleinman, 1988; Williams, 2004).  
Existential questioning can be quite easily but perhaps mistakenly seen as inherently 
distressful and harmful. An abundance of literature from meaning-centred psychiatry and 
philosophy affirms that questioning our being can enhance our sense of meaning (e.g., Breitbart, 
Gibson, Poppito, and Berg, 2004; Frankl, 1946/1984; Heidegger, 1927/1962). Arrays of 
published narratives of cancer speak of personal development and discovery born out of initial 
disruptions, fears, and difficulties; such narratives employ hopeful languages, for example, of 
metaphorical “triumph” (Lerner, 1991), spiritual “reflection” (Matthews, 2007), and personal 
“growth” (Stefaniuk, 2009).  
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These positive transformations seem to result from alienation, which can breed a critical 
distance from limited or oppressive discourses, assumptions, and ways of living. Writer Virginia 
Woolf (1926/2002) wrote that lying in bed, no longer part of the “army of the upright,” people in 
the midst of illness are afforded reflection of their taken-for-granted worlds; they are able to 
“look round” at their lives from a new angle and “look up…at the sky” to ponder existence (p. 
12). Literary critic Anatole Broyard (1992) wrote of his advanced cancer as “like a great 
permission, an authorization or absolving…All your life you think you have to hold back your 
craziness, but when you’re sick you can let it out in all its garish colours” (p. 23). A bit more 
romantic than necessary perhaps, but Woolf and Broyard are pointing to a paradoxical sense of 
liberation that can come out of disruption, where halting unfamiliarity with the world can, in 
turn, redirect the paths of people’s lives in sometimes enriching directions.  
We have to be cautious about imposing an imperative of positive transformation upon 
cancer patients, as such discourses can sometimes have that effect (e.g., Delvecchio-Good, Good, 
Schaffer, and Lind, 1990; Lazarus, 1998; Salliant, 1990). In many cases, unhomelike being can 
be antithetical to ‘well being’; however, there are times when, through reevaluation and 
resistance, illness may lead to desired personal and perhaps even social changes. Social worker 
Kimberley Thompson (2007) saw these opportunities emerging from the “creation of a liminal 
space…in which one has the potential to experience themselves and their social surround outside 
of preconceived categorical notions” (p. 340-341). In these moments, existential challenges may 
be reframed as releases from dissatisfying lives and opportunities for remaking peoples’ worlds 
in healing and liberating ways. 
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6. Liminal Being during Illness 
 Studying lives affected by cancer demand attention to the liminality of illness experience. 
Though illness may be referred to as a ‘state’ of being, this language can be problematic. Cancer 
is often ‘lived through’ as a process, a transition between moments of meaning and between 
moments of being. Over time being chronically ill can entail a variety of changing, unpredictable 
states. Symptoms may for an extended period remain moderate but have sharp, sudden spikes in 
intensity. Cancers may be diagnosed at a specific stage (0 to 4), but their stage may vacillate 
depending on the efficacy of treatment, evidence of remission, or emergence of metastases. 
Cancer treatment itself comes in waves: radiation and chemotherapy treatments operate in shifts, 
with days or weeks off before the next round.  
Thus, it seems dubious to refer to cancer as ‘an’ experience, in the singular; it seems to be 
many experiences—sometimes continuous, other times erratic or fluctuating—happening over 
time. Anthropologist Victor Turner (1986) was quite reflective about what it means to 
‘experience’ something; he looked to the etymology of ‘experience’ and found transitional 
meanings in its roots: the Indo-European per meaning “to attempt, venture, risk”; German 
cognates of per meaning “fare, fear, ferry”; and the Greek perao meaning “I pass through” (p. 
35). In sum, Turner concluded that the concept of “experience is linked with peril, pirate, and ex-
per-iment” (p. 35), embodied in many cancer patients’ experiences as feeling closer to death, 
robbed of time, and desperate to try whatever works.  
 Cancer experiences may thus be seen as inherently transformative, though of course to 
widely varying extents. Living through cancer in young adulthood may manipulate bodily shape 
or functionality through surgical therapies, change the course and goals of people’s lives, lead to 
more intimate or more strained relationships with family, and catalyze advocacy work in hopes 
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of creating more awareness of young adult cancers. In all of these examples there is a period of 
“liminality” in which some calm, undisturbed aspect of life is agitated, sometimes shaken to its 
foundations. We can see here that unhomelike being is a form of liminal being, where much of 
one’s former life is made strange. Liminality is any process of flux within the structures of 
everyday social life, leading to passages from one status, identity, or stage to another (Turner, 
1966; Van Gennep, 1909/1960). In the process, people’s selves and meanings are radically 
transformed. 
Chronic illness can produce liminal selves and meanings wherein one’s perceived 
positionings in local social worlds are disrupted, reinterpreted, and renegotiated. This is not a 
new concept; for instance, anthropologist Robert Murphy (1987) wrote of his liminal experience 
of disability brought on by a tumour in his spine: “The sharp edges of my self had become 
porous and weak” (p. 42) and “I had changed in my own mind, in my self-image, and in the basic 
conditions of my existence” (p. 85). He felt a “revolution of consciousness” and a 
“metamorphosis” that set him and others with chronic conditions apart from the larger society (p. 
87). Connected in their otherness, he saw people with disabilities as an “undefined, ambiguous 
people” (p. 131) who suffer a “deprivation of our social being” (p. 227). Murphy did not see this 
as having an inherently negative connotation; he suggested these liminal lives were “positive and 
creative, for their self-assertion is a profound celebration of life” (p. 161). Liminality has been 
since used as an interpretive frame for understanding cancer experiences (e.g. Little et al., 1998; 
Thompson, 2007) and similar themes—of transformation, isolation, and creation—may apply to 
the young adult narratives I studied. 
Turner (1969, 1986) broke down liminality into three phases of transition, which seem to 
resemble some of the transitions articulated by cancer patients. The first phase is “separation” or 
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detachment from the usual order of things, producing a shock response in its unexpected, drastic, 
or unpredictable emergence (Turner, 1969, p. 94; Turner, 1986, p. 35-6). Many people report 
feeling numb or disoriented after hearing their diagnosis of cancer, a disease thick with cultural 
associations to death and loss. Being told one ‘has’ cancer can be a surprising or even 
humiliating exposure of vulnerability to many people.  
 As people are making decisions about their care, going through and recovering from 
sometimes debilitating treatment, and attending follow-up visits to see if they are in remission, 
they may be all the while trying to grab hold of some understanding of their passage. This 
involves Turner’s second phase of “struggle” to find meaning, wherein one tries to make sense 
of what’s going on, where it might have came from, and how best to proceed (Turner, 1969, p. 
94-103; Turner, 1986, p. 36).  
 Finally, the aggregation or “consummation” phase entails an arrival, a restoration of stasis 
or continuity in people’s circumstances (Turner, 1969, p. 94-103; Turner, 1986, p. 36). At this 
stage, according to Turner, some sense has been made of the ordeal, some representation or story 
of lived experiences has been produced. Importantly, because cancer is not always ‘cured’ or 
guaranteed to never return, there is often no clear finale to the experiences. The uncertainty of 
the future, coupled with enduring changes for better or for worse, can keep people in a continual 
state of liminality (Little et al., 1998; Thompson, 2007). Nevertheless, many cancer patients who 
recently finished treatment talk longingly about arriving at the three-year or five-year mark of 
their remission status, which they believe will signal the ‘end’ of the experience and a return to 
‘normal’ (see e.g., Jain, 2007).  
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7. Conclusion: The Complexity of Lived Experiences  
To conclude this first section on my conceptual tools, there may be much more going on 
in illness experience than biological happenings, perhaps more than can be comprehended. 
Though important work, accounting for the diverse interactions between bodies, selves, and 
worlds during periods of illness can be incredibly difficult, if not impossible. Jackson (2008) 
summarily wrote, “We can never grasp intellectually all the variables at play in any action or all 
the repercussions that follow from it, partly because they are so variously and intricately 
nuanced, and partly because they are embedded in singular biographies as well as social 
histories. However, it is possible…to produce edifying descriptions of what Virginia Woolf 
(1985) called ‘moments of being’ when we are afforded glimpses into what is at stake for the 
actors, and how they experience the social field in which they find themselves” (p. xxv).  
These “moments of being”—and we may correlatively add ‘moments of meaning’ that 
show what life with cancer is like—come out of expressions people construct of their 
experiences. While one is living through cancer, one is in the separation and struggle phases 
marked by what could be called “mere experience” (Turner, p. 36) or “experiencing” (Gendlin, 
1997, p. 1-4)8, which are not yet meaningfully expressed. Narratives perform or bring into 
expression what their authors find most relevant and most at stake at the time. It is thus to the 
arena of narratives that many illness researchers turn in order to understand illness.  
B) Moments of Meaning and Being Produced in Illness Narratives 
 For all their attempts to witness suffering, families and friends of cancer patients cannot 
fully comprehend the physical pains, existential anxieties, and social challenges that they face—
often enough patients themselves cannot sort these issues out. For my part as a social researcher, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Gendlin used the gerund form of experience to denote it as a constant process, as distinct from the noun form that 
is a relatively static or at least bounded account of action. !
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I cannot claim to have access to others’ day-to-day flow of experiencing, as though “through 
some magical intrusion into their consciousness” (Geertz, 1986, p. 373). What we do have some 
access to are the meanings of illness people articulate when they speak, write, or in any way 
express their experiences. But, how do people make sense of cancer experiences? And where do 
meanings of illness come from? For my interests, I look to illness narratives as situational 
productions of moments of meaning and moments of being. 
1. ‘Meaning’ in Intellectual and Health Discourses 
 Discourses of meaning abound in academic literature, making the concept as fraught with 
complexity and confusion as the concept of experience (e.g., Eagleton, 2007; Ogden and 
Richards, 1927). The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy (Audi, 1999), for example, wrote of 
meaning in a multitude of senses: the literal or definitional meaning of a word, a person’s 
intended or purposive meanings, cognitive meanings or mental images associated with certain 
words or signs, the referential meanings or objects pointed to in the world, the expressive or 
performative meanings in the elocutionary act, and so on (p. 545-550). The dictionary observed 
that the wide range of theories out there locate the basis of ‘meaning’ within either thought, the 
context of each speech act, and/or social practice (p. 546).  
One dominant way of thinking in Western intellectual traditions is that of a 
“correspondence theory of meaning” (Gamut, 1982/1991), in which language is believed to 
possess strictly referential meanings; our words, it is argued, refer straightforwardly to the world 
of experience. Within these traditions, meaning is perceived as “a relation between the symbols 
of a language and certain entities which are independent of that language” (Gamut, p. 2). Thus 
conceived, meanings of illness would be the ‘real’ events pointed to in people’s stories. This 
referential perspective is often challenged within some philosophical traditions as a “myth of 
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objectivism” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; see also Derrida, 1967/1976; Ricoeur, 1976), wherein it 
is taken for granted that the meaning of words is independent of their use or purpose within 
particular contexts. As I have shown above, illness is a way of being-in-the-world and makes 
sense only in relation to its placement within the surrounding world of culture and action.  
The health sciences seem to be dominated by a different, more idealist conception of 
meaning located primarily in cognitive processes. People making sense of illness or other 
stressful events are often seen to go through strictly mental “appraisals of meaning,” or 
reevaluations of beliefs about self and world (e.g., Park and Folkman, 1997; Richer and Ezer, 
2000). This appears to be an extension of the medical Cartesianism around illness; while 
experience is allegedly tied to an objective body, meaning is perceivably held within a more 
subjective mind. The same limitations of decontextual understanding thereby apply: the body is 
displaced from its lived roots in subjective and intersubjective worlds, and the mind is abstracted 
from its location within embodied and social life. 
2. ‘Meaning’ as Expressions  
 Some social scientific and literary discourses of illness ground meaning in performances 
and cultural idioms (e.g., Kleinman, 1988; Good, 1994; Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993). Within these 
discourses, expressions are seen to produce or make apparent culturally available ways of 
meaning and being. For instance, many stories of illness repeat familiar, cultural plots—like 
“quests” into the foreign lands of hospitals—in creative and informative ways (Frank, 1995). 
Stories do not necessarily reflect real events in the individual’s world or pre-narrative 
assessments of meaning, but they articulate certain customs and strategies for telling stories that 
others may understand. 
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 I find the attention given to expressive meanings to be potentially more rewarding than 
referential or cognitive meanings in placing people’s stories of illness into personal and social 
contexts. Expressive meanings are not necessarily pre-linguistic, static things residing in our 
minds, but more likely ‘productions’ inspired by individual creativity and broader social mores 
around expressing illness experience (Good, 1994, p. 142-144). But, I do have to contend with a 
paradox in seeing expressions as productions: they do not necessarily correspond to what 
happened during periods of illness or what people are thinking, yet they are the only way we can 
learn about the experiences and thoughts of others (Kleinman, 1988; Geertz, 1986).  
What, then, do expressive meanings have to do with lived experiences? Expressions are 
“naturally occurring units of meaning” (Turner, 1986, p. 35) in which the flow of on-going 
experiencing gets reformulated as an experience with demarcated form (Gendlin, 1997, p. 4)9. 
Although there may be pre-communicated, mental meanings (Park and Folkman, 1997) or bodily 
“felt meanings” (Gendlin, p. 233-234) that put illness to order, the meanings we as social 
researchers have access to are outward-projecting expressions of suffering and healing. Because 
our only bridge-ways into others’ lives are their gestures and signs, educational researcher 
Melissa Freeman stated, “inquiry into being should focus [on] the conceiving and performing of 
being” (p. 929). Our work operates within language and it is therefore useful to think of meaning 
and being within linguistic frames.  
 Selective focus on expressive meanings does not mean outright dismissal of the mental 
meanings of a thinking mind or the felt meanings of a lived body. Post-structuralist Roland 
Barthes (1966/2000) was quite radical in writing that, “‘What takes place’ in narrative [or other 
expressions] is from the referential (reality) point of view literally nothing, ‘what happens’ is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!The distinction is comparable to that of Erlebnis (i.e., experience lived through) and Erfahrung (i.e., experience 
conceptualized) discussed above.!
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language alone, the adventure of language, the unceasing celebration of its coming” (p. 113). It 
may be difficult to make an unburdened leap from expressive meanings to ‘underlying’ or ‘real’ 
indications of experience, but it seems too drastic to conclude that expressions point to “nothing” 
beyond language. Such an attitude toward expressions comes dangerously close to overlooking 
the pain and suffering that is often not only the content of but also the catalyst for stories about 
illness.  
There is more to expression than blowing hot air or playing with words; that we are 
moulded by culture and language does not make our utterances hollow. Rather, with the help of 
larger systems of meaning, illness experiences can be communicated, shared, and somewhat 
understood. Patients use cultural meanings to form a “living testimony,” an account of injuries 
and injustices inflicted on their body-self (Frank, 1995, p. 140) and of the “distinctive moral and 
spiritual form of distress” they have lived with (Kleinman, 1988, p. 26).  
Health researchers need to consider the powerful impact of language on the process of 
understanding our own lives and deaths during illness. In Susan Sontag’s (1978) analysis of 
illness metaphors, she found that the common language used to talk about illnesses such as 
tuberculosis and cancer have a huge impact on how people perceive the causes and cures of 
illness. For instance, in the 19th century tuberculosis was typically spoken of as a disease of 
excessive passions, poor hygiene and inadequate food, and an affliction of the eccentric 
character; in the 20th century (and to some extent today), cancer was discursively linked to 
repressed passions, wealth, and shameful bodily processes10 (p. 10-21). In these contexts, 
dominant metaphors may not represent the ‘true origins’ of illness, but they affect how people 
make sense of and act on their suffering.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#!This cultural association taps into some of the common forms of cancer originating in organs of reproduction, 
sexual activity, and excretion, such as the breast, colon, bladder, cervix, testicles, etc. 
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Instead of resorting to rash skepticism, we can attend to language by placing mind and 
body within local, situational productions of meaning. Cultural psychology, for example, 
demonstrates that “cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and transform the 
human psyche” (Shweder, 1991, p. 73), and feminist theory shows that matters of personal 
distress are intertwined with political struggle and oppression (Hanisch, 1970). The lived body is 
relatedly entangled in shared systems of meaning, known as the “social body,” as well as 
controlling, hegemonic forces of power, known as the “body politic” (Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 
1986). For example, our local social worlds may define what constitutes illness and disability, as 
already noted above with regard to contested illnesses. Moreover, some illnesses may actually be 
a product of social conflict; anthropologist Arthur Kleinman used the term sickness to denote 
disease “in relation to macrosocial (economic, political, institutional) forces…seeing it as a 
reflection of political oppression, economic deprivation, and other social sources of human 
misery” (p. 6). 
By studying dominant cultural discourses around cancer and their engagement in 
people’s expressions of themselves, we can gain entry into some of the larger contexts of social 
and political meanings and practices. What these contextual considerations do for us is draw 
connections between language (which Barthes saw as empty of substance and lacking any 
reference to life), the felt experiences of an individual’s lived body, and the concrete and 
everyday interactions that make up what is known in critical circles of illness studies as the 
“lived relations” between people (e.g., Chouinard, 1994; Good, 1994; Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 
1986).  
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3. Narrative Expressions of Illness 
Studies of illness expressions often portray narrative as one of the most quintessential 
modes of expressing lived bodies and lived relations (Charon, 2008; Frank, 1995; Good, 1994; 
Kleinman, 1988). Narratives produce what Paul Ricoeur (1988) called a “virtual experience of 
being-in-the-world” (p. 100)—an imaginative reconstruction of lived experiences11. Through 
people’s stories the personal and social contexts of meaning and experience are not only made 
available but are placed front and centre. According to Arthur Frank (1995), our bodies become 
ineffable in illness and only through stories can we restore a sense of intelligibility (p. 2). 
Furthermore, narratives help to place the events of illness within a larger life story (Freeman, 
2010a, 2010b), relating the past life before diagnosis, the present life of treatment, and the 
imagined future life of recovery or death.  
These attempts to conceptualize and narrativize our suffering are also intersubjective in 
that they depend on cultural forms of meaning-making (e.g., common tropes like journeys and 
battles) and they are co-constructed by our stories’ many characters, co-authors, and audiences 
(Good, p. 158). Intersubjectivity crosses two axes: the sharedness of everyday lived relations, or 
what existential psychologist Adrian van Kaam (1966) described as “horizontal coexistence”; 
and the effects of shared histories on the present, or “vertical coexistence” (p. 29). Through the 
study of stories we may come to appreciate both horizontal and vertical coexistence, what we 
may think of, respectively, as lived relations within the present and lived relations with the past. 
Personal narratives of cancer are becoming increasingly popular and a means of drawing 
attention to authors’ moral, political, and existential issues. Numerous published narratives of 
young adult cancers have been released in North America in recent years, including !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Ricoeur applied this understanding to fictional and historical narratives alike, both involving creativity in putting 
events into plots.  
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autobiographies (e.g., Corrigan, 2008; Handler, 1996; Zammett, 2005) and combined narratives 
from different patients or family members (e.g., Karr, 2007; Middlemiss, 2008; Rosenthal, 
2009). Print media is not the only narrative mode used by young adults. Advocacy groups like 
Young Adult Cancer Canada invite members to post profiles on their website. The Huffington 
Post developed a website called “Generation Why”12 to share young adults’ stories of cancer 
through videos, blogs, and digital images.  
Narrative as a particular form of expression can be delineated in a wide range of ways. 
Medical sociologist Catherine Riessman (2008) wrote that narratives can be defined more rigidly 
as a specific unit of speech with identifiable elements13, or more loosely as any account of self 
regardless of structure, including “evolving dialogues” or “brief fragments” of talk (p. 136). 
Riessman herself carried a relatively flexible definition of narrative, which I employ in my 
analyses: “a speaker connects events into a sequence that is consequential for later action and for 
the meanings that the speaker wants listeners to take away from the story” (p. 3). Riessman saw 
storytelling as “only one form of communication” distinguishable from debate, argumentation, 
essay, report, and others.  
Narratives may also be seen either as synonymous to stories or as a subspecies of stories 
(Riessman, p. 6-7). With regard to the former position, a variety of narrative scholars treat the 
terms ‘story’ and ‘narrative’ interchangeably as causally connected events through an evolving 
plot (e.g., Randall and McKim, 2008; Ricoeur, 1984; Riessman, 2008; Sarbin, 1986). The latter 
position asserts that stories follow a sequence of events over time, while narratives take the step 
further to link events into a plot (Forster, 1963/2000, p. 45; White, 1981, p. 5-16). Thus, for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 A play on “Generation Y,” a term often used to refer to the current cohort of people in their 20s and 30s.  
13 For example, sociolinguist William Labov determined specific ingredients to a “fully formed” narrative: an 
abstract or main point, an orientation to a past scenario, evaluation of the event, resolution of conflict, and a coda 
returning to the present (as cited in Riessman, 2008, p. 84). 
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example, narratives are distinguished from annals or chronicles possessing only a temporal chain 
of events (White, 1981). Within this latter framework, a basic chronology of hospital 
appointments, treatment times, and follow-up appointments may be seen a story absent of 
narrativity, while an account in which remission is shown to come about through an effective and 
timely treatment regime could be considered a bone fide narrative.  
I lie somewhere between the two positions. I would not reify possible differences 
between plotless stories and emplotted narratives because plots are not always stable and 
coherent; they have the potential to leave aporias of meaning and harbour disruptions or 
inconsistencies (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 73), carrying within them what could be called ‘plot holes’ 
ripe for deconstruction. Illness narratives often involve phases of disintegration as well as 
coherence, exposing vulnerabilities to chaos and uncertainty (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002). On the 
other hand, some stories that initially seem to lack plot may, in a truncated or implicit way, 
express causation; for instance, some health researchers have suggested that chronological 
medical charts can be seen as compacted narrative renderings of patients’ longer and more 
complex stories (Charon, 2008, p. 137-146; Kleinman, 1988, p. 17). Thus, the lines between 
narratives and other kinds of stories or accounts are permeable due to the fragility of plots.  
4. Narratives and Practices 
Narratives may be said to have “mimetic relations” with people’s lived experiences and 
everyday practices (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 32). According to Paul Ricoeur, narratives and 
practices/experiences are dialectically related. On the one hand, we tend to live in a storied form 
of time where our experiences flow from one moment to the next, and in some circumstances we 
implicitly act out culturally familiar narratives and tropes (e.g., Carr, 1986, p. 45-51; Ricoeur, 
1984, p. 74-75; Sarbin, 1986, p. 8; Turner, 1981, p. 149-152). On the other hand, our narratives 
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are often purposeful productions, what Jean-Paul Sartre (1960/1968) understood as “praxis,” 
heading toward satisfaction of situational needs and desires (p. 5). In other words, narrative plots 
can have practical and moral utility, received and used by audiences (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 70-71); 
the storyteller, wrote philosopher Walter Benjamin (1955/2000), “has counsel for his readers,” 
whether it is a universal proverb, friendly suggestion, or caring advice (p. 47). Furthermore, 
people try to work out the challenges and circumstances of life not only for their listeners but 
also for themselves. Aside from a didactic process, telling stories may also cultivate a reflective 
process of “autobiographical reasoning” (e.g., Baddeley and Singer, 2007; Habermas and Bluck, 
2000), that is, thinking through problems of action and understanding by narrating them.  
 Plots of illness narratives often initiate “mimesis-praxeos,” that is, applications or 
imitations in practices (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 70). According to physician and literary theorist Rita 
Charon (2006), plots are the “engine” not only of illness narratives but also clinical practice, in 
which attempts are made to emplot or to explain specific events within patients’ lives in order to 
direct therapeutic action (p. 48-50). Medical anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly (1998) noted that, 
in medical contexts, clinical practices prime patients for storying their experiences: “Many kinds 
of social actions (including many therapeutic interactions) are organized and shaped by actors so 
that they take on narrative form” (p. 19). Both clinicians and patients try to make manifest an 
“untold story” (p. 46), they “want something to happen” throughout the course of treatment, in 
particular, a “milestone, even a transformative moment” that moves the lived story along “a path 
from illness to rehabilitation” (Mattingly, p. 6).  
The same is true outside of clinical practice, as some young adult support organizations 
imitate quest-like narratives in their services, like the Montreal-based VOBOC who provide 
“Vo-pak” backpacks with information for ‘navigating’ through cancer care, or the rafting 
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adventures of Calgary-based Survive and Thrive Expeditions meant to foster reflection and 
exploration. Our stories and our actions thereby shape one another, a dialectic that for Jean-Paul 
Sartre (1960/1968) meant people are both creators and products of their expressions14.  
5. Prototypical Plots or Illness Narrative Forms 
Individual stories imitate other stories as well, what we might call “prototypical plots” 
(Good, 1994) that are collectively shared and socially legitimated stories, lent credibility because 
of their familiarity (Todorov, 1968/1981, p. 18). They provide cultural forms for telling stories, 
creating mythic patterns of the world in revealing, though selective, ways. Here we may 
understand ‘myth’ as literary theorist Anne Hunsaker-Hawkins (1993) did, as both an “illusion of 
fiction” and a “more profound truth” (p. 19); though imaginative constructions of experience, the 
powerful imagery of mythic plots may communicate intense realities of chronic illness. I want to 
emphasize this point because, as I show throughout my analyses, the young adults’ stories 
heavily relied upon mythic plots, figures, and explanations of suffering to communicate their 
needs and desires.  
 What we now understand as prototypical plots has a long historical progression of 
loosening restrictions and welcome inclusions into an ever-widening taxonomy. In the Poetics 
(1987), the classical Greek scholar Aristotle listed four dominant plots: tragedies, poetry, 
comedies, and epics, the last of which may include battle stories (p. 4-7). According to Paul 
Ricoeur (1985), this taxonomy diversified with the emergence of the modern novel, its relative 
emphasis on character development and private experience over the evolution of events into a 
tragic or comic ending (p. 9-10). From there literary types proliferated exponentially, including 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 In his dialectical language, Sartre described this as a double relation between expressions and being: our being is 
already “signified” by other “signifying” persons, expressions, etc., but we are also signifying persons who 
transform how our being is signified (p. 165-166).  
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those intended to resist traditional modes of storytelling such as “epistolary” (i.e., letters and 
documents) and “carnivalistic” (i.e., polyphonic) novels (Ricoeur, 1985, p. 10-14, p. 96-97).  
 For its part in this history, non-fictional life writing became much more popular in the 
18th century, taking its cue from some of the more ‘life-like’ structures of novels to explore 
personal and social issues in individuals’ lives (Kadar, 1992, p. 3-6). This form of non-fictional 
narration has seen a recent boom, demonstrated by the list of sixty kinds (p. 253-286) provided 
by Smith and Watson (2001/2010). Illness narratives, or “pathographies” (Couser, 1997; 
Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993) emerged in the 20th century as a sub-genre of life writing, when 
illness started disappearing from everyday life and becoming both more institutionalized and 
more manageable by modern medical advancements (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 11)15. This 
now burgeoning narrative form centres around an experience of acute, chronic, or terminal 
illness.  
Illness narratives are often “cautionary parables” in the sense that they “offer us a 
disquieting glimpse of what it is like to live in the absence of order and coherence” (Hunsaker-
Hawkins, 1993, p. 2-3). They forewarn others about a number of contemporary health issues and 
debates: the spiritual or existential trials encountered in illness; the depersonalization of modern 
medicine, on the one hand, and its perceivably miraculous treatments on the other; the power of 
the mind to heal or destroy oneself; or some other testimony to illness experience (Hunsaker-
Hawkins, 1993, p. 3-4).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 ‘Pathography’ is a problematic term for a couple reasons. For one, it often refers only to published stories of 
illness (see e.g., Couser, 1997, p. 4; Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 2-3), while I use it more freely as a reference to 
any story of illness. Second, Couser (who coined the term) later regretted that coinage, recognizing that many who 
write about illness challenge medical constructions of illness and resist some of the negative connotations of 
pathologizing language (Couser, 2005). He thereby concluded that it may be better to label them “anti-pathography” 
narratives, or perhaps not even as “pathographies” at all (p. 143). For these reasons, I will stick to the term I am 
most comfortable using, i.e., illness narratives.   
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 Though they stand out in this regard, illness narratives overlap with a variety of other 
narrative forms—not surprising since they usually do not abstract the disease from its effects on 
and connections with other areas of personal and social life. Arthur Frank (1995) noted that 
illness stories tend to resemble autobiographies of spiritual conversion, gender identity stories, 
and survivor narratives (e.g., of war), as they all involve serious disruption and reclamation of 
selfhood (p. 69). As an example, in her story of cancer in middle age newspaper columnist Kelly 
Corrigan (2008) interwove the evolving plot of her illness with that of a familial memoir, 
recounting earlier life episodes reflecting her relationship with her Irish-American father.  
Other forms of life writing from Smith’s and Watson’s (2001/2010) collection may be 
relatable to illness stories: testimonies of suffering and trauma; autothanatographies (i.e., self-
stories about dying); personal memoirs, which like Corrigan’s The middle place may include 
episodes of illness in and amongst broader life stories; bildungsroman or coming of age stories, 
if we think specifically of adolescent and young adult illness narratives; biomythographies 
placing oneself within mythic conceptions of the world; and internet blogs, an online form used 
by many of my research participants, usually mixing a personal journal, chronicle of diagnosis 
and treatment, and reflective essay about how to perceive illness. This list, which could be 
extended much further, shows that prototypical plots are neither clearly nor distinctly separable 
from one another. Rather, they may blend into and build off one another, producing complex 
narratives that cannot easily be categorized as one kind of story. 
6. Narrative Moments of Meaning 
As different plots often intermingle and cohabit a single narrative, the meanings 
constructed in stories are perhaps best understood as ‘moments of meaning.’ Because narrative 
forms are malleable and permeable, we should not see emplotment as forsaking the flooded river 
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of lived experiences in favour of a clean, formal story. Rather, with shielding sandbags of 
cultural meanings and individual innovative techniques, emplotment redirects the flows of life 
into more manageable streams. Emplotment orders experiences into logical and temporal 
successions (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 39), but they are “never the simple triumph of ‘order’” (p. 73). 
Rather, included in plots are narrative “dramas” of tensions, disruptions, and negotiations 
(Mattingly, p. 154; Turner, 1981, 1986).  
Stories may sometimes contain “redemption” (McAdams, 2006, p. 232) or “restitution” 
(Frank, 1995, p. 77), in which conflict is resolved, health restored, and liminal phases overcome, 
but these moves toward harmony are not always guaranteed or desired. Circumstances may 
change over time as people try to write endings to their stories, producing later ‘hindsights’ that, 
according to narrative psychologist Mark P. Freeman (2010b), require rewriting earlier life 
events. In the throes of shock some newly diagnosed patients may see cancer as a daunting and 
terrifying thing, yet after an uncomplicated treatment and good prognosis they may speak of their 
illness as a minor health issue. Over time people may modify their stories again and again 
depending on their health status, moods, purposes, and audiences at the time.  
Talking about past experiences is always a creative task of remembering earlier felt 
emotions and meanings as well as producing new ones—often as a result of later events (Frank, 
1995; Freeman, 2010b). Instead of enduring states, assertions, or “global meanings” (Park and 
Folkman, 1997)—it seems more fitting to conceive narrative meanings as momentary 
productions in situational contexts, open to reevaluation, revision, and opposition. This does not 
mean narrative meanings are inherently false or untrustworthy. As Arthur Frank (1995) has 
argued, narratives share insights into “not only what was experienced, but equally what becomes 
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experience in the telling and its reception” (p. 22; original text). In other words, we may catch 
glimpses of past experiences along with present interpretations and future expectations.  
7. Narrative Moments of Being 
A correlated function to meaning-making in narrative is self-making, producing what is 
referred to as “narrative identities” (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002) or “self-stories” (Frank, 1995, p. 56). 
Vast is the theoretical commentary on the concept of ‘self’ (De Munck, 2000), ranging from 
rationalist theories of a singular entity held constant over time (e.g., Descartes’ dictum, “I think, 
therefore I am”), to more dialogical theories of a self formed through social interaction and 
internalized self-talk (e.g., Shweder, 1991), to post-structural and post-modern theories of 
‘decentered’ (e.g., Heidt, 1991), “protean” (Lifton, 1993) or “distributed” (Bruner, 1990) selves 
across a spread of situations, roles, and practices16. Some scholars have historicized different 
cultural perceptions of ‘self’ in Western societies, juxtaposing an earlier “ancien regime of 
identity”—in which selves were taken as more fluid and traversable across different social 
spaces such as race, class, and age—with an emerging regime over the last few centuries of a 
more individualized, fixed, and static self (Wahrman, 2004, p. 275; see also Mauss, 1985, p. 19-
22).  
The vagary behaviours of cancer cells and the situational interpretations of people living 
with chronic illness leads me to some skepticism about an enduring self. My ontology of self 
may be plotted somewhere between dialogical and post-structural theories and borrows from 
both existentialist and deconstructionist schools of phenomenology. Though admittedly odd 
bedfellows, the two schools share a blanket assertion that selves have temporary or indeterminate 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#!At its most extreme, this position asserts that no self truly exists, that all we have are our temporary roles and 
performances, that the self is but an empty symbol or imaginary concept and around its borders we feebly try to 
appropriate it (De Munck, 2000).!
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centres (e.g., Charme, p. 8; Heidt, 1991; Park, 2006)17. Our self-stories and “self-readings” are 
situational productions of being, and may or may not be synthesized into a singular Self as they 
are continually under personal and social negotiation (Randall and McKim, 2008, p. 99-102). 
What results is not a static self, or even a self that can be understood as given, but rather a 
tentative self (Randall and McKim, p. 17), what Virginia Woolf described as fleeting “moments 
of being” carried along a sea of “moments of non-being” (Woolf, 1938/1985, p. 78-79)18.  
Narrated attempts to construct a unified self sometimes fail or are so abstracted from the 
changing currents of lived experience as to be seen as mere fictions (Charme, p. 13; Heidt, 1991; 
Olney, 1998, p. 24-25). Drawing on deconstructionism, literary theorist Edward Heidt (1991) 
referred to this as an act of “violence”: “The violence occurs when an autobiographer forces the 
construction of a system, a narrative, to represent the essence of the particular experience or even 
the life itself” (p. 222). This imposition is done at a time when some aspects of self are 
remembered and introduced into the narrative, while other aspects are forgotten, ignored, or left 
out; thus, the narrated self is an incomplete, edited, and perhaps even incorrect representation of 
the author’s being-in-the-world. Liminal experiences like illness may elude assertions of being 
and narratives of coherence.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 It may be a hard sell to attempt a consistent theory of selfhood using two typically opposed traditions of 
philosophy. However, I consider them as complementary in their treatment of mind and language; in different ways 
they criticize the self-sameness of identity, favouring ways of exposing gaps of being. For example, in 
Deconstruction and the remainders of phenomenology, literary theorist and philosopher Tilottama Rajan (2002) 
argued that the legacy of Sartre “finds in consciousness the same difference and nonidentity that deconstruction later 
finds in language” (p. 60).  
18 I take some liberties with Woolf’s concept of “non-being,” which she defined as the prosaic and unremarked 
“cotton wool of daily life” (p. 80-81). I take a cue, however, from her description of moments of being—as a 
“revelation of some order,” sudden perceptions that “behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern” (p. 80-81)—in 
concluding that moments of non-being can be similarly profound illuminations of dis-ordered, un-patterned life, of 
selves spread across untethered plains. In other words, we may be sometimes gripped by the elusiveness of our own 
selfhood. Furthermore, moments of being are somewhat dependent upon non-being, for patterns to our identity may 
only be knitted out of the seemingly unraveled backdrop of scattered situations, roles and practices we engage in on 
a day-to-day basis.   
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 On the other hand, narrating does not always coat the colourful provinces of 
consciousness with a thieving frost. Heidt admits, “The violence is in the synecdochic, idealizing 
self-invention itself, not so much in the metaphoric, metonymic remembering and re-telling” (p. 
222). The dangers of misrepresentation lie in essentializing narratives, where ephemeral 
moments are taken for hard steel monuments of Being. Not all narratives strive for this dubious 
ideal; they may be great communicators of struggle, ironic references to absurd circumstances, 
potent expressions of uncertainties, and even confessions of the impossibility of order. As social 
scientists Hyvarinen, Hyden, Sarrenheimo, and Tamboukou (2010) have argued, narratives may 
sometimes be less indicative of an allegedly “complete and intact self” and more of a “creative 
study of one’s history and its complexities” (p. 7). Stories may be exploratory, what Victor 
Turner (1986) saw as expressing a “subjunctive mood,” namely, “the mood of maybe, might be, 
as if, hypothesis, fantasy, conjecture, desire” (p. 42). 
Furthermore, narratives are not solely for the purpose of representing pre-narrative 
selves. As performances, our stories often construct what could be called “practical identities” 
through “practical reasoning,” directing our self-images according to the specific demands of 
current circumstances and audiences (e.g., MacKenzie, 2008; Velleman, 2006). Literary theorist 
Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (2002) stated that, “The act of narration is, at least partly, a response to 
the needs of the present, as distinct from an attempt at a faithful representation of the past” (p. 
15). Illness narratives construct a provisional and pragmatic order that may (or may not) satisfy 
such diverse needs as reducing pain or isolation, releasing frustration, envisioning hope, 
recruiting ‘witnesses,’ or seeking recognition.  
Just as we are limited in making conclusions about objective reality or thought process 
from expressive meanings, narrated selves may or may not correspond to a body-self of lived 
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experience or an enduring, mental self independent of the body. My attention to narrative 
identities is in the capacity of recognizing moments of being and non-being, trying to understand 
for what purpose they may be constructed, and withholding claims about the self beyond the 
reach of situated expressions.  
8. Narrative-Audience Relations 
As an audience to young adults’ stories, I am implicated in was said and why. The 
audiences of stories have a chance to enter the lives of others, influence moments of meaning 
and being in their responses, and perhaps develop affinity and kinship with narrators. According 
to sociologist Arthur Frank (1995), those who listen to the stories of patients can become 
“witnesses,” and “a particular quality of the word witness is its movement of outward concentric 
circles. When someone receives the testimony of another, that person becomes a witness, and so 
on” (p. 142). The camaraderie built from storytelling and listening can lead to social mobilization 
and change—for example, advocacy and awareness campaigns—making illness narratives 
powerful tools for rallying support of certain causes. 
The social impact of illness stories is not without its politicking. Narrative ‘truths’ are 
given moral and political status, as impetuses for action (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 70-71; Riessman, 
2008, p. 8). Literary theorist Sidonie Smith (1993) argued that narratives often serve as 
“manifestos,” public declarations of evidence that the body-self has incurred injuries from a 
sovereign19 (p. 156-157). In this way, illness narratives can be used to serve or to resist certain 
hegemonic interests. Audiences may be deceived (intentionally or not), their glances diverted 
from hidden or alternative truths. For instance, the critical documentary Pink ribbons, Inc. (2011) 
illuminates some of the corporate use of the breast cancer symbol as a marketing ploy. In !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 This could be a verbal attack against cancer itself (seen as an imperialistic entity), against the institution of 
biomedicine, against a society’s stigmatizing fear of the disease, or other perceived adversaries. 
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addition, the contested grounds of alternative medicine is often defended through anecdotes of 
cancer recovery, with the tacit suggestion that if it works for one it works for all.  
Narrators use a number of rhetorical devices for their purposes (Riessman, p. 8; Smith, 
1993, p. 154-156). For instance, they may position themselves as a universal subject, a member 
of humanity in general (instead of accounting for race, class, wealth, or social location), and thus 
invite readers to think, “If they can do it, so can I.” Such voices can empower listeners, like other 
patients, to pursue similar treatments, but they can also hide structural factors like wealth and 
healthcare access that get in the way of all patients being treated as equal. Narrators may 
alternatively situate their identities within certain groups, such as women of colour with breast 
cancer. While they may bring to light differences in illness experience, some audiences may find 
these accounts not as relevant for themselves and thus are left unmotivated or dissuaded (Smith, 
p. 155-156).  
Other narrative strategies are used to draw people into stories, get them emotionally 
invested, perhaps even entertain them (Riessman, p. 8). People may construct a drama of pain 
and personal struggle (e.g., Middlebrook, 1998), use dark humour and comic relief (e.g., 
Handler, 1996; Radner, 2009), or draw parallels with larger myths and epics (e.g., Lerner, 1991). 
One young man wrote a “comedy of terrors” about leukemia and poked fun at the bureaucratic 
rituals of the healthcare system (Handler, 1996), while another glamour girl jokingly wrote that 
she was thrilled to lose weight as a result of chemotherapy (Zammett, 2005). For their part, 
audiences may expect certain kinds of illness stories to be told—particularly those with healed 
bodies and happy endings (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002)—and people may modify their stories and 
strategies to fit within their audiences’ expectations. 
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9. Conclusion: The ‘Truths’ of Illness Narratives 
It is important to consider both the values and the limits of attending to stories. In the 
words of cultural psychologist Jerome Bruner (1986) the “life as told” and the “life as 
experienced” are connected but they suffer “inevitable gaps” (p. 6-7). Thus, we face a question 
about the truth of narratives: if they do not wholly represent experiences, then how can we treat 
them as true? The Personal Narratives Group (1989) address this issue in a helpful way, by 
redefining the notion of ‘truth’: 
When talking about their lives, people lie sometimes, forget a lot, exaggerate, become 
 confused, and get things wrong. Yet they are revealing truths. These truths don’t reveal 
 the past ‘as it actually was,’ aspiring to a standard of objectivity. They give us instead the 
 truths of our experiences…Unlike the reassuring Truth of the scientific ideal, the truths of 
 personal narratives are neither open to proof nor self-evident (p. 261; original text).  
 
Narratives may not adequately ‘capture’ individuals’ experiences, but they express local truths 
that are their own. Recognizing that experience and narrative are somewhat connected enables us 
to “witness” and “honour” storytellers’ distress on their own terms (Frank, 1995; Charon, 2008). 
However, acknowledging that this connection is always tenuous, that meaning and being are 
always flimsy, opens the door to critically questioning stories, especially around what else may 
be a driving force. Cultural discourses are among many possibly relevant forces to narrative 
construction, but they are of particular importance to thinking through the politics and poetics of 
narratives. The final section on conceptual tools reviews how cultural discourses may be 
intertwined with lived experiences and narrative expressions of illness. 
C) Cultural Discourses as Illness Narrative Environments  
Moments of meaning and moments of being are not simply productions; they are 
struggles, in the sense that people come up against “limited possibilities, finite abilities and 
scarce resources,” and are in constant jeopardy of being “thwarted, conflicted and thrown by 
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contingency and circumstance” (Jackson, 2005, p. xiii-xiv). Among many other delimiting forces 
within each person’s local world are dominant ways of thinking about and narrating illness. 
These prevalent cultural forms can sometimes become prescriptive or ideological, the default and 
normalized modes of expression, overshadowing alternative voices and perspectives. However, 
we cannot help but be participants in discourses.  
I take it that people telling stories of cancer work within culturally constituted spaces of 
experience and horizons of expectation, what may be called narrative environments. Within the 
frames of narrative environments people try to find stories or plots that make sense in their lives, 
and in the process may reinforce, clash against, or cross these borders. There are two-way 
interactions between experiences, narratives, and discourses: a) individual narratives reinforce 
discourses as they depend upon a language created outside/before personal experiences, and b) 
narratives add to the textures of discourses by creating new constellations of experience through 
creative metaphors and innovative plots. As people participate in and interpret discourses, 
meaning and being are negotiated and indeterminately formed into narrative productions. 
1. Enabling and Disabling Narrative Environments 
People often rely upon precedent symbolizations of illness to make sense of themselves 
and their lives. Referred to as dominant cultural discourses or “master narratives” (Mishler, 
1995), “normalizing ideologies” (Becker, 1997), or “cultural myths” (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993), 
these cultural precedents propose that subjects should take on certain identities and life events 
should follow certain paths. According to disability studies scholar Susan Whyte (1995), 
“discourses are ways of objectifying situations, issues, values, persons, and relationships”; in 
their expression “a message is conveyed” (p. 268). For example, within North America aging 
cancer patients are perceived to be on terminal trajectories of “decline,” a quick track toward 
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bodily failure, social disconnection, and imminent death (Hammond et al., 2012; Sinding and 
Gray, 2005).  
Perhaps younger cancer patients are influenced more by discourses of ‘recovery’ than 
discourses of decline. Rimmon-Kenan (2002) recapped recovery discourses thus: “in Western 
society, the first commandment of illness seems to be ‘get well!’…and if this fails—at least 
conceal disruption under a semblance of continuity and/or victory” (p. 14). Kathy Charmaz 
(1992) saw this as a moral imperative among patients who felt they “deserved” to get better, 
unwilling to accept the chronicity, perhaps even the terminality, of their illness (p. 15). Whether 
acute or chronic, illness is objectified as temporary forms of being-in-the-world from which we 
return. Expectations of recovery are encouraged in part by what Arthur Frank called modern 
medicine’s “telos of cure”—defining itself more often by the ability to end disease than the 
ability to provide supportive and holistic care (p. 83). Representing some of the difficulties with 
dominant discourses, medical discourses of recovery and cure do not always fit well with 
experiences of chronic or terminal illness among all ages (Charmaz, p. 42-43; Frank, p. 83). 
The influence of discourse does not just come later, in times of retrospection or 
reflection. Our very experiences of illness may be guided by shared narratives of how illness is 
and how it should be. As already noted, Mattingly (1998) saw that recovering patients often 
experienced treatments as recovery narratives rooted within particular cultural understandings of 
medicine. Our perceptions prior to telling stories are to some extent ‘conditioned’ by cultural 
understandings of self and its relation to the world (e.g., see Nisbett, 2003). Thus, the 
relationships between narratives and experiences are mediated by pervasive influences of 
cultural systems of meaning. 
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As cultural precedents, dominant discourses exist as “narrative environments” prior to 
people’s personal objectifications of experience (Randall and McKim, 2008). Discourses that 
influence people’s thinking about their lives provide both “spaces of experience” and “horizons 
of expectation” for understanding present circumstances and imagining future possibilities 
(Ricoeur, 1985, p. 208-209). They fall under what Sartre (1960/1968) defined as the “practico-
inerte,” the pre-existing (though not static) social and material conditions that affect people’s 
activities and meanings by simply being there (p. 173). More fundamentally, discourses may 
constitute people as ‘subjects,’ that is, make it possible for them to see themselves as having 
certain identities and being part of larger intelligible worlds (e.g., Foucault, 1978).  
This is both a bane and a boon. Discourses may be used for ideological purposes, 
legitimating only a few identities and meanings and foreclosing many others. Critical 
perspectives on discourses challenge the ways in which narrative environments may restrict the 
range of ways of being-in-the-world (Roberge, 2011). For example, literary theorist Carolyn 
Heilbrun (1989) outlined how women wishing to participate in public stories are often 
discursively relegated to the ‘private’ sphere of home life, while historian Michel Foucault 
(1978) saw normalizing categorizations of sexual practices within a plethora of scientific 
discourses beginning in the 19th century (p. 58). In these examples, discursive constructions of 
gender and sexual identities not only create but also control the subjects so labeled. 
However, dominant discourses are not necessarily of the ‘Big Brother’ variety in George 
Orwell’s 1984, tyrannically stifling human freedom and serving figuratively as “a boot stamping 
on a human face – forever” (1949/2004, p. 334). Narrative environments may open up ways of 
understanding for those in times of crisis. In fact, as expressions depend upon the language and 
signs we have been socialized into, we cannot help but to use the narrative environments 
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available to us in our daily struggles. Narratives of illness, in particular, construct selves and 
meanings using the “building blocks of metaphor, image, archetype, and myth” inherited from 
past and present discourses (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 18). Thinking about how we may break 
free from oppressive ideologies, Paul Ricoeur wrote, “There are no other paths, in effect, for 
carrying out our interest in emancipation than by incarnating it within cultural acquisitions” (as 
cited in Roberge, 2011, p. 5).  
In this way, discourses may be restrictive but they may also be ‘productive’; they do not 
simply hedge people’s efforts to understand their worlds, but make possible construction of 
selves and meanings in socially recognizable and practically useful ways—including critique of 
those very discourses (Becker, 1997; Butler, 2004; Foucault, 1990). Discourses of decline, for 
instance, enable aging cancer patients to talk about suffering, loss, and death, while disabling 
recognition for doing well or suffering little during these experiences. Discourses of recovery or 
“progress,” on the other hand, marginalize indefinite experiences of liminality while lending 
credence to talk of illness as a thing of the past (Hammond et al., 2012).  
2. The Potential Formlessness of Suffering 
Despite their power to constitute subjects, dominant discourses are not necessarily 
bandages for bodies “leaking” meaning (Devaney, 2012). Customary storylines do not always 
offer fitting plots for individual cases. In some circumstances, according to Cheryl Mattingly, 
people cannot story their illness because “lived experience seems to be driven by no form other 
than brute sequence,” that is, it lacks emplotment (p. 47). These moments can occur, for instance, 
when treatments are not working, or when clinicians dismiss patients’ attempts to story their 
experiences in a certain way (Mattingly, p. 129). In any case, the constitutive function of 
discourses can break down in local situations. 
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Many cancer patients express feeling life has lost its meaning (e.g., Bolmsjö, 2000, 2002; 
Jacobsen, 2006; Morita et al., 1999). Patients’ expressions of meaninglessness and of plotless 
“brute sequences” of experience suggest that some forms of ‘unhomelike’ being may toe the 
borders of intelligibility within given cultural discourses (see e.g., Becker, 1997). 
Anthropologists Janice Jenkins and Martha Valiente (1994) noted a great deal of ambiguity in 
how Salvadoran women talked about their symptoms of nervios, meaning “nerves,” a common 
idiom of distress involving, among others, a sudden feeling of intense heat or el calor in various 
parts of one’s body (p. 168). Specifically, some found it difficult to articulate their experiences 
even though el calor was a familiar and readily available concept, and some used the term 
literally while others used it metaphorically. Having access to well-known cultural categories, 
like nervios, does not guarantee people will be easily able to story their felt encounters with 
illness. 
Mattingly was quick to point out that “formlessness is not so much a description of the 
structure of everyday life as a depiction of despair” (p. 47). When dominant discourses fail us or 
lose their hold, we may grieve over losing the ability to make experience meaningful. When 
people talk about a sense of ‘meaninglessness,’ according to literary theorist Terry Eagleton 
(2007), they are not referring to a lack of meaning—as narratives always carry a multitude of 
meanings—but a lack of direction in the face of many competing, discordant meanings that take 
no authority over another (p. 36-37; p. 58-59). A dominant discourse loses its authority and a 
host of alternative discourses contend for power. Jenkins and Valiente argued that, in fact, bodily 
experiences of illness contribute to the historical shifting of discourses, or the construction of 
new cultural meanings, when readily available meanings fail to explain them (p. 176).  
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 3. Negotiations of Meaning and Being 
Although my work hones in on dominant discourses, there are many other discourses 
operating at the same time in people’s lives, leading to much more complex narratives of 
experience that need to be accounted for (Whyte, 1995, p. 275-280). It is important, as Whyte 
has argued, to “find a way of describing a dominant pattern while showing the extent to which 
people ignore or actively contest it” (p. 281-2) through employment, evaluation, and invention of 
different discourses. In this sense, the parameters making up our spaces of experience and our 
horizons of expectation are not necessarily clear and distinct; the variety of discourses available 
to people enables a multitude of voices, a polyvocality, to narratives of illness.   
The links between the lived, social, and political bodies are relevant here. The body is a 
social object assigned and manipulated by cultural meanings, but it is also a social agent capable 
of disputing, resisting and even producing cultural meanings (Becker, 1997; Jenkins and 
Valiente, 1994; Lyon and Barbalet, 1994). In other words, the discourses swirling around us 
often require negotiation in episodes of acutely transformative experiences. Anthropologist Gay 
Becker (1997) observed that Americans who experienced infertility, stroke, chronic illness, or 
late-life transitions sometimes repeated and other times rejected dominant cultural assumptions 
about the orderliness and “rational determinism” of life (Becker, 1997, p. 6, p. 65, p. 78). She 
concluded that although the discourse of “everything happens for a reason”—which can also be 
found in my participants’ narratives of young adult cancer—exerts both explanatory power and 
normalized pressure on individuals, people sometimes found this discourse oppressive, 
inadequate, or daft.  
It may be that meaning and being is neither culturally determined in full nor completely 
derived from individual agency or creativity (Becker, p. 123; Gendlin, p. 163-164; Jenkins and 
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Valiente, p. 169-170). There seems to be a process of negotiation and renegotiation between 
personal experiences, narratives, and varying cultural discourses, especially as circumstances and 
needs change, and as plot twists take people’s lives into new directions. This process of 
negotiation is possibly what Paul Ricoeur (1984) meant by “iconic augmentation,” where each 
and every narrative reconstructs reality, taking “presignified” narrative forms and drawing new 
meanings and new pathways into them, making them “oversignified” (p. 77-82). 
Indeed, it may be part of the human condition, as Jean-Paul Sartre (1960/1968) has 
defended, to continually engage in “mediations” between larger social and material forces, on the 
one hand, and local needs, desires, and strategies on the other (p. 58-60). Thinking of Sartre, 
Michael Jackson (2005) wrote that “Our humanness” is shaped by a dynamic between 
“circumstances over which we have little control” and “our capacity to live those circumstances 
in a variety of ways” (p. xi). The complexities of having cancer may be revealed in how people 
live with, through, and against the conditions of their existence.  
4. Conclusion: Seeking (Co)Existence 
In conclusion to this final section on discourses, it may be better to see biographical and 
existential challenges during cancer as intersubjective negotiations with dominant discourses, as 
illness is a liminal process that seems to hang definitive certainties in hiatus. These negotiations, 
according to Michael Jackson (2005) involve movement “between alternatives that promise more 
or less satisfactory solutions to the ever-changing situation at hand” (p. xii), all in the effort to 
create “viable forms of existence and coexistence in relation to the given potentialities of our 
environment” (p. xv). In this way, the spaces of experience and horizons of expectation people 
live within are constantly changing, expanding and contracting as people rework their 
boundaries. Looking at how meaning and being are negotiated with cultural discourses may 
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provide a glimpse into what ‘forms of (co)existence’ young adults see as ‘viable’ at a certain 
point in time. 
Chapter Conclusion: Iterative Theory and Understanding 
This chapter outlined the fundamental concepts and contexts within which my 
dissertation research was carried out. I have created a visual representation of how my theoretical 
concepts relate to one another (see Appendix A). Although I have laid the foundation, each of the 
following chapters expands upon or extends this foundation as it becomes pertinent. In the 
following two chapters, I operate within this basic framework in my evaluation of research 
literature on young adult cancer (ch. 2) and in my discussion of theoretical and methodological 
issues of representing illness experience in social scientific research (ch. 3). In the analytic 
chapters (chs. 4-7) I add extra concepts to my framework, highlighting how these extensions still 
fit within the larger set of interpretive tools.  
The overarching theme of this chapter was recognition of lived diversity among young 
adults with cancer (in response to Kairol Rosenthal’s plea for such), meanwhile attending to the 
various cultural and linguistic contexts out of which that diversity is born. Though young adults 
may be familiar with similar discourses about their illness, they may engage with those 
discourses in a multitude of ways, producing an array of narrative moments of meaning and 
moments of being. As with the theoretical concepts, I build upon and enrich my understanding 
of these processes as I enter into more specific debates and discourses. It seems to me this 
constant movement of my framework, this ongoing incorporation of new concepts, comes out of 
a parallel lack of stasis I found in the young adults’ narratives, where in order to go further into 
the rabbit holes of their experiences I had to do some of my own digging. 
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CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS AT STAKE IN YOUNG ADULT CANCER?      
 
Representations of Young Adulthood 
“The attempt to impose upon man, a creature of growth and capable of  
sweetness, to ooze juicily at the last round the bearded lips of God, to  
attempt to impose, I say, laws and conditions appropriate to a  
mechanical creation, against this I raise my sword-pen”  
—Anthony Burgess, A clockwork orange, p. 21 
Introduction 
The above statement starts a manuscript written by a minor character in Burgess’ (1962) 
dystopian novel. These few words encapsulate the book’s major theme, a debate between, on the 
one hand, ‘organic’ development or “growth” and, on the other, forced or “imposed” order 
(Dexter, 2008, p. 200-203). This issue revolves around the actions of adolescent Alex, Burgess’ 
sharply intelligent but sadistic anti-hero, who peruses the manuscript during a midnight raid on 
an isolated cottage, set in a future Britain. A bright and yet brutish young man, capable of a 
highly sophisticated level of thinking and scheming, Alex violated many preconceived ideas of 
adolescents as melodramatic and immature subjects.  
Later on in the story, Alex is arrested for a few of his many criminal acts of violence and 
put into an experimental trial, a Pavlovian procedure of building stimulus-response associations, 
meant to curb recidivism and ‘make’ him into a law-abiding citizen. Conditioned to recoil from 
violent actions Alex is released from prison, and is subsequently caught in a form of poetic 
justice whereby he helplessly suffers victimization from many of the people whom he had 
wronged. He ends up in the hospital where his conditioning wears off and, as Burgess wanted 
him, he is no longer confined by the “imposed” order.  
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But, Burgess’ desire for affirming free and uninterrupted development is betrayed by an 
ending to the story that seems positively deterministic. At age 18, Alex is overcome with a 
drastic, unexpected (for him and for his readers) personality shift; he is suddenly aware of the 
errors of his ways and decides to “get started on” a new “chapter beginning” (p. 148). He 
describes this new chapter as a powerful image, a nagging desire, a palpable future involving a 
wife, a son, and a home. He says to the reader, “I knew what was happening, O my brothers. I 
was like growing up” (p. 147).  
Reacting against Pavlov, Burgess seemed to evoke a quasi-Piagetian account of 
development: after being left alone to make mistakes for a while (and Alex indulges in incredibly 
severe errors of moral judgment) children will grow into a predictable and more mature 
understanding on their own. Despite his history of perverse desires and aggressive actions, and 
despite state interventions to change him, Alex arrives on his own at a straight-laced, 
mainstream, and suspiciously legal project for adulthood. This last chapter was such a stark 
contrast to the rest of the book’s tone, so difficult to believe, that in its first editions American 
publishers convinced Burgess to remove it (Dexter, 2008, p. 203). What Burgess saw as an acute 
exercise in free will, many of his audiences and critics perceived as an implausible self-
correction into conformity.  
 A clockwork orange is an example of the difficulties in constructing images of young 
adults as “creatures of growth” and not “mechanical creations.” Some account is needed of the 
social and historical contexts that surely influence young adults’ lives—Alex lived in a dystopian 
world full of corrupt officials and hostile revolutionaries—but to what extent do we include 
individual creativity, choice, and negotiation? Ironically, in his attempt to accentuate the latter, 
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Burgess fell into a common trope of young adult desires—marriage, children, and a home of 
one’s own—in tension with the liberties he took in depicting adolescent life.  
Similar struggles to understand young adulthood may be seen outside of fiction, in master 
narratives in academia, media, and public conversations. This chapter involves a critical review 
of some such discourses, in and outside of contexts of illness. I see myself as a less hyperbolic 
and grandiose version of the writer in A clockwork orange; I do not metaphorize my computer as 
a blade for cutting the hardened trunks of discourses, as though their bloomage has created an 
oppressive shadow from which we need to escape. However, my purpose here is to reveal how 
some discourses can portray young adulthood in a “mechanical” way as a collective body of 
subjects, minimizing diversity or variability while enhancing a sense of predictability and order. 
I juxtapose these images with my own understanding of young adulthood as negotiations of 
meaning and being within lived circumstances and narrative environments.  
Young adulthood is discursively constructed for the sake of some purposeful end. 
Burgess wanted to show that juvenile delinquents, even of the worst kind, may come into a 
maturity that aligns with societal norms and expectations. Many of the discourses I review below 
construct young adults for a similar purpose of explaining how they come to fill their ‘roles’ in 
society. The first part of this chapter places discourses about identity development and traditional 
markers of adulthood into some social and material contexts of young adult life in North 
America.  
 The second part of the chapter entails interrogation of oncological discourses about the 
challenges of possibly distinct biomedical characteristics and developmental tasks within young 
adult cancer patients. In my review and evaluation, I am participating in these precarious naming 
games and co-constituting the subjects of this research as young adults. Still, I try to withhold a 
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strong commitment to defining young adulthood, recognizing the flaws and aporias of such an 
endeavour. In sum, I suggest the presence of a normalizing ideology of young adulthood, one 
which intersects dominant discourses of narrative identity development and young adult 
oncology. The following literature review is restricted to representations of young adulthood and 
cancer, leaving discussion of the literature on illness narratives until after the chapter’s 
conclusion, where I make the case for a critical narrative program of study. 
Understanding Young Adulthood: Some Contextual Considerations 
Young Adulthood as Cultural Construction 
Young adulthood has not always been a familiar developmental reference in Western 
societies. According to young adult literary critic Michael Cart (2011), ‘young adulthood’ is a 
term only well known to North America over the last few generations: “until 1900 we were a 
society with only two categories of citizens: children and adults” (p. 4). With psychologist 
Stanley Hall’s position that there exists a third developmental category “adolescence,” the 20th 
century started to think differently about the life span (Cart, 2011, p. 4; Rogoff, 2003, p. 172). 
Believing that the transition from childhood to adulthood went beyond the teen years, later 
psychologists started to talk about other coming of age ‘stages,’ like “young adulthood” (e.g., 
Erikson, 1968) and, more recently, “emerging adulthood” (e.g., Arnett, 2000).  
While they initially may not have represented lived experiences, these discursive terms 
within academic have entered and continue to influence more public narratives, percolating 
personal and social imaginaries, shaping the way people think, experience, and act. In other 
words, they became reified, believed to be real and, in a way, took on a social reality in the 
effects they had on people’s lives. For example, as developmental psychologist Erica Burman 
(2008) has shown, these discursive constructs have been used dogmatically toward political ends, 
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such as deciding certain features of individual development as “normal” and others “abnormal,” 
naturalizing the distinctions between by appeal to ‘biological’ underpinnings, and reinforcing 
their ontological status through policies and regulations (p. 117).  
The discursive rise of ‘adolescence,’ and later ‘young adulthood,’ could be considered 
“cultural inventions” (Rogoff, 2003, 173) or ideological constructions in the sense that they 
developed out of interacting changes to social life and to cultural discourses of the time. For 
example, cultural psychologist Barbara Rogoff (2003) argued that adolescence may be a product 
of segregating youth from adults in North America by way of laws placing most children in 
schools and putting prohibitions on their work lives (p. 172). By analogy, what is referred to as 
‘young adulthood’ may have started to stand out as recent historical conditions such as widened 
access to post-secondary education and effective birth control methods extended typified 
narratives of coming of age (Arnett, 2011). I do not mean to deny that biology has a place within 
this representation, but rather argue, as developmental psychologist Michael Cole (2006) has, 
that it is interlinked with culture; following the schooling examples, Cole argued that formal 
education alone affects cognitive development in culturally specific ways, directing the courses 
of memory, reasoning, self-reflection, and so on (p. 655-660), all of which are utilized as people 
perceive and narrate their lives.  
It may be thus said that ‘young adulthood’ is not an inherent or biologically determined 
stage of life but a historical product of certain social, cultural, and economic shifts in industrial 
societies, and therefore, riding along the waves of societal change, may be interpreted and 
experienced in several ways. By extension, the ways in which the onset of illness may affect 
young adulthood may be countless. But, before we get there, we need a glance at some of the 
contemporary discourses of young adulthood surrounding a) narrative identity development, b) 
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social and material conditions of young adulthood, c) young adult meanings and ways of being, 
and d) emerging adulthood. I do not wish to present this as an essentializing survey of young 
adults nor as a desperate grasp at all the variables at play, but rather as a helpful backlight to 
illuminate some narrative, material, and practical environments that may shape lived experiences 
of those deemed young adults. 
1. Narrative Identity Development  
 ‘Young adulthood’ is a developmental term, pointing to a particular period of the life 
course. In trying to understand relevant contexts to young adult cancer, we cannot ignore what 
may be at stake in their development toward meaningful lives. One of the most important stakes 
in young adulthood is identity development. What that means can depend on who is asked. The 
well-known developmental psychologist Erik Erikson (1980) understood the development of 
identity as “a gradual integration of all identifications” (p. 95), that is, a synthesis of people’s 
conflicting desires, identities, and life experiences. Identity development is a large area of 
research and clinical interest. My interests lie in the smaller sub-field of narrative identity 
development, given my focus on narrative constructions of meaning and being.  
At the time of his writings, Erikson attributed identity development primarily to 
adolescence. His legacy was carried forward into narrative studies of development, including his 
assumptions about adolescent explorations (see e.g., Baddeley and Singer, 2007; McAdams and 
Logan, 2004). However, as noted above, discourses about transition into adulthood have changed 
in the last half-century, extending the interim period beyond the teens into the twenties and even 
the thirties (e.g., Arnett, 2011). Erikson (1980) himself recognized that the concerns of one 
developmental stage were not exclusive to it and could be found in other periods of the life 
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course. Thus, it seems some of the discourses around adolescent identity may be appropriately 
applied to young adulthood.  
Like Erikson, some narrativist camps construct identity development as a stage-like 
approach of appropriating myth, or larger cultural narratives, into one’s identity. For example, 
childhood is seen as a “pre-mythic” time of learning to apply narrative forms to personal stories, 
while adolescence and young adulthood are seen as “mythic” periods of authoring an identity 
parallel to cultural ideals (Randall and McKim, 2008, p. 65). Clinical psychologist Dan 
McAdams (1993) went so far as to argue, “making life into myth is what adulthood is all about” 
(p. 91). It is said that after such time emerges a “post-mythic” period of reflection on one’s 
legacy during aging, namely, whether or not one contributed to the preservation of cultural ideals 
(Randall and McKim, 2008, p. 65; see also Bruner, 1990, p. 80-87; McAdams, 1993, p. 67-110).  
Despite a laudable sensitivity within these camps to cultural influences on identity, there 
is often a surprisingly universalized and moralized stance toward adult identity development. It is 
from these assumptions, I argue, that an ideology of young adulthood has emerged. Two 
thematic prescriptions ring out from this perspective: narrative coherence and self-authorship1. 
To the first, stories are indicated as more “mature” if they attain standards of temporal, stylistic, 
causal, and thematic coherence (e.g., Baddeley and Singer, 2007; Habermas and Bluck, 2000; 
McLean and Pratt, 2006). McAdams (2013) asserted “continuity in experience,” a synthetic unity 
of selfhood, as a “developmental imperative” in adulthood (p. 152). These sentiments repeat 
Erikson’s (1980) prescriptive position on coherence, stating that “in their search for a new sense 
of continuity and sameness” some adolescents and young adults are “never ready to install 
lasting idols and ideals as guardians of a final identity” (p. 94; my emphasis). His comments are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Though not always coming to the same conclusions, my analysis is indebted to theorists who have critically and 
insightfully engaged with narrative coherence and authorship in philosophical contexts (e.g., Carr, 1985; Ricoeur, 
1984, p. 73-75, 1988, p. 169).  
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slightly pejorative toward less coherent identities, as failures to reach a finality or completion of 
self-searching.   
Ambiguity or instability of identity seems to be expected to eventually subside, 
regardless of individual circumstances or cultural values of coherence. Narrative order is put 
upon a pedestal of self-knowledge and sophisticated meanings, meanwhile enduring lapses of 
coherence are judged as bulwarks against future maturity. It seems quite doubtful and 
inconsistent to recognize cultural conditions in narrative constructions of identity, yet hold fast to 
standards void of contextual considerations. Other perspectives within the humanities and social 
sciences question both the general merits and the attainability of narrative coherence, arguing 
that it has become an ideological imperative that does violence to the fluidity of narrative selves 
and meanings (e.g., Heidt, 1991; Hyvarinen et al., 2010).  
Philosopher Galen Strawson (2004), for instance, criticized what he called the “ethical 
Narrativity thesis,” an arbitrary judgment that “diachronic” selves fitted to telling coherent 
narratives are inherently superior to more “episodic” selves with a weak or absent sense of a 
broader biography (p. 429-433). He defended more episodic selves as being non-pathological 
forms of living and understanding, sensitive to the vagaries of life and expediency of the present, 
and sometimes befitting many different life circumstances (e.g., feeling ill or in pain, carrying 
out quotidian tasks, telling about an isolated situation, etc.). Indeed, as I noted in the previous 
chapter, narrative identities may be seen as constructions more attuned to situational needs and 
practical concerns than to the task of synthesizing past, present, and future. It may be more 
appropriate in contexts of illness to minimize demands for a unified self and think of identity as 
more momentary occurrences—not because people with chronic illness cannot hope to tell 
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coherent stories, but because reader expectations for unity may be insensitive to the situational 
needs and wishes of those who speak about illness.  
Often appended to the favouritism of narrative coherence is a perplexing fixation upon 
self-authorship. For example, McAdams (2013) concluded that the task of younger adults is to 
“become the author of your life” (p. 151). In other words, adult identities are distinguishable 
from more ‘juvenile’ identities by being self-directed and self-defined. In illness or other 
disruptive moments of life, development is perceived as taking (narrative) control of a self-in-
crisis and recommitting to a unified identity (Mclean and Pratt, 2006; see also Marcia, 1973).  
There are built in cultural prescriptions to this second task, a soft imperialism implicit in 
both of McAdam’s imperatives. His assertions would not be in good company with more critical 
developmental psychologists, who may see these statements as ideological constructions made to 
be seen as ‘natural.’ For example, Erica Burman (2008) was critical of discourses that 
‘naturalized’ development as they often led to moral judgments about different developmental 
trajectories within or outside of a particular culture. She noted how, through selective 
observations, social scientists of the 19th and early 20th centuries imposed two Eurocentric 
associations between ontogenetic (i.e., individual) and phylogenetic (i.e., species) development: 
first, identifying European children with the ‘primitive’ peoples of the world, both alleged to be 
plagued by irrationality and magical thinking; and second, identifying European adults with the 
more ‘progressed’ Western cultures of individuality, independence, and reason (p. 13-15). Note 
the parallels between the alleged attributes of ‘developed’ individuals and societies, and the 
proposed features of ‘mature’ narratives within discourses of identity development. We are in 
danger of repeating the same mistaken generalizations of the past.  
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While I would not dispute that many younger people desire a sense of control, or at least 
a say, in where their lives are headed, it is not clear that this is always the case. To what extent 
does this make sense in situations of chronic illness where it has become quite apparent you are 
not driving your own life, or at least not the only hand on the wheel? Sometimes disruptive 
experiences elude our abilities to bestow meaning upon them, exposing what existentialist 
scholar Stuart Charme (1984) saw as the “difficulties inherent in the narrative recording of a 
person’s life” (p. 9; my emphasis). Do we simply diagnose illness narratives as pathological or 
developmentally stalled if they show control and authorship as contestable?  
Insistence upon self-authorship seems to discount the lack of certainty and control that 
becomes strongly apparent during serious illness. In a review of modern discourses sharing a 
“language of responsibility and free will” around illness and dying, historian Michael Ignatieff 
(1988) noted that they tend to lack a “vernacular of fate” (p. 32). He saw such discourses 
perpetuating assumptions that “we are the makers of our own lives” and can even be makers of 
our own health, ignoring that “chance and contingency and the dull determination of living all 
combine to push our lives into sequences we neither desire nor intend” (p. 33). Having advanced 
cancers in need of immediate medical intervention, submitting to agents other than oneself, and 
observing foreclosure of certain life possibilities, do not easily (or, perhaps, appropriately) lend 
themselves to narratives of self-determination. There may be other ideals toward which people 
strive in times of crisis, such as a ‘vernacular of fate’ or other displacement of control. 
Instead of measuring upon a moral scale whether narrative ‘agency’ is expressed within 
people’s stories, it may be more appropriate to evaluate what psychologist Jerome Bruner (1990) 
called “agentivity” (p. 118-119), the range of ways agents and actions may be constructed. This 
broader narrative concept recognizes that the extent of agency may, “as we know from studies of 
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‘locus of control,’ vary from person to person, and, as we know, vary with one’s felt position 
within the culture” (Bruner, p. 119). Specifically, people may see themselves as participants in 
the drama of illness and/or externalize agency to God, those delivering cancer treatments, 
sometimes cancer itself. Without making normative statements, we can come to appreciate how 
people distribute agency among the various perceived actors within their local social worlds.  
 There is also the issue of co-authorship. Our stories can surely be acts of self-authorship 
and self-affirmation, as argued by McAdams and others (e.g., Carr, 1986, p. 93-94; Frank, 1995, 
p. 7), but they are often not entirely our own. They are co-authored not only by chance and 
contingency but also by our social encounters and narrative environments (Rogoff, 2003, p. 50; 
Randall and McKim, 2008, p. 32). People who are ill, whether children or adults, co-construct 
their stories with family and friends, health care providers, others with the same illness, and so 
on. It seems rather suspicious to argue that people have full sovereignty over their narratives with 
these many external influences operating upon them.  
I am critical of the imperatives of narrative coherence and self-authorship, in particular 
how these constructions can constitute subjects as ‘disabled’ or ‘arrested’ or have ‘deficits.’ 
Anthropologists Ray McDermott and Herve Varenne (1996) described different cultural models 
of disability (or illness) and development, noting that the most frequent models equate 
development to ‘mastery’ of certain tasks—whether standardized tests like I.Q. exams or 
culturally relevant activities like being financially independent (p. 106-107). Discourses of 
narrative coherence and self-authorship repeat these ‘task-based’ models of achievement.  
Emerging critical models of development argue that by defining “what to aspire to and 
hope for” we are creating subjects who will be inevitably deemed inferior or disabled (p.108), we 
are projecting “irremediable distortions of the complex persons forced to live inside” these 
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definitions (p. 121). In other words, task-based discourses of development are “conventions at 
best and political fabrications at worst” (p. 109). McDermott’s and Varenne’s solution for doing 
developmental research, which I take up in my own, is to study “how members of a disabled 
minority make sense” as well as “showing how they could have been made to look so bad in the 
eyes of the community and, more importantly, how to change the world enough for them to look 
sometimes wonderful and sometimes not, just like everyone else” (p. 114). In sum, our work 
should buffer against cultural idealizations imposed on and juxtaposed with those who are ill. 
 Development is always a risky subject, no less so with identity development, as we may 
easily enter into moralized positions about what is ideal. The ideology of young adulthood, as I 
have called it, can have a ‘productive’ side in the sense of offering guidance to young adults in 
crisis, but it also contains ‘irremediable distortions’ of young adults’ lives that continue to haunt 
influential theories of adult development (e.g., Erikson, 1980; Havighurst, 1972; Lachman, 2004; 
Levinson, 1986). Among many young adults with cancer are expressions of alternative ways of 
being and of making sense of life (e.g., Rosenthal, 2009) that are in friction with the universalist 
claims of some developmental psychologists (e.g., Baddeley and Singer, 2007; Habermas and 
Bluck, 2000; McAdams, 2013). It seems dismissive to think of narratives lacking coherent and 
self-authoring themes as failures to follow an ‘external’ imperative that may not be relevant to 
the lives being told.  
I prefer to think about development in terms used by developmental psychologist Barbara 
Rogoff (2003) as “changing participation in sociocultural activities” (p. 50). Her definition lacks 
strong judgments about, for instance, where people’s identities go over the course of time. 
Instead of working with reified ideals of narrative development, I see a more fruitful task in 
observing how narratives mark changing participation, that is, how young adults’ stories engage 
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with, negotiate, and contribute to the narrative environments within which they are told. This 
approach recognizes the multiple ways in which individual stories validate and/or resist the 
allures of the above ideology. We need a suspension of judgment over the inherent value of 
narrative coherence and self-authorship, and instead respectfully listen to how young adult 
identities and agentivity are constructed within their own narratives. We may gain clues toward 
this end by looking at some of the significant conditions under which young adults lives are told. 
2. Some Social and Material Conditions  
Part of the work of understanding young adults’ identities is placing them within certain 
shared socio-historical circumstances of their construction. Sometimes people refer to a 
“generation” to denote a common response to shared conditions among an age group of a 
specific time period (see e.g., Savage, Collins-Mayo, Mayo, and Cray, 2006). Categorizing age 
cohorts into generations was popularized in the 20th century industrialized world, and broke 
down the century into the kickstarting GI Generation that lived through the First World War; the 
Silent Generation that suffered the traumas of the Great Depression and World War II; the post-
war Boomer Generation who found new prosperity and affluence, and used it to bring about a 
variety of countercultural and civil movements; and Generation X known for its “baby bust” and 
“accelerated culture” (Coupland, 1991; Savage et al., 2006; Young-Eisendrath, 2009).  
“Generation Y” is said to come on the heels of the new millennium, representing today’s 
young adults and carrying some important distinguishing characteristics from previous 
generations2. One of the most commonly reported observations is their peculiar upbringing. 
According to psychotherapist Polly Young-Eisendrath (2009), dominant North American 
parenting practices are typically preoccupied with fostering a form of self-confidence in children. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 As with the other generational labels, no real consistent year is used to delineate who is and is not a member of 
Generation Y. Sufficed to say that although the most commonly suggested generational starting line is in the 1980s, 
it seems to be quite arbitrary where the chalk is drawn.  
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This confidence is cultivated by a socialized belief in one’s superiority among peers and a 
dwelling attention on one’s self-image, in sum an intensely individualistic perception of reality 
(p. 21). Children are supposedly taught they can be anything and encouraged to see the future as 
limitless possibilities (Henig, 2010; Henig and Henig, 2012; Twenge, 2006; Young-Eisendrath, 
2009). Generation Y is sometimes given the alias “Generation Me” due to their allegedly 
incessant focus on themselves (Twenge, 2006; Young-Eisendrath, 2009, p. 47). This may be one 
way the myth of self-authorship is embodied in praxis.  
I am somewhat skeptical of the language of ‘generations,’ for two primary reasons: first, 
they tend to be created, used, and studied within North America specifically yet often uncritically 
applied across different regions of the world; second, they are meant to represent popular trends, 
attitudes, and practices, and thus rarely account for varying or alternative characteristics however 
common they may be. The first limitation is not a deal breaker since my research was carried out 
in Canada, but in combination with the second the term “Generation Y” comes close to losing 
sight of the complexity of young adult lives I have tried to bring to light.  
In terms of some of the material conditions young adults face today, some social 
scientists and journalists report that the current global recession economy and its effects on local 
economies has made it much more difficult to acquire financial stability and independence. 
Accounting for inflation, recent articles in the Globe and Mail, The Walrus, New York Times, 
and Maclean’s Magazine compared young adults of the new millennium and of the mid- to late-
20th century, and they found much higher tuition fees, higher mortgages, higher unemployment 
and lower minimum wages now than 30 years ago (Carrick, 2013; Coates, 2012; Henig, 2010; 
Lunau, 2012). Many teens are encouraged into “mass participation” of post-secondary education, 
creating a balloon of graduates unable to be fit into the available skilled positions (Coates, 2012). 
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The majority of university and college graduates today have too few employment opportunities 
and too high qualifications for the current job market (Coates, 2012; Lunau, 2012).  
All of this plays into the work trends of unemployment and underemployment, as well 
the home trends of struggling to maintain financial stability, paying off student loans and other 
debt, living longer with parents, and not having children until later, if at all. The conditions of 
wealth and labour may be further exacerbated when young adults fall ill, having a meager 
cushion of savings to support their time off work. Perhaps more importantly, those without jobs 
do not have employer-provided healthcare coverage and with a pre-existing condition like cancer 
may either be denied coverage or charged a high premium for it. Kairol Rosenthal (2009) notes 
that their financial lives are among the most at stake during and after treatment: “for many of us, 
cancer is not necessarily an open door on the future, but rather an extremely large financial 
question mark upon which our big dreams hinge” (p. 24). These stories of lower wealth may 
question the extent to which financial independence—one major aspect of self-authorship—is 
both attainable and relevant to young adulthood within current economic conditions.  
Another important material condition is the advancement of technology, especially media 
technology, and its permeation into everyday young adult life. According to research conducted 
by psychologists Rosen, Carrier, and Cheever (2010), the young adult demographic is to a large 
degree defined by its spike in media consumption and synaptic ties to the internet, hence the 
researchers’ references to the cohort as the “iGeneration” or “Net Generation.” They based their 
claims on surveys indicating that from morning to evening today’s youths are engaged with 
either computers, televisions, cell phones, media players, or video games (Rosen et al., 2010).  
Online interactions alone may have a crucial part to play in how young adults experience 
cancer, or any illness. ‘Google’ may be consulted before a physician is, prior to diagnosis as well 
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as during and after treatments. From their homes young adults have unprecedented access to 
medical information—reliable and not—and may research both conventional and non-
conventional treatments to inform their medical decisions. Furthermore, support groups, 
advocacy organizations, and online forums rely upon a strong internet presence for connecting 
young adult cancer patients with one another, including those in rural, remote, or small-scale 
communities who may never meet another younger patient locally. This unprecedented access to 
digital media may thus affect how young adults interpret themselves and tell their stories. 
3. Young Adult Meanings and Ways of Being 
The social and material conditions of their upbringing have likely shaped today’s young 
adults in complex ways, revealing historical changes in how young adulthood is understood and 
lived. Media technology, for instance, has played a crucial part in young adults’ exposure to what 
has been called a “globalized world” (Savage et al., 2006, p. 143); for example, the internet and 
television enable as never before cross-national interactions and cross-fertilization of cultural 
discourses across the world. Today’s young adults are exposed to both the diversity of voices 
within media outlets as well as the local social worlds of meanings and practices within which 
they live, and in response have created “bicultural” (or, perhaps, ‘polycultural’) identities within 
their multiple worlds and networks of interaction (Arnett, 2002). Thus, the processes of 
globalization may have multiplied the meanings and ways of being available to young adults. 
A deep ambivalence is said to reside in many young adults’ sense of self: they are seen as 
uncertain about their religious beliefs, dashed with bits of suspicion, indifference, and biases 
passed on from secular media portrayals of religion (Savage et al., 2006, p. 21); they may be 
caught between socialized expectations of limitless opportunities and unanticipated disruptive 
experiences, whether of illness, unemployment, poverty, social isolation, or rejection (Young-
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Eisendrath, 2009, p. 21); and they may be lost in explorations of their identities for longer 
periods of time than earlier generations (Arnett, 2011; Henig, 2010; Savage et al., 2006, p. 153).  
It is sometimes said we are in an “age of anxiety and depression” (Twenge, 2006) striving 
for a better “age of self-confidence” (Young-Eisendrath, 2009). Psychologist Sara Savage and 
colleagues (2006) tried to put these tensions into an existential framework through what they saw 
as the most common stories young adults tell about themselves. Young adults’ so-called “happy 
midi-narratives” expressed ambivalence yet optimism about the future, and conceived of a local, 
small-scale (i.e., “midi”) world centred around an individualized self and reflective of 
postmodern aversions to larger, “meta” narratives (p. 37-39). I perceive these observations as 
signs of dominant discourses that are entering into and being perpetuated by young adults’ 
narratives; that is, instead of revealing the zeitgeist of the current generation, these studies mark 
recent shifts in how young adulthood is formulated through dialogue between dominant 
discourses (e.g., of self-esteem, choice, and positive thinking) and individual narratives.  
 Correlatively, there are significant changes in young adults’ praxes, possibly related to 
current conditions of young adult life in North America. Developmental psychologist James 
Marcia (1973), for instance, observed that adolescence and young adulthood are often times of 
“moratoria,” liminal times of exploring different ways of being before settling on a matured 
identity marking a particular path for the rest of life. Among many notable hiatuses taken during 
this time are ‘delays’ or departures from what is called the “traditional cycle,” or “traditional 
milestones,” of adulthood in modernity: graduate from post-secondary education, leave home to 
purchase one’s own, develop a stable career, acquire a spouse, and produce a family (Carrick, 
2013; Henig, 2010; Henig and Henig, 2012; Savage et al., 2006, p. 4). This ‘traditional’ course 
reflects the ideology of young adulthood in its emphasis on integration and independence. 
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Although these horizons of expectation still hold sway and can be seen in their “midi-
narratives,” many young adults are in all sorts of ways breaking with tradition—or, “not growing 
up,” according to critics of this social change (see e.g., Henig, 2010). Recent statistics in North 
America show that around one half of women and one third of men had gone through the 
traditional cycle by the time they were thirty, compared to 1960 when the rate was closer to two-
thirds for both genders (Henig, 2010). Forty percent of young adults move back home in their 
twenties—usually for financial reasons—hence the attribution “boomerang kids” (Carrick, 2013; 
Henig, 2010). With the popularity of premarital sex and birth control, both teen moms and 
voluntarily childless couples are more common now (Henig, 2010). Careers are not leaving the 
ground quite as early and may switch directions more than once before even taking off (Coates, 
2012). These and other emerging trends suggest an ambiguous trajectory or perhaps, according 
to sociologist Frank Furstenberg (2010), even a “new timetable for growing up” (p. 80).  
Some of the noted historical changes may be partly due to the social and material 
conditions of young adulthood today. Moratoria may be, on the one hand, uninvited liminality 
brought on by economically hard times and multiplying discourses about life’s options and 
choices; yet, on the other hand, there may be culturally supported liminalities, spaces of 
experience and horizons of expectation socially constructed as temporary escapes and adventures 
from responsibilities3. Parental permission to stay at home into one’s thirties, governmental loans 
and support for undergraduate and graduate education, growing acceptability of spouses who 
wait to have children, and many other practices point to this possibility. What we may be seeing, 
at least in their current incarnations, is a mix of chosen and involuntary suspensions of meaning 
and being among today’s young adults.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 While I am restricting my focus to North American young adults, these moratoria are widely sanctioned in other 
upper- and middle-income countries, and even among wealthier classes in low-income countries throughout the 
globe (Arnett, 2011).  
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Though not exhaustive, this review outlines some of the life circumstances that young 
adults may carry with them into lived experiences of illness. We see that in many aspects of 
home and work lives young adults may be ‘in-between’ different narrative environments. They 
are in dialogue with a multiplicity of discourses, local and global, which may influence their own 
worldviews and practices. Savage and colleagues (2006) referred to young adults of the present 
as a “hinge generation,” raised within specific community traditions aspiring to a particular 
social order as well as participating in emerging and diverse global traditions through 
informational and social media (p. 150). While I am critical of referring to young adults as a 
cohesive ‘generation,’ this is a helpful metaphor for imagining young adults as pins wedged 
within local social frames of meaning and being, yet linked to gateways into new narrative 
environments and spaces of experience. Deviations from ‘traditional’ markers not only signify 
fluctuating master narratives but also shifting lived practices of young adulthood. 
4. Emerging Adults? 
 Within psychology, the term “emerging adulthood” is being used more frequently to 
denote people in their late teens and twenties who are ‘in-between’ adolescence and young 
adulthood (Arnett, 2000)—an interim period marked by prolonged periods of familial 
dependence, self-searching, and bachelorhood. Psychologist Jeffrey Arnett (2011), who coined 
the term, defined emerging adulthood as “the” age of possibilities, of identity explorations, of 
unstable home and work lives, and of absent responsibilities and social control.   
‘Emerging adulthood’ may be an apt concept for talking about young adult cancer 
patients, who often have to move back home, rely on parental care and finances, and reevaluate 
their assumptions of self and life (D’Agostino, Penney, and Zebrack, 2011). However, there are 
reasons to object to this concept as well. First, Arnett studies a much more narrow age group (18-
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29) than I studied in my research (18-45)4, based on his ideas about the duration of this liminal 
stage. More fundamentally, the people I interviewed had varied significantly according to 
whether they even satisfied Arnett’s criteria for emerging adults—including those within the 
defined age range. Conceptions of ‘emerging adulthood’ have been criticized as an image of 
White, privileged young adults who do not suffer many of the limitations to their possibilities 
imposed by illness, disability, sexism, racism, or poverty (see e.g., Henig, 2010). Arnett (2011) 
himself admitted to the limited applicability of his theory. 
A related concern is with the relation of ‘emerging adulthood’ to cultural discourses. 
Arnett (2011) claimed that this life stage marks a “nadir of social and institutional control” (p. 
266), which is a very peculiar statement within a chapter about the sanctioning of moratoria 
across different cultural contexts. Local social permission and endorsement of emerging 
adulthood is a form of social influence, and is subject to ideological use as with the case of 
adolescence. Nevertheless, if Arnett understands the term as such then it may be inappropriate 
for me to use it. In addition, ‘emerging adulthood’ has not been commonly put to use in 
dominant oncological discourses. ‘Young adulthood’ continues to be the preferred term; many 
patients, doctors, and families participating in these discourses refer to young adulthood as a 
distinct biomedically and psychosocially relevant category. Thus, it seems fitting to operate 
within the discursive concept more familiar to the social actors involved.  
5. Conclusion: Approximations of Young Adulthood 
I am cautious about using the above terminologies, notwithstanding possibly shared 
narrative and lived experiences among young adults. ‘Emerging adulthood’ seems to be a useful 
term but one rarely used in oncological settings or in reference or discursive constructions of 
self. ‘Generation Y’ places today’s young adults into social context, but does not seem to balance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 I make the case for my chosen age range in the following section. 
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its macro focus with attention to local social worlds of meaning and being. Despite their 
limitations, these terms inform us of some current spaces of experiences and horizons of 
expectation: both sanctioned and unwanted moratoria, the impact of globalizing technologies, 
and deviations from traditional milestones. Consideration of these historical realities brings to 
light the contexts and limits of the ideology of young adulthood, which seems to overlook them.  
‘Young adulthood’ is itself a problematic term, lumping together people from many 
different walks of life into a collective; however, it is useful to the extent of establishing 
approximations of some social and material conditions that today’s younger populations 
encounter. Among the different ways I could refer to the population of interest to me, I chose 
‘young adulthood’ as a familiar yet relatively loose term to be employed without as high a risk of 
constructing homogenous subjects. The above review is the basis for my evaluation of young 
adult oncology (especially psychosocial discourses) in the following section. 
Oncological Discourses of Young Adulthood 
Introduction and National Contexts 
 Among other contexts such as gender (e.g., Seale, 2002; Sormanti, 2010) and 
socioeconomic status (e.g., Williams, 2004), age is gaining increasing attention within 
oncological research and clinical settings. For instance, in their work with aging cancer patients, 
Blank and Bellizzi (2008) called for a “marriage of the gerontologic and oncologic perspectives” 
(p. 2574) in order to properly understand and care for the distinct difficulties cancer patients face 
as they grow older. A similar call has recently been issued for young adults with cancer in 
pockets of North American oncological discourses (e.g., D’Agostino et al., 2011; Pritchard, 
Cuvulier, Harlos, and Barr, 2011; Zebrack, 2011).  
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Many of the discourses advocating for young adult cancer care say that, compared to 
other age groups, young adults are relatively invisible, ignored, and overlooked within 
oncological institutions and research (Barr, Rogers, and Schacter, 2011; CCS, 2009; CPAC, 
2010; Sutcliffe, 2011). Many cancer centres (or wards) in Canada and abroad have specialists 
trained in more established sub-fields of pediatric or geriatric medicine, while very few have 
training specifically for adolescent and young adult (“AYA”) oncology (Barr et al., 2011; 
Nathan, Hayes-Lattin, Sisler, and Hudson, 2011; Ramphal, Meyer, Schacter, Rogers, and 
Pinkerton, 2011). For example, while there are sixteen pediatric oncology and hematology 
centres across Canada, there are only two young adult cancer centres (CIHR, 2009)5.  
Pediatric oncologist Ronald Barr (2011a) has written, “The needs of AYA with cancer 
are poorly met by the conventional dichotomy of the pediatric and adult health care systems” (p. 
2239). Young adults who do not have access to the few facilities or experts may go to either an 
adult or a pediatric cancer centre for treatment depending on their age, type of cancer, and 
geographical location (Nathan et al., 2011). Treatment outcomes for young adults are believed to 
suffer as a result of too few specialists and specialized centres in Canada (Tonorezos and 
Oeffinger, 2011). This relative absence carries on south of the border as well; Kairol Rosenthal 
(2009) observed that “out of 13,000 practicing oncologists in the United States, a scant handful 
focus exclusively on young adult oncology. The majority of our doctors have zero expertise with 
the physiology of young adult cancer patients” (p. 139). 
Furthermore, young adult cancer is seen as poorly represented in oncological research. 
Pediatric, adolescent, and young adult cancer research (across biomedical and psychosocial 
disciplines) shares a mere $4 million provided each year by the Canadian Institute of Health !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 They are the Adolescent and Young Adult Oncology Program housed within Montreal’s Segal Cancer Centre, 
Jewish General Hospital, and Toronto’s PYNK Breast Cancer Program for Young Women at the Odette Cancer 
Centre, Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre.  
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Research, making up approximately 50% of the funding provided for young adult cancer 
research in Canada (CIHR, 2009). Some governmental, community, and research bodies have 
called for better categorization, research, advocacy and surveillance of young adult cancers, like 
CIHR (2009) and the Canadian Cancer Society (CCS, 2009). Two organizations committed to 
improving AYA outcomes—the Canadian Partnership Against Cancer and C17—tried to bring 
more light to the issue by creating a national task force for pediatric, adolescent, and young adult 
patients, composed of researchers, patients, policy makers, and health practitioners. Much of the 
published research on AYA cancer came out of the meetings recently held by the task force (e.g., 
Barr et al., 2011, 2011b; Nathan et al., 2011; Zebrack, 2011). 
National attention to young adult (and adolescent) cancer has caught on quicker in some 
countries than others. The British advocacy group Teenage Cancer Trust began in the early 
1990s pushing for improved medical care; in the United States LiveStrong (Lance Armstrong’s 
foundation) created a Young Adult Alliance in 2006. Widespread concern regarding young adult 
cancer has only quite recently become part of the national landscape of major oncological 
discourses in Canada (and, even now, it is still somewhat on the fringes)6. This may be due to the 
fact that young adult cancers (using a 20-44 age range) make up only 6% (men) and 11% 
(women) of cancers diagnosed in people ages 20 and over (CCS, 2006).  
 Due to select leading governmental and non-governmental organizations, conversations 
and ‘awareness’ are growing relatively quickly in the public sphere. The first organization in the 
country to engage in distinguishing and advocating for young adults was Young Adult Cancer 
Canada (formerly RealTime Cancer), a not-for-profit group founded in 2000 by cancer survivor 
Geoff Eaton. A few years later, health researchers as well as larger health organizations began to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Almost nothing had been published on AYA oncology until the 21st century, with some exceptions specific to 
adolescent cancer (e.g., see Ettinger and Heiney, 1993; Kellerman and Katz, 1977; List et al., 1991; Struber and 
Kazak, 1999) and young adult cancer (e.g., see Roberts et al., 1997; Rowland, 1990). 
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publish reports and release news on young adult cancer, including community organizations such 
as the Canadian Cancer Society (2006, 2009, 2012) and the Canadian Partnership Against 
Cancer (2010, 2011), and governmental organizations such as the Canadian Institutes of Health 
Research (2009). The awareness produced by these discourses has enabled the development of 
research programs, support services, and targeted clinical trials for many young adults with 
cancer.  
The benefits or ‘productivity’ of emerging discourses on young adult cancer cannot be 
understated, yet they are not without their limitations. In the process of constituting ‘young 
adults’ as a cohesive group, oncological discourses have constructed subjects of questionable 
characteristics and desires. In particular, biomedical statistics and developmentalist narratives 
have been used to differentiate young adults from other patients in some dubious ways. To be 
fair, all discourses have a potential element of partiality and failure to them—they have both 
enabling and disabling effects—but because in a given cultural context few discourses dominate 
and many remain marginal, the resulting spaces of experience and horizons of expectation are 
always constrained (Ricoeur, 1985, p. 208-209).  
The point of my critique is to not to strip credence from discourses about shared cancer 
experiences, but to enable multiple voices to have their say in what meanings and ways of being 
are available to young adult cancer patients. I aim to problematize—not refute—dominant 
discursive constructions of young adults with cancer, with the purpose of distancing them from 
‘natural attitudes.’ Participating in alternative or marginal discourses, I try to disrupt some taken-
for-granted assumptions about the lived experiences and primary stakes of young adults living 
with chronic illness. In addition, I have two constructive goals in mind in my critique of 
dominant illness discourses. The first is to show how young adult cancer is commonly 
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constructed or performed, which is a crucial background to how the young adults in this study 
interpreted themselves. Second, I hope to reveal and reopen life paths that dominant discourses 
may be censuring, discouraging, or covering up. Within this critical space I propose a narrative 
approach to studying young adult cancer.  
I concern myself primarily with the research literature within oncology—despite the 
possibility that the majority of healthcare practitioners might not follow this research. My 
concern stems from the potential impact that dominant representations may have on care policy 
and practice. Some distresses borne by patients and their families may be created or exacerbated 
by healthcare practices that follow from unquestioned assumptions.  
With that point in mind, my evaluation does not place responsibility solely upon 
healthcare researchers and practitioners. Discourses around young adulthood are neither formed 
just by researchers and clinicians nor do they serve as purely academic or professional matters; 
they also grow out of the voices of patients, their families, and other stakeholders who tell their 
stories in online videos, advocacy pamphlets, published texts, and interactions with their 
caregivers, researchers, etc. My critique is of certain dominant representations within young 
adult oncology regardless of who is perpetuating them, in recognition that patient narratives—as 
participants in discourses—may contribute to ideological or politicized claims about suffering 
and meaning (see e.g., Smith, 1993).  
I appreciate that many benevolent intentions lie behind these discourses, such as raising 
awareness of young adult cancers, isolating the distinct concerns of young adults, and convincing 
others that young adults need better care. In order to achieve these goals, many articles pitch to 
their audiences of practitioners and policymakers that there exist widespread ‘problems’ with 
young adults and broadly applicable ‘solutions.’ Yet, some of the proposed reforms risk doing 
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violence to the very people they are meant to serve, much in the same way that cohesive self-
stories may do violence to chaotic or disjointed experiences (e.g., Heidt, 1991; Rimmon-Kenan, 
2002). In their efforts to constitute the group ‘young adult cancer patients,’ they may conceal, 
marginalize, or foreclose the multiple meanings and ways of being that make up the complex 
lives of today’s young adults.  
Within my review I discuss two sets of dominant discourses: a) biomedical discourses 
regarding the biomedical distinctiveness of young adult cancer; b) psychosocial discourses 
concerned with age-specific developmental issues. For my purposes here, I critically study the 
rhetorical side of these discourses, the strategic/selective uses of research knowledge toward 
particular (though often implicit) practical ends, and the limitations they impose on 
understanding young adult cancer. I conclude from these evaluations that a critical narrative 
program of research may provide complementary and informative images of young adulthood. 
A) Dominant Biomedical Discourses 
I begin my evaluation with biomedical discourses of young adult cancer. Below I discuss 
four common ways in which young adult cancers are constructed as distinct from the cancers of 
younger and older people: first, by way of age-specific definitions of young adulthood; second, 
through identifying biomedical distinctions; third, by employing enflamed incidence and 
mortality rates; and fourth, with proposals for more biomedical research to justify their rhetoric. 
As I engage each discourse I critically evaluate the logic and intentions behind such 
representations.  
1. Age-specific Definitions of Young Adulthood 
 The majority of attempts at defining young adulthood use chronological age as an 
appropriate signifier of young adult status (instead of, for example, psychosocial markers, 
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patients’ self-definitions, cultural rites of passage, etc.). With that signifier a vast array of 
definitions scatters across different research publications, including those by the same authors. 
Cancer Care Ontario (2006), the first Canadian-funded, non-for-profit organization to issue a 
publication specifically on young adult cancer, defined young adulthood as 20-44 years old. 
They cited a gendered rationale for this choice: “It stretches from ‘adolescence’ (generally 
defined as ages 15–19) to the time of life around which, in women, menopause induces quite 
marked changes in the cancer profile” (p. 6). No other publication has since reiterated those same 
parameters, suggesting it has fallen out of vogue. Among a small sample, the numbers have 
varied from 15-39 (Odo and Potter, 2009), 18-35 (Snobohm, Friedrichsen, and Heiwe, 2010), 21-
45 (Clausen, 2010), 22-35 (Roberts, Severinsen, Carraway, Clark, Freeman, and Daniel, 1997), 
to 31-47 (Dunn and Steginga, 2000).  
There are a number of complications to setting out a hard and fast age range. First of all, 
the relevance of age varies depending on the type of cancer; for instance, lymphomas are most 
common in 15-19 year olds, while breast and colorectal carcinomas are more common among 
people 20-29 years of age (Bleyer, Barr, Hayes-Lattin, Thomas, Ellis, and Anderson, 2008). The 
characteristics of young adulthood are further obscured by the fact that the category is frequently 
expanded to include adolescence, breeding the acronym “AYA” now used in reference to 
patients who are deemed to be neither full-fledged adults nor children. The CCS (2009, 2012), 
for example, used a range of 15-29 years old when they incorporated adolescents into their 
categorization.  
The Canadian Partnership Against Cancer (2011) adopted this updated AYA definition, 
but other researchers7 who write of AYA cancer provide conflicting ranges of 11-22 (Decker, 
Hasse, and Bell, 2007), 13-21 (Kameny and Bearison, 2002), 14-25 (Grinyer, 2009), 15-25 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 This list includes research from both Canada and the United States. 
 ! 84 
(Grinyer, 2007), 15-39 (Bleyer et al., 2008), 16-22 (Kyngas et al., 2000), 16-30 (Crawshaw, 
Glaser, Hale, and Sloper, 2009), 18-25 (Grinyer and Thomas, 2004), and 18-40 (Zebrack, 2008). 
A 2011 special supplement to an issue of the journal Cancer—run by the American Cancer 
Society—published a series of articles from participants of an AYA cancer workshop in Toronto, 
and even among them were incongruent definitions stretching from 15-25, 15-29, to 18-35 years 
of age (e.g., D’Agostino et al., 2011; Pritchard et al., 2011; Zebrack, 2011).  
 The purpose of laying out this range of age ranges is to show that defining young 
adulthood is an imprecise, inconsistent, and controversial venture. On the one hand, many of 
these parameters seem arbitrarily restrictive, with no obvious reasoning behind them. On the 
other hand, one may be remiss to take a more inclusive approach; adopting the lowest and 
highest ages suggested, one would lump 11-year-old elementary students together with 47-year-
old workers, possibly with grandchildren, into the same ‘group.’  
Nevertheless, we must start from somewhere. Setting out a framework at least allows us to make 
comparisons and contrasts. It may just be that in the process we discover the flaws in our own 
design, but in order to get there we need to take a bit of a leap. The leap taken for my study was 
for a wide range between 18-45 years of age—not an impeccable choice by any stretch, but a 
relatively inclusive range enabling people across three decades to demonstrate their 
commonalities and differences. This decision was influenced by some of the institutional 
discourses my supervisor and I were involved with when we sought research funding. When Dr. 
Teucher developed a grant proposal for the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council in 
2008, the differentiation of adult cancer patients into three age groups of 18-45 ("young adults"), 
45-65 ("middle age"), and 65 and above ("aging") was not uncommon and seemed as useful as 
well as problematic as any other. At that time, generally only quantitative research had been 
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done with young cancer patients but hardly any qualitative research and Dr. Teucher was 
successful in receiving tri-council funding for this project. My supervisor and I continue to have 
our suspicions and hesitations in adopting this age-related framework of 18-45 and I have 
laboured above to show that no age range, including our own, is without its limitations.     
The Canadian Institutes of Health Research—another influential Canadian governmental 
organization participating in these discourses—summarily articulated the challenges of setting 
down a firm definition. In a 2009 conference report on the aforesaid AYA workshop, which was 
funded by CIHR, they expressed reluctance in playing this guessing game: 
Although it is generally accepted that the pediatric age range is 0 to 14, and that 
adolescents range from 15 to 19 years of age, the definition of a ‘young adult’ has less 
clarity, particularly at the upper limit - ranging from 29 to 39. It is recognized that not 
only do individuals have very different clinical, developmental and psychosocial needs 
that are often age-related but that the incidence and biology of the tumours and the 
expected clinical outcomes also differ significantly with age at diagnosis. Meeting 
participants felt that it would therefore be appropriate, rather than set a fixed upper limit 
in the young adult age range, to base the definition on the incidence and specific biology 
of the tumour under study and the needs of the patient both at the time of diagnosis and 
going forward after treatment (p. 8). 
 
In the absence of a “fixed” age-related signifier of young adulthood, the task force proposed 
biological markers and incidence rates to distinguish young adult tumours from those of other 
age groups. It is to these two other signifiers and their limitations we shall now turn. 
2. Biological Markers  
 In terms of arguments from physiology, young adults are often portrayed, sometimes with 
adolescents (abbreviated as AYAs), as having a distinct set of common cancers during this time 
of life (Bleyer et al., 2008; CCS, 2009; CPAC, 2011; McGoldrick, Gordon, Whiteson, Adams, 
Rogers, and Sutcliffe, 2011; Tonorezos and Oeffinger, 2011). 90% of all cases of cancer in 
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adolescence and young adulthood are represented by just ten of the 200+ forms of cancer8; some 
cancers occur at their highest rates in young adulthood, including Hodgkin’s lymphoma, 
testicular cancer, Kaposi sarcoma, and others (Bleyer et al., 2008). It is also argued that there are 
possible differences in the genetics, epigenetics, physiology, and pharmacology of the same type 
of cancer between ‘AYA’ patients and people in different age groups; for instance, hormonal 
differences as a result of age and genetics are suspected to create cancer with distinct behaviours, 
including rates of acceleration, symptoms or expressions, and responses to treatment (Bleyer et 
al., 2008; CCS, 2009; CIHR, 2009; CPAC, 2010).  
 Young adults have been described as a “crossover” age group according to the types of 
cancers that are common to them (CCS, 2006). About 85-90% of cancer in later adulthood are 
epithelial9 cancers, that is, carcinomas of the skin tissues or tissues lining organs and cavities 
(Bleyer et al., 2008; CCS, 2006)10. On the other end, about 90% of cancers in youth (from birth 
to adolescence) are classified in pediatric oncology as non-epithelial cancers, that is, sarcomas of 
the connective tissues (i.e., bone, muscle, cartilage), gliomas of the neural tissues, lymphomas of 
the lymph tissues, or leukemias of the blood tissues (Bleyer et al., 2008; CCS, 2006). In contrast 
to both age groups, 37% of young adult cancers are epithelial while 47% are non-epithelial, 
signifying a transitional phase during which certain bodily tissues become more vulnerable to 
cancer while others less so (CCS, 2006).  
 This “crossover” image of young adult cancer can be misleading. Non-epithelial cancers 
are said to make up 64% of male young adult cancers while comprising only 25% of female 
young adult cancers, and while in all other age groups men have higher rates of cancer, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!These are breast cancers, lymphomas, melanomas, ovarian and cervical cancers, thyroid carcinomas, sarcomas, 
testicular cancers, colorectal carcinomas, leukaemias and brain tumours (Bleyer et al., 2008).!
9 Epithelium is the form of tissue that lines cavities, makes up glands, and coats the surface of many bodily 
structures.  
10 Carcinomas are the most common type of cancerous growth (Alschuler and Gazella, 2010, p. 4).!
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reverse is true in young adulthood (CCS, 2006). Beyond that, age-specific incidence rates 
accelerate much more for women across young adulthood, so that in their 40s women have 
nearly double the rate to men: 118 vs. 224 cases per 100, 000 (CCS, 2006). Thus, there are 
gender and age differences that complicate the above perceptions of young adult cancer, with a 
disproportionate number of women relating more to the carcinomas of older cancer patients and, 
in turn, altering the scales to appear more balanced between epithelial and non-epithelial 
malignancies.  
Even though a number of relevant distinctions seem to vary by type of cancer, age within 
young adulthood, gender and individual patient biology, common conclusions are that “AYA 
oncology would benefit from the creation of its own classification system” (Bleyer et al., 2008, 
p. 297). Accounting for differences that go well beyond physiology, we have a less cohesive 
image of young adult cancers, one that is ‘decentered,’ scattered by qualifier after qualifier, 
weakening the case for a “distinctive biology” (Bleyer et al., 2008). This criticism moves us 
away from an essentialized image of young adult cancers. We find similar difficulties when we 
look to incidence and mortality rates.   
3. Incidence and Mortality Rates 
 Other statistical measures have been used to spot young adults from the crowd, perhaps 
the most notable being disconcerting incidence rates and outcomes. Most forms of young adult 
cancer are claimed to have risen in incidence over the last couple of decades (CCS, 2006, 2012; 
CPAC, 2010). Young adults have allegedly also seen less improvement in the five-year survival 
ratio than children and older adults, and death rates are seen as particularly high for some non-
epithelial cancers such as leukemias, gliomas, and non-Hodgkin’s lymphomas (Barr, 2011; 
Bleyer et al., 2008; CPAC, 2010; McGoldrick et al., 2011). Looking more broadly, cancer is the 
 ! 88 
second leading cause of death for young adult women and the third leading cause for young adult 
men (ages 15-35), alongside accidents and suicide (Statistics Canada, 2009).  
 Discourses around the ‘crisis’ of young adult cancer are sometimes balanced by more 
hopeful discourses about the effectiveness of modern medicine in improving outcomes. Often, a 
selective presentation of statistics is involved in order to shift the discourses one way or another. 
Extending the upper limit of young adulthood from 29 to 39 years of age, for example, actually 
doubles the incidence rate for the AYA group (Barr, 2011). On the other hand, if one excludes 
female epithelial cancers from the analysis, overall young adult cancer rates seem to have 
actually decreased (CCS, 2009)—just as the “crossover” principle is not so obvious when 
accounting for gender and age differences in typology. In addition, despite slower advances than 
other age groups, young adult mortality has also decreased over the last couple decades (CIHR, 
2009; CCS, 2006), improving the five-year survival ratio from 80 to 85% (Barr, 2011; CPAC, 
2010; Nathan et al., 2011). Of course, broken down further the image is more complex; though 
young adults die more often from some kinds of cancer over others, in the case of melanoma 
they die less often than younger or older patients (Bleyer et al., 2008). 
 We see here that incidence and outcome statistics can be and have been used to either: a) 
enhance the perceived plight of young adults, thereby rallying support for funding, research, and 
interventions; or b) enhance the perceived advances of medical interventions, thereby protecting 
or even inflating the image of biomedicine as a “cure-promising authority” (Rimmon-Kenan, 
2002, p. 22). Often statistics are used in oncology—incidence and mortality rates as well as 
survival ratios—to construct a palpable image of cancer, functioning as a “technology of 
presencing” according to medical anthropologist Sarah Lochlann Jain (2007, p. 78). As an 
ideological construct, they are deceptively certain in their representations and yet “bloodlessly 
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vague” about the present and future (Jain, p. 78): Are the circumstances for young adults getting 
better or worse? Are current medical practices failing them or saving them? This ambiguity 
affords the use (or abuse) of statistics toward contradictory arguments. We may conclude from 
this that using medical statistics to justify the reification of ‘young adult cancer’ is, at the very 
least, an equivocal attempt to illuminate the extent and severity of the disease in this age group.  
4. Biomedical Proposals 
Despite their assurances of young adult distinctiveness, oncological discourses around 
young adult cancer sometimes admit that little is known about their cancers in terms of genetic 
and environmental origins, long-term effects of treatment, and possible trends in incidence (CCS, 
2006). Two major areas are seen as needing more research: a heavily biomedical agenda of 
improving survival and a predominantly psychosocial agenda of enhancing quality of life (Barr 
et al., 2011; CIHR, 2009). Some may see these two lines of inquiry as complementary, and 
together holding potential for an integrative approach to illness; however, they are treated 
hierarchically with biomedical research on cancer treatments receiving priority over psychosocial 
studies on cancer support (Barr, 2011; CIHR, 2009)11. Tonorezos and Oeffinger (2011) wrote 
that, “of primary importance in AYA cancer survivor research is the ongoing effort to improve 
cancer outcomes in this age group” (p. 2298). The chosen commitments are defended by appeal 
to the incidence and mortality rates of young adults—statistics, I have already noted, that are 
strategically modified and crafted to this purpose.  
As laudable as these directives are (and I will not deny their importance), there is an 
underlying problem with the proposed course of action. With so many young adults and people 
of other age groups surviving cancer (from 45% to 90% rates for the most common cancers), !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 While nobody is necessarily stopping psychosocial research from happening, because the single most contributing 
organization to financing this area of research, CIHR, has indicated its preference for biomedical research, there are 
few financial opportunities and incentives to pursue it.  
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long-term issues of survivorship seem to be more and more prevalent. Among those issues are 
emotional, social, existential, and economic challenges (McGoldrick et al., 2011; Tonorezos and 
Oeffinger, 2011; Zebrack, 2011). Perhaps, then, the stakes should not be monopolized by one 
particular research agenda, which defines in a limited way what concerns young adults most.  
The primary objectives of AYA research seem to be directed toward a medical “telos of 
cure” (Frank, 1995, p. 83), which concerns itself narrowly with removing disease. With this lens, 
it is easy to engage in what I referred to in the last chapter as medical Cartesianism, a 
problematic bifurcation of person and disease, restricting focus to medically objectified young 
adult bodies and bracketing out their subjectively lived bodies within local social worlds. In sum, 
care for the multifaceted life challenges faced by young adults may be forsaken in efforts to treat 
their physiological problems. 
Survival is no doubt of great significance to the majority of young adults, but is it the 
only, or even primary, issue at stake? Social researchers Kleinman and Kleinman (1991) argued 
that, “While preservation of life, aspiration, prestige, and the like may be shared structures of 
relevance for human conditions across societies, that which is at stake in daily situations differs 
(often dramatically) owing to cultural elaboration, personal idiosyncracy, historical 
particularities, and the specifics of the situation. What is at stake in life settings, then, is usually 
contested and indeterminate” (p. 277). Given the limited research and understanding of young 
adult cancer, it seems we need better understanding of the stakes in young adult cancer before 
committing selectively to one particular agenda.  
5. Conclusion: Creating a Critical Distance from Biomedical Rhetoric   
 Within this first part on dominant oncological discourses, young adults are constructed in 
terms of their age, tumour biology, incidence rates and mortality/survival statistics. None of 
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these constructions are without their limitations; the age cutoff of young adulthood is so notably 
arbitrary that some have dispensed with an umbrella definition of young adulthood, yet statistical 
analyses are still selectively chosen (not randomly, but not objectively either) to make a case for 
distinct young adult biology, incidence, and mortality. Proposals for research and clinical 
supports seemed to be based on this understanding, filtering focus into self-serving biomedical 
interests and perpetuating medical Cartesianism.  
To some extent, this mystification is necessary to facilitate concern for and investment in 
improving the well-being of young adults with cancer. I mean not to deny that cancer is an 
important health issue for young adults, or that all of the above studies in the field of AYA 
oncology are nothing more than a hall of mirrors. I mentioned in the previous chapter that 
language is not empty, but an exercise that both reveals and conceals at the same time. My 
intention here is to reveal that which is often concealed—the questionable logic and alteration of 
numbers—creating a critical distance from the frequently employed rhetoric used to convince 
audiences of the distinctness of young adult cancer. In turn, I raised questions about other 
possible stakes and contexts that may be at play while living with cancer. This mode of doubt 
afforded some distance from the dominant rhetoric while I was investigating young adult cancer. 
I pursue a similar goal below with regard to discourses around the psychology of illness.   
A) Dominant Psychosocial Discourses 
In the following review, I discuss two recurring discourses in the psychosocial literature 
on young adult cancer: purportedly underserved psychosocial and developmental issues and 
individual responsibility for prevention and treatment. These discourses tie more strongly into 
the scopes of my dissertation—exploring the biographical and existential challenges of cancer 
and evaluating the ideology of young adulthood—than do the aforementioned biomedical 
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discourses. My engagement with them here sets the stage for their reemergence within my 
analyses of young adults’ narratives.  
1. Psychosocial and Developmental Issues 
Other sets of discourses are growing in AYA oncology, not from the interpretive frames 
of biology or epidemiology, but from psychosocial and developmental perspectives. They are 
predicated upon neo-Eriksonian assumptions that young adulthood is a distinct period of the life 
course, peppered with developmental concerns not encountered until such time (CCS, 2006, 
2009; CIHR, 2009; CPAC, 2011; McGoldrick et al., 2011; Pritchard et al., 2011; Tonorezos and 
Oeffinger, 2011; Zebrack, 2011). Engaging in developmentalist discourses, many social 
scientists argue that the psychosocial issues of young adult cancer patients12 are distinct from 
those of other age cohorts, especially with regard to the prevention or delay of age-specific 
‘developmental tasks’ (Decker et al., 2007; Grinyer, 2007; Grinyer 2009; Kellerman and Katz, 
1977; Roberts et al., 1997; Rowland, 1990; Woodgate, 2005; Zebrack, 2011).  
Some of the suggested dominant ‘tasks’ of young adulthood include independence from 
one’s parents (i.e., emotional, physical, financial, etc.), a secured body-image and sexuality, a 
stable and intimate relationship (leading to marriage or long-term commitment), social 
integration among peers, and a future orientation on family life and career development (CCS, 
2006, 2009; CIHR, 2009; CPAC, 2011; D’Agostino et al., 2011; Ettinger and Heiney, 1993; 
Gavaghan and Roach, 1987; List, Ritter-Sterr, and Lanksy, 1991; McGoldrick et al., 2011; Odo 
and Potter, 2009; Struber and Kazak, 1999; Woodgate, 2005; Zebrack, 2011).  
From these studies an echo can be heard of psychologist Erik Erikson (1980), who said of 
young adulthood: “when childhood and youth come to an end, life, so the saying goes, begins: by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Some of the articles subsume both young adults and adolescents—typically from ages 15 to 39—under a unique 
age cohort, but my commentary does not make the same extension into mid-teens, who cannot legally marry or 
access other privileges of adulthood.  
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which we mean work or study for a specified career, sociability with the other sex, and in time, 
marriage and a family of one's own” (p. 96-97). We see here the enduring legacy of the 
‘traditional cycle’ narrative of adulthood, first discussed much earlier in this chapter.  
The above tasks seem to parallel the imperatives found in many narrative studies of 
identity development (i.e., narrative coherence and self-authorship), not surprising given the 
residual voice of Erikson in both sub-fields. The ‘task’ of independence seems quite correlative 
to the imperative of self-authorship, commanding young adults to ‘take charge’ of their lives. 
Images of stable home and work selves (i.e., marriage, career, social integration) seem to 
articulate a coherent and predictable narrative of ‘successful’ young adulthood. Together these 
tasks could be seen to make up the biographical and existential concerns to young adult life, 
defining the contours of a person’s forms of meaning and being during this time of life: drawing 
a bridge between self and body through sexual practices and physical appearance; defining one’s 
perspective of time by a strict focus on future plans and relative disregard for their pasts; 
organizing social relations through ‘fitting in,’ getting married, and procreating; and so on. In 
sum, dominant discourses of AYA oncology and narrative identity development seem to assert 
that the integration of life experiences and the attainment of self-determination are the normative 
paths toward transcending illness and developing into adults.  
It is often believed that diagnosis of a chronic illness will disrupt a young person’s 
progress toward these tasks, leading to biographical and existential crises. Recall some of the 
many ways that illness represents alienation or “unhomelike” being-in-the-world (Svenaeus, 
2000)—altered embodiment and consciousness, awareness of mortality and time, disrupted 
activities, social isolation—and we can see how these alleged tasks may be endangered. For 
example, nursing researcher Roberta Woodgate (2005) argued that bodily alienation can produce 
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an array of “different ways of being in the world” among adolescents, perceiving their bodies as 
“rebellious, unreliable, sensitive, dependent, conspicuous, vital, and ‘in therapy’” (p. 13). A 
younger patient’s newly acquired body-image, sexuality, and independence may be radically 
destabilized by chronic pain, limited energy, and other psycho-physical effects of cancer (e.g., 
Grinyer, 2007; Snobhohm, 2010; Woodgate, 2005). In addition, focus on future family and 
career plans may be thwarted by the prospect of dying young, reduced attention or motivation 
from fatigue, or fears of being rejected by potential partners or employers (e.g., Grinyer, 2007; 
Odo and Potter, 2009).  
When these tasks are jeopardized, young adults are often expected to experience 
heightened levels of distress (Decker et al., 2007; Grinyer, 2007; Kellerman and Katz, 1977; 
Roberts et al., 1997). Some have even argued—dubiously I might add—that young adult cancer 
is possibly more distressing than for cancer patients of other ages: “It is manifestly not pleasant 
to develop cancer at any age, even in extreme old age, but in the most active and productive 
years of life, with maximum family and social responsibilities, it is a particular tragedy” (CCS, 
2006, p. 6)13. This perceived distress may carry on for years due to the initial shock of the 
diagnosis and liminal phases of treatment and recovery.  
As a case in point, social worker Carol Decker and colleagues (2007) found that young 
adult patients often continue to feel uncertain about the present and the future for years after 
diagnosis. Newly diagnosed patients expressed heightened worry regarding anticipated pain, 
their illness’ trajectory, potential loss of independence, and the roles of the medical staff, while 
patients who had completed treatment felt more uncertain about the success of their treatments, 
the predictability of their physical symptoms (e.g., the timing and intensity) and the meaning of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 By contrast, in her excellent research on self and time in illness, sociologist Kathy Charmaz (1992) offered a 
different perspective: “several young adults had fluid, rather unstructured lives…Having few time pressures, their 
lifestyles and time perspectives muted the effect of intrusive symptoms” (p. 58-59).  
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their pain (e.g., if it signified a recurrence or chronic effects). Decker et al. argued that new 
patients’ concerns originated from the alienating experience of being “thrust into the unfamiliar 
environment of an oncology center” (p. 684), which entailed a complex of new interactions (e.g., 
with health professionals), new roles and responsibilities (e.g., attending frequent appointments), 
and a new language (i.e., medical terminology); later on, other fears emerged as check-ups 
became less frequent, patients lost contact with healthcare providers, and medical oversight of 
their health tapered off—in other words, a second alienation from a medical world that had 
become familiar and routine. Emerging and changing fears as a result of unhomelike experiences 
are seen to prolong the disruptions of cancer long after it has been treated, thereby having an 
indefinite interference with young adults’ developmental tasks.  
 The purported stakes of young adult cancer seem to revolve around a host of perceived 
psychosocial outcomes: adjustment to life with a chronic illness, satisfaction with body-image, 
identity development, putting aside morbid thoughts about death, ‘mastering’ life tasks like 
sexual intimacy, etc. (CIHR, 2009; Decker, 2006; Ettinger and Heiney, 1993; Gavaghan and 
Roach, 1987; Woodgate, 2005). In response to the potential dangers of cancer on developmental 
‘success,’ a variety of interventions have been proposed that focus on maintaining social 
connections with peers; providing information/counseling on familial, reproductive, and health 
issues; ensuring ‘mastery’ of developmental tasks; boosting self-esteem; and reorienting patients 
toward future (family and career) goals (D’Agostino et al., 2011; Ettinger and Heiney, 1993; 
Nathan et al., 2011; Odo and Potter, 2009; Rowland, 1990; Woodgate, 2005; Zebrack, 2008). 
The prevailing, and quite problematic, directives of these interventions may be summarized thus: 
“Ultimately, the goal of supportive care for AYA with cancer is to facilitate their achievement as 
self-reliant, independent, and productive members of society” (D’Agostino et al., 2011, p. 2333). 
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There seems to be a growing literature on young adults’ concerns, particularly on age-
sensitive struggles, possibly signaling the construction of an AYA oncology sub-field. In some 
ways health research is heading in a praiseworthy direction, taking stock through interviews and 
surveys of young adults’ major biographical and existential challenges. On the other hand, much 
of the literature shares a serious limitation: age is often seen as important only insofar as it 
relates to essentialized ‘developmental tasks’ of young adulthood. Much of the literature 
employs sweeping generalizations—in their efforts to reveal the distinct psychosocial concerns 
of young adults—that blind readers to the plurality of life histories that lead to multiple 
trajectories of young adult life14.  
Exaggerated or uncritical assertions are tossed out without providing rigorous analysis to 
defend them; for instance, that AYAs harbor “a perceived invulnerability and a growing desire to 
be autonomous” (McGoldrick et al., 2011, p. 2312). For the most part absent of young adults’ 
own voices, many of these publications appear to presuppose young adults’ desires and projects. 
Considering that there may be a “new timetable for growing up” (Furstenberg, 2010) not 
necessarily following the narratives and practices of the ‘traditional milestones,’ we have to 
wonder why they are so strongly affirmed within young adult oncology.  
What is lost in this normative approach is consideration of what young adults find 
significant within their local social worlds, which may be gleaned from their stories of cancer. It 
is possible that they may have very different ideas about where they are in their lives and where 
they want to be and, therefore, they may have dissimilar ‘developmental tasks’ that are desired, 
pursued and/or frustrated while living with cancer. In some circumstances, young adults may not 
narrate their changed bodies, destabilized identities, or reliance on parents as failures, but rather !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14The same may also be said of many representations of cancer patients irrespective of age. At the very least, it is 
often the case for older people with cancer as well (see e.g., Hammond et al., 2012; Sinding and Gray, 2005; Sinding 
and Wiernekowski, 2008). 
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as fodder for seeing new life possibilities (e.g., advocacy for other young adults, deeper 
appreciation for their families, etc.).  
The question is not whether there are alternative meanings, ways of being, and 
trajectories, but how we judge narratives of such scenarios in relation to normative expectations. 
Do they mark a failure to achieve ideal young adulthood? Arrested development? Deviant or 
maladapted subjects? Meaningful and gratifying projects in their own right? Marginalized lives 
in need of legitimation? These are serious questions about individual narratives of disruptive or 
alienating experiences interact with ideological perspectives, questions to which I do not believe 
much of the psychosocial research on young adult cancer answers sensitively or critically. 
2. A Critique of Developmentalist Discourses 
Young adults’ age-specific concerns are perhaps partially dependent upon social and 
material conditions, as well as personal and cultural expectations around significant life events 
and rites of passage (e.g., Kelly et al., 2004; Rowland, 1990; Zebrack, 2011). I question the 
above discourses in terms of their visible lack of critical and contextual considerations of young 
adulthood, for instance: that development can be thought of as negotiated identities and may thus 
place less normativity on task achievement; that economic recessions can make financial 
independence and independent living less feasible and perhaps even less desirable (risky as it can 
be); that a lot fewer people in North America are following the ‘traditional cycle’ of adulthood 
than even 30 years ago; and that modern technology has possibly enabled the emergence of 
multiple local and global identities. In sum, how the majority of young adults talk about and 
experience psychosocial development may be changing dramatically from how it is represented 
within oncological discourses.  
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The reviewed literature and the discourses they perpetuate construct relatively few life 
paths as being desirable, thereby normalizing certain trajectories to the neglect of other equally 
meaningful ways of living. Some propose, like radiation and medical oncologist Simon Sutcliffe 
(2011), that there is a “multiplicity of medical, social, and psychological challenges for AYA 
cancer patients,” that we need “cultural and contextual perspectives on the provision of AYA 
oncology care,” and that “a single solution is unlikely to fit all situations” (p. 2244); yet, this 
commentary is hardly ever offered let alone elaborated upon. While some researchers reflect on 
the “social, financial, and cultural resources” available to young adults (e.g., Grinyer, 2007, p. 
266), they evaluate such contexts only according to whether they enable or impede achievement 
of the aforementioned developmental tasks.  
This general criticism could go in a number of specific yet interconnected directions 
regarding the failures of ideological discourses to account for hidden or unsanctioned meanings 
and ways of being among young adults. For example, heterosexist assumptions pervade talk 
about AYA patients’ sexuality without consideration of the fluidity and multiplicity of sexual 
orientations and practices (e.g., Diamond, 1998). Also, the goals of self-reliance, independence, 
and productivity fall within what some would say are capitalistic expectations of accumulation of 
wealth and property that marginalize, among many others, dis-abled or other-abled people who 
do not meet those demands (e.g., Oliver, 1998, 1999)15. Finally, patriarchal discourses of 
femininity are implicit in efforts to preserve and encourage fertility among young women 
patients, even though quite recently many women are choosing voluntary childlessness (e.g., 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Importantly, the current recession and housing market bubble has possibly minimized desires for property 
ownership, signifying yet another possible cultural shift in values and identities. For example, in a 2013 interview 
for the CBC radio show The Current, Queen’s University professor of environmental studies and business John 
Andrew noted that home ownership is increasingly becoming unfeasible for most younger Canadians. In turn, he 
reported shifting attitudes among young adults from assuming “you’re not successful in society unless you own your 
own home” to thinking it is “much more attractive to be a renter long-term, perhaps never buying your own home.”  
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Gillespie, 2000). These ideologies do not just fail to capture certain ways of being; they create 
“deficit models” that judge different ways of being as failures to achieve a singular ideal 
(Rogoff, 2008, p. 16).  
Allow me to expand upon two illuminating counterexamples of the dominant research on 
AYA patients. With regard to family plans and sexuality, fertility is often presumed to be an 
issue all young adults care about (e.g., List et al., 1991; Nathan et al., 2011); however, in a study 
conducted in Britain, social worker Marilyn Crawshaw and colleagues (2009) reported that 
adolescents and young adult patients actually had mixed responses to finding out they may have 
troubles with infertility. A marginal majority of patients were deeply impacted by the loss of 
reproductive capabilities, while a large minority said they were more concerned about surviving 
than about fertility or were simply not interested in parenthood. They observed “there were clear 
differences in reactions among participants who shared a chronological age and might be seen to 
be at a similar life stage” (p. 387). They concluded there is a “need to be alert to the unique 
meaning of fertility to the individual concerned” (p. 388).  
Crawshaw and colleagues also found that patients varied in the extent to which they 
wanted to involve their parents in their decisions about fertility services, which raises questions 
about young adult independence. To what extent do young adults want to rely upon their parents 
while living with illness? What kinds of (in/ter)dependence are desired? Such questions are 
rarely raised in the research. Many articles present increased dependence upon parents as a 
burdening “stress” on both parties (e.g., Ettinger and Heiney, 1993; Pritchard et al., 2011), even 
as an unfavourable and “infantilizing” “regression” to earlier family dynamics (e.g., Kellerman 
and Katz, 1977; Odo and Potter, 2009; Tonorezos and Oeffinger, 2011). Yet, among some 
qualitative research with AYA patients, issues of independence and choice seem to be a great 
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deal more complicated, bringing some positive and some negative changes to how patients see 
themselves and their families (e.g., Crawshaw et al., 2009; Kelly, Pearce, and Mulhall, 2004).  
Perhaps we should not be so hasty to label dependence or other ‘deviations’ from 
normalized pathways as an inevitable threat to young adults, but instead ask ourselves and ask 
patients what family involvement means to them. Most importantly, we need to critically 
evaluate what ‘independence’ means for patients (as the literature is quite vague on the concept 
to begin with). The two British studies above, though admittedly small in number and limited in 
generalizability, should give pause to the assumption that young adults place similar meaning 
and importance on family planning and independence, at least within the context of living with 
cancer. 
In sum, this research raises questions about the differential relevance of the ideology of 
young adulthood. There is hardly any sense in the literature that these issues carry varying 
degrees of significance for people at different points in their lives—a sensitivity anthropologist 
Michael Jackson (2005) summarized in the following assertion: “being is never an ‘either/or’ 
thing, but a ‘more or less’ question” (p. x). While certain modes of being are essentialized within 
these discourses—parenthood, marriage, financial security, independence—these modes may 
retain different levels of relevance both between different people’s stories and over time within a 
single person’s narrative. With all these discourses of developmental ‘tasks’ and social ‘roles’ 
(e.g., D’Agostino et al., 2011; Zebrack, 2011), little room left for conversations about ‘meanings’ 
and ‘praxes,’ which get us thinking about situational desires and needs: In what ways do young 
adults reevaluate what they find meaningful in life as a result of having cancer? In reflection, 
what tasks are considered fundamental to their senses of meaning and being, which are simply 
seen as hoops to jump through, and which have no currency in their lives whatsoever? In other 
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words, how do people live out in meaningful, sometimes critical, ways the expectations of young 
adulthood when their pre-conceptions may be threatened, foreclosed, or stripped of value by 
illness?  
Age in itself does not determine people’s most pressing concerns. Developmental 
researcher Bernice Neugarten (1987), for instance, believed that “age has become a poor 
predictor of the timing of life events, just as it is a poor predictor of health, work status, family 
status, interests, preoccupations, and needs” (p. 74). Instead of reifying age-specific concerns, it 
is better to look at how individuals relate to dominant identities, meanings, and values within 
their narratives. For instance, critical gerontology argues that, contrary to dominant discourses of 
aging as a time of decline, there is no singular trajectory either of aging (Friedan, 1993; Gullette, 
2004; Randall and McKim, 2008) or of aging during illness (Hammond et al., 2012; Sinding and 
Wiernekowski, 2008; Towsley, Beck, and Watkins, 2007). In her research on midlife 
experiences, developmental psychologist Margie Lachman (2004) asserted that we need 
“multiple conceptions” of development to account for their “diverse trajectories” (p. 313). 
Extending these approaches to young adults with cancer, health researchers may be challenged to 
consider the cultural diversity of meanings and ways of being across different people.  
Cultural diversity goes beyond alleged differences between two predetermined groups 
(e.g., Caucasian patients and First Nations patients, young adults and older adults, men and 
women). Culture, according to anthropologists Arthur Kleinman and Peter Benson (2006), “is 
not a single variable” that can be reduced to, say, ethnicity or age group, but rather is 
“inseparable from economic, political, religious, psychological, and biological 
conditions…through which ordinary activities and conditions take on an emotional tone and a 
moral meaning for participants” (p. 1674). If we try to account for at least some of these factors 
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in interaction (it is a daunting if not impossible task to incorporate all), we may find that people 
within the same age, gender, ethnic background, political stance, socioeconomic status, 
geographical location, religious community, and family tell very different stories about their 
experiences. Such is a potentially fruitful strategy for studying young adults’ lives.  
For my part I wanted to conduct a general, explorative investigation into the 
unrecognized diversity of young adult meanings and ways of being expressed within narratives 
of cancer. At the beginning of the first chapter is a cited plea from writer and cancer patient 
Kairol Rosenthal to study the “complexity” of young adult life. I see very little effortful practice 
within psychosocial oncology of locating young adults within the social, cultural and historical 
frames that would richen our representations. It seems ironic that McGoldrick et al. (2011) cite 
Margaret Mead as an inspiration for their work with younger patients, as her book Coming of age 
in Samoa (1929/1963) radically challenged universalist ideas about the adolescent stage of life. 
This consideration could be feasibly extended to young adults as well, and the diversity seen 
among the general young adult population may be even further multiplied by the various 
physical, psychosocial, and existential changes that life with cancer can instigate. 
3. Individual Responsibility for Illness  
Going beyond developmental tasks but still within the prescriptive framework of 
independence or self-authorship, many of the discourses around young adult cancer perceive it to 
be a matter of personal responsibility. Not your typical understanding of ‘patient-centred care,’ 
illness is often individualized as a matter of personal ‘issues’ rather than social tensions like 
isolation from others, stigma around certain illnesses, and physician-patient conflict; or structural 
restrictions like discrimination, an overburdened healthcare system, or inaccessibility of proper 
treatment (see e.g., CIHR, 2009; McGoldrick et al., 2011).  
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Risk factors requiring intervention are predominantly related to personal lifestyle (e.g., 
diet, exercise) while social-environmental factors receive very little attention (see e.g., CCS, 
2006; CCS, 2009; Riley, Manske, and Cameron, 2011). The latter would include larger socio-
political issues such as racism within the clinic, air and water pollution, and, as Arthur Kleinman 
(1996) observed, poverty as a predictive indicator for morbidity and mortality. Cancer is often 
constructed as an individual disease, not as a socially related sickness that may have both social 
causes and effects (Kleinman, 1988). Lung cancer may be seen as an example as it may develop 
from airborne carcinogens including first- and second-hand cigarette smoke as well as asbestos, 
naturally occurring radon gas, and cooking oil vapours (Sun, Schiller, and Gazdar, 2007); despite 
the limited control people have over what they breathe it is often stigmatized as a self-inflicted 
disease (Chapple, Ziebland, and McPherson, 2004). Attention to patient individuality should not 
mean that intersubjective factors to health and illness are ignored or ruled out.  
Intervention programs are also usually geared toward individual adjustment instead of 
community support such as social recognition and reduction of stigma, or political change such 
as advocacy for better awareness, access, and care (CCS, 2006; CCS, 2009; CIHR, 2009; CPAC, 
2011; Nathan et al., 2011). McGoldrick and colleagues (2011) see “empowerment” of young 
adults as teaching them to “take responsibility for their own health and wellness, encouraging 
regular checkups and screening, as well as educating them on lifestyle choices and behaviors, 
focusing on management of exposures to known carcinogens as well as environmental and 
occupational health hazards” (p. 2313); in other words, placing the burden of prevention on 
individuals. This may be seen as a form of self-surveillance that can indeed improve some 
outcomes (e.g., breast self-exams may lead to earlier detection), but lends itself to assuming 
illness is predominantly under individual control and blame. Young adults’ cultural practices are 
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reduced to either ‘healthy’ or ‘unhealthy’ lifestyles, with the route to better outcomes paved 
mainly by patient labour.  
Let me illustrate an important example for my research. One of the identified reasons 
young adults have relatively poorer outcomes is that diagnosis of their cancer are often delayed 
for longer periods of time, allowing accelerated growth and metastatic spread of their tumours 
(CCS, 2009; CIHR, 2009; McGoldrick et al., 2011). There may be many explanations for why 
this is happening, but the issue tends to be boiled down to patient non-compliance and resistance 
to seeking medical attention (CCS, 2009; CIHR, 2009; McGoldrick et al., 2011). This 
assumption flies in the face of many young adults’ stories—and there are many, as we will see in 
following chapters—of seeking medical attention for symptoms and not being taken seriously 
because their physicians held preconceptions that young adults don’t get cancer. It is perhaps 
ironic that often the problem lies with heavy reliance upon incidence rates, which show that 
young adult cancer is statistically very rare. The very “technology of presencing” (Jain, 2007) 
used to argue young adult cancer is an important health issue can also be a technology of 
“absencing,” serving to conceal young adult cancer because of its statistical insignificance.   
Very rarely is it expressly acknowledged that faults in earlier diagnosis and better 
outcomes may be partially due to a lack of knowledge and understanding on the part of 
practitioners (for some exceptions, see Barr, 2011; Gafni, 2011; Ramphal et al., 2011). Social 
and structural barriers within medical institutions can be so pronounced that some patients find 
the biggest challenge in cancer care is simply being heard. In one of Kairol Rosenthal’s (2009) 
interviews with young adult patients, one person who was attuned to this struggle said, “Don’t 
fight the cancer, fight the people who get in the way of you receiving the best care possible” (p. 
236), recalling how his healthcare team was sometimes a barrier to his recovery. ‘Self-advocacy’ 
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has become a buzzword among many younger patients who see cancer as a partly political 
process of conflict and negotiation with their care providers. Unfortunately, this local politics of 
cancer is concealed by discourses of individual responsibility and adjustment. Along with 
finding ways to encourage regular medical checkups and treatment compliance among young 
adults, attention should also be drawn to the barriers that “get in the way of” young adults 
seeking medical treatment.  
4. Conclusion: The Need for Localizing Meaning and Being 
 Dominant psychosocial discourses within young adult oncology seem to emphasize task-
based theories of development and patient-determined outcomes, repeating broader cultural 
assumptions that young adults become authors of their lives and perform certain predefined rites 
of passage into ‘adult’ identities. Informative of some of the stakes and existential challenges of 
illness, these discourses direct attention away from a) the diverse ways in which young adults 
may talking about ‘development’ in negotiation with the conditions of life set out by having a 
chronic illness, and b) young adults’ perceptions of barriers to and factors involved in healing 
beyond assumed personal negligence of their health. In response to these limitations, there need 
to be programs of study placing psychosocial issues of illness within local social contexts of 
meaning and being. My purposes within this research project were to bring such a program into a 
narrative analysis of young adults’ stories of cancer, to which I refer to in the following 
concluding paragraphs.  
Chapter Conclusion: A Critical Narrative Program of Cancer Research 
 Dominant biomedical and psychosocial discourses generate the above representations of 
young adults, which may be used by oncologists, nurses, patients and families alike in order to 
drive social and political change within healthcare. By no means should they be construed as 
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intentionally malicious or violent discourses, adding no merit or value to conversations about 
young adults with cancer. The purpose of my critical analysis of the literature was to show not 
the harms that are intended by such discourses, for I am sure the very best of intentions drive 
their usage, but rather their implicit, hidden, yet inferable conclusions and effects, the unintended 
violence to young adults’ ways of understanding and living.    
We saw within this chapter a repetition of more general discourses already identified in 
the first chapter as problematic: the medical Cartesian assumptions about the reduction of bodies 
to biology; the separability of bodies from minds with priority given to cure of disease over care 
of the lives affected; and the isolability of people from their local worlds, leading to prescriptive 
claims about developmental tasks and individual responsibility. The social and 
phenomenological sides of illness tend to get lost in medical Cartesianism, which may lead to 
marginalization of young adult narratives that do not follow the normative ‘trends’ or fit into the 
subjects constructed by these discourses. One way to bring forth these hidden meanings and 
ways of being is to enter the worlds constructed within young adults’ stories and critically 
evaluate how they repeat and how they resist dominant discourses.  
A few studies of young adult cancer have already employed narrative techniques, but 
rarely does this research go beyond the normalizing discourses I have critically evaluated within 
this chapter. Health researcher Anne Grinyer (2007), for example, showed an unreflective 
affinity to ‘normal’ trajectories of young adulthood, as when she argued, “Anything that 
contributes to the maintenance of normality must be welcomed, and fostering a continued 
connection to youth culture and the ‘normal’ activities undertaken by young people is valuable” 
(p. 274). A critique of discourses, especially around what is normal, seems unfortunately absent 
in her proposed solution to the unhomelike being of young adult cancer. 
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 Critical study of illness narratives has a fringe but strengthening tradition within the 
health sciences. Among the strongest proponents of narrative research in clinical practice are 
psychiatrist Arthur Kleinman (1988) and physician Rita Charon (2008), who argue that 
narratives can bring to light patients’ stakes within their social worlds, cultural assumptions, and 
politicized discourses. A narrative agenda may restore attention to the larger contexts of patients’ 
needs and experiences. In my own studies, narrative analysis provided an interpretive frame for 
questioning embedded assumptions about young adulthood and the effects of cancer, and making 
sense of how meaning and being are negotiated within situations of illness. In the next chapter, I 
outline the methodological as well as philosophical details of the narrative approach adopted for 
my dissertation.  
 Perhaps within young adults’ voices, within their stories of cancer, we may hear dissent, 
contradiction, and resistance to the above discursive constructions—even alongside affirmations 
and reiterations of developmental tasks, individual responsibility, and the like. My call for 
critical research into young adults’ stories does not mean we do away with any thought of age-
specific experiences and concerns; quite the contrary, we look into the wide spectrum of ways 
these assumptions are engaged, from reification, adaptation, and evaluation to opposition. 
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CHAPTER 3: PERSPECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY       
 
A Crisis in Illness Representation? 
“The academy has long rewarded readings that dismantle literature’s  
illusions but, with regard to literary and amateur illness memoirs, it is  
also evident that critics need other options, interpretive approaches that  
enable them to assemble meaning in the face of life’s fragility.” 
 
—Anne Jureric, Illness as narrative, p. 4 
Introduction 
 In a short presentation at the International Congress of Qualitative Inquiry, psychologist 
Kenneth Gergen (2012) spoke to a crowded audience about competing and seemingly 
irreconcilable modes of interpretation within the discipline, between more suspicious, critical 
analyses of human expressions and more empathic attempts to understand the perspectives 
expressed on their own terms. He was not talking about illness narratives per se, though his 
words rang resoundingly true for me in my work. Dr. Gergen pined for a time when these vastly 
different modes of interpretation could be synthesized within his own mind and many of us 
nodded in admission of having similar wishes every so often.  
 Dr. Gergen seemed most concerned about what is often called a ‘crisis in representation,’ 
in this case a perceived failure between psychologists to agree on what human expressions 
symbolize or represent. How should we evaluate the actions and stories of others? In place of a 
consensual ideal, there is endless dispute, contention, and downright antagonism at times about 
the ‘right’ reading or analysis. This issue of ‘how to represent’ may be more inflamed and 
convoluted than I present it below, but I introduce it to bring home a more specific and relevant 
point: illness narratives are not exempt from these interpretive tensions in the human sciences. 
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This is, of course, very pertinent to research projects that have expressions such as narratives as 
their unit of analysis.  
Beyond this particular point, I share my basic theoretical orientation and methodological 
practices in this chapter. I continue on from the previous chapter about the need for narrative 
study of young adult cancer experiences. In light of a possible “crisis of illness representation” 
(Good, 1994) I show support for critical phenomenology, a theoretical perspective intended to 
straddle and converse between different traditions of evaluating narratives. From there I share 
some philosophical assumptions about the nature of human reality and knowledge that I infuse 
into my theoretical perspective. In a final section on the research process I explain narrative 
analysis as an applicable methodology for pursuing a critical phenomenology of young adult 
cancer, before summarizing the methods used in my study for gathering, conducting, and 
analyzing illness narratives. 
The Double Motivation of Modern Hermeneutics 
 Sentiments of a crisis in representation are not unique to psychologists; every scholarly 
discipline has its opposing perspectives and contradictory evidence. Indeed, the particular 
impasse that Dr. Gergen regretted in psychology is one shared by all of the human sciences, from 
sociology to literary theory. Philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1970) saw these disciplinary conflicts as 
a pervasive plight of modern interpretation theory: “there is no general hermeneutics, no 
universal canon for exegesis, but only disparate and opposed theories concerning the rules of 
interpretation” (p. 26-27).  
I do not mean to suggest interpretive dispute is a recent phenomenon. Even the ancient 
Greeks argued vehemently over how to evaluate people’s stories. Plato (1956) wrote in Book X 
of The republic that many artistic representations—including paintings, drama, poetry, and the 
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like—are “imitator[s] in the third generation from nature,” that is, they are based on 
“appearances” that are themselves loosely based on their true, ideal Forms (p. 393-397). Though 
Plato found art forms like narrative veritably useful in the production of dialogue1, he 
subordinated the former to the latter in the pursuit of truth.   
On the other hand, Plato’s own pupil Aristotle held art in higher regard. In Poetics 
(1987), he saw a dual power in all stories. The first is their ability to capture transformative 
moments, the grist of lived experience2, with the most notable examples being the changing life 
circumstances in reversals of fortune and coming to knowledge in recognitions of some hidden 
or unknown state of affairs (p. 14-15). Secondly, through metaphoric, ornamental, or unfamiliar 
uses of words, stories can not only articulate what is in life, but also what may be (p. 35-37). 
Illness narratives, for instance, postulate and explore multiple possible realities (Good and 
Delvecchio-Good, 1994) through, for example, at one time referring to life with cancer as a 
‘battle’ and at other times as a ‘journey.’ Subjunctive mood is a form of narrative voice that 
entertains diverse futures (Good and Delvecchio-Good, 1994; Turner, 1986, p. 42).   
Though somewhat disparate, the different islands of interpretation may be grouped into 
two sides. Ricoeur (1970) described what he saw as the “double motivation” of modern 
hermeneutics: a “willingness to suspect” informed by skeptical enquires into the falsities of 
expressions, and a “willingness to listen” informed by phenomenological enquiries into their 
illumination of lived experiences (p. 27). Philosopher of science Michael Crotty (2003) placed 
these dual motivations within the robust traditions of critical and interpretive analysis, with the 
former exposing ideological layers of cultural meaning within a “battleground of hegemonic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 For example, Socrates often engaged Greek myths in order to advance dialogues with his interlocutors from 
sophistic to more logical reasoning.  
2 This argument, which I unpacked in chapter 1, has informed much of contemporary interpretive psychology and 
anthropology (see e.g., Bruner, 1986; Mattingly, 1998; Turner, 1986).  
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interests” and the latter “uncritically”3 interpreting cultural meaning within a “peaceable” world 
of interactions (p. 60-63). 
Despite the historical endurance of scholarly disagreements around representation, certain 
debates are accentuated in contemporary human sciences. Let us look briefly at some of these 
different perspectives, starting with those sharing a willingness to suspect.  
Current Critical Traditions of Analysis 
More recent critical traditions of the last three centuries spend less time evaluating the 
limits of the medium—the perceived inferiority of art for finding truth, as Plato saw it—and 
more time noting the many prejudices of the messenger. The legacies of Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud share suspicion over the ‘falsity’ of consciousness, ignorant of its 
own material conditioning, drive for power, or unconscious urges (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 32-33).  
Through a psychoanalytic lens, literary theorist Elizabeth Bronfen (1992/2000) saw all 
narratives as “fictions” that “serve to negate reality, to repair or mitigate one’s own destructive 
impulses and patch up wounds to one’s narcissism” (p. 193). Behind texts she saw authors 
seeking psychological consolation and narratives strictly functioning as a means toward that end. 
Some recovery stories of illness, for example, young adult writer Erin Zammett’s (2005) 
published memoir, contain a patent optimism and hopefulness that could be interpreted as a 
survivor’s bias. Death, a subject of immediate concern to many cancer patients who have not 
reached a state of remission, is notably absent within Zammett’s story and may more closely 
represent her appeased state of mind while writing than the prevalent feelings she encountered 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 I do not think Crotty meant that interpretive traditions lack critical thinking, but rather they bestow a “postcritical” 
trust in language as a disclosing medium of meaning (Riceour, 1970, p. 28). !
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while in the midst of diagnosis and treatment4. The scholar’s duty, from Bronfen’s perspective, is 
to expose these mechanisms of self-justification that underlie a story’s composition. 
From a different angle, Hayden White (1981) proposed that underlying all narratives 
(historical or fictional) is a human impulse to “moralize reality” (p. 14). In particular, White 
insisted that narratives lead audiences to believe that the world can “speak for itself,” when in 
truth narratives make the world appear in unison with authors’ moral expectations. A more 
obvious example of this is young adult Kris Carr’s (2007) Crazy sexy cancer tips, partially a mix 
of memoirs from different cancer patients and partially an instructive guide for how to ‘beat’ 
cancer. Though the tone is relatively forgiving, the content implies that with a strict diet, exercise 
program, positive thinking, and related activities of ‘self-care,’ cancer can be cured. Behind these 
claims are moral constructions of healing revolving around cultural notions of individualism, 
personal responsibility, and psychosomatic medicine (see e.g., Ignatieff, 1987; Stacey, 1997).  
These narrative ‘advertisements’ for certain care practices are, again, retrospective 
accounts written from a position of remission. That one event (e.g., drinking an organic 
vegetable shake) preceded another (e.g., remission) does not necessarily prove a causal relation 
and may instead lead to what in philosophical logic is called the post hoc ergo propter hoc 
fallacy (Latin for “after this, therefore because of this”). Moral expectations and cultural 
assumptions may fill the gaps between past and present, and conceal leaps of logic in stories of 
recovery. It may be argued from this perspective that counter-narratives are needed to balance 
out morally weighty depictions of the world, and it is the job of the narrative critic to provide 
these against-the-grain interpretations. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!In the spirit of the interpretive crisis, many other explanations for this absence are not only plausible, but may even 
complement a psychoanalytic reading: publishers’ requests to tone down the gloom in Zammett’s narrative; social 
pressures to censor stories that may evoke anxiety in some readers; genuine absence of death awareness during her 
illness experience; and many others. !
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Finally, post-structural literary theorist Roland Barthes (1966/2000) insisted that there is 
no “final meaning” to a text that could lend itself to reality, the varied paths of meaning cannot 
be “deciphered” but only “traversed,” and that assigning an authority to a text serves only to 
“impose upon that text a stop clause” (p. 4-6). Let’s return to Zammett’s optimistic attitude, 
which could be seen as a “final meaning” plugged in to stop the emotional currents of 
uncertainty while living with cancer. There are moments in her narrative where she breaks down 
and starts crying, but the scene is hastily cut off. As critical readers we may see these as 
“signifying traces” (Derrida, 1967/1976, p. 23) of other attitudes, other meanings, in this case 
possibly fears of death, shimmering cracks in the curtains separating audiences from behind-the-
scenes. Through a deconstructive reading, post-structuralists may defuse the laborious work of 
narratives to seize the unending pulse of life and meaning.  
Current Interpretive Traditions of Analysis 
There are also more charitable interpretive traditions today, in which narrative is lent 
more trust and truth. Narratologist Gerald Prince (1990/2000) suggested we ought to consider the 
etymology of the word narrative (the Latin word gnarus meaning “knowing” or “acquainted 
with”), which implies narrative is didactic in some sense, revealing some truths about human 
life. According to physician David Kuhl (2003), illness narratives may offer “practical wisdom” 
about deeply existential matters of living with and overcoming suffering. The published young 
adult narratives of Zammett and Carr may be read with eyes for what Ricoeur (1970) referred to 
as “revelation,” an openness to discover something illuminating from the words of another. In 
this perspective, their flippant attentions toward death and dying speak true of something about 
young adults’ experiences of illness, perhaps their proclivities to see illness as more of an 
 ! 114 
“interruption” than an “intrusion” (Charmaz, 1992, p. 58-62), perhaps, more broadly, their 
obstinate optimism toward life (see e.g., Savage et al., 2006).  
Modern interpretive traditions, according to Ricoeur (1970), dispute Aristotle’s 
assumption that representations hold a “univocity of meaning” (p. 23), arguing instead that 
meanings are richly plural and diffuse depending on the audiences, circumstances, and literary 
forms of a story. Many of the interpretive traditions in the human sciences today are heavily 
influenced by phenomenological methods and hermeneutic perspectives (Polkinghorne, 1983; 
Ricoeur, 1970). In terms of phenomenology, a pervasive assumption is that in any expression, 
including narrative, there is “something intended” or signified (Ricoeur, 1970, p. 29). That which 
is signified is both literal in that people mean what they say and symbolic in that metaphors, 
metonyms, tropes and other poetic uses of words signify more than what was said.  
The richness of expressions holds the potential for misunderstanding and 
miscommunication. Ricoeur (1988) made a convincing point: “The ‘right’ reading is, therefore, 
the one that admits a certain degree of illusion…and at the same time accepts the negation 
resulting from the work’s surplus of meaning, its polysemanticism, which negates all the reader’s 
attempts to adhere to the text and to its instructions” (p. 169). In his narrative of advanced 
cancer, literary critic Anatole Broyard (1992) noted, “what a critically ill person needs above all 
else is to be understood. Dying is a misunderstanding you have to get straightened out before you 
go” (p.67). This can be tricky as “the sick man sees everything as metaphor” (p.7) and it may be 
hard, perhaps impossible, for listeners of illness narratives to catch the scattered signs and 
associations shooting off in different directions. Many interpretive researchers enter into the 
jurisdiction of hermeneutics—theories of interpreting symbolic gestures—to help them negotiate 
the “surplus of meaning” with their limited capabilities to understand the expressions of another.  
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Though ‘revelation’ may be the express goal of this form of hermeneutics, narratives are 
still seen within interpretive traditions to be constructions based on unconscious, ideological, 
and/or dominant cultural modes of organizing life stories (Good, 1994, p. 144-146). The same 
person may tell very different narratives of his or her cancer depending on the situation and 
audience. However, instead of ruling that narratives are therefore false, interpretive traditions 
look more benignly, sometimes even exultantly, on the constructive elements of narrative. Some 
may see a provisional and pragmatic order being produced in narration and serving certain 
demands of a situation aside accuracy, such as making the account more intelligible to others and 
providing instructions for action (Kleinman, 1988, p. 49; Rimmon-Kenan, 2002, p. 15). For 
instance, people seeking a diagnosis and medical intervention of their pains, lumps, and 
bleedings, may tell stories they believe will spur on health professionals to become concerned 
and provide care.  
Taking into account expediency, bias, coercion, and other editorial factors, most 
interpretive traditions argue narratives produce a reality among many, what Paul Ricoeur (1988) 
called a “virtual experience of being-in-the-world” (p. 100). ‘This’ story, told at this time and to 
this group of people, may not be the ‘whole’ story, but contemporary hermeneutics harbours 
more doubt about the existence of a singular account of experience. The prevailing assumption is 
that narratives do not correspond uniformly to the reality of lived experiences, but construct new 
realities that broaden understanding of what happened. In some sense, as sociologist Arthur 
Frank (1995) put it, “The truth of stories is not only what was experienced, but equally what 
becomes experience in the telling and its reception” (p. 22; original text). 
 The above review of critical and interpretive analyses should demonstrate that 
scholarship of narratives is torn between an itching desire to question people’s claims to 
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authenticity and a sympathetic concern for hearing them out. Divisions between these different 
approaches has only deepened and widened over time, now appearing as an archipelago of 
theoretical positions separated by dark, chasmal waters.  
The Crisis of Illness Representation 
 Some scholars have written about how this crisis of modern hermeneutics has affected 
illness representations in their own discipline. For instance, Byron Good (1994) wrote about the 
frequent “juxtaposition of ‘critical’ to ‘clinical’” positions in his home discipline of medical 
anthropology (p. 59); while the former often interpret illness narratives as the products of 
oppressive social structures and self-deceptions, the latter typically develop phenomenological 
accounts of illness from within the perspectives of the ill. The two camps tend to fight between 
each other for interpretive authority over their subjects of enquiry. Ann Jureric lamented that 
literary studies of illness also suffer from critical divisiveness: “On one side stands the 
dispassionate critic who is suspicious of art that elicits sympathy or empathy; on the other is the 
empathic critic who seeks to acknowledge the suffering bodies at the center of art” (p. 13). 
Across many disciplines that study illness are these interpretive polarities.  
 I do not quite agree with Jureric’s implication that the polarities are between people of 
different ‘sorts’ or personalities. The sense I get from Drs. Good, Jureric, Gergen, and many 
others is that the tensions between suspicious and empathic interpretations are keenly felt within 
themselves. It is not a matter simply of different ‘camps,’ where a like-minded group is tenting 
away from ‘those other guys.’ Conflicting readings is a matter also of individual interpretation, 
when one is caught between seemingly irreconcilable assumptions and conclusions. The 
incessant drum of competing voices is both a public and a private tension. I feel the tantalizing 
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lure of different perspectives, which all make sense on some level as I listen to (or criticize) 
stories of cancer. That is what strikes me most about the alleged crisis of illness representation.  
 Furthermore, the modes of action instructed by different perspectives hold varying sway 
for me as time passes. As a case in point, my default position is that young adults’ stories just 
need to be heard and acted upon on their own terms, and all will be well. Yet, in moments of 
working against-the-grain, I begin to think that what could benefit many young adults most is 
tearing away their assumptions of entitled longevity, a contradiction that seems to be among the 
most devastating to people who are recently diagnosed. These and other moments of self-doubt 
transform the general crisis in illness representation into my crisis in representing young adult 
cancer narratives.  
A Philosophical Perspective on Illness Representations 
Singularizing Hermeneutics of Illness 
 From my perspective the primary problem of the crisis of illness representation is not its 
consequences for the status of academic knowledge, disrupting efforts to attain a singular, 
higher-order, or regal form of understanding. No, my concern over the crisis is the discomfort 
and intolerance many scholars—including myself—feel toward it at times. Often enough, 
perspectival diversity may be seen as anathema to a social science within which a unified Truth 
is held as ideal. Research can be a political and ideological affair where scholars take ‘sides’ and 
toss heckling shouts of hostility across the floor at the ‘opposition.’ In his historical review of 
different schools of thought, psychologist Donald Polkinghorne (1983) observed that as long as 
disagreement has existed between interpreters (and he traces modern hermeneutics to Catholic 
and Protestant disputes over biblical exegesis), an ideological unity of interpretations has been 
attempted among those who are most discontent with difference of opinion (p. 219).  
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 The danger of such an effort, from my view, is that human life in general and illness 
experience in particular is much richer than a unified theoretical orientation can afford. 
Intellectually I see theory in this toned-down light, but I am still caught up sometimes in 
statements of certainty. Nevertheless, I try not to sever the pull from one side, knowingly 
forsaking my own doubts in an effort to finalize my own perspective as ‘critical’ or 
‘interpretive.’ On a more socio-political level, philosopher Odo Marquard (1981/1989) argued 
that working toward a final interpretation, what he called a “singularizing hermeneutics,” can 
lead to a “hermeneutic civil war” if pushed to the brink (p. 122-127). Such was the case, he 
claimed, with the Thirty Year’s War, in which Catholics and Protestants killed each other over 
unaccepted interpretive differences (p. 122). Disputes of interpretation do not just remain in the 
clouds of lofty reflection but can plummet to the ground of embodied life and wreak havoc.  
 Not to say that I expect a divided discipline will lead to a riot between misguidedly 
zealous scholars. The violence need not be a literal battle of arms, but a harmful breakdown of 
conversations, a collective refusal to share knowledges and perspectives. More importantly, a 
rigid reading of people’s lives can produce disastrously simplified images of illness experiences, 
marginalization of unrecognized voices and social locations, and an aloof ignorance of people’s 
pain, all of which are forms of interpretive violence5. Kleinman and Kleinman (as cited in 
Whyte, 1995), observe this danger as a crucial “challenge…as social researchers; any rendering 
of human experience as a category (e.g., medical diagnosis, social role, symbolic gesture) 
threatens to dismiss distress on its own terms” (p. 283). Byron Good (1994) wrote that “illness is 
all too real” and treating patients’ stories as analogous to fictional novels, as critical schools are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Philosopher Jacques Derrida (1980/2000) pointed out that it can be dangerous to simply call on a person to recit 
(“give an account of”) serious illness, for suffering can actually escape “an objectifiable topology or chronology” (p. 
223). From my perspective, the violence of imposing form on formless experiences is an ever-present possibility, 
neither fully avoidable nor fatally inevitable, but at least made visible when we speak openly about the limits of our 
understanding.  
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wont to do, can “devalue suffering and misrepresent the very essence of the experience” (p. 163). 
Directions toward a dogmatic or unified reading, especially a suspicious reading, of illness 
narratives do not promise recognition of illness as a real and complex experience of suffering 
worthy of our care and compassion. 
 Within the humanities, Jureric (2012) provides an important example of the limitations to 
a singularizing hermeneutics. She wrote concernedly of the dominance of critical theory within 
literary studies of illness narratives. She observed that many literary critics, rightfully so, keep in 
mind that stories of illness are “constructed by medical discourse and political, economic, and 
cultural forces” and that the uncritical reader is susceptible “to the myriad powers of dominant 
discourse” (p. 3). Problems emerge when the whole of the work is consumed by these 
considerations. Although critical theory has historically endeavoured toward empowerment, it 
may ironically disenfranchise people seeking recognition of their anguish. Jureric referred to 
dance critic Arlene Croce’s paper “Discussing the undiscussable”6 as part of a larger trend of 
boiling down artistic expressions of pain and illness into cheap ploys for political rallying. “Such 
a suspicious critical position,” she notes, “is not necessarily wrong, but it is incomplete” (p. 3); 
what it lacks is sensitivity to its own limits as one among many different readings of a text.  
 I provided other examples of singularizing hermeneutics in the previous chapter, 
regarding how young adults are typically represented within oncological discourses. Generalized 
images of the ‘distinctness’ of young adult cancer often conceal much of the plurality of illness 
narratives. Of special importance to my dissertation is the homogenization of biographical and 
existential challenges, rooted in a singular hermeneutics of young adult development. Though 
bringing some light to our understanding, these discourses deflect our attentions from their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!In this paper, Croce disparaged Bill T. Jones, a theatre director with AIDS, for using images of dying people in his 
work Still/Here to cultivate in his audiences vicarious despair of loved ones lost to the disease (cited in Jureric, 
2012, p. 12-13).!
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founding ideologies, such as assumptions that narrative coherence and self-authorship are 
hallmarkers of ‘normal’ young adulthood.  
Critical Phenomenology: A Buffer against ‘Hermeneutic Civil War?’ 
 The multifaceted narratives of those going through hard times deserve our attention and 
respect (Good, 1994; Whyte, 1995; Jureric, 2012). In opposition to a “singularizing 
hermeneutics” in which scholars must choose to be either complicit or vilified, Odo Marquard 
(1981/1989) advocated a “pluralizing hermeneutics” in which multiple readings could be posited 
without their difference leading to violence (p. 123). In the area of illness studies, it seems 
important to maintain a gentle discordance of representations and a neutralizing appreciation for 
plurality. Such was a guiding principle in my preceding criticisms of the young adult oncology 
literature, in response to the singularizing ways in which the lives and illnesses of young adults 
are often depicted.   
 A singular critical theory or phenomenological theory is antithetical to seeing illness 
narratives afresh, in new and illuminating ways, opening up a broader understanding of what life 
is like during illness. Byron Good (1994) affirmed a “multiplicity of tongues” speaking about 
illness experiences because “disease and human suffering cannot be comprehended from a single 
perspective” (p. 62). Contradictory orientations are of comparable merit because they bring 
something insightful into conversations; different aspects of illness are emphasized and through 
explication of these aspects something is learned about people’s experiences more generally.  
 In the spirit of a pluralizing hermeneutics, I used the theoretical perspective of “critical 
phenomenology,” Good’s answer to the crisis of illness representation and the dangers of 
dogmatic interpretation (p. 61). Its promise is in possibly answering the question, “How can we 
write about illness in a manner that heightens our understanding of the realities of lived 
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experience and still speaks to the larger social and historical processes of which the actors are 
only dimly aware?” (Good, p. 62).  
 Critical phenomenology is, at its heart, a dialogical and dialectical perspective. It is 
dialogical in its process of what cultural psychologist Richard Shweder (1991) called “thinking 
through others” (p. 108-110). Not just a matter of setting aside my perspective in order to arrive 
at another’s, thinking through others transforms both perspectives: a participant’s through 
revealing what is hidden in their narrative (i.e., distanciation) and my own through coming to 
question my own hidden assumptions (i.e., appropriation). In sum, this practice is “an act of 
criticism and liberation, as well as of discovery” (Shweder, p. 110). The critical component has 
to do with revealing cultural and political forces operating on meanings, while discovery means 
finding how meanings are personalized and negotiated within individuals’ stories.   
 The dialectic is between a willingness to suspect and a willingness to listen, what Paul 
Ricoeur (1976) later referred to as processes of “distanciation” or keeping a critical 
“estrangement” from a narrative, and “appropriation” or incorporating its meanings within one’s 
own understanding (p. 43). Interpretation is an effort to “suppress” as well as “preserve” the 
text’s “estrangement,” to place it in a new proximity relative to ourselves (Ricoeur, p. 43). 
Critical and interpretive analyses vary in terms of how close or how far they place narratives, but 
between them is a wide range of placements. From a critical phenomenological approach, these 
scattered readings may be complementary and may productively inform one another; the 
structures of lived experiences (as told in stories) may be better understood in relation to the 
structures of power (such as dominant discourses) that shape experiences. In my case, it was my 
willingness to listen to the richness of meanings in young adults’ stories that I came to suspect 
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dominant representations; on the other hand, this richness only became salient when juxtaposed 
against the ideologies that conceal it.    
 I do not mean to say that critical phenomenology ‘resolves’ the conflicts of interpretation; 
it is not necessarily a synthetic perspective going over and above its constituents. Rather, the 
approach enacts a conversation between the tensions encountered within the research process, 
between competing ways of thinking, invoking the crisis of representation anew. A reading-with-
the-grain is engaged with a reading-against-the-grain, in hopes of enriching discussion and 
negotiating readings of illness narratives. As a result of maintaining dialogue across the divide, 
we may be pressed to temper our truth claims, see both the strengths and limits of any one given 
perspective, and finally, in Jureric’s words, “conceive of a critical practice that adds to our lived 
experience rather than stands apart from it” (p. 16).   
 My understanding of critical phenomenology is informed by philosophical assumptions 
about the interpretive nature of truth and reality, as well as a narrative methodology for studying 
how personal truths and realities of illness are thematized, structured, and performed in stories. I 
now turn to each of these linkages in sequence.  
Epistemological and Ontological Assumptions 
The crisis of representation shows that there are many different ways of thinking about 
human life; underlying these schools of thought are divergent epistemological and ontological 
assumptions. Epistemology pertains to what counts as knowledge and how knowledge is attained 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 8). My research study was informed by an epistemology known as social 
constructionism, a position of doubt about the objectivity of knowledge, attending instead to its 
subjective and intersubjective productions through people’s interactions with each other and their 
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local worlds (Crotty, p. 9). Thus, it may be said that there are multiple, varying truths dependent 
upon historical and cultural context (Crotty, p. 45-48).  
Whatever insights I offer into the lives and concerns of young adults with cancer is 
subject to several social negotiations, for instance: between myself and those I interviewed; 
patients’ families and caregivers; those who have also studied young adult cancer; my 
participation in surrounding cultural discourses; and so on. These ongoing social negotiations, 
according to hermeneutic philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960/1989), preclude one true or 
complete meaning that can put an end to all interpretation (p. 427)—something like an objective 
knowledge. Nevertheless, when we acknowledge our interpretive anchoring within these 
negotiations, we reveal to ourselves and to others our epistemological vantage points, that is, 
where we stand within the complex arenas of social locations and theoretical frames. 
Both critical and phenomenological traditions share social constructionist understandings 
of knowledge, though obviously with different foci. Among critical perceptions of knowledge, 
negotiations may be seen to take place within “hegemonic” relations of rivaling interests, biases, 
and sources of power (Crotty, p. 60-63). Knowledge may be seen more as a competition of 
ideologies than a pursuit of higher enlightenment, its attainment like a treaty between two 
warring states where, as the idiom goes, ‘history is written by the victors.’ Within 
phenomenological approaches, knowledge may be seen as more cooperative productions, co-
constructed by “peaceable” dialogues, shared interests and mutual (attempts at) understanding 
(Crotty, 1998, p. 60-63). Befitting a critical phenomenology, my analyses explore both these 
varying relationships within illness narratives. ! Ontology pertains to the nature of existence and of reality (Crotty, p. 10). The ontology I 
held throughout my research study was a form of weak realism, assuming that there may be real 
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objects out in the world and any form of consciousness may experience them, but the way they 
are and the way they appear may differ from person to person, or from situation to situation. 
What is real is not readily obvious and may, in fact, be contingent upon how one is socialized to 
perceive the world. Blended with constructionism, weak realism upholds the existence of 
multiple realities out of which different meanings may be produced. As an ontology for critical 
phenomenology, a weak realist position assumes there are many realities expressed in narratives. 
In the encounters between narrators’ and audiences’ realities may be potential frictions and 
barriers, though within these interactive spaces new realities may be constructed.  
 The crisis of representation is a lingering preoccupation in my study of illness narratives. 
Above, I disclosed the influence of critical and interpretive approaches on my theoretical 
perspective, and how critical phenomenology enables a dialogue between them. From here on I 
draw perspective into practice, the methodological processes of carrying out a critical 
phenomenology of young adult cancer. 
Methodology and Research Process  
Introduction   
I proposed in chapter 2 that narrative analysis can be informative for revealing the 
diversity of young adults’ lived experiences and their engagements with dominant discourses. 
Critical phenomenology does not depend upon a narrative analysis, but the two seem to go hand 
in hand rather well. Narratives are a subspecies of representations studied by interpretive and 
critical approaches. Through the study of narratives it is possible to gain a fleeting glimpse of the 
subjects of interest to a critical phenomenology: the nature of illness experiences as well as the 
larger social forces and discourses influencing how illness is experienced and understood.   
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The second half of this chapter entails: a) the research process facilitating the production 
of narratives, b) a description of the forms of narrative analysis I employed for my dissertation, 
and finally, c) some descriptive details regarding the sample of young adults I interviewed. My 
conclusion marks the end of these last three introductory chapters and the beginning of my 
analyses of young adult cancer narratives.  
A) Research Procedures 
 My dissertation research came out of a larger project conducted by Drs. Ulrich Teucher 
(my supervisor) and Roberta Woodgate (co-investigator), concerning how young adults make 
sense of life with cancer. I came into the project with my own research questions, theoretical 
framework, and methodological approach, all integrated into the interview protocol. The project 
was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and had received ethical 
approval from the University of Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board prior to being carried out 
(Appendix B). With this funding as well as the funding of the Qualitative Research Centre 
(QRC), we had the resources to recruit young adults from across Canada to talk about their 
experiences with cancer. My role within the larger project was manifold as I spearheaded 
recruitment, data collection, transcription, and analysis.  
 We used a number of recruitment strategies for the project. For Saskatchewan residents 
we handed out pamphlets and letters of invitations (designed by Dr. Teucher and some members 
of the CYA research team, see Appendices C and D) to the Saskatchewan Cancer Agency, 
HOPE Cancer Help Centre, and other related clinics or support organizations. Certain interest 
groups (e.g., Young Adult Cancer Canada, Gilda’s Club, etc.) broadcasted these invitations 
online; I also designed and distributed a Facebook page through word of mouth (it has since been 
 ! 126 
shut down in accordance with the REB Ethics agreement). Over the course of about 9 months 
(from November 2011 to July 2012) I recruited and interviewed a total of 21 young adults.   
We collected narratives in two different ways. In our consent form (see Appendix E), sent 
to people in advance of their agreeing to participate, we outlined that people had the choice 
between three options: writing a short account of their cancer experiences, participating in a 
research interview, or doing both. Regardless of which narratives participants agreed to provide, 
we supplied them with a $20 iTunes gift card for their time and help. The purpose for gathering 
written as well as oral narratives fed into some of the interests of the larger project on making 
sense of young adult life with cancer. In particular, we were interested in how people construct 
their stories differentially in contexts of writing versus contexts of telling.  
Writing a personal narrative can in some ways be dissimilar to talking with another in an 
interview. For example, the dynamic between narrators and audiences can be quite different. 
Ricoeur (1976) observed that a written narrative is often “addressed to an unknown reader” not 
readily apparent, while the audiences to spoken narratives are often ‘live,’ there in the moment of 
its telling, and thus the story is “addressed to you” (p. 31). In other words, intended audiences are 
narrowed and personalized in speaking, possibly tailoring stories to those present. Furthermore, 
in person extra contextual information or “demonstration” (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 34) is provided 
through non-verbal gestures, intonation, and subtle interactions; on the other hand, written 
narratives often try to help readers imagine being there through metaphors, allusions, genres, and 
other literary forms (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 34-37). Thus, in their own ways writing and telling 
employ narrative forms to shape their meanings and provide understanding.  
With these and other considerations in mind, multiple stories of illness from the same 
person may appear quite different according to whether they are written or spoken. Comparative 
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analysis between written and oral narratives is not a primary research question within this 
dissertation. Still, the issue informs some of my analyses and reflections in the following 
chapters, as it is a matter of narrative structure (i.e., how the story is told) and performance (i.e., 
when, where, and to whom is the story told). Having more than one narrative for most 
participants demanded deliberation on the contexts around their production.  
While the written narratives were given little instruction outside of asking young adults to 
speak about cancer and its impact on their lives, the interviews were semi-structured through a 
loosely employed protocol (see Appendix F). They typically involved three parts: first, an 
introduction to the study and some demographic questions (e.g., age, occupation, ethnic 
background, etc.); second, a broad question about what young adulthood was like for participants 
prior to being diagnosed; and third, a much longer conversation about what it was like to have 
cancer, with some supplementary questions. While the primary questions were general in nature, 
inviting people to select what stood out as most relevant, I would sometimes ask more specific 
questions about people’s senses of their bodies, attentions, feelings, relations, expectations and 
activities before and after having cancer.  
Before beginning the interview I explained that the purpose of this research was to study 
the lives and challenges of young adults living with cancer. We usually agreed that more 
research is needed on young adult cancer, and I said that my main contribution would be 
exploring what is at stake for the people I interviewed. I made few promises to them, outside of 
publishing and presenting my findings in settings that would likely have health researchers, care 
providers, and/or other cancer patients as their audiences (e.g., the Canadian Association of 
Psychosocial Oncology conference, the Qualitative Health Research journal, etc.). I did not 
promise to seek out their feedback on my analyses, only to contact them if I needed further 
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clarification on something they said (which happened on a few occasions). I invited questions at 
the end of the interviews and offered my contact information in case concerns emerged later on.  
Two-thirds of the participants did both activities, while seven people declined to write for 
personal reasons: some were too busy, uncomfortable with writing, did not know what to write, 
felt they had ‘said it all’ in the interview, etc. The written stories I received were comparably rich 
in detail but much, much shorter in length than the interview transcripts, and as a result my 
analyses are disproportionately rooted in the latter. The written stories were used most often to 
‘fill out’ a complex representation of their lived experiences, providing complementary material 
to the interviews. 
The interviews ranged in length from just over an hour to nearly three hours, with the 
average being approximately an hour and forty minutes. Roughly half were conducted in person; 
for Saskatchewan residents they were set in either the QRC or a negotiated meeting place and for 
some Ontario residents I was able to afford travel to their locations for a brief period of time. The 
other interviews were conducted through telephone conversations. All interviews were audio-
recorded and transcribed by myself or another research assistant.  
I established a set strategy for transcribing the interviews with the research assistants. The 
interviews were transcribed nearly verbatim, but some nuances and signs were inevitably lost 
because “transcription is not reduplication, but metamorphosis” of the data (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 
42). All silent pauses were recorded, but not length of time. Not every filled pause was recorded 
(e.g., uh and um) as we tried to juggle capturing the subtleties of speaking with maintaining the 
readability and flow of the transcripts. For the same reason we did not transcribe intonation or 
emotional expression (i.e., as sometimes done by adjusting text size or font). Because of my 
interest in the teller-listener relationship, relatively more emphasis was placed on transcribing 
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my verbal confirmations (e.g., mhmm, okay, right, yes) and non-linguistic vocal gestures with 
possible relational significance (e.g., laughs, coughs, sighs, throat clearings, etc.). I proofread 
and edited the transcripts written by others to ensure a relatively consistent ‘metamorphosis’ of 
the spoken interviews into written text.  
B) Methodology: Narrative Analysis   
Different aspects gain more attention than others within varying traditions of narrative 
analysis, from the study of universal structures of speech in sociolinguistics to the context-
specific use of genres and grammar in literary theory, to the interpretive anthropology of stories 
as expressions of self and culture (see e.g., Mattingly, 1998, p. 11-15; Riessman, 2008, p. 76-78). 
Divergent methodologies come out of divergent interests; however, they may be and are 
sometimes brought into dialogue, combining “in bricoleur-like fashion ideas and methods from 
here and there as these have been deemed useful in analyzing [stories]” (Mattingly, 1998, p. 11).  
I took advantage of the procedural freedom of narrative analysis and brought together 
three analytic techniques as described by medical sociologist Catherine Riessman (2008): 
thematic, structural, and performative analysis. The first, thematic technique was used to answer 
the question, “what is told?” (Riessman, p. 105). Thematic narrative analysis is parallel to other 
qualitative methodologies, such as phenomenological analysis or grounded theory, in building a 
substantive interpretation of lived experiences; however, it stands out from other methods in that 
it “keep[s] a story ‘intact’”(Riessman, p. 53). Narrative analysis often entails reconstruction of 
the evolution of themes across a plot; in my project, I looked at the emplotment of meaning and 
being while living with cancer. I chose thematic analysis because it enabled me to catalogue the 
diversity of stakes involved in the young adults’ stories, a few among which were attempts to 
make sense of what happened, position oneself within the story’s events, communicate the 
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unknown to a naïve audience, explore possible pasts and futures, and resist dominant 
expectations about recovery. 
Included in the content of a story is its context, namely, the “relationship between the 
individual life story and the particular society” (Personal Narratives Group, 1989, p. 10-11). This 
is where analysis goes beyond simply reporting what is at stake in individual narratives to 
consider how those stakes weave into discursive constructions of young adulthood and life with 
cancer. I carried out comparative analyses across narratives for the sake of observing variations 
on a theme, accounting for nuances and differing developments in how meaning and being are 
negotiated (Riessman, 2008, p. 74). Each chapter includes demonstrative exemplars and studies 
how their dominant themes unfolded similarly and differentially.  
 A second technique, structural analysis, can have many different meanings, but they 
typically centre on the question, “how is a story told?” (Riessman, 2008, p. 105). By studying 
narrative form, we can start to understand “how participants use speech to construct themselves 
and their histories” (Riesmann, p. 103). Furthermore, structural analysis may involve evaluation 
of “cultural and social patterns” of thinking, wherein we “suspend, or make problematic, 
common-sense thought and generally held beliefs of everyday life” (Rothe, 2000, p. 150). From 
my perspective, structural analysis is inherently built into narrative analysis. Keeping a story 
intact means taking into account formal characteristics of emplotment, most notably temporality 
(i.e., when something happened and how it relates to what happened before and after it). 
Therefore, structural analysis was a necessary approach to interpreting how the participants’ 
storied their stakes, and how their choices of emplotment shaped their expressions of meaning 
and being. 
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 In the way just described above, what is told and how it is told are possibly inseparable, 
but they do require a different lens to observe their effects on a story’s meanings. Unlike 
thematic analysis, structural analysis takes issue with the process of narrative construction, 
including “literary and cultural models which help shape people’s life stories, the social and 
historical conditions affecting their life experiences, and the family relations in which the life 
develops” (Personal Narratives Group, 1989, p. 10). By comparing individual stories to the 
narrative environments within which they are told, we can see how the former may utilize and 
resist common forms for communicating to others. The following chapter takes on the most 
extensive use of structural analysis in order to set up the dominant genres of my participants’ 
narratives, but throughout this dissertation I combined structural with thematic analyses.  
 Performance analysis was my third strategy, adding to the overall analysis by asking the 
questions: when and why was a story told, and to whom is it directed? (Riessman, p. 105). In 
other words, for what “use” is a narrative constructed and how am I, as a reader, to respond to it 
(Personal Narratives Group, p. 11). Performance analysis involves a “close reading of contexts, 
including the influence of investigator, setting, and social circumstances on the production and 
interpretation of narrative” (Riessman, 2008, p. 105). In keeping with the method, within which 
“intersubjectivity and reflexivity come to the fore” (Riesmann, p. 137), I used performance 
analysis to reflect on the teller-listener relationship, the actions involved (i.e., the ‘act’ of 
constructing narratives, as well as the ‘act’ of listening and responding to them), and their ethical 
and political implications. The whole dissertation is interspersed with performance analysis, but 
chapter 6 is heavily dependent upon the method in its consideration of audiences and 
applications of moralized cancer narratives. 
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 Treating narratives as performative acts requires an important disclaimer about my 
conclusions. As already noted in chapter 1, I worked with expressive meanings, those 
constructed in narratives and so limited in their applicability beyond the situation of their 
production. In addition, performances require actors and audiences, and through their dialogue 
meaning is constructed (Good, 1994, p. 142-144; Ricoeur, 1984, p.70-71). I am therefore 
implicated in others’ expressive meanings. Though I set out to understand the local worlds of 
young adults during times of illness, the following chapters contain syntheses of my participants’ 
performances and my interpretive participation as an audience. A hermeneutical task through and 
through, creating images of cancer in young adulthood is an activity of co-construction between 
those involved in discourse. In recognition of this activity, I add in my concluding chapter some 
reflections on my participation and response to the meanings produced in the narratives. 
 I drew the three analytic angles of thematic, structural, and performative analysis into an 
iterative process of interpretation, a “close reading” of each narrative with attention to subtleties, 
contexts, and transformations of a narrative’s elements (Charon, 2006, p. 113). From the page of 
a transcript to a page in the following chapters was a long, meandering journey through several 
points of interest. First, I conducted a series of readings for each person’s narrative. In my initial 
reading I meticulously decorated the margins of the transcript with any thoughts, commentary, 
reflections, criticisms, superficial thematic categories, and other notes I thought relevant to my 
project. I carried out a second reading in search of answers to the question, “what is at stake in 
this narrative?” I asked this question meticulously at every turn of the page, listing the aspects of 
self and experience that seemed to be emphasized in the texts and tied them to perceivable needs 
(e.g., a sense of continuity, belonging, life direction, etc.). At this point I was not selective in my 
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analyses; I would often switch from thematic to performative to structural analysis depending on 
what seemed most relevant and informative to me at a particular time in my reading.  
At the next step in my journey I started to compartmentalize my analyses. I initially 
focused upon structural analysis, re-plotting storied lives into temporal sequences within which 
to place significant events and themes. Specifically, for each transcript I divided a page into 
columns and transferred information from the transcript into either the time before cancer, the 
time of first symptoms and diagnosis, the time of treatment, the time of post-treatment, or the 
time of the present. This helped me to see the earlier lives from which each person entered the 
drama of cancer, as well as where he or she had ended up at the time of the interview.  
After this reconstructed emplotment, I studied the significant themes expressed within 
and across each sequence, which revealed the stakes within each narrative sequence and how 
they evolved over time due to changing circumstances and desires. At this point in time in my 
interpretation, I started to develop what would become the major foci of my analytic chapters. 
Moral explorations first emerged as a dominant concern across the narratives, especially attempts 
to link present suffering with past events and to pursue an ethical future after experiencing 
suffering; these two stakes led me to into what would eventually become chapter 6.  
Though morality was the first theme, it moved into the later parts of my analysis as it 
gradually appeared to be a derivative of more fundamental concerns for placing cancer 
experiences within stories of action (i.e., narrative forms) and locating oneself within these 
stories (i.e., narrative identities). Initially, I had a fourth category of stakes related to 
intersubjective negotiations, but eventually subsumed that under the theme of narrative identities 
as it became apparent these negotiations were almost always about where to place the young 
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adults within their stories (e.g., as agents responsible for the causes/resolutions of their suffering 
or as patients who should submit their bodies to the experts in charge of healing).  
As these three themes became more salient within the narratives, I decided to enter into a 
targeted literature review on each one. While my chapter 2 review of psychosocial oncology and 
narrative identity development served to develop a rationale for my research project, I felt I had 
not adequately explored the issues that had become the most important findings within my 
research. Thus, I read up on some important literature on narrative forms, identities, and 
moralities (the results of which, eventually, became the introductions to chapters 4-6). I placed 
these readings within concept maps, which provided a theoretical context through which I further 
interpreted the narrative themes. Throughout the analytic chapters I incorporate these additional 
concepts into my theoretical framework (see Figures H1, I1, and J1).  
These targeted reviews served another purpose: assessing the dominance of discourses. 
While I was in writing my proposal, I was in search of dominant discourses in psychosocial 
oncology; at that time, I defined dominant discourses as uncritically engaged representations of 
young adult cancer within certain institutions (e.g., CIHR, CCS), cancer support organizations, 
and published academic research7. I saw them as relatively more sedimented than other 
discourses into larger social spaces of experience. Battle tropes, for instance, exemplify a 
narrative form that has spread its sphere of influence across many different contexts, not just 
cancer experiences but medicine in general and, to go further, much of everyday social life. I 
centred my proposal upon the sedimentation of narrative coherence and self-authorship within 
representations of cancer and young adulthood.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 The assumption here is that the most dominant images are those that are often taken-for-granted, invisible to 
suspicion, and in their repetition have developed a power to influence others. 
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I continued these assessments of dominance in my targeted literature reviews. I compared 
my earlier conclusions about psychosocial oncology with the said selective bodies of research, as 
well as with participants’ commentaries on (both in support of and against) what they saw as 
prescriptive language about cancer experiences. As a result, I interpreted the presence of the 
imperatives of narrative coherence and self-authorship within discourses about genres (i.e., 
narrative form=narrative coherence), identities (i.e., agency and consummated being=self-
authorship), and moralities (i.e., moral explanation=narrative coherence, personal 
responsibility=self-authorship). These equations were not just observed within the literature; they 
were typically emphasized, encouraged, and presented without juxtaposition or contradictory 
evidence. It is against these predominant assumptions about cancer and young adulthood that 
some of my more critical analyses are directed, but not without accounting for some of their 
merits and uses.  
Still within thematic analysis, I colour-coded the stakes of formalization, identity 
formation, and moralization within each of the rendered narratives. Encountering repetition in 
the stories and comparing these codes with the above bodies of literature, I started to develop a 
working list of categorized themes and then made a table for sorting out how each person 
expressed these themes. Thus, over time, I built up a range of narrative genres (e.g., journeys, 
battles, mysteries, etc.), identities (e.g., patients, tricksters, advocates, etc.), and moral 
explanations (e.g., psychological, biomedical, etc.) from the dialogue between interviewees’ 
narratives and the reviewed literature on illness narratives.  
In order to balance my more critical and more interpretive perspectives, I entered into 
performative analysis just before the writing process. Specifically, I asked what was being 
accomplished in their narratives in relation to the research context; more to the point, why or 
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why not was narrative coherence and self-authorship not salient within a particular moment in 
time. The issue of critical witnessing, in chapter 6, arose from this more reflexive analysis, as an 
attempt to articulate and manage some of the expectations and dynamics that are brought into the 
relationship of teller and listener.  
 The last step within this interpretive journey (though I returned to earlier points again 
and again) was writing up the analyses as an engagement between idiosyncrasies within 
individual stories, dominant narrative themes across participants, and relevant theoretical 
concepts within the research literature. I typically weaved conceptual discussions into evidence 
within the narratives, but I changed the way I narrated my dissertation according to my purpose. 
When writing about broadly observed results I analyzed a number of different metaphors used 
across the young adults’ stories, which may be understood as short-hand “kernels” of 
emplotment—or, moments of meaning in my conceptual language—that inform the whole of the 
longer narratives (Teucher, 2003). When writing about the idiosyncrasy of certain narratives, I 
analyzed a select few exemplars over the course of their particular plots.  
I hope in these varying interpretive practices to have demonstrated shared aspects of 
narrative forms, identities, and moralities while accentuating the diversity and creativity of each 
person’s story. I often use visual representations within this manuscript as interpretive aids, 
condensing the girth of information that I felt was necessary to my task. As mentioned above, I 
also use visuals to reintroduce my theoretical framework within each of the next three chapters, 
adding new concepts to it (signified by italics and underlining) as they relate to the issue at hand.  
C) Participants’ Characteristics 
While some research may seek homogeneity within a sample (in order to ‘control’ for 
extraneous ‘factors’), critical phenomenological research comes at a topic with an interest in 
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multiplicity, with the intention of revealing peoples’ manifold selves and meanings. I have 
provided a table of some participant characteristics to show the diverse demographics of the 
sample (see Figure G1 in Appendix G).  
There were, of course, common patterns and characteristics to the sample. Among the 21 
people who participated in this study, nearly all were middle-income, European or Caucasian 
Canadians; the only other ethnic background reported was Asian Canadian. The majority of 
people came from two provinces: Saskatchewan and Ontario. Most of the people I recruited in 
my home province were from word of mouth through friends and associates, but a couple came 
from advertisements I had issued. Ontario was heavily represented because it contains one-third 
of the country’s population. On top of that, compared to most other provinces, it has a rich 
network of organizations engaging in advocacy and support work for young adults: Gilda’s Club, 
Wellspring, Maplesoft, and many others offer programs specific to young adult survivors. When 
I asked them to pass along information about my study, word of mouth again spread across in-
person and online connections. Young Adult Cancer Canada helped me tremendously, reaching 
contacts in places throughout the country I would have otherwise never found.  
There seemed to be good distribution of participants across age and gender. People in 
their late twenties to early forties were very well represented in this group. Looking to gender, 
despite the disproportionate number of women, this is a relatively balanced representation. Far 
fewer men participate in psycho-oncological research than women, with some studies reporting 
as low as 15-30% representation of men (e.g., Decker et al., 2006; Zebrack, 2008). Notably, most 
research on young adults with cancer do not even report how many men and women they studied 
(e.g., Grinyer, 2007; McGoldrick et al., 2011; Riley et al., 2011). 
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There are important contexts around the construction of their stories needing mention. 
Many of the participants had written the stories before, usually for more public consumption: 
blogs, newspapers, online profiles, etc. None of them wrote professionally, although twelve had 
had post-secondary training and were thus somewhat familiar with writing—one had even started 
his narrative in the style of an essay defining and explicating terms from neurology and 
oncology. A few had training in pedagogy and had some experience teaching others.  
In terms of exchanging stories with other patients, outside of larger city centres there was 
very little person-to-person contact with other young adults, in support groups or patient-
matching programs. While the web enabled young adults to communicate with each other from 
across the country, these interactions were neither as frequent nor enduring as they were for 
people involved in support groups. In addition, some of the similar themes of people’s narratives 
is also partially an artifact of snowball sampling, where the people who agree to join are likely to 
know and appropriate the stories of others who have already participated. A significant 
consideration for analysis, for people in continual contact with one another may shape each 
other’s narratives, forming discourses that may not be shared by those outside of their ‘circle.’  
The details of people’s cancers were also quite diverse (see Figure G2 in Appendix G). 
Nine different types of cancer were accounted for in this study. They represented a mixture of 
epithelial cancers (i.e., carcinomas of the breast, cervix, colon, etc.) and non-epithelial cancers 
(i.e., leukemias, brain gliomas, Hodgkin’s and Non-Hodgkin’s lymphomas, etc.). In line with 
research on gender and young adult cancer, more women had epithelial cancers than non-
epithelial (8 vs. 5), while the reverse was true of men (2 vs. 6).  
As can be seen, participants’ cancers were in a wide spectrum of stages. There are many 
ways to stage cancers (e.g., the Tumour, Node, Metastasis [TNM] guide), but most people’s 
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healthcare teams seemed to use the Overall Stage Grouping, from Stage 0-4. Stage 0, or 
carcinoma in situ, is when cancerous cells have not invaded surrounding tissue. Stage 1 has 
invaded local areas of the body and may be surgically removed, while in Stage 2 the cancer has 
often advanced enough to require chemotherapy and/or radiation as well. Stage 3 is a further 
localized progression of cancer, while Stage 4 marks metastasis into other areas of the body.  
Getting information on the stages of people’s cancers was surprisingly difficult. Just over 
half knew with confidence the stage at which they were diagnosed, with the other half not 
entirely sure. There are two major reasons for such a high number of unknown stages. Four 
participants said that their diagnoses vacillated depending on who they talked to in their 
healthcare team, and thus weren’t clear on the severity of their illness: in three cases, the 
diagnosis ranged from Stage 1 to 3, while the fourth ranged from 2 to 4. The remaining five 
could not remember if or what they were told at the time of diagnosis.  
We may interpret the ambiguity of staging in a variety of ways: perhaps the participants 
were not that concerned about their stage; perhaps staging was overshadowed by the word 
“cancer” and not heard; perhaps there are difficulties within oncology in staging young adult 
cancer accurately; perhaps caregivers were evasive about sharing specific details; and so on. 
Each explanation was applicable to some extent within the young adults’ stories.  
Much more than staging, the majority of young adults were quite concerned with how 
long they had had cancer. The amount of attention given to time since diagnosis may have 
something to do with three-quarters of the sample having cancer for less than 5 years. Most 
survival ratio statistics are assessed at the 3-year or 5-year mark and can become for many a 
‘finish line’ beyond which they consider themselves to have ‘survived’ cancer. A lot of weight 
was placed upon these statistics, and in turn a lot of anxiety during follow-up appointments 
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within that time frame8. Indeed, those who were beyond 5 years since diagnosis seemed notably 
less interested in the number of years passed. All this despite the enduring prospect of relapses at 
any time; the three participants who did have a relapse were at one, three, and seven years post-
diagnosis. This is often how the statistics are used, as a deceptive measure of certainty for an 
unpredictable disease and future (Jain, 2007).   
Chapter Conclusion: Proceeding to Analyses 
 Here we are at a transition, from the study’s introductory chapters on theory and method 
to its substantial analyses of the narratives. There is much more to be said of the participants’ 
characteristics, and more broadly about the study’s characteristics, but these details come into 
relevant discussions in the following chapters. The remaining pages explore the moments of 
meaning and being expressed within participants’ narratives of cancer: from considerations of 
narrative forms in chapter 4, to analyses of narrative identities in chapter 5, to a discussion of 
moral meanings in chapter 6, up to a concluding chapter 7 on this study’s major findings and 
implications. Throughout the moments of meaning and being brought into this dissertation are 
conversations between critical and interpretive ways of understanding young adult life with 
cancer. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 One woman who was told she had a high survival prospect with just surgery still underwent five years of 
tamoxifen to increase her chances by an estimated 1%: “1 percent is 1 person out of a 100 like that, that’s one person 
who will die if they don’t do chemo so give me the chemo.”  
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CHAPTER 4: NARRATIVE GENRES AND MOMENTS OF MEANING     
 
Illness Narrative Genres  
Her name is Yoshimi 
She's a black belt in karate 
Working for the city 
She has to discipline her body 
'Cause she knows that 
It's demanding 
To defeat those evil machines 
I know she can beat them. 
 
—The Flaming Lips, Yoshimi battles the pink robots 
Introduction 
 In 2002, the psychedelic rock band The Flaming Lips released an album called Yoshimi 
battles the pink robots. The album tells a story of a young woman dying of breast cancer from 
the perspective of a compassionate male witness, perhaps a caring boyfriend or brother. In order 
to make sense of her illness and to maintain hope for her survival, he sees the young woman as a 
freedom fighter, reinventing her as a Japanese warrior who possesses an unflinching courage. He 
imagines they are in an apocalyptic world being invaded by an army of conniving, destructive 
machines. That world will be lost unless somebody resists their advances, and the man positions 
his beloved as the hero, trained in martial arts and ready to ward off total annihilation. 
 However fantastical the imagery, mythic stories like the one above powerfully express 
the gravity of the pain and struggle experienced by a dying cancer patient and her closest 
intimates. The unnamed storyteller in the Flaming Lips album does this by use of particular 
narrative forms, in this case through a war story. The scene of the hospital bed is transformed 
into a battleground, while visiting friends and families appear as helpless bystanders watching 
the forces of good and evil fight to determine the fate of their world. Battle stories have arguably 
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become a trope du jour or “prototypical plot” (Good, 1994, p. 146), a dominant genre for today’s 
cancer stories (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 88); as a case in point, the commercial success of the 
Flaming Lips album precipitated its adaptation into a rock opera. Stories with dominant war 
themes are among other genres that are “so familiar to the public that the public uses them as 
keys” (Todorov, 1968/1981, p. 62); however, they hang upon a hefty key ring of other ready-to-
hand narrative forms.  
 My purpose in this chapter is to study some of the keys jingling in the young adults’ 
pockets, for they open doors to constructing meaning and being in complex ways. My attentions 
are temporarily narrowed on moments of meaning; the different genres discussed below set the 
stage for analyzing moments of being in the next chapter. The analyses within this chapter are 
divided into three sections, corresponding to three important generic considerations: narrative 
forms, narrative contexts, and narrative purposes (Personal Narratives Group, 1989, p. 100-102). 
These explorations inform the critical task of my study in showing use of prototypical plots 
along the axis of narrative coherence; that is, I evaluate the extent to which young adults used 
these narrative forms to integrate their experiences into orderly representations of cancer.  
The first section builds upon exemplary and foundational scholarly work on illness 
narrative forms (e.g., Couser, 1997; Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993; Frank, 1995; Rimmon-Kenan, 
2002; Teucher, 2001a, 2001b) by cataloguing a range of “prototypical plots” within the 
interviews. As part of a “pluralizing hermeneutics” (Marquard, 1981/1989), I exhibit the 
multiplicity of narrative forms within and across the young adults’ stories, which vary according 
to their construction of narrative coherence.  
The second section entails a modest interpretive pursuit of some cultural contexts, 
namely, relevant narrative environments that may have contributed to the narrative forms of the 
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young adults’ stories. Among many different muses I could discuss, I chose those deemed to be 
quite influential in the lives of today’s young adults, including the stories of popular fictional 
media and dominant genres in medical and public rhetoric about illness. Then, I weigh the 
dominant plots in fictional and non-fictional discourses against the hierarchy of plots seen within 
my study, finding some different trends in this comparison.   
The uses and purposes of narrative genres make up the third and final segment of this 
chapter. Included are three exemplary narratives that show the creative application and utility of 
different genres. I consider possible reasons these three young adults evoked some narrative 
forms over others, and the many different needs that may be (and may not be) expressed by 
them. What we come to see is that narrative coherence is but one of many stakes involved in 
structuring narratives of illness. I draw the chapter to a close by affirming that stories of illness 
must be situated within the forms, contexts, and purposes of their making in order to recognize 
and appropriate these many possible stakes. .  
A Note on ‘Genres’: Sedimentations and Innovations of Meaning 
 It is difficult to define the term ‘genre,’ though in its many definitions it is used to discuss 
works of art according to style or form. Structural literary theorist Tzvetan Todorov (1968/1981) 
referred to genre as the “signifying organization of ‘discourse’” (p. 16), a way of structuring 
texts into particular arrangements. Tied to this function of genres are the shorthand “kernels” of 
meaning known as metaphors (Teucher, 2003). These techniques carve out the shapes and 
meanings of a narrative. They may be identified by asking, “how does a text signify?” (Todorov, 
p. 16).  
 Beyond Todorov’s relatively abstract definition, genre is an elusive and problematic 
term. Thomas Couser (2005), a literary scholar of disability life writing, wrote that it is often 
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unclear what is a genre, sub-genre, or sub-sub-genre because people do not agree on the 
hierarchical organization of generic categories (p. 140). Within literary theory, for instance, 
Marlene Kadar (1992) wrote of “life writing” as an umbrella term subsuming autobiography 
while her colleagues Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson (2001/2010) placed them on equal footing 
as different sub-genres of life narrative1.  
 Some have rejected use of the term as too structuralist, placing complex and diverse 
narratives into “tidy categories” following rigid “rules” (Personal Narratives Group, 1989, p. 99). 
In response, some scholars refer instead to “narrative forms” (Personal Narratives Group, p. 99) 
or “narrative types” (Frank, 1995, p. 75-77). I heed the above advice about the simplifying 
dangers that plague discussion of genres; however, the term does not need to be understood in an 
obstinate way and, indeed, literary discourses about genres have shifted in recent decades to 
recognize flexibility in form. Couser (2005) claimed “notions that genres are pure, stable, rule-
bound, and distinct compel little credence today” and contemporary scholars tend to see genres 
“as plastic, fluid, and perhaps inherently hybrid entities that may emerge, evolve, and eventually 
die out” (p. 141). Contemporary notions of genre enable recognition of narratives that modify, 
play around with, and refuse to follow formal ‘rules.’  
 That does not mean we disregard the traditions upon which illness narratives today are 
inspired. According to Paul Ricoeur (1984), “a tradition is constituted by the interplay of 
innovation and sedimentation” (p. 68; my emphasis); that is, in a variety of ways individual 
narratives both deviate from and reproduce customary forms of storying life. With regard to the 
latter, meanings are sedimented through the establishment of formal rules, norms, or codes for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Free usage of the prefix “sub-” to talk of genres adds no clarity to the issue, and I confess I may also be 
inconsistent in this regard. Let me try to manage some of the confusion by stating that the plots I spend most of the 
chapter on are technically sub-genres of illness narratives, which are themselves sub-genres of life writing. That 
said, below I demonstrate the ‘leakiness’ of this neat hierarchy. 
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constructing a text (Derrida, 1980/2000, p. 220-221; Ricoeur, 1984, p. 31-33; Todorov, 
1968/1981, p. 18). The “rules of the genre” may provide narrators with a “model of writing” 
while shaping finite “horizons of expectation”2 among audiences (Todorov, p. 62). Among the 
many ‘sedimented’ meanings within illness narratives are “prototypical plots” (Good, 1994), 
available storylines for narrating illness in socially familiar ways. Prototypical plots thus become 
“cultural possibilities and models” for telling and hearing narratives (Personal Narratives Group, 
1989, p. 100).  
Even stories that strive to resist these customs, like feminist critiques of male-dominated 
forms of narratives, may rely upon preceding standards of intelligibility (Personal Narratives 
Group, 1989); the fissures they forcibly create may only be seen against the sedimentary 
backdrop of normativity they puncture3. In a sense, then, stories are constructed in response to 
what is socially deemed to be “appropriate and familiar,” even if the response is primarily critical 
(Personal Narratives Group, p. 100). Yet, such disruptions to tradition may transform it, and 
rules may be challenged, modified, and contested. This is often an ideological affair, as 
traditional rules tend to conceal marginalized or non-dominant narrative forms (Personal 
Narratives Group, p. 6-8).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 His use of this phrase is not accidental to my use of it. Both Todorov and Ricoeur (who I draw upon) take it from 
German literary theorist and philosopher Hans Robert Jauss. 
3 I should note that though Derrida, Ricoeur, and Todorov shared a normative notion of genre, Derrida (2000) 
seemed to disagree that all stories must work within the rules of the genre in order to subvert it. Instead, he 
envisioned resistance narratives that “mark a collapse that is unthinkable, irrepresentable, unsuitable within a linear 
order of succession, within a spatial or temporal sequentiality, within an objectifiable topology or chronology” (p. 
223). At the time he was writing about the bounds of intelligibility, an issue I find, by necessity, quite difficult to 
traverse let alone find an end to it. The debate is whether at the tip of the intelligible world we are sucked into a 
maelstrom of meaninglessness or inevitably pushed backed into it by the shore-bound waves of dominant narratives. 
This issue amounts to a disagreement between post-structuralist and structuralist visions of narrative order; I try to 
address this tension delicately throughout the remaining chapters, though at the risk of oversimplifying my position I 
will briefly state that both and neither fates are possible: sometimes our stories are pulled out into the infinity of the 
inexpressible, sometimes they are held fast by readily available meanings, and perhaps most often they hang 
somewhere in between, floating toward and away from cultural spaces of experience.  
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Some patients refuse to tell the types of stories that are indoctrinated into their social 
worlds because they do not account for the many potential disruptions people may experience 
while living with illness (Frank, 2010; Rimmon-Kenan, 2002). Herein lies the innovative side of 
narrative construction, the negotiative power individuals have access to in interpreting their 
experiences. People may transform larger myths about life with illness into more locally resonant 
worlds of meaning. Different prototypical plots may be used loosely and in combination with 
others (Good, 1994, p. 146; Neuman, 1992, p. 223-226; Whitehead, 2006). For instance, the 
abstract criteria for distinguishing a coming of age narrative from a young adult cancer narrative 
may seem exclusive and rigid, but the “actual genres” embodied in individuals’ stories may 
“admit, on the contrary, diversity and coexistence” (Todorov, 1968/1981, p. 19). New plots may 
be created through the dialogue between available forms, the contexts of narration, and 
individual purposes for telling their stories (Personal Narratives Group, p. 102).  
Thus, there is a singularity to each story, where no two narratives are the same (Charon, 
2008, p. 45-47). As Arthur Frank (1995) stated, “people tell their own unique stories, but they 
compose these stories by adapting and combining narrative types that cultures make available” 
(p. 75). Some have argued that this marks a “post-modern” period for illness narratives (Egan, 
1999, p. 14; Frank, 1995, p. 4; Morris, 1998, p. 3), involving a “hodgepodge” of storylines that 
“[contain] multitudes” (Egan, 1999, p. 15-19). It may, therefore, be appropriate to think about 
genre in a microscopic way, as pertaining to bits or sequences of stories, as modestly marked 
moments of meaning instead of homogenizing labels. Figure H1 (in Appendix H) demonstrates 
how this position on narrative forms fits into my overall interpretive toolset. 
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Illness Narrative Forms: Moments of Meaning in Stories of Illness 
Prototypical Plots in Young Adult Cancer Narratives 
 If misunderstood generic analysis could be taken as an exercise in pigeonholing, which is 
not at all my intention. My task is precisely to study the creative blending of generic categories 
in the framing and forming of young adult cancer narratives, for the purpose of relating them to 
the expectations of narrative coherence in dominant discourses. Talk of genres should serve not a 
categorizing but a “clarificatory” function, as “comprehension of [generic] hybridity depends on 
naming and identifying the various sub-genres in play” (Couser, 2005, p. 144-145; see also 
Thomas-Maclean, 2004). We must appreciate the originality and specificity of each narrative, 
but not at the expense of knowing the historical and cultural circumstances that shaped them. 
Below I discuss an array of prototypical plots and dominant metaphors employed in innovative 
ways, expressed as moments of: a) fighting, b) sojourning, c) healing, d) inspecting, and e) 
disordering4. See Figure H2 for a visual representation of the moments of meaning and their 
different motifs (numbered according to prevalence). 
A) Moments of Fighting: Battles, Politics and Athletics 
As mentioned in the introduction, stories of fighting are among the most familiar 
prototypical plots within cancer discourses. There were many sequences in the young adults’ 
narratives when cancer experiences were emplotted as moments of fighting, though they were 
talked about in different ways. I found moments of fighting to be most often set as battles against 
cancer, political struggles with others, and athletic struggles to overcome personal limitations.  
Like the man who imagines Yoshimi defending her land and taking down menacing 
intruders, many people thought of some aspects of their cancer experiences as a kind of battle. 
Stories of battle are pervasive in public discourses, where cancer is externalized as an ‘other,’ a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The quoted texts within this section come directly from the participants’ narratives. 
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foreign adversarial body that is battling it out with patients’ cellular defences (Sontag, 1978, p. 
66-67; Teucher, 2001b, p. 166). Patients’ bodies become warzones and the stakes are ownership 
of the territories (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 66). Just over half of all the young adults I 
interviewed utilized this prototypical plot of illness at some point in their narratives, often in 
reference simply to “fighting” or “battling” cancer.  
Often their stories described the course of events as follows: discovery of a lurking 
enemy (diagnosis), mobilization of resources (determining the best treatment), a defensive attack 
(“cut, poison, and burn”, as crudely put by some5), and a survey (biopsies and blood tests) of the 
strength of either side. Across these plots and metaphors of military procedure, the young adults 
talked about using “aggressive” treatments on their cancer, being “in the trenches,” seeking the 
“strength” and “bravery” to carry on, motivated to “win” the war on their disease, and 
determined to “conquer” the “world” that is in danger of being destroyed. They talked of 
treatment as an “arsenal” or “secret weapon” designed to “destroy” or “kill” cancer cells, and a 
few people visualized their cancer “dying” during their chemotherapy or radiation treatments. 
When treatments were unsuccessful, particularly for other cancer patients, they talked about 
“losing” or “lost” battles.   
In some circumstances, like that of the imagined Yoshimi, the connotation of foreignness 
took a radical form as an alien invasion, invoking a science-fiction plot (Sontag, 1978, p. 66-67) 
like that of War of the Worlds. Living with colorectal cancer in her thirties, Laura described her 
disease as a “monster”: 
 C: And what sort of features does this monster have? 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For instance, Counseling psychologist Brenda Hunter (2004) wrote critically of surgery, chemotherapy, and 
radiation as “barbaric” for inflicting such violence on patients’ bodies. However, her “new ally,” Dr. Linda 
Seligman, encouraged her to “combat [cancer] on all fronts,” defined by her as the body, mind, and spirit (p. 8-9). 
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 L: He’s, he’s big. He’s black. He’s scary. He’s got teeth and he’s probably got  
 a gun, and he’s willing to take anybody down, you know? 
 
 C: Mhm, it’s very powerful, very (J: Yeah), very dark. (J: Yeah) Um, what  
 else stands out for you for this, this monster? 
 
 L: The fact that he’s just ruthless, the fact that he doesn’t value life. (C: Mhm)  
 (Pause). The fact that he’s calculating, ‘cause he, he probably lurks and y-you  
 know, goes where the weakest part of your body is so he’ll attack there and 
 hold on, you know? 
Here as elsewhere in young adults’ narratives, cancer was seen as a vicious and conscious 
villain, deliberate in its actions and corrupt in its motives. Cancer was sometimes referred to as 
simply “evil,” and Laura along with another woman, Penny, specifically described their battles in 
religious language, seeing themselves as “God-chosen” warriors engaged in a divine war. When 
they interpreted their battles on grander scales, as threats to humanity, they emphasized the 
importance of “rallied” support, a collective effort and “interlocking hands” of “allies,” in order 
to overcome cancer.  
Sometimes allies were not so cooperative and the language of battle shifted to 
interpersonal conflict. Alliances sometimes broke down and disagreements ensued over how to 
proceed. At their worst, an ally—usually a care provider—started to be seen as an enemy of, or 
at least interference to, the best interests of the patient. During these hard times, war efforts were 
redirected toward, for example, oncologists who the young adults identified as stubborn or 
negligent (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 66-67). Battles often became less militaristic and more 
political in such circumstances; patients employed techniques of rhetoric in order to gain 
support, and this sometimes led to heated debates with their caregivers. 
A large minority of my interviewees noted alliance breakdowns at some point during 
their care. In these moments of meaning, the young adults saw “advocacy” as the primary fight 
within their care, doing their “own research” into symptoms and treatments (e.g., “Googling” it), 
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“taking responsibility” for their own recovery, “challenging the assumptions” of their care 
providers and striving to be heard. They talked about feeling “rushed” by “forceful” oncologists, 
“disputing” with doctors who “don’t listen” to their concerns, and seeing their time in healthcare 
as a “struggle to be taken seriously.” For example, 34-year-old Lorena, who had lung cancer, 
was “angry at the fact that [the oncologists] weren’t willing to try radiation and they weren’t 
willing to operate on me, even though I would have gladly volunteered…I definitely wish that, 
like, my doctors had been in my corner.”   
Miscommunication and disagreement were not limited to patient-doctor relationships. 
Other alliances were said to be at risk as well, most notably the support of patients’ families. 
Some described their spouses or parents as “useless,” “fractured,” a “mess,” clueless of how to 
understand or care for a loved one with cancer. Family tensions sometimes became battles unto 
themselves, as when 31-year-old Jeanine who suffered a “bombardment” of questions about 
cervical cancer from a family insensitive to her needs and concerns, or when a “turf war” 
developed between the wife and the mother of 39-year-old George while he was recovering from 
leukemia treatments. As with caregiver disagreements, the young adults struggled for a voice, 
wanting to advocate for themselves among a familial arena of competing interests and needs.   
 Some battles were more oriented toward self-refinement than overcoming or negotiating 
interpersonal strife; they often emplotted struggles as athletic obstacles (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 
1993, p. 76-77). Rather than a fight to the death, the conflict was—mind the pun—within 
oneself, between one’s limitations and endurance. Much less common than battle stories but 
slightly more frequent than stories of advocacy, athletic plots constructed cancer as a “hurdle,” 
“challenge,” or “marathon,” one involving “training” and preparation, as well as the strength to 
“confront fears” and “never give up.” Some spoke of needing a personal “coach” or a 
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motivational figure, usually a family member, caregiver, or celebrity athlete with cancer (e.g., 
Lance Armstrong).  
 Post-treatment time was often perceived as the “finish line,” when patients were 
“triumphant” and had “overcome” their cancers, showing “gratitude” for all those who helped 
them along the way. One woman who took up exercise classes post-treatment, Beth, wrote about 
becoming mentally and physically “stronger” than she’d ever been and more than she’d ever 
expected of herself. The sense of conquering ‘internal’ obstacles was for her a sign of hope and 
inspiration toward a future without breast cancer. Lorena’s statement about wishing her 
healthcare team was in her “corner” (as in boxing matches) pulls from this athletic language as 
well. 
Moments of meaning related to ‘fighting’ may be positioned in a variety of ways, some 
of which include militaristic, political, or athletic conflict. Other battles may also be seen in 
cancer narratives, likened to struggling with one’s faith or resisting evil, facing social conflict or 
‘societal decay,’ and taking control of nature by ‘battling with the elements’ (Teucher, 2001b, p. 
168-169). These different battles can signify a variety of issues at stake in living with cancer, 
including conquering over evil or injustice, establishing one’s own voice, transcending one’s 
limitations, and many others.  
In the context of youth, some war imagery may also draw upon dominant Western 
discourses of adolescence and young adulthood, as a time of “storm and stress” within oneself 
(for some history on the use of this phrase, see Arnett, 1999). For example, a few participants 
spoke of young adulthood as a “fight” to build a successful career, “wrestling” to find love and to 
be “ahead of the game.” Cancer in young adulthood may be seen in these moments of meaning 
as yet another battle within (or shortly after) already turbulent times.  
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Though battle stories may be most familiar among the different narrative genres used in 
cancer narratives, as I have shown there is a great deal of diversity within them. Let us now turn 
to the multiplicity beyond them, in other prototypical plots of illness, starting with the genres of 
journey narratives.  
B) Moments of Sojourning: Journeys, Banishments, and Near-death Experiences 
 Moments of sojourning relate to prototypical plots that typically involve a sense of travel 
and adventure. A variety of sojourns may be present in illness narratives, which require patients 
to exit everyday life and enter a “new world” rife with foreign customs, bizarre values, and 
exotic dangers (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993; Frank, 1995). I discuss three particularly notable 
motifs within this context: journeys, banishments, and near-death experiences. These stories 
speak of a deprived sense of home: friends or families may seem worlds away as their loved ones 
traverse the geographies of their emotions; spiritual explorations may take them into hitherto 
unimagined places of divine or dark inspiration; and so on.  
However sojourning may be imagined, illness tends to be constructed as a pursuit toward 
edification (e.g., Mosack, Abbott, Singer, Weeks, and Rohena, 2005). Cancer is still seen as a 
source of much anguish, but it holds out an opportunity to ‘gain perspective’ on one’s life 
(Frank, 1995, p. 115). In comparison to moments of fighting, moments of sojourning employ less 
adversarial language, and tend to carry a “less aggressive, quieter, and more introverted ethos” 
(Hunsaker-Hawkins, p. 78).  
A wide range of sojourning plots may emerge in illness narratives. Journeys are perhaps 
the most general of such plots. About three-quarters of my participants referred to their illness as 
a “journey,” “adventure,” or “quest,” sometimes more specifically as a “rollercoaster” or a 
“ride,” along a “windy” or “bumpy” or “blocked” road, going “downhill” into a “valley,” or 
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going through several “phases.” Having cancer had set in motion a “new life” or “new path,” one 
that left them forever “changed.” The dominant theme expressed in these moments of meaning 
was movement along an unpredictable but hopefully finite and rewarding quest. 
Most of the young adults’ narratives envisioned treatment as a journey “ahead,” a “plan 
of action” offering “direction” and “going somewhere.” Sometimes their “tour” of the healthcare 
system was seen as a “minor detour,” beyond which they would be on the “other side” of the 
“cancer world,” “continuing on the same path.” One of the most common journey emplotments 
used was around hopes that treatment and post-treatment adjustment would enable them to 
“move on” from their suffering, get “back on track,” or see some “movement” in their situations. 
These moments of meaning alluded to possible expectations among young adults that cancer will 
be a temporary interruption to their lives, as suggested by Kathy Charmaz (1992). When these 
expectations were disappointed, people felt they had fallen “behind,” were caught in journeys 
that were “never complete” or “never over.” They spoke of “searching” for some sense of home, 
“routine,” or “normality” again, “needing guidance” for how to live on after cancer.  
Catherine, who at the time of the interview was still receiving chemotherapy for colon 
cancer, said, “There’s nothing worse than being 30 years old and unable to care for yourself. 
Umm, coming out of surgery was the same, it’s, yeah it’s tough and it’s a struggle and it’s 
slogging through crap.” This journey was still very present for her, and she said it was often hard 
to see an end in sight. She said that through the course of her treatments she gradually came to 
see that “life is not gonna be what it was” and faced a difficult question: “What am I supposed to 
take from this? There has to be a lesson, this can’t just be for nothing.” Catherine’s words 
resound with many of the young adults’ narratives, expressing frustration over not appearing to 
learn a ‘lesson’ from cancer. 
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She also pointed to some of the “mental tourism” that other young adults encountered, 
where they explored the landscapes of their perceptions and assumptions, seeing a hopeful 
perspective as among the most salient journeys during illness (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 78). 
The young adults sometimes talked about seeking to find a “gift” or “lesson” within their 
experiences. They were usually cautious to add disclaimers about cancer being an unwelcome 
gift or mixed blessing, but it still had an edifying element, whether a “new outlook,” some 
“understanding” about life, or personal “change” for the better.  
In her mid-thirties with cervical cancer, Penny blended two seemingly incompatible 
personifications of cancer: an entity of “evil,” as we saw in the previous section, and a “teacher” 
taking patients upon an educational journey toward seeing the world in new ways. She titled a 
part of her written story “What cancer has taught me”: 
It teaches you to love deeper than you ever did before because you may not have a  
tomorrow. Cancer teaches you to find the good in any situation. Cancer strengthens the 
 bonds of true friendships. Cancer makes you find the words when you thought there 
 weren't any left. It teaches you to appreciate the simple pleasures of life like a bird 
 singing in a tree or the smile on your child's face when they hand you a handful of 
 dandelions. It teaches you to evaluate your priorities. It teaches you to work through your 
 emotions and decide if you should smile, cry or scream. 
 
This list goes on for a couple of pages, showing the wide extents of cancer’s ‘influence.’ Despite 
her hostility toward her disease, she repeated most other young adults’ claims to being taught 
“love,” “appreciation,” and “empathy” for others, and to “reevaluate” their lifestyles. Cancer 
illuminated some beloved part of their worlds that had been previously neglected. Teachers can, 
of course, have varying personalities; they can be mean, even misanthropic as Penny saw hers, 
and they can educate people on things they didn’t want to know about, like bloody discharges, 
invasive surgeries, survivor’s guilt, and other undesirable illuminations. This was often the case 
among the young adults. A young woman in her thirties, Martha, summed up her mixed feelings 
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toward her teacher in this way: “I freaking hate that I had cancer – but I love the person it made 
me.”  
 Sometimes young adults would be accompanied by “guides” and “fellow travelers” (e.g., 
care providers, loved ones, or other cancer patients), but much more often their journeys were 
done “alone.” With a more intense degree of alienation and separation, and yearning for a world 
that has been lost, these moments of meaning expressed plots of “exile” or banishment 
(Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 79). Over half of participants described being “uprooted,” “shipped 
off,” sent along a “conveyer belt” to “another world” away from their own. They constructed 
their new worlds as unappealing places, like a “dark tunnel,” “desert,” “island,” or “boat in the 
ocean.” Across these different metaphors is a theme of having no choice in the journey one is on, 
of being sent against one’s will upon a saddening and perilous trip without company. When 
describing their cancer journeys this way, participants talked about being “set back” from what 
they saw as the normal course of life, feeling “isolated,” “confined,” or “lost,” not where they 
“expected to be” and “going nowhere.” 
Expressions of banishment were often used in reference to long periods of waiting for 
answers or for recovery. Dismissing her caregivers’ cautions about infection as paranoia and 
feeling impatient for the end of her journey, Catherine went shopping during chemotherapy 
treatments and caught a flu over which she had to be admitted to emergency. She said, “After 
that I was kinda scared to go out anywhere, so I really didn’t for the next like, like next 6 
months.” Though not detained against her will, Catherine had to distance herself from a social 
world consisting of malls, clubs, and other public places. Stories of banishment put emphasis on 
distressing experiences of alienation and “unhomelike” being (Svenaeus, 2000), aspects of 
illness that signify unwilling segregation from others. In a sense they are seized journeys, for the 
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young adults were stripped of the freedom of movement and exploration during their time ‘away’ 
from others. Weighed down by fatigue and nausea, some people simply laid in bed, hoping to be 
released one day soon back into their communities.  
 A smaller minority of young adults (about a quarter) told of travels to yet another world: 
the realm of the dead (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 80). Journeys telling of near-death 
experiences were mentioned within several narratives of more advanced cancers (i.e., Stage 3 to 
4), but they were most prevalent among the few brain cancer patients, who not only had some of 
the worst prognoses but also whose treatments had stopped before having removed all visible 
cancer cells6. Those who saw their journeys heading toward the land of the dead spoke of having 
“almost died,” believing they were at “the end of the road” and that it was “game over.” They 
“prepared” for their seemingly final journeys by writing their wills, receiving the sacraments, 
planning their funerals, or “living like [they were] dying” (e.g., spending money hastily, 
dispensing with a vision of the future, etc.). 
With glioma in a very sensitive area of his brain, Adrian’s doctors were not sure the 
treatment would really improve his situation…so they left it. They forewarned him that there was 
little hope for a future: “My oncologist even told me to not be so focused on a degree but just the 
act of going to university when so many doctors have their doubts.” In Adrian’s and the others’ 
cases, the omens of death within a year or two did not occur as predestined. Here is where 
survival statistics can be most misleading and most distressing for cancer patients (see e.g., Jain, 
2007), though, to be fair, in this study we are exposed only to the narratives of those who lived, 
and many have not come back from the dead to speak about terminal medical predictions that 
were accurate. Having an indeterminate time of life left, these young adults told of a time ‘after’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Across the board, the primary reason cited for the cessation of treatments was that care providers believed the 
treatments would likely kill their patients before the cancers would.!!
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being near death; a “new side opened up” at the end of the road, revealing a “new start” or a 
return “back to what you would call normal.” With their prognoses still looming over head, they 
were also in a limbo of sorts, a period of “waiting” to see where they would end up and when. 
 Moments of sojourning all seemed to emplot life with cancer as a time away from home. 
Outside of that dominant theme, the young adults told of a variety of journeys, from reflective 
explorations of thought, to banishments to unfamiliar worlds, to liminal experiences of being in-
between life and death. This wide range of use demonstrates the flexibility of this genre, as some 
young adults told of journeys that had an identifiable end to them—a return ‘home’ after a time 
of being ‘unhomelike’ —while others left the end more open-ended, not yet in sight. Cancer is 
rarely just one journey, rather like many mini-journeys initiated and completed at various times 
throughout the narratives.  
C) Moments of Healing: Medical, Transformative, and Serendipitous Recoveries 
Many of the above moments of sojourning articulate some form of ‘return’ to a sense of 
homelike being. Stories involving “restitution” (Frank, 1995) or “redemption” (McAdams, 2006) 
also refer to restored health, order, or equilibrium in life. However, what are particular to Frank’s 
(1995) restitution narratives are their moments of healing in particular: “Yesterday I was healthy, 
today I’m sick, but tomorrow I’ll be healthy again” (p. 77). These recovery plots often begin 
with the onset of symptoms, searches to locate and “fix” the root of the problem, and 
implementation of the cure (Frank, 1995, p. 88-89; Rimmon-Kenan, 2002). It may seem 
tautological to talk about recovery in illness narratives that don’t end with patients’ deaths; 
however, what narrative moments of healing signify can go well beyond what we might think of 
as wellness in contexts of chronic illness.  
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People can conceptualize recovery in a variety of ways; dominant within the young adult 
stories were three different but sometimes co-occurring ways of coming into healing: through 
medical intervention, spiritual transformation, or serendipitous circumstances. By some 
appearances they may be perceived as quite contradictory; indeed, some of the characteristics 
Arthur Frank (1995) lent to recovery narratives—like patient passivity to the ‘expert healers’ (p. 
91-92)—were not essential to them, as we shall see below, and were also seen in moments of 
sojourning where patients talked of being banished or forced into their travels.  
 Arthur Frank discussed at length stories of medical recovery. In such stories a 
“mechanistic view” of the body often dominates, constructing healing as a process of fixing and 
tuning up broken, fleshy machines (Frank, 1995, p. 84-88). People submit their bodies to the 
“cure-promising authority” of modern medicine (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002, p. 22) as a passive 
vessel of regimented treatments (Frank, 1995, p. 86-88). Personal responsibility in such 
narratives is limited to taking one’s medication and letting care providers do their work; thus, 
restitution narratives are sometimes seen as less of a personal story of illness and more of a 
testimony to the expertise of others (p. 91-92).   
 These forms of recovery connote retroversion, that is, returning to a prior state in contrast 
to coming into a new space of understanding. Contra journey metaphors of cancer as a “gift,” 
“lesson,” or “discovery,” recoveries often express (desired) restoration of the way things were, a 
mode of being unencumbered by the burdens of illness. This way of thinking about cancer 
reflects more “interruptive” experiences and expectations of illness, wherein cancer may be 
constructed as a temporary crisis, a brief episode with a “predictable outcome: recovery” 
(Charmaz, 1992, p. 13). Within the field of oncology, both spaces of experiences and horizons of 
expectation are shaped by these prototypical plots of momentary illness.  
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The majority of young adults expressed recognizable moments of medical healing. 
Responsibility was placed primarily upon care providers; people said that they had “trusted” 
their treatments, had “faith in surgeons and chemotherapy,” and “expected to get better.” For 
their part, they “followed the plan” and “just [laid] in bed.” In post-treatment time, they saw 
themselves as “normal again,” “not changed” by the experience, “alive and healthy,” “fixed,” 
“cured,” and confident their medical team “removed” or “took it all.” They said they were 
“relieved” and “thankful,” with “low anxiety” about the effectiveness of their medical care.   
There were sequences in the young adult narratives when they internalized some of the 
responsibilities of their recovery, minimizing the roles of contingency and medical care. A 
different curative discourse emerged in these moments, suggesting people must take a more 
active role in their care and conceiving of disease and treatment in spiritual or psychosomatic 
terms (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 3-4, p. 28-29; Mount, 1993, p. 52; Ignatieff, 1988, p. 28-29). 
Two basic assumptions are built into these narratives, noted by Susan Sontag (1978): the 
“primacy of ‘spirit’ [or mind] over matter” (p. 54) and, by extension, healing of the spirit/mind 
as a prerequisite to bodily recovery (p. 45-46). These different prototypical plots have thematic 
connections to religious conversion narratives, where healing is marked not by the preservation 
of old ways but by personal transformation (Hunsaker-Hawkins, p. 31-37).  
Transformative recovery plots were only marginally less common than medical 
recoveries, meaning that a sense of individual responsibility for illness was expressed frequently 
among the young adults. Most often the narratives took on the form of psychosomatic healing. 
People implied that the course of their illness was partially determined by their emotions and 
thoughts; they believed they “must be positive” and “break out of negativity” (e.g., thinking 
about death, dwelling upon loss and suffering, expressing anger about misfortunes, etc.), they 
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must “protect against stress” which can be a “killer,” by evoking “humour” in their situation, 
seeking advice on “self-help,” acquiring a “sense of control,” and “visualizing” their bodies 
getting better. Other aspects of their “lifestyles” were also considered pertinent, like “diet” and 
“exercise.” By changing their minds and actions, they expected their bodies to follow.  
Personal responsibility was also expressed, to a lesser degree, in terms of spiritual 
connection or purification. Some individuals spoke about the need to “accept” and to “rejoice in 
suffering,” for in it is “post-traumatic growth,” positive “change” in who they are, and so on. A 
few of these plots emerged from a Christian language of “redemption,” stressing the importance 
of “prayer” and faith in God. Instead of retroversion, as in medical recoveries, emphasis is placed 
on conversion, the ways in which having a serious illness can enhance spiritual or religious 
sensitivities.  
A smaller cluster of plots seemed to interpret illness as serendipitous. In these moments, 
the young adults did not bestow responsibility upon any particular agent of healing beyond 
chance and contingency. We see allusions to serendipity when the young adults talked about 
being “lucky,” “fortunate,” or “blessed,” a “rare” or “ideal” case where their cancers were by 
“fluke” caught in early stages, they “responded well” to treatments, and/or had few lasting 
complications. They applied these metaphors to what they saw as exceptional and fortuitous 
circumstances of their illness and recovery: chance discoveries of tumours, very responsive 
caregivers, supportive families, financial coverage or security, etc. Within these narratives and 
metaphors, the young adults appeared to be more considerate of the different social contexts 
within which people live through their diseases, seeing recovery as more dependent upon being 
at the right place and time than being under the scopes of modern medicine or being personally 
in charge of healing.  
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For instance, Lee received a mammogram in her forties for a lump she found on her 
breast. This turned out to be a stroke of luck she says: “The lump that I had found was benign 
[but] it’s only because [G.P.] did take me seriously and sent me for the mammogram that we 
found the micro-calcifications, which were in fact malignant.” This second lump turned out to be 
Stage 0 breast cancer. She saw a series of fortunate events leading to this discovery and 
treatment of her cancer: she found the lump only days before her doctor’s appointment; her 
physician responded to a perceivably innocuous lump with a mammogram; her first screening 
mammogram for breast cancer would have been years later, at age 50; and, caught so early, she 
only needed surgical treatment. Lee suggested that without the role of serendipity, she may have 
had a more severe diagnosis years later and may have not survived it. 
 It may be hard to see the diverse moments of healing above as under one roof—in some 
ways they are worlds apart—but they share one dominant theme. Recovery stories often address 
matters of etiology and curative power, for it is assumed that to know the treatment one must 
identify the cause: for biological disorders, biomedical interventions are necessary; diseases of 
the soul require spiritual transformation; and unlucky plights are undone by changes in fortune. 
Not to say such explanatory models are not present in other prototypical plots, but their 
prevalence stands out in recovery narratives. We will revisit and expand these issues of etiology 
and personal responsibility in ch.7 in relation to moralizations of cancer. 
D) Moments of Inspecting: Mysterious Symptoms, Criminal Plots, and Infiltrated Borders 
I observed another series of moments of meaning, based upon prototypical plots that are 
quite pervasive but relatively understudied within illness narrative research (for an exception, see 
Teucher, 2001b). These plots all expressed moments of inspecting enigmatic circumstances and 
bizarre occurrences, thereby engaging narrative genres of mysteries. I observed three dominant 
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kinds of ‘inspections’ in the narratives: making sense of mysterious symptoms, suspecting 
criminal activity, and discovering infiltrated borders between victims and assailants. Some 
aspects of past, present, or future appeared uncertain, and the mystery plots unfolded through 
pursuit, attainment, and doubt of answers.  
By far the most commonly told mysteries were around reading mysterious symptoms in 
hopes of pinpointing a diagnosis. Nearly all the young adults noted that they were having “vague 
symptoms,” with “random,” “puzzling,” and “weird” things going on with their bodies (e.g., 
bleeding, fatigue, lumps). The “confusion” typically didn’t stop when they sought medical 
attention; their symptoms were often “dismissed” as medically insignificant or “misdiagnosed” 
as “depression,” “stress,” or “anxiety.”  
Those physicians who took the symptoms seriously still struggled to make sense of them. 
Some tests came back “inconclusive,” providing “no answers,” “no explanations,” and “no 
information.” The young adults’ illnesses “eluded” their physicians, prompting one neurologist 
to tell Adrian, the brain cancer patient who wasn’t sure he would live to graduate from 
university, that he wished he had “a crystal ball.” Diagnosis often evoked a cautious sense of 
relief among people who had been searching for answers for months or years, but they did not 
always protect against mystery. On surveillance, Adrian had serial MRIs to determine whether 
his brain tumour had inflamed enough to warrant risky radiation treatments; over the course of 
many years the MRIs showed “no change” or “indication” in the tumour, yet his neuromotor 
symptoms continued to worsen. For others, there was a flow of inconsistent information coming 
through to them. In the section on participants’ characteristics in chapter 2, I observed that just 
over half of the participants knew the staging of their diagnoses with certainty, and one major 
reason was conflicting reports given by different members of their healthcare teams. Beyond 
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treatment, the future remained “uncertain” for many young adults, a “mystery” only partially 
(and somewhat misleadingly) answered by prognostic statistics. 
The second most moment of inspecting involved criminal plots, which are similar to 
battles and wars in the sense that cancer is often othered, constructed as a villain or threat to the 
protagonist’s life. These antagonists often took the form of thieves, tricksters, or murderers. 
Struggles with these adversaries were usually battles of wit or evasion, working to deceive or 
escape the other. Like the plots of so many crime mysteries, political thrillers, and slasher films, 
these diagnostic mysteries contained “elements of innocence, first suspicion, the shock of 
detection of a deadly threat, historical and medical research, pursuit, and arrest” (Teucher, 
2001b, p. 165).  
Some young adults said they believed they were being “robbed,” feeling “afraid,” 
“scared” or “terrified” for their lives, or “paranoid” that it was “all in [their] head.” They talked 
about how cancer snuck into their lives when they were stressed, overworked, or exhausted; 
others were more surprised to acquire cancer when they felt they were relatively healthy, eating 
nutritious foods, exercising on a regular basis, and so on. Their diseases were constructed as 
opportunistic, catching unsuspecting people during inconspicuous times. The enduring metaphor 
was that cancer took them by surprise, when their attentions were elsewhere.  
Often comments about ‘paranoia’ came with frustration with care providers; in particular, 
the young adults said they were often “not believed,” they had to “fight to be heard,” their 
concerns—first about their symptoms, later about recurrence or side effects of treatment —were 
considered a “non-issue,” and a few were referred to a psychologist for voicing their suspicions. 
Losing faith in “narrow-minded” doctors and “sloppy” medical work, and aware that their 
actions were “time sensitive” and “against the clock,” they “looked into it” on their own, 
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conducting their own private investigations through Google searches, local contacts, other 
opinions, and support organizations. In sum, they had to ‘play the system’ in order to have their 
‘case’ heard.   
 Attempts to ‘other’ cancer seldom failed, but when this happened guilty parties were 
identified much closer to home than an opportunistic stranger (e.g., Teucher, 2001b, p. 165). In 
these moments of meaning, people described suspicion and panic around possibly infiltrated 
borders. For example, some people’s bodies appeared untrustworthy, possibly co-conspiring 
with the disease; they were, in a sense, double agents. A gray mist arose around the borders 
between person and disease, victim and assailant. Participants’ bodies were sometimes referred 
to as “strangers” or as friends who had “betrayed” them. For example, Mandy narrated a love-
hate relationship with her body after being diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma. She says:  
It’s tough because, I mean, I mean evil comes to my head. But then that word gets kind of 
mixed up, because it’s part of you. Right? (C: Right.). It’s your own cells; it’s your own 
body that’s turned against you. For me, I think I had a hard time separating it and making 
it, you know, something that wasn’t part of me. Right? (C: Mhm). You know, like if you 
get, if you get the flu virus, you know, you’ve been invaded by, you know, it’s a foreign 
invader. But cancer’s not a foreign invader. It’s your body killing itself. So...I don’t know 
how to describe it.  
 
Mandy seemed to struggle to identify an adversary she could place in opposition to her; friend 
and foe were not easily discernible. She wanted to cherish her body and appreciate its delicacy, 
but she also distrusted, “loathed,” and “hated” it. She wanted to put it at a distance, “put [it] on 
the bed and leave it there” but she couldn’t “escape” or “get out of it.” When we came to talking 
about her current pregnancy, she said that as much as she “started to love” her body again, she 
could not be certain it wouldn’t “fail” her again, resurrecting cancer when she and her child 
would be most vulnerable. Many young adults felt a lingering suspicion that the borders between 
body and disease were still infiltrated post-treatment and could not ever be fully fortified.  
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Sometimes the infiltration went beyond the body to include the self. Cancers were 
suspected to have links to conflicting desires that had become so opposed that the divisive self 
was enacting its own destruction. A remarkably psychoanalytic angle on mysteries, explanations 
centred around unconscious motives (especially the death drive7), repressed desires, and self-
deceit. A few young adults believed they had partially or indirectly contributed to their cancer by 
repressing “emotional turmoil,” putting too much “stress” upon themselves or leading what they 
later interpreted to be “unhealthy” lives. These stories carry a residue of mid-twentieth century 
theories that people with cancer have certain personality traits and lifestyles that foster the 
growth of cancers (Sontag, 1978, p. 50-56).  
Mysteries mark an important genre for understanding illness in a population that is not 
typically believed to get cancer. Young adults and their doctors alike do not always look for 
cancer initially, let alone believe it when they see it. Mysteries tend to signify experiences that 
challenge our notions of predictability and assumptions of foresight: Different readings of 
mysterious symptoms are contested in clinical settings; suspicions of foul play lead to anxieties 
and self-doubts; and previously held categories like self and body, or friend and foe, start to leak 
into one another as patients start to question who they can trust. The moments of inspecting 
found within my research show tensions within the young adults’ narratives between wanting to 
understand and fearing what one may find. 
E) Moments of Disordering: Chaotic Narratives 
The above plots express certain narrative forms of illness experiences, putting disruptive 
experiences into some sort of order. However, there were many moments within the narratives 
where form broke down, where life was disordered, and meanings were subverted. Typically, 
these chaotic moments of disordering in narratives are understood as a different kind of story !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See Beyond the pleasure principle (Freud, 1920/2011).  
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altogether, distinct from journeys, battles, and so on. For Arthur Frank (1995), chaotic narratives 
are the “opposite of restitution” and show “life never getting better” (p. 97). While all other 
genres seem to espouse a sense of control or order over one’s fate, chaotic narratives are seen to 
express “life’s fundamental contingency” (Frank, 1995, p. 102). Such narratives may articulate 
what Charmaz (1992) understood as “immersive” forms of illness (p. 73-74), distinct from 
“interruptive” episodes as suffering is chronically (or terminally) experienced and with 
exponential intensity. Many others have used Frank’s formulation to inform their own work on 
disruptive illness (e.g., Mosack et al., 2005; Whitehead, 2006).  
 A less structuralist approach may see chaotic narratives differently; not as distant, 
craterous kinds of stories but as everyday aporias of meaning, or plot holes, that many stories 
have (see e.g., Ricoeur, 1984, p. 73; Thomas-Maclean, 2004)8. Sociologist Matt Hyvarinen and 
colleagues (2010) argued that chaotic elements are among the “necessary and integral aspects of 
a narrativity that tries to capture an uncharted aspect of experientiality” (p. 9). According to 
some literary theorists, chaotic and liminal experiences of being outside order may, in fact, be the 
rule rather than the exception during life with illness (e.g., Gough, 2005; Rimmon-Kenan, 2002); 
though some narratives may be more ‘orderly’ than others, moments of meaning also bear the 
“potential of its absence, negation, or irrelevance” (Engelke and Tomlinson, 2006). To categorize 
them as separate may conceal the presence of chaotic language across illness narratives. Though 
they were minority moments, all the young adults’ narratives had at least some lapses of 
coherence, unanswered questions, or enduring mysteries. 
Chaotic narratives are perhaps not part of an independent genre, but represent the 
precariousness of meaning when trying to make sense of illness. As prototypical plots are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Recall that, in chapter 1, I argued that meaning is indeterminate and narratives are not guaranteed to have a 
recognizable form or order. Moments of chaos are among several ways in which narrative coherence is disrupted; 
another way is through subjunctive explorations of meanings  (Turner, 1986).!
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negotiated with lived experiences, we may see some expressions of chaos within the different 
moments of meaning. For example, moments of fighting may either arrive at a stalemate or cede 
to the enemy; some participants found their treatments “demoralizing” or “overwhelming,” they 
felt “vulnerable” to their illnesses, and “refused to engage” out of fear.  
Similar disordering may be seen in moments of sojourning. During their adventures 
people sometimes described feeling “lost” or “purposeless”; their journeys took them to “hell,” 
or they felt that “life is on hold,” has “shut down,” and they were “not living” but just “laid on 
the couch” and suffered. Instead of seeking out “lessons” from their experiences, they struggled 
to “process,” “absorb,” or “remember” what they had been through, or, alternatively, tried to 
“forget” or “distract” themselves from thinking about it.  
Many moments of healing expressed only temporary/partial healing or indefinite 
deferrals of recovery. They challenged assumptions and expectations of “normality,” and 
expressed anxiety and doubt about the “effectiveness” of medical treatments as they saw “slow” 
or “halted” progress. A few people saw themselves as “damaged,” “not whole,” “not healthy,” or 
“wasting away.”  
Finally, some moments of inspecting bled into chaotic stories. A few people said they 
were “freaked out,” “unsettled” by and “terrified” of the dark unknown. A few others felt there 
was “nothing more” for their cancers to “take,” so much had their bodies and identities been 
stripped away already. In thinking about the future, many young adults gave up on concrete 
images or expectations, concluding that it is all a “mystery,” there are “no final answers,” and the 
possibility of recurrence was always there.  
Moments of disordering may signify the ubiquitous instability of narrative order, 
prompting literary theorist Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan (2002) to ask to what extent people 
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“conceal disruption under a semblance of continuity and/or victory” (p. 14). Some narratives 
may indeed reflect more chaos than others, but it seems more productive to talk about a spectrum 
instead of a distinct narrative genre. By extension, the imperative of narrative coherence seems to 
overlook these nuances of meaning, and may even fuel attempts to conceal disruption. 
Conclusion: The Multiplicity of Narrative Genres  
 Young adults’ stories of cancer can be couched in a number of different terms. By no 
means have I exhausted the vast range within which their stories may be structured; I have only 
reviewed some dominant genres that seemed to be at work within my participants’ stories, the 
many battles, journeys, recoveries, mysteries, and chaotic moments that emplot their lived 
experiences. Most of my participants evoked at least three of these plots, and in some narratives 
all five may be found. Referring to the genres of individual narratives as moments of meaning 
helps here, as our language shifts from a dichotomy between narrative order and disorder to co-
existing moments of order and disorder, the “discordant concordance” of stories (Ricoeur, 1984, 
p. 73) that embody people’s struggles to understand life with chronic illness. It may be better to 
refer to these forms as ‘moments’ within a narrative rather than as different kinds of narratives, 
noting both the temporary presence of meaning or being at a given point within a narrative as 
well as its eventual absence or transformation over time.   
 Seeing such a colourful bouquet of narrative forms should give us pause and a chance to 
appreciate the diversity of young adults’ stories, the many images and moods they may elicit 
among their recipients. The next step within the broader purpose of this chapter is to plant this 
diversity within the pots of history and language, various muses within the young adults’ 
narrative environments. My analysis ideally helps us to understand where young adults’ 
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emplotments may come from on a broader social and cultural level, the ways in which larger 
discourses and their generic organization may attract particular moments of meanings.  
Illness Narrative Contexts: Influential Narrative Environments  
Framing Young Adults’ Stories of Illness 
 Young adults are primed for emplotment, ignited by the many stories they encounter in 
everyday interactions, books, movies, YouTube, etc. They may use these narratives to interpret 
and construct their own lives, including particular episodes like illness. I turn to some culturally 
sedimented meanings within the young adults’ narrative environments that may provide at the 
very least a departure point and at the very most a model for them to tell their stories of illness. I 
look to some of the cultural forms that seem to be most often consumed and are, presumably, 
most likely to shape young adults’ cancer narratives: a) fictional stories and b) medical and 
public rhetoric of illness.  
The media and discourses available to young adults are vast and exceedingly diverse 
fields, and their proposed impacts need to be qualified. First of all, I cannot possibly review all or 
even most possible cultural influences on young adult cancer narratives. The following 
contextualization is intended as a briefly surveyed, backgrounding frame, not as the focal point 
of the chapter. Second, notwithstanding the widespread access to the Internet, social media, 
bookstores, and television, I cannot assume that similar media forms or contents reach the 
dispersed Canadian populations from which my interviewees came. Third and finally, young 
adults clearly have divergent preferences from one another and any conclusion about what 
genres inspire them must heed the limits of generalizing statistics.  
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A) Contexts of Fictional Stories: Prototypical Plots in Film, Television, and Literature 
During his study of social dramas, cultural anthropologist Victor Turner (1981) observed 
that social conflicts tended to take on similar structures to theatrical performances, especially 
tragic plays; furthermore, the theatre seemed to imitate current happenings in social life. As a 
result, Turner concluded a dialogue between everyday life and artistic expressions, where the one 
inspires the other into being (p. 149). Other scholars in a wide range of disciplines have since 
defended his claims, arguing that everyday stories are shaped dialogically by fiction and history, 
myth and mundane experience, imagination and memory (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Freeman, 2010; 
Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993; Mattingly, 1994; McAdams, 1993; Ricoeur, 1985, 1988). It is from 
this argument that I propose fictional narratives are relevant here.  
Arguably the most influential medium of fictional storytelling among young adults is not 
live theatre per se, but its contemporary cousins: film and television. In their study of the 
“worldviews” of today’s young adults, psychologist Sara Savage and colleagues (2006) found 
their interviewees constantly referring to fictional movies or television shows in storying their 
own lives (p. 73). Cinematic fiction seemed to provide two services to young adults: a 
juxtaposing image to compare and contrast with ‘real’ life, and a framework for imagining their 
ideal worlds and futures.  
We may see some parallel plots between generic preferences of fiction among young 
adults and the moments of meaning employed in their illness narratives. These applications are 
sometimes easily and readily prepared by movies like 50/50 (2012)—an advertised quasi-
autobiography portraying a twentysomething male live through neurofibrosarcoma and the 
resulting loss of his girlfriend, tensions with his best friend, and the precarious effects of 
chemotherapy. Most films, however, require a longer stretch and a more metaphoric linkage 
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between everyday young adult life, including life with chronic illness, and the sorts of grandiose 
trials common to Hollywood protagonists (think, for a moment, of the action films of Arnold 
Schwarzenegger).  
 According to some media research, there are a few common generic tastes that many 
young adults seem to share. For example, media psychologists Fischoff, Antonio, and Lewis 
(1998) noted that the four most favoured prototypical plots of film among young adults (ages 13-
25) seem to be action-adventure (a synthetized category of battles and journeys), romances, 
science fictions, and dramas, respectively9. This differed remarkably from middle and older 
adults, who had much more interest in dramas and less interest in action-adventures. It is also 
notable that though among one of the least favoured across all ages, murder/crime films were 
significantly more popular among young adults than older adults. It is possible that the relative 
favouritism of action, adventure, and crime dramas may partially explain the presence of battles, 
journeys, and mysteries in the young adult narratives.   
Many of the prototypical plots of film have redemptive endings, making restitution a 
dominant form of dénouement. Historians Neil Howe and William Strauss (2000) put this trend 
into context, observing a shift in popular media toward a “happy business” in the last few 
decades (p. 239). They claimed that in many strands of modern media, emphasis is placed on 
either exaggeratedly happy endings or plots mostly devoid of high stakes conflict. Life’s 
takedowns are deliberately softened and getting back on one’s feet is portrayed as an easier and 
more total recovery. This is one way in which popular media, like blockbuster films, may 
encourage (or impose) more coherent narratives among its audiences. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Unfortunately, the researchers cited above put little effort into defining and reflecting on generic categories, and 
use expedient labels that do not always capture the complex and genre-crossing plots of many films. Nevertheless, 
they provide some clues to the kinds of stories that capture young adults’ imaginations. 
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Literature can have a similarly profound effect to film on how people construct their own 
life narratives. Historically, battle stories told around illness may build upon many literary myths 
and celebrated fictions of our culture (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 61), whether it is the ancient 
Greek mythic war between the Achaeans and the Trojans in The Iliad, or the J.R.R. Tolkien 
fantasies The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings. These and many other war myths perpetuate 
organization of the world into dualities of light and dark, life and death, good and evil, and tell of 
the unfolding conflict between the two over time (Hunsaker-Hawkins, p. 61-63). Battles against 
cancer may symbolically invoke mythic stories of struggle against a perceived enemy of peace; 
imagery of cancer as “evil” and a “monster” are just a couple signs of these mythic influences. 
Narratives of transformative recovery have also endured over a long period of Western 
history and across different forms of life writing. Arthur Frank (1995) noted this historical 
preservation in his comparison of non-fiction illness and spiritual narratives. Religious 
conversions bear a more notable mark in earlier times, when the “confessions” and 
transformations of Saint Augustine, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Leo Tolstoy resonated with a 
collective concern for healing afflictions of the spirit (Frank, p. 32). In contemporary times, more 
materialist discourses have made the material body (i.e., Körper) of primary interest, and so we 
tend to talk more about bodily illness and medical healing than about soul sickness and 
transformative recoveries (Couser, 1997, p. 5; Frank, 1999, p. 32). Nevertheless, he concludes, 
“even if science has tended to replace religion as the official mythology of a secular culture, 
religious ways of thinking and imagining still persist” (Frank, p. 49). Prototypical plots of soul 
healing in earlier confessionals seem to permeate many of the recovery stories discussed above, 
sometimes in explicitly religious languages of prayer, redemption, and rebirth, other times in the 
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more recent language of psychoneuroimmunology constructing the mind as the locus of cure (see 
e.g., Mount, 1993).  
The world of reading is one less traversed by young adults today than film but is still 
quite common. According to some recent national research by the Pew Center in America, 83% 
of young adults had read a book within the last year (Zickuhr, Rainie, Purcell, Madden, and 
Brenner, 2012). Among the most popular books read by young adults are “mysteries, fantasies, 
and horror thrillers” (Howe and Strauss, 2006, p. 171), including the works of J.K. Rowling (the 
Harry Potter series), Stephanie Meyer (The Twilight series), and the pervasively well-known 
suspense writer Stephen King. These stories are not to be discounted as irrelevant to cancer 
experiences, as they often articulate encounters with, for example, unexpected adventures, 
villainous adversaries, internal conflict, and the fearful unknown. They also often explore issues 
of being banished from home, having near-death experiences, and living with serendipitous 
fortunes and misfortunes.  
At the heels of these successful fantasy writers has been an emerging interest in young 
adult fiction that is more directly exploring mental or physical illness. Including main characters 
suffering from depression, suicide ideation, cancer, cystic fibrosis, or other chronic difficulties, 
this so-called sub-genre of ‘teen sick-lit’10 is being sought out by younger readers as much as or 
sometimes more often than the above mythic stories. One of the most notable examples is John 
Green’s (2012) The fault in our stars, a story of two teenagers with cancer who together try to 
contend with how to live and die meaningfully. TIME Magazine chose The fault in our stars, 
which was advertised as young adult fiction, as the #1 fictional book of 2012. Not to dismiss the 
verisimilitude of more imaginary forms of fiction, but these stories often have a stronger realist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 I am cautious in using this phrase, for it has been criticized for simplifying the complexity of the characters and 
plots within such stories (see e.g., the January 9, 2013 episode of CBC’s The Current).  
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mood to them, exploring specific health issues that could actually happen to their readers, 
possibly facilitating reflection and understanding of chronic illness.  
 It could be argued that film, television, and books are little more than modes of 
entertainment, and many young adults report them as such (e.g., Mundorf and Brownell, 1990). 
However, as stories rife with metaphor, symbolism, and allegory, as “virtual experiences of 
being-in-the-world” (Ricoeur, 1985, p. 100), they may also communicate ways of understanding 
non-fiction life. Indeed, Fischoff et al. (1998) make the convincing case that people’s preferences 
in film and television may relate to their social identity, that is, they value stories within which 
they can see some part of themselves; the same may also be true with literature. Life and art 
leave their sticky imprints on each other. Whether it is an Arnold Schwarzenegger film or John 
Green novel, the fictional worlds created within may bleed their radiant ink onto the young 
adults who enter into them, becoming part of the skin they wear in their own worlds of existence. 
The popularity of battle, journey, mystery, and recovery narratives may be reflected in their 
frequent appearances in the young adults’ narratives of illness. 
B) Contexts of Medical and Public Rhetoric: Prototypical Plots in Discourses of Illness 
Looking at some cultural discourses outside of fiction and entertainment, let us enter the 
realms of medical and public discourses regarding illness. By ‘public,’ I mean larger 
conversations across local communities, as may be seen in national debates, widely broadcasted 
media, and online forums. These two contexts overlap quite a bit, likely co-constituting each 
other. Comparing medical and public rhetoric, we see two dominant prototypical plots shining 
out from their surfaces: battle narratives and recovery narratives.  
There is a particularly tight affiliation between the language of war and medical rhetoric. 
A long historical link can be seen between war and medicine; while surgical procedures were 
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advanced on the battlefield to treat wounded soldiers, radiation and chemotherapy were first 
designed for combat. The latter two still carry these connotations in the way medical 
professionals talk about treatment, often referred to as “weapons” designed to “bombard” the 
“invasive” bodies that threaten patients’ safety (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 64; Sontag, 1978, p. 
63-65). For instance, the very first cobalt therapy unit to use gamma rays for treating cancer—
built in Saskatchewan in 1949—was nicknamed the “Cobalt Bomb.”  
Along with metaphors of military power are symbols of purifying power. Modern 
medicine is said to be driven by a “telos of cure,” an overarching project to rid the world of all 
ailments (Frank, 1995, p. 83). Medical discourses tend to encourage recovery narratives by 
promising medical knowledge is up to the task of any puzzling illness. Seeing some successes 
over time among people whose illnesses used to be incurable or unpreventable, the possibility of 
recovery has now nearly become an expectation for many. Medical professionals and advanced 
cancer patients alike have been found to perpetuate discourses of hope even amidst severe and 
poor prognoses (e.g., Delvecchio-Good et al., 1990; Salliant, 1990).  
These dominant discourses are found in more public rhetoric as well. First of all, plots of 
war may be seen in public and healthcare policy discussions. Personal battles with cancer may 
now be ‘incorporated’ into the larger ‘War on Cancer’ U.S. President Richard Nixon formalized 
in 1971 when he signed the National Cancer Act, the very first of its kind in the world 
(Hunsaker-Hawkins, p. 64-65). Even broader still, after a century of two world wars, 
innumerable smaller-scale conflicts, and pervasive coverage of violence in both fictional and 
news media, battle tropes are household symbols ready to hand within and well beyond North 
American borders. 
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Second, expectations of cure go beyond medical self-confidence. Whether perpetuated by 
or underlying the telos of cure, many Western discourses of health put forth a “commandment” 
to “get well” (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002, p. 14). While illness is acknowledged to be a life 
disruption, and sometimes a severe one, there seems to be an overwhelming cultural desire for an 
eventual return to ‘normalcy’ defined in terms of health and happiness (Gough, 2005; Rimmon-
Kenan, 2002; Smith and Sparkes, 2011). Frank (1995) identifies these discourses as part of a 
larger “modernist project” to render life events predictable, manageable, and neatly tethered 
together (p. 83-84).  
Fictional narratives and social discourses shape one another. On the one hand, the “happy 
business” of much contemporary media and cultural activity may be said to cultivate this 
dominant perception of life without enduring strife (e.g., Howe and Strauss, 2000). On the other 
hand, many researchers see the trends of fictional media as part of a larger public practice (at 
least in North America) to preserve a false sense of hope, optimism, and self-esteem among 
today’s youth and young adults (Polly-Eisendrath, 2009; Savage et al., 2006; Twenge, 2006). It 
is noted, for example, that there is some resemblance between the favoured protagonists of 
fiction and the dominant image parents are said to paint of their children. Most films seem to 
draw “attention on courageous, even heroic deeds” meant to inspire shy youth (Howe and 
Strauss, 2006, p. 254). These images are reproduced by a common parenting style of instilling an 
inflated sense of heroism and self-admiration within children, convincing them they are 
exceptional among their peers (Howe and Strauss, p. 345-360; see also Young-Eisendrath, 2009).  
These larger public discourses about how to interpret adversity, limitation, and illness 
seem to translate into imperatives of narrative coherence and self-authorship. The “generic happy 
ending,” says bioethicist Rebecca Garden (2012), is a convention that hangs over the heads of 
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people living with conditions “for which there are medical interventions but no cure—such as 
chronic illness, disability, degenerative diseases, and the psychological sequelae of these 
conditions” (p. 122). Due to the focus on individual exceptionality, an excessive amount of 
control and, in turn, blame is placed in the patient’s hands, what historian Michael Ignatieff 
(1998) called “medicalized individualism.” Jungian analyst Christina Middlebrook (1998), in her 
cancer memoir, referred to this discourse as a “bootstrap theory of illness”; one is expected to 
hoist oneself up from travails of disease by sheer force of will. Those who are confident in 
themselves are believed to be able to self-determine the course of their illness whether by 
lifestyle change or positive thinking (Becker, 1997; Bell, 2010; Delvecchio-Good et al., 1990; 
Mathews, 2000; Mount, 1993). As shown in chapter 2, more specific oncological discourses of 
young adult cancer also tend to emphasize individual responsibility and power over other 
possible factors such as social-structural barriers to proper care and the co-authoring 
participation of health care workers (see e.g., CCS, 2009; CIHR, 2009; McGoldrick et al., 2011).  
In sum, the above dominant discourses may foster certain kinds of illness narratives. 
Battle and recovery narratives seem to be among the most perpetuated prototypical plots in 
medical and public discourses, accentuating the battles involved in illness and promising 
“happy” endings for those ‘exceptional’ and ‘motivated’ patients who transcend statistical 
predictions and poor prognoses. To be sure, many of the young adult narratives expressed 
heightened self-confidence, speaking of battles unequivocally won and recoveries impeccably 
achieved, and often attributing them to being a “rare,” “ideal,” or “unique” patient among others. 
But, these claims were often tempered by some degree of modesty, especially around perceptions 
that they were comparatively better situated than other people or simply “lucky.” As we turn next 
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to the dominant genres within my participants’ narratives, we see some similar and different 
trends between them and the above discourses.  
Comparisons and Conclusions: Young Adults’ Dominant Moments of Meaning  
In the two previous sections, we saw that in popular fiction young adults encounter a 
wide range of war, journey, mystery, and recovery plots, while in medical and public rhetoric 
they are more often exposed to battle and recovery narratives. We may conclude that battles and 
recoveries are the most dominant discourses available to young adults. Interestingly, that does 
not straightforwardly translate into the hierarchy of genres in the narratives I studied, which took 
the following sequence from most to least dominant: 1) journeys, 2) recoveries, 3) battles, 4) 
mysteries, and 5) chaos. See Figure H3 for a visual representation11.  
Let us further compare the cultural contexts of fictional and non-fictional plots with the 
noticeable trends within my sample of young adult narratives.  Above all, I found in my research 
that many more cancer patients emplotted their experiences along moments of sojourning than 
along moments of fighting, which was somewhat unexpected because of the pervasiveness of 
battle plots in medicine, public rhetoric, and fiction, as well as in other illness narrative research 
(e.g., Thomas-Maclean, 2004; Whitehead, 2006). To be sure, moments of fighting were abundant 
in the young adults’ narratives, but their richness and frequency were comparatively diminished 
to moments of sojourning.  
Some people went so far as to repudiate illness narratives of war. For example, a few 
mentioned the controversy around New Democrat Party leader Jack Layton’s death, in which 
some public backlash resisted media constructions of his death as ‘losing a battle’ because it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 This hierarchy was determined by two techniques of analyzing the narratives: first, by studying the frequency of 
metaphors and narrative sequences that signified a particular genre; and second, by comparing and contrasting those 
moments of meaning to the overall plots of the narratives. Thus, for example, while many people made frequent 
reference to “fighting” cancer, these metaphors seldomly endured beyong passing mention or harmonized with the 
dominant genres of their stories. Thus, it has a lower place within the hierarchy.  
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implied personal weakness and failure (see the Globe and Mail article on this issue; Weeks, 
2011). The languages of war were unattractive or problematic for some, who instead preferred 
journey narratives. Perhaps this trend marks a growing resistance among cancer patients (and 
physicians too, as the Globe and Mail article suggests) to talk about illness in terms of fighting, a 
shift in dominant constructions of cancer.  
Some of the other trends may also lend credence to this possibility. Though not as salient, 
moments of inspecting and disordering were quite common as well, despite contradicting 
cultural expectations of order and predictability within medical (and public) rhetoric about 
illness. These narrative forms have received relatively less academic attention than the other 
genres discussed, but recognition of their prevalence is growing (e.g., Frank, 1995; Gough, 2005; 
Rimmon-Kenan, 2002; Smith and Sparkes, 2011; Thomas-Maclean, 2004; Whitehead, 2006).  
According to some cultural theorists, contemporary illness narratives demonstrate a loss 
of power within modern medicine to influence patients’ perceptions of illness (e.g., Couser, 
1997, p. 11; Frank, 1995, p. 5-12) and, by extension, its imageries of war and recovery. This case 
may be made for battle metaphors, but I am not so convinced narratives of medical recovery are 
losing ground because they were nearly as common as journey narratives. Admittedly, some 
kinds of healing—serendipitous and transformative, for example—were not always endorsed by 
the young adults’ care providers. But, it is possible that young adults involved with the 
healthcare system are still heavily influenced by the dominant discourses within, but may be for 
whatever reason more receptive to plots of recovery than of war.  
It is hard to say whether these trends signify departures from particular prototypical plots, 
but they do suggest a decentralization of meaning in which multiple cultural sources and forms 
are competing for a chance to be taken into young adults’ stories. Consuming a wide range of 
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media, fictional and non-fictional, young adults may be doing extensive digestive work to absorb 
these numerous influences into their own lives. The perceived dominance of journeys over 
battles may just be a momentary flicker of favouritism, or a local preference among young 
adults, or it may be an indication of a larger transformation genres within illness discourses. 
Maybe the diverse fictional plots inspire young adults to a greater extent than the more selective 
non-fictional plots, leading to more multiplicity of forms.  
Though there may be such underlying social changes in language, there may also be more 
local factors at play. At this juncture, we need to consider the personal needs and purposes for 
which individual narratives are constructed, why they may choose the moments of meaning they 
do. We shall now turn to this concluding analysis of narrative purposes. 
Illness Narrative Purposes: Innovative Uses of Prototypical Plots 
Looking to the “Language of ‘Doing Something’” 
The contexts of narrative construction help place young adults’ stories within larger 
cultural discourses, but there is more to narrative moments of meaning than their ties to 
prototypical plots. Narrative forms are also mediated by local experiences, needs, and 
applications, as some feminist critics of genres have pointed out (e.g., Personal Narratives 
Group, 1989, p. 102). No story is a simple rehash or exemplar of a prototype, but “an original 
production, a new existence” even if it is situated within limiting narrative environments 
(Ricoeur, 1984, p. 69).  
This is part of the larger indeterminate processes of negotiating dominant discourses with 
lived experiences, of converting social conventions or the “practico-inerte” of narrative forms 
into personally meaningful stories or narrative “praxes” (Sartre, 1960/1968, p. 173). Studying 
narrative form, writes Ricoeur (1984), demands we try to “understand both the language of 
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‘doing something’ and the cultural tradition from which proceeds the typology of plots” (p. 57; 
my emphasis). I have laid out the latter in the previous section, and here I consider the many 
innovative ways in which sedimented meanings are used and transformed in order to ‘do 
something’ or achieve some purpose.  
This final section is intended to demonstrate, via extended analysis of three narratives, 
the innovative uses of prototypical plots to communicate individual purposes and needs. To 
begin with, I discuss some of the purposes that may be served (or not) by the above prototypical 
plots. Next, divergent uses of these plots are shown within the stories of Tim, Dani, and Rose, 
bringing out the deeply personal aspects of life with cancer. Although the three stories are 
reconstructed through my own words and analyses, I tried to use a fitting language to the 
imagery expressed in their telling to me. 
Purposes that Prototypical Plots may Enable and Disable  
Narrative genres may be used for nearly uncountable purposes (see e.g., Charon, 2008, p. 
49, Mattingly, 1998, p. 5, McAdams, 1993, p. 31), and attention to these may enrich our 
interpretation of individual stories. Often it is the case that “the act of narration is, at least partly, 
a response to the needs of the present, as distinct from an attempt at a faithful representation of 
the past” (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002, p. 15). Because I study young adult narratives as performances, 
as expressive meanings, my analyses must go beyond the study of narrative forms to see what 
forms are used for.  
In this final section, I analyze a range of purposes or needs—loosely categorized as 
emotional, hermeneutical, relational, and practical—that may be satisfied by using certain 
narrative forms. Let me first clarify these purposes a bit. First, putting form to illness experiences 
may serve an array of emotional functions such as soothing or consoling anxieties with 
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predictable plots, establishing a mood or tone for stories, and releasing or expressing strong 
feelings with evocative imagery (e.g., Aristotle, 1987; Broyard, 1992, p. 20-21; Kleinman, 1988, 
p. 49). Second, many of the hermeneutical efforts of narratives entail searching to understand, 
(re)make, organize/integrate, explore or gain insight into selves and worlds by situating them 
within larger, mythic conceptions of life (e.g., Charon, 2008, p. vii; Freeman, 2010; McAdams, 
1993, p. 28-31).  
Third, some relational purposes may include making private sensations relatable to 
people without cancer via familiar tropes, or, on the other hand, communicating different 
(perhaps even hidden or oppressed) worlds of experience through relatively unfamiliar tropes 
like chaotic narratives (e.g., Frank, 1995, 2009; Kadar, 1992; Kleinman, 1988, p. 50). Finally, 
the practical uses of different genres may include a process of practical reasoning, imagining 
possible futures and options, storying clinical actions, setting and solving problems, and defining 
the (un)available courses of healing (Charon, 2008, p. 50; Gergen and Gergen, 2007; Mattingly, 
1998, p. 2-14; Mehl-Madrona, 2007). 
Prototypical plots may be seen as tools for helping us (or not) achieve the above ends in 
the midst of crisis; however, they may also be limiting in their selective figures of speech, 
moods/settings, characteristics, trajectories, etc. As I showed in the previous section, some plots 
have become more popular than others, which may broaden their intelligibility to larger 
audiences but may also overshadow other, perhaps contradictory, plots of life with illness. This 
is especially problematic as narrative forms that “may seem constructive and therapeutic to one 
patient or writer (or to his/her readers) can be destructive and further traumatizing for others” 
(Teucher, 2003, p. 1). It is important to consider the ways in which dominant narrative forms 
may carry these “enabling” and “disabling” effects (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 24).  
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 It is important to enter more extensively into individual stories, as this approach helps to 
expose some of the demands of people’s local situations, as well as the innovative ways they 
negotiate those demands narratively. I chose exemplary narratives from three participants 
because they accentuate different moments of meaning and the many personal purposes for 
which they may be used. First is Timothy, who was treated for brain cancer in his late teens and 
whose story highlighted moments of mysterious symptoms and medical recoveries. Second, Dani 
constructed much of his early twenties in terms of personal journeys and athletic achievements as 
he went through a diagnosis of acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL) and then, during treatment, 
two concurrent strokes. Third, in her late twenties Rose was diagnosed with cervical cancer; 
struggling with disruptions and wounds that continued into the present day, there were many 
chaotic moments of disordering expressed within her narrative. I explore each of these stories in 
turn and discuss what possible purposes may have been enabled or disabled by their particular 
use of prototypical plots.  
A) Timothy: Enabling Endings with Moments of Inspecting followed by Healing 
I talked with Timothy a few years after he recovered from brain cancer surgery. He had 
already graduated high school, entered the world of work, and put some distance to the year he 
writhed in pain from severe migraines. He was keen on concise sentences and modest 
descriptions of small-town adolescent life: “Just like anyone else I was enjoying life, I did 
whatever I liked, asked my parents, you know, I am gonna go to this party wherever could you 
give me a ride and pick me up, whatever dude, being responsible.” His patient, man-of-few-
words demeanour reinforced an image of slow-paced, low-stress living.  
When his headaches first appeared nothing seemed radically different, just a bout of 
migraines that made climbing staircases a dizzying activity. But when the headaches throbbed 
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everyday for three weeks straight, when he could neither walk around nor get a moment’s rest, 
Tim and his parents started to worry. These symptoms were needle sharp in his agonized head, 
but mysterious to his foggy mind. 
His family doctor offered no relief, confounded by Tim’s condition. So back to bed he 
went, and back to the unanswered questions that riddled his thoughts. Without a diagnosis, Tim 
attempts to understand his situation were potholed with ellipses. His only recourse was film, a 
medium that came closest to representing the extent of his agony. All he felt he knew was that he 
was dying: 
The next two weeks I either laid in my death bed or the couch with the feeling of 
paralysis by fear of the excruciating pain that could be triggered by the simplest of 
movement…The only time I would get up would be to stumble like a drunk to the 
bathroom so I could puke acid, which would be my only time of relief. I even recall 
looking up and screaming, caused by the pain, just like the movies.  
 
The biting pulses consumed him, stealing his bodily control and mental fortitude. His vision 
blurred and his words slurred. He began contemplating suicide, for a time the only foreseeable 
escape: “I was, like, starting to think I should just go out into my dad’s shop and drill a hole in 
my head to release the pressure, just end it.”  
In these moments of mystery, Timothy was setting up a particular mood, an emotional 
setting within which to place his suffering; his reference to film implies suspense and horror, 
while the mention of suicide shows us an acute moment of despair. These signifiers help 
audiences to relate to Tim, inviting them to imagine unimaginable pain, but they also lent Tim a 
framework for understanding. Thriller and horror movies often emplot suffering as an infliction 
brought on by the aggressions of another; Tim positioned himself as a helpless victim, lacking 
control of and, in turn, responsibility for his suffering. 
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Within the context of young adult cancer, mysteries may also perform another notable 
function. Often in oncology literature, as discussed in chapter 2, delays in diagnosis and 
treatment are more common among young adults than other age groups, and this is typically seen 
as a result of young adults’ procrastination or non-compliance (see e.g., CCS, 2009; CIHR, 2009; 
McGoldrick et al., 2011). To be fair, some of my interviewees admitted they avoided the 
doctor’s office because they were too afraid, busy, or ignorant of what their symptoms could 
mean. But, in the case of Tim along with a much larger majority of young adults, medical 
judgments often got in the way of good care. Whether by lack of evidence, knowledge, patience, 
attention, or respect, many physicians did not initially act on the young adults’ health concerns12. 
From young adults’ perspectives, mysteries were often perpetuated by medical staff who were 
slow to listen and quick to judge. Though Tim was not intending to criticize his physician for 
sending him home with severe migraines, that his mysteries were extended by that decision adds 
a critical element to his narrative. 
Tim boasted of withholding his urges to take hold of his father’s drill long enough to 
attend a CT scan—“I just fought through it and came out on top”—at which point the mysterious 
dark of his pain was flooded with light. He could see where he was—very close to death as it 
turned out, a fast-growing brain tumour discovered at the eleventh hour by a rescuing faculty of 
medical technicians and physicians. As he was hastily swept into surgery, Tim claimed he was 
suddenly no longer afraid or doubtful:  
I just stayed calm, you know, [and said] thank you for telling me what was wrong with 
me, let’s get me fixed…And I didn’t worry at all, I knew I had people around me that 
would do everything they could for me, so, I was just happy, looking forward to the next 
day where it would be better and next day and next day to the point that it would be all 
over and I’d be alright.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"#!Erroneous assumptions often underlined these dismissals, for example, that young people don’t get chronically 
sick, don’t know their own bodies, are hypochondriac or depressed, and so on.!
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In what seemed an instant a moment of inspecting mysterious symptoms leapt into a moment of 
medical healing, similar to the time sensitive plots of film Tim drew upon in his time of agony. 
The suspect was identified, caught in the act by the illuminating CT scan. With the name and 
remedy in the hands of professionals, Tim spoke of feeling deeply reassured and relieved. He 
never once retrospectively questioned their authority, even when they initially sent him home 
with little more than riddles and pills. This unflinching trust endured from surgery to weeks of 
radiation treatment and then months of chemotherapy.  
When asked if cancer changed his identity at all, his response was blunt: “Nope. I am 
who I am and if anything it’s made me a better person…healthier, more caring, live life to the 
fullest” (my emphasis). Such commentaries on his own life are a testament to his convictions that 
he was cured. This story of what he saw as “triumphant” healing builds upon an unwavering 
confidence in the power and predictability of medical interventions.  
Like his use of mystery plots, Tim’s medical recovery narrative placed the burden of pain 
and healing outside of himself. His disease was constructed as ‘other’ to him and as having very 
little to do with his spiritual and moral lives—unlike many journey plots or transformative 
recovery plots. This is a very welcome dissociation for people who do not wish to believe cancer 
is a disease of the soul. As with the cause, so too the cure; his healthcare teams acted upon his 
body, “fixing” him, relieving him not only of unbearable pain but also of having to interrogate 
his role in his cancer’s etiology and remission. Medical interventions were constructed as the 
defined course of healing, a path toward restitution, a preferential ending instilling hope within 
Tim and promising recovery to others who place their trust in oncology.  
Though Tim’s narrative enabled hope, consolation, and understanding, it carried with it 
some restrictions. For example, his narrative was demonstrative of how much weight can be 
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placed on simply naming cancer. In the mysteries of film and books, typically the climax is the 
time leading up to discovery of ‘who done it’ and the dénouement is the quick capture and 
cessation of the culprit’s schemes. Applying this structure to chronic illness experiences can be 
problematic, for it seems answers are often conflated with solutions. Diagnosis can be just the 
beginning, which may disappoint and further distress those expecting it to be the final ‘scene.’ 
Furthermore, not all problems in medical care are, in fact, solvable (e.g., permanent disabilities, 
surgical complications, chronic fatigue, etc.); these enduring disruptions seem to conflict with 
Tim’s narrative (and many others) where all questions (purportedly) get answered in the end.  
Some of the limitations of medical recovery narratives also come out of their attempts at 
normalcy and coherence. Tim’s story ends with restored health and happiness, an expectation 
that is not always attained by people with chronic illness and may, in Tim’s case, conceal 
enduring complications from having cancer in a very sensitive area. A growing body of medical 
discourses and cancer memoirs from patients (some of whom are young adults) are endorsing 
nearly unconditional recoveries (e.g., Carr, 2007; Zammett, 2005). With external and 
internalized pressures to become well again, Tim and many others may construct their stories in 
these terms, possibly subverting some underlying physical or emotional needs in favour of social 
needs for acceptance. Enduring anxieties, recurring pains, late side effects of treatment, or other 
ongoing troubles may be discouraged as a violation of decorum.  
In the “language of ‘doing something’,” we may say that Tim’s story was enabling 
distance from and an ending to his cancer experiences, while disabling conversations about 
possible enduring mysteries and unachieved recoveries. Some of these themes re-emerge in the 
next narrative, although by way of different plots and for different purposes.  
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B) Dani: Acceptance and Agency within Moments of Sojourning and Fighting 
 In terms of life circumstances, few people would differ from Tim more than Dani; and 
yet, their stories rang with some familiar tunes. Dani immigrated to Canada from Asia as a young 
child and had lived in one of Eastern Canada’s metropolitan cities for most of his life. For him, 
growing up was a complicated matter, rife with “testing my boundaries,” “exploring the world, 
trying new things and seeing what life had to offer.” After high school, he was “ready to 
adventure” into unfamiliar territories, seeking “opportunities to learn” about himself and his 
surroundings. Though three years had passed from his diagnosis of ALL to the time we sat down 
to an interview, between chemotherapy and physiotherapy his recovery “regime” filled all but 
the last six months of that time period.     
 Committed to fresh foods and elliptical trainers, Dani believed he followed a “healthy” 
and “active” lifestyle. He was rather surprised when he started cramping up and had trouble 
breathing. He went immediately to the doctor and was—unlike Timothy—quickly diagnosed 
with ALL. He was numb with shock at first, but primed with adventurous instincts and bored 
with his current life path he was, oddly enough, looking forward to the escape: “For awhile, ha, I 
actually enjoyed going through treatment because I didn’t, I did not enjoy school…I really was 
looking for a way out and cancer took me out of that. I didn’t have to worry about anything…It 
felt like a vacation.” More parallel to Tim, he was under the impression illness is temporary and, 
as with most vacations, he expected it would end far too soon. This claim foreshadowed a rude 
awakening to the severity of Dani’s condition:  
One day my, my arm just raised up on its own and I was just, I was just eating lunch in 
my bed and my right hand was active and all of a sudden I wasn’t even paying attention 
to it but suddenly my left arm just raised high above my head and I couldn’t move it. I 
was just, it just stayed there so I buzzed my nurse and, ha, I was still in a good mood I 
was like ‘Nurse, I have a question’ and I couldn’t move my wrist so I was just waving my 
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hand and she’s like ‘Well you can put your hand down’ and I was like, ‘That’s my 
question, why can’t I?’  
 
Dani had had two strokes, which left his whole left side paralyzed. Though he tried to 
maintain a “positive demeanor” the vacation was over. His moment of sojourning had taken a 
turn for the worse, becoming a moment of banishment, leaving him in a world he had not 
anticipated or desired. “Because of all the side effects of the medication in chemotherapy…I 
decided to do all the, the medication first before I focused on the physical rehabilitation.” That 
meant “my life was on hold for three years” until chemotherapy was over. This was a time of 
“mood swings,” isolation, and yearning for a “safe place to talk” about his fears. It seemed to 
him that a journey without movement was akin to a life without living. Dani felt he was “wasting 
away” in a “surreal” time and place, consisting mostly of “medication, appointments and 
confinement.”  
No longer able to carry on a “vacation” kind of journey, he sought out a “sense of clarity” 
and “acceptance” through a more reflective kind of journey. He spent time working on the anger, 
depression, and frustration he held toward the place entrapping him. With the help of some 
available support groups, he sought to break out of his confining sphere of “negativity.” 
Recognizing his suffering in others allowed him to see he was not “the only bitter human being 
in this world.” Many had to make the same travels, and could offer advice or testimony toward 
regaining a sense of hope.  
This first sequence of Dani’s story was emphatically adventurous. His narrative 
expressed a “sense of estrangement and ‘otherness’” (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 87), the 
sentiments of “unhomelike being-in-the-world” that health researcher Fredrick Svenaeus (2000) 
described as integral to illness experiences. Dani’s moment of sojourning provided a mood 
predominantly of uncertainty and loneliness but also of curiosity, a desire for and a will to 
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enforce change. This invitation to be transformed had practical connotations as well, as he 
positioned his reflective journey toward ‘acceptance’ as a prerequisite for continuing upon the 
path of rehabilitation. 
Physiotherapy requires a lot of stretching and resistance training, and so it may come as 
no surprise that during this period Dani started to reimagine his journey as an athletic feat, 
transforming a moment of sojourning into a moment of fighting with one’s own limitations. He 
worked for eight months on regaining mobility and strength in his weakened limbs. He saw this 
as a “huge challenge” that he had to “overcome” through the “miracle of exercise.” He was in 
“training” hoisting dumb bells, pulling ropes, walking on treadmills, and “a lot of planks, a lot of 
squats.” His mother started his training early, before physiotherapy, by getting him to pay 
attention to his neglected arm, asking him at sporadic times, “What’s your arm doing?” He 
continued this training in the gym not only for general use and mobility, but more specifically for 
a marathon he ran just after finishing rehabilitation.  
The marathon was more than just a goal; it was an overarching metaphor of healing. As 
both athletic achievement and long distant run, a marathon is an obstacle to overcome as well as 
journey toward a defined end. For Dani, it emblemized a milestone in recovery, a return to his 
former glory as a “healthy” and “active” person. This image carried forth in his general 
perception of cancer: “I’ve achieved so much, I’ve conquered my paralysis, I’ve conquered my, 
my chemo therapy and I’m just continuing to move up a mountain, the proverbial mountain and 
the physical mountain of, of success and challenge and hardship.” Part conquest, part 
accomplishment, he presently saw himself on the “other side of the cancer world” and “back in 
society,” as one who “learned from the ordeals” and could instruct others as a trainer-guide.  
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In this regard, Dani and Tim seemed to share strong ideas of unequivocal restitution. As 
Dani said, “Though we [young adults] talk about a new normal, my new normal is the fact that 
I’ve become normal again.” At some points he depreciated the significance of his cancer 
experiences: “It was just a facet of my life. It is not the whole of my life.” On the other hand, 
Dani placed a lot more stress on cancer still being a part of his self-image: “Though I’ve done 
treatment, I’m done all my analysis, I still feel I’m living with, I’ll, I, I might be living with it for 
the rest of my life.” This is perhaps owing to his emplotment of cancer as an athletic 
achievement for which to be proud.   
Moments of sojourning were also more frequent in Dani’s narrative, and with them were 
statements that he had ‘learned’ from his illness. There is a slippery slope to talk of ‘learning 
lessons’; it can create a social expectation—almost a command—to gain something from one’s 
suffering and to improve one’s life. Some people do not wish to seek a “sense of clarity” in their 
suffering, but rather perceive cancer as meaningless pain irrelevant to how they have lived. 
Dani noticeably shifted from journey and sport metaphors once he started talking about 
physiotherapy. Whether as war or as athletic task, narratives of fighting illness are believed to 
empower patients who may otherwise feel helpless or passive to their disease (Hunsaker-
Hawkins, 1993, p. 88). Dani seemed to embrace the agency and activity implied by a plot of war. 
On a collective level, people with cancer may envision a sense of camaraderie common to army 
soldiers who train together, hold similar ranking, or fight in the same battalion. Dani found this 
team in other young adults he knew who had cancer. However, his fight was often 
individualized, as a personal exercise in strength and endurance.  
The constructed path toward healing was, contrary to Tim’s, a matter of patient labour 
and training. Dani imagined a very different, but still hopeful, trajectory that enabled him to ‘take 
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charge’ of his well-being, to participate in his own recovery. Please understand, in no way do I 
see Dani’s interpretation of healing as preferable to Tim’s. I do not necessarily favour more 
‘agentic’ constructions of narrative identity; I am rather more interested in “agentivity” (Bruner, 
1990, p. 118-119), how agency is distributed differently in narratives and what that means for 
praxis. In these juxtaposed narratives, Dani bestowed more agency upon himself, implicating his 
actions in his recovery to a much greater extent than was the case for Tim—according to whom 
the actions of his medical staff were more essential.  
 My critical evaluations dwell less upon the therapeutics of agency (toward which I have 
demonstrated my suspicion) and more upon the limits of fighting languages. For some patients, 
healing is not facilitated by imagining one’s body as a competition or battlefield between 
conflicting entities (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 66). In Dani’s story of training, personal 
commitment seemed to be a determining factor in healing, which may segregate or disallow 
expressions of ambivalence and doubt as inimical to recovery. Emotions outside of courage and 
resolve—including the acceptance Dani said he pined for prior to these moments of fighting—
may be implicitly judged as reservations of the cowardly or precursors to surrender (Teucher, 
2001b, p. 169-170). There are also, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, problems with saying the 
deceased have “lost” their battles.  
 These first two stories both express restitution in post-treatment time; with Dani in 
particular we can see expressed needs for understanding his purpose and place in the route 
toward ‘normality,’ in the process disabling more ambivalent voices about assigning personal 
meaning and responsibility to survivorship. Maybe these two stories derive from an authentic 
account of the facts. Maybe they come out of people’s optimistic wishes for a clean bill of 
health. Maybe they originate in strong expectations that survivorship stories of cancer must have 
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hopeful endings. Whatever the case may be, Rose stood out as someone who did not fit these 
standards. 
C) Rose: Destabilizing Narrative Order through Moments of Inspecting and Disordering 
 When I interviewed Rose, she was a year out of treatment for cervical cancer and two 
years since her initial diagnosis. She unabashedly disclaimed promises of medical recovery or 
hopes of discovering existential benefits from her cancer journey and, for this reason, may be 
seen as a counterweight to the more chipper stories above. Rose hailed from a small town and, 
for her as for Tim, nothing quite matched rural living. She couldn’t stay away for long, always 
ready to return to the intimate charm, calm streets, and open fields.  
Not to say she spent her time absorbing the ambience of conversing crickets and setting 
suns; she said, “I was always busy with something so I didn’t really have time to really reflect on 
anything.” She worked hard toward the life she had envisioned, though sometimes it felt like a 
delayed journey: “Well, at first things were all going on the right path…[but] even before 
diagnosis [my] time lines kept shifting back (C: Right, yeah.) so the expectations I had um, going 
into I guess my early 20’s they had to change.” These “time lines” represented some of the more 
‘traditional markers’ of adulthood—especially getting married and having a family—that were 
introduced in chapter 2.  
 Rose shared with Tim an extended moment of inspecting rather odd bodily changes her 
physicians could not effectively interpret. Rose was sure she was incontinent for several months. 
“Embarrassed,” she sought medical help and was told by a bladder specialist that it was nothing: 
“the specialist actually treated me horribly…she did, like, her exams and she diagnosed me with 
something else, um, told me it wasn't, there was nothing she could do for me and I’m gonna have 
to just live with it.” A few months later she returned with more leakage, and though the specialist 
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“rolled her eyes,” she referred Rose to a colleague. She had a biopsy and after a weekend sitting 
in suspense was told she had cervical adenocarcinoma, a glandular cancer that had kicked 
secretion production into high gear.  
 For Rose, identifying the perpetrator was no real consolation; it had infiltrated her body 
and would not be taken without taking in return. She lost her chances of childbirth as her uterus 
and several lymph nodes were cut out, a tremendous blow to her vision of the future: “having my 
family, like, that’s what I’ve been wanting my whole life since I was like a teenager.” Her next 
CT scan was clear, meanwhile her thoughts were muddier than ever: “I never really thought 
much about having cancer, more about what the cancer took from me. I felt like damaged goods 
and that I had lost part of my identity as a woman, even now though the emotional aspect is still 
something I struggle with on a daily basis still.” As her moment of inspecting shifted from 
mysterious symptoms to a criminal plot, cancer appeared as a thief who robbed Rose of her body 
and identity. Solving the mystery of its activities saved her from losing much, much more, but it 
also revealed the extent to which the tumour had embedded itself within her being.  
 Post-treatment she felt she was getting “back on track” with the guidance provided by 
loving family and friends. That is, until a year after her first diagnosis: “Follow up appointments 
always put me on edge and at 12 months, I received a PET scan. The PET scan revealed a 
localized tumor and 2 positive lymph nodes; radiation and chemotherapy was my next 
adventure.” In her clinical consultation, she had “too much information and too many emotions 
to process”; she left this appointment of bad news thinking, “What just happened?”  
Her thief had returned and this time had made it even more difficult to apprehend: “There 
was nothing more [the surgeons] could take,” so they had to employ other arresting technologies: 
four rounds of Cisplatin, twenty-eight rounds of external radiation, and two rounds of internal 
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radiation. The urgency with which her oncologists planned this tactic did not allow for time to 
save her eggs (her last, though remote, hope of having her own biological children). She was 
hastened into the medical system before she could absorb the full shock of it:  
I got really emotionally upset with, with um, the first time with not being able to carry 
children and then I was gonna do like the egg freezing and then it came back and then I 
couldn’t put the treatments on hold and then I lost that. 
  
Like so many other small town patients, chemo and radiation meant frequent trips to the nearest 
city, and in Rose’s case, she had to move into an urban centre she had no desire to be in, cut off 
from her main supports. And along the trail to and from the hospital was a continuing series of 
irreparable losses. So much so, she said, that “I no longer consider myself whole.”  
In contrast to the earlier two stories, Rose’s narrative is relatively more chaotic: it did not 
expound miraculous changes of fate, or redemptive purposes to suffering, or a neat ending that 
reaffirms the normalcy of health and the transience of illness. Rather, she told a story of still 
being in illness, of being a perpetuate victim of its appetites, and each time walking away with 
less flesh and less life:  
I can definitely say that this is not where I thought I would be in my life, but life happens 
and there is really nothing you can do to change it. I struggle daily with the emotional 
aspect…again not of having cancer or the treatments themselves, but more what was 
taken away and the hopes and dreams that I lost. There are days that I don’t even know 
why I am even alive. Don’t get me wrong, I am not suicidal…rather somewhat depressed 
as to not knowing what my purpose is in life…What I need is someone to tell me what 
my future holds, but I won’t be holding my breath for that to happen.   
 
Rose seemed in search of a journey, one that would lead her out into more clearly marked paths, 
predictable weather, and bearable obstacles. She asked for guidance, for purpose and dreams, for 
life to take on an orderly character. To be sure, she was not in total chaos; she spoke of having a 
job she loved, but tempered her pleasure by admitting she uses the distraction of work to blot out 
her sadness.  
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It is the comparatively strong sense of enduring mystery and chaos that crowns Rose’s 
story as an exception, perhaps as a deliberate dissent, to expectations of narrative order. 
However, her story is distinct only by degrees, as many moments of disordering may be found 
across the young adults’ narratives. Her hesitation to overshadow her distress with redemptive 
rhetoric should be a teachable moment: that we don’t get so caught up in our search for narrative 
patterns that we start to normalize them. 
This last point brings us to the different purposes of chaotic narratives. Narratives 
involving chaos, or what psychologist Dan McAdams (2006) called “contaminated plots” that 
reflect “problems in life movement” (p. 219), are often perceived as the opposite of restitution or 
redemption (Frank, 1995, p. 97; McAdams, 2006, p. 211). Indeed, Rose’s narrative expresses 
difficulties in how to proceed in light of the many disruptions incurred. She communicated a 
need to escape her present disorderly life, to find a path leading toward healing.  
There are, however, other purposes revealed in how Rose used chaotic plots that suggest 
more is going on than a simple inability to find order. Chaotic narratives may instigate reflection 
on some of the most strongly held expectations of their audiences (Frank, 1995, p. 97). Moments 
of disordering wriggle into the cracks of narrative forms and split them apart. By speaking of 
enduring mysteries, interim recoveries, and disorienting journeys, Rose exemplified the 
instability of narrative order, the frailty of sedimented meanings, and the customary concealment 
of incomprehensible experiences. Chaotic narratives may be, in fact, marginalized and relatively 
invisible due to the seemingly critical attitudes they present toward dominant discourses of 
illness and healing; they may be one of many “outlaw” genres of storytelling, vilified or avoided 
because they transgress the rules set out by more dominant genres (Egan, 1999, p. 14). 
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Rose’s chaotic language also criticized established forms of narrative and knowledge. In 
a more intentional way than for Tim, she demonstrated that mystery and, indeed, chaos can be 
perpetuated by inattentive care providers. She reversed the typical narrative about delayed 
diagnosis in young adults, affirming that negligence cannot be attributed to people like her who 
have had to “fight to be heard.” Her story contradicted dominant genres about the possibility of 
restitution, recovery, or any foreseeable “lessons” from having cancer—even while she 
mentioned her desire for such things. We could read her moments of chaos as a failure to reach 
an ideal, or as the failure of an ideal (i.e., narrative order) to apply to Rose’s experiences; I am 
more inclined toward the latter in my attempts to legitimize marginal stories of chronic illness. 
It seems that, for her, the critique of narrative coherence was more important than the 
dream of achieving it. One of the main limitations to chaotic storytelling is the impact it can have 
on audiences. Frank (1995) called for “enhanced tolerance for chaos” (p. 111) because it remains 
difficult to be heard when one’s story violates customs and expectations for talking about illness. 
Those seeking social validation may not always find it. Some researchers have found chaotic 
stories can elicit fear, anxiety, and discomfort among some audiences, as well as prescriptions 
for how to get out of chaos (e.g., Smith and Sparkes, 2011)13.  
As Rose herself has admitted, she has “no one to talk to” because friends and family 
cannot seem to hear her story. While moments of disordering her life have served to reveal 
marginal ways of thinking about illness and the follies of dominant genres, the ability to 
communicate her story, to acquire an audience, may damper because of the ‘outlaw’ nature of 
her narrative. 
  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The most commonly reported suggestions were to seek therapy or the support of others, remove social and 
structural barriers to proper care, and entrust in the powers of modern medicine (Smith and Sparkes, 2011).  
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Conclusion: The Subjective Stakes of Narratives 
 Without delving into the idiosyncrasies of a particular story, we may recourse into 
thinking of narrative genres as abstract, categorical entities. Individual stories bring different 
forms to life, they anchor metaphors within tactile situations and challenges. The narratives of 
Tim, Dani, and Rose enrich an array of images of young adult life during cancer as they employ 
different moments of meaning toward divergent ends. Attention to form brings out the symbolic 
meanings of their stories, but attention to purpose links form more intimately to praxis. We see 
what their stories are ‘doing,’ for them and for their audiences. In individual stories we may see 
the varying values of narrative agency and order (the former of which I address more extensively 
in the following chapter). This shows that the personal stakes involved may go well beyond the 
desire for self-authorship and narrative coherence. We may see the creative ways in which young 
adults interpret and address the existential challenges of crippling pain, chronic disability, 
thwarted life goals, and prospective death. Above all we appreciate the subjective stakes at the 
heart of each person’s story, the service of which different narrative forms are engaged. 
Chapter Conclusion: Innovative Narrative Forms and Purposes  
Use of generic categories in clinical or therapeutic settings must be premised on the 
assumption that narrative form is fluid, up for negotiation, and dependent upon context and 
purpose. Taking into account both the values and limitations of different prototypical plots, it 
seems that no form of storying cancer can say it all. Telling a particular kind of story brings forth 
certain experiences more easily than others. Battles, journeys, recoveries, mysteries, and chaotic 
moments of disordering all have a valuable place in constructing images of illness. Perhaps this 
is why we see synthesis of multiple genres in young adults stories of cancer; they bring in 
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divergent plots that portray cancer as sometimes predictably ordered and sometimes 
unexpectedly complex.  
We also need to appreciate that this diversity is not, strictly speaking, a free-for-all; in 
medical and public rhetoric in particular, we encounter some genres more often than others. 
Innovative narrative forms are produced through negotiating sedimented meanings with personal 
needs. In order to appreciate this dialectic between narrative forms, contexts, and purposes, we 
must take into account both the intersubjective plots that link young adults’ stories together and 
individually rich moments of meaning.  
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CHAPTER 5: LIMINALITY, MYTHS, AND MOMENTS OF (NON)BEING    
 
Narrative Identities as Moments of (Non)Being 
“[I]n order to make you understand, to give you my life, I must tell you a  
story—and there are so many, and so many…How tired I am of stories, how  
tired I am of phrases that come down beautifully with all their feet on the  
ground…I begin to long for some little language such as lovers use, broken  
words, inarticulate words, like the shuffling of feet on the pavement.” 
 
—Virginia Woolf, The waves, p. 137 
Introduction 
 One of many powerful passages in Virginia Woolf’s beautiful novel The waves 
(1931/2012), the above quote prefaces an attempt by Bernard, one of six main characters in the 
book, to tell his life story. He seemed to be voicing some contempt for stories, or at least a 
suspicion that stories may be too neat, too singular, too structured to get anywhere near what we 
call our ‘selves.’ Woolf’s editorial choice in who speaks this criticism is quite significant, as 
Bernard was known by his friends to be a great story-teller. He was, in fact, attacking the 
adequacy and relevance of his own craft. He questioned grand narratives with all “their feet on 
the ground” but still high in the sky, abstracted from the shaky floors of experience. Through 
Bernard, Woolf called for a “little language,” much smaller stories unrestricted by a single, 
overarching plot or identity, offering only slippery spaces for our toes to stand unsteadily upon.  
The waves is a fictional text and perhaps its criticisms of narrating life do not extend to 
autobiographical narratives. Indeed, some stronger proponents of narrativist theories of self 
argue that people’s stories about themselves are their identities, insofar as stories are essential to 
their being (e.g., Baddeley and Singer, 2007; McAdams and Logan, 2004) or are the “very 
medium of our existence” (Randall and McKim, 2008, p. 8). I harbour little doubt that people’s 
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self-stories are important to understanding who they are, and if Virginia Woolf found them 
entirely worthless she would not have also been a prolific non-fictional writer. Narratives are, 
however, not the only medium of self-making; people constitute themselves through a wide 
variety of symbolic expressions, including not just stories but also visual self-images (e.g., 
fashion), bodily gestures, everyday activities, life projects, etc.  
More importantly, some emerging narrativist traditions more convincingly argue that 
narrative identities are partially fictional in that they are imaginative and constructive (e.g., 
Bruner, 1990; Freeman, 2010; Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993; Mattingly, 1994; McAdams, 1993; 
Ricoeur, 1985, 1988). As with narratives genres, people’s identities are constructed through a 
dialogic process of innovation and sedimentation (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 68), creatively interpreted 
and located within a dynamic world of possible lives. People’s stories use and negotiate different 
identities, drawing on different cultural forms as they try to make sense of the ebb and flow of 
crisis situations.  
There are many ways to make identities, each with their own limitations, and I offer no 
privileging defence of narratives as producing truer, more coherent, more authentic or otherwise 
better selves. Corresponding to my performative understanding of identities, I see narratives as 
putting forth “moments of being” (Jackson, 2008; Woolf, 1938/1985, p. 79), shimmering 
reflections in the rough waters of life that are both illuminating and distorting, and always 
fleeting. This angle may be particularly apt for cancer research as experiences of severe illness 
often entail “narrative wreckage” (Frank, 1995, p. 68) threatening to sink a “self-in-crisis” 
(Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 17-18). In recognition of the instability of identities it is also 
necessary to discuss “moments of non-being” (Woolf, 1938/1985, p. 79), the absence, ambiguity, 
or play of orderly identities, the uncontained liquid depths from which patterned waves of being 
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arise. My intention is to seek not a deep, unmoving floor of being but its rippling surfaces, the 
rising and falling identities reaching the shores of my perception, all the while taking in the 
motions of young adult life during cancer. Figure I1 (in Appendix I) outlines how this 
perspective on narrative identity follows my larger theoretical framework. 
In this chapter I explore narrative identities in four waves. The first wave reintroduces 
and applies the concept of liminality to moments of (non)being in illness, touching on each of the 
phases of separation, struggle, and consummation (Turner, 1966). The second wave builds on the 
previous chapter with regard to some pertinent narrative forms and narrative environments; in 
particular, I review the influence of mythic characters from different prototypical plots within the 
young adults’ moments of (non)being. Third, I situate these mythic identities within the young 
adults’ depictions of their social relations. In particular, I consider how moments of (non)being 
and meaning are intersubjectively constructed within interactions that are sometimes amicable 
and sometimes oppositional.  
The fourth and final wave moves the discussion into mythic conceptions of young 
adulthood, including the “traditional milestones” of development (i.e., independence, career, 
marriage, family, etc.) defined by many psychologists and psycho-oncologists as the apex of 
adulthood (e.g., Decker et al., 2007; McAdams, 2013; Roberts et al., 1997; Zebrack, 2011). I 
address how the young adults negotiated these idealized identities and what that may mean for 
thinking about identity and generativity among young adults living with chronic illness. 
Throughout this chapter I critically engage with the ideological construction of young adult 
identities, exploring the extent to which young adults used mythic identities to reintegrate 
disruptive experiences into a unified identity (narrative coherence) and reconstruct themselves as 
agentic actors (self-authorship). 
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Transformed Being: Liminality and Cancer 
Reintroducing Liminality 
Severe or chronic illness can produce liminal selves wherein one’s perceived positioning 
in local social worlds is disrupted, reinterpreted, and renegotiated. Liminality is often talked 
about as a process of rituals and practices (Turner, 1966); this definition pertains to emplotment 
as well. Indeed, as I argued at the end of the last chapter, narratives may be seen as purposeful 
activities or “praxes” intended to mediate and move beyond restricting conditions (see e.g., 
Charme, 1984; Sartre, 1960/1968). I apply liminality to my analyses not only as a descriptor of 
personal and social experiences of cancer but also as a poetic device, a literary frame for 
speaking of disrupted and transformed being over time. In this context, I discuss liminality as 
narrative sequences—comparable to moments of “disequilibrium” described in literary theory 
(e.g., Todorov, 1968/1981, p. 50-51)—including the sequences of a) separation, b) struggle, and 
c) consummation.  
A) Separation 
 Within rituals of liminality, the first sequence of “separation” begins when some 
revelation or reversal of circumstance leads to a shaken sense of self (Turner, 1969, p. 94). It 
should come as no surprise that for all the young adults I interviewed, their diagnoses marked 
most acutely their sense of separation from who they once were, what sociologist Michael Bury 
(1985) referred to as a “biographical disruption” of illness. This “shock,” a term many used, was 
constructed as a visceral experience through metaphors of bodily impact, likened to a “knee to 
the goods,” being “hit by a bus,” or witnessing an “earthquake.” Diagnosis also separated them 
from people with whom they previously affiliated; they were set apart from the majority of other 
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young adults, and the general population at large, who had no chronic illnesses and held very 
little consciousness of their mortality.  
 Some people may see this separation as a release from all obligations or social roles, a 
moratorium of sorts1. For instance, literary critic Anatole Broyard (1992) came to believe that his 
cancer was a “great permission, an authorizing or absolving” from responsibility (p. 23). To be 
sure, some young adults talked this way about the beginnings of their treatment. For example, 
readers may recall from last chapter that Dani, an ALL patient in his early twenties, initially saw 
his chemo treatment as a “vacation” from an uninspiring time in university; he changed his mind, 
of course, when he had a stroke. Martha, who had Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (NHL) in her late 
twenties, noted that nobody in her local world expected her to play a supportive role to them: 
“for the first time in my life, family and friends didn’t rely on me for anything. Even the train 
wrecks.” In both examples, they reported a sense of respite from responsibility, in a way a 
refreshing escape from their former lives.  
However, this moratorium was often described as temporary. Before the shock of 
diagnosis barely set in treatment plans were discussed, planned, and executed. People had to 
adjust to a new set of routines very quickly as medical appointments became the order of the day. 
Simply getting diagnosis often involved blood tests, follow-ups, ultrasounds or CT scans, more 
blood tests, more follow-ups. Once treatment began it only got worse. The sheer number of times 
each person had to come in and be poked by needles necessitated installation of PICC lines or 
Hickman lines (both central venous catheters). The young adults were entangled in a new life 
schedule dictated by medical procedures.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 I discuss moratoria at length in chapter 2 as a socially sanctioned time of exploring different identities often seen 
among adolescents and young adults (Marcia, 1973).  
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People with full time jobs or other commitments had to put them aside in order to attend 
six-hour chemotherapy appointments several times a week (usually with a weekend ‘holiday’). 
Each ‘round’ of chemo was usually a few weeks long. With the average number of chemo 
rounds being 4 to 6, and sometimes coupled with radiation treatments (once a week for several 
months), it is no wonder participants felt their lives taking on more structure during treatment, as 
opposed to the anti-structure that is said to inhabit liminal spaces. Hospitals had their own social 
structures and the young adults became immersed in them through regular contact with their 
staff, policies, and interventions.   
Because of the breakneck speed of intervention, the majority of young adults said they 
had not really digested or comprehended their diagnosis until after treatment stopped. In sum, 
they were too preoccupied with the regimens of their treatments to reflect on larger existential 
questions. Then, the new routines of treatment halted as quickly as they began. With the tempo 
of post-treatment life slowing down and appointments reduced to 3- or 6-month follow-ups, 
people finally had the time to reflect on what was happening. Thus began the second phase of 
“struggle” or liminality proper.  
B) Struggle 
The time after treatment often replaced the rushed, practical mindset, what some called 
“survival mode,” with a reflective awareness of their transformed and transforming being. At this 
point in their narratives people encountered identity crises, recognizing above all the bodily toll 
of treatments. Weight gain or loss, fatigue, sensorimotor dysfunction, visible scarring, and other 
noticeable body changes demanded reevaluation of their self- and body-images. Faced with 
damaged bodies, they had to renegotiate to what extent and in what ways their selves depended 
upon their bodies. They also talked about trying to figure out if they were on the same path in life 
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they followed prior to cancer, or if the experience had sent them on another course. Finally, they 
considered where they were in relation to those around them, perhaps as reintegrated equals, 
delayed travelers, involuntary deviants, lost hopes, and so on.  
It may seem strange at first glance that people would feel more liminal in post-treatment. 
Surely the young adults “struggled” in the midst of chemo or radiation, but their troubles became 
more recognizably existential once they acquired the uncertain status of being ‘finished’ 
treatment. Were they still part of the hospital or not? Were they well or still ill? Were they cured 
or dying? Being released from medical care can seem more ambiguous than being admitted 
because nothing is really being done about the situation. Common long-term and late effects of 
cancer can further this ambiguity—chemo brain, physical disability, and the like—because of 
their chronicity and their possible allusions to an imminent recurrence. Emotional and existential 
issues can also be ‘chronic,’ repeatedly encountered and rarely ever resolved, complicating the 
process of “consummation.”  
C) Consummation 
The “consummation” phase is most problematic in this context, as nearly half of the 
young adult narratives did not exhibit a strong sense of ‘aggregated’ identities. Finding where 
one fit in seemed an ongoing effort, a chronic negotiation. Many doubts and obstacles stood in 
the way. The majority of participants had not reached five years post-treatment, and as that is 
often used as a goal post in survival statistics for determining whether people are ‘in the clear,’ 
the young adults may have been holding out their votes of confidence until then. Some also 
talked about new problems, like late emerging pain from surgery, which foreshadowed more 
possible disruptions in the future. Most were still dealing with emotional distress and existential 
questions—not knowing their place in the world—few of which found assistance in their cancer 
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care centres or local social worlds. Some young adults still hadn’t returned to work, a few of 
whom hadn’t finished treatment. In light of these moments of uncertain and transformative 
being—what may be more accurately called moments of non-being—it could be said that post-
treatment identities do not always end in consummation.  
None of these points are meant to criticize the participants for ‘failing’ to reconstruct 
stable narrative identities; it would be anathema to my ontology of identity to demand more 
extended or unified moments of being. In addition, couching this liminality in terms of failure 
does a disservice to the creative ways people reinterpreted their identities and the merits they 
attributed to being in liminal spaces. To their credit many young adults reinterpreted themselves 
in meaningful ways, or were content to live in a time of uncertainty (as the most likely certainty 
would be a terminal prognosis). Frustrations aside, their illnesses enabled new ways of thinking 
of themselves. See Figure I2 for a visual of liminality in relation to cancer experiences. 
The following sections extend discussions of liminality by relating them to the use of 
mythic figures to make sense of selfhood during illenss. Across these debates we see a wide 
range of liminal and non-liminal identities produced out of the young adults’ negotiations.   
Mythic Moments of (Non)Being: Prototypical Emplotments of Identity 
Narrative Forms and Illness Identities 
Larger mythic stories, or master narratives, are internalized and reinterpreted as people 
make sense of their own lives (Charme, 1984; Hammack, 2008; Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993; 
McAdams, 1993). Religious and existentialist scholar Stuart Charme (1984) aptly described this 
process as the “sacralizing of the self” (p. 4), the interweaving of personal identities with cultural 
myths. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how prototypical plots and personal purposes are 
brought into innovative moments of meaning. An extension of that basic premise is that people 
 ! 208 
may use mythic figures and characters from different narrative genres to place themselves within 
larger plots of action, from the shock of diagnosis to the attempt at consummation in post-
treatment. Working with the different narrative forms I have already discussed—battles, 
journeys, recoveries, mysteries, and chaotic stories—I show how myth and personal experience 
come together in their expressions of narrative identity2. In this context, I make the distinction 
between a) less liminal moments of being and b) more liminal moments of non-being.  
A) Less Liminal Moments of Being: Heroes of Perseverance and Force  
Though used in a variety of ways, the following characters positioned the threats of 
illness as temporary and reparable. These identities emerged at times when participants displayed 
a sense of normalcy, recovery, or resilience in the face of disruptive transformations, thereby 
accentuating less liminal (more consummated) moments of being. Thus, we see identities 
positioned as “heroes of perseverance” and “heroes of force,” characters that Arthur Frank 
(1995) located within particular narrative forms3 (p. 134). As moments of (non)being alongside 
moments of meaning, the young adults’ identities tended to parallel the kinds of plots they used 
to story their illnesses. 
Perhaps the most common performances under this heading were “heroes of 
perseverance,” constructed to signify an ability to endure ongoing and life-threatening adversity 
(Frank, 1993, p. 119). These identities affirmed that whatever obstacles or disruptions may arise 
in a person’s world, they may be overcome or accommodated. Among the most familiar 
identities in cancer discourses—often seen in recovery narratives but also in journeys and 
mysteries—‘survivor’ identities seemed to be the most highly contested among young adults. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 I am by no means implying these associations with mythic figures are delusions of grandiosity; though some young 
adults found heroic demonstrations in their confrontations with illness and mortality (and I will not deny them that 
either), the majority conceived of themselves modestly as doing what anyone would do or as doing not much of 
anything worthy of praise.  
3 For example, he situated heroes of perseverance within journey stories (p. 129). 
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Survivorship suggests that one has persisted; though changed somewhat, one has ‘lived through’ 
a perilous experience. Some participants, like Lindsay living with Hodgkin’s lymphoma, argued 
the term ‘survivor’ should be reserved for those who suffered “most,” those “who were worse 
off, the ones who have to go through bone marrow transplants or who (pause) lost something or 
is not curable.” Quite a few young adults shared her sentiments, and if they did not see 
themselves as suffering ‘enough’ they would object to being called survivors. Contrast that with 
Jerry, a young man with brain cancer who held a broader notion of ‘survivor’ simply meaning 
‘not dying’: “I feel like a survivor, I just, I don’t know what else you could say. Just, I guess it 
wasn’t my time.” Although ‘survivor’ was a familiar identity to most participants, they had very 
different ideas about who it applies to—who, in effect, ‘really’ had a crisis that they had to 
‘endure.’ Thus, people varied widely in the extent to which they applied the term to themselves.  
Sometimes in illness narratives—particularly in the prototypical plots of medical 
recoveries—selves and bodies are separated out and the latter are lent to medical scrutiny, 
surveillance, and modification (Frank, 1995, p. 84-88). During such moments of healing, the 
young adults were often positioned as ‘patients’ who may be seen as ‘passive,’ helpless, or 
resigned to powers beyond themselves, a humbling appreciation of their limited control. More 
agency was attributed to medical personnel or, in more serendipitous recovery stories, to the 
capricious whims of chance. This may not be an inspiring image for some people living with a 
serious illness4, but it articulates an important aspect of many people’s experiences. One of 
Kairol Rosenthal’s (2009) young adult interviewees summed it up best; Geoff spoke about how 
he could not take credit for his recovery at all:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 For instance, in a recent interview about her memoir of living with cancer on the CBC Radio program Q, feminist 
playwright Eve Ensler said that becoming a patient seemed too much like “stopping,” inhibiting a transformative 
experience—a “cancer conversion”—she said she invited. People who are not interested in being changed 
dramatically by their illness may perceive ‘patienthood’ in a very different, more favourable, light. 
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Everyone thinks that survivors are fighters. I don’t think I really fought for my life. I laid 
there and got doped out of my mind for six months and got well, while other people were 
sitting around reading Bernie Siegel, doing their imagery work, and died. (p. 94)  
 
With discourses of visualization and psychosomatic healing being passed around in and out of 
cancer centres, some patients may feel they must be somehow involved in their own recovery. 
Geoff’s comments resonated with a few of my participants who talked about just “laying in bed,” 
waiting for their treatments to take effect, believing the route to healing required little effort on 
their part.  
Resignation to medical intervention is a theme in various parts of every participant’s 
narrative. Not a single person refused medical treatments in favour of more ‘participatory’ 
approaches (like imagery work), though some negotiated what treatments they would accept, 
others complemented mainstream medical care with alternative approaches, and a few ended 
treatment because their care providers believed it was more likely to kill them than would their 
cancers. For the most part, people communicated ‘trust’ in the capabilities of their care 
providers, putting faith in modern medicine to preserve their self-images by saving their bodies. 
But, the divisions between bodies and selves could not always be sandbagged; changes in one 
sometimes leaked into the other. Patient identities were not necessarily free of transformation, 
only mediated by confidence in medical care to mend anatomies and selves.  
Participants emplotted their experiences quite differently when telling of moments of 
fighting, which implies more resistance and agency than given to patient identities. Many people 
who are ill ascribe to this positioning as they have a “strong aversion…to the idea of themselves 
as victims” (Hunsaker-Hawkins, 1993, p. 65). This aversion can come along with fears of being 
judged for not appearing to try hard enough or of not displaying a sufficient demonstration of 
defence (Rimmon-Kenan, 2002). Those who seem to be engaging in battle are often 
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commemorated in public discourses as militaristic ‘warriors’ or “heroes of force” (Frank, 1995, 
p. 134).  
Warrior identities were present to varying degrees in many of the young adults’ 
narratives. As noted in chapter 4, battle stories were not nearly as dominant as journey or 
recovery narratives; as a result only a few people heavily and consistently evoked war-like 
identities. Two women positioned themselves frequently as divine warriors, “chosen” by God to 
resist cancer’s evil advance. Laura, for instance, believed that cancer went beyond her individual 
case of colorectal cancer. She constructed the disease as a widespread, corrupting plague that 
requires mobilization of all those affected to “beat it.” She pitched individual suffering as a 
social problem with a collective solution—not a contained fight on a cellular level but a cosmic 
war between good and evil.  
The young adults sometimes constructed themselves as ‘detectives’ or ‘vigilantes’ when 
mysterious events required investigation and, for whatever reason, they felt responsible for 
seeking answers. These identities often emerged in moments of inspecting when undiagnosed 
symptoms exhibited themselves as mysterious signs, when care providers seemed to get caught 
up in ‘red tape’ and other bureaucratic entanglements, or when they did not attend to patients’ 
complaints. For instance, Linda said she was frustrated by “things that never came up, you know, 
that really should have, around menopausal symptoms, around all kinds of things like that that 
were just not mentioned any where by anyone, no literature no website no nothing.” One 
example she gave was of something to conceal her PICC line. She decided to do her own 
research: “I went online and…I Googled cast covers.” She discovered that “there are different 
companies that offer lovely covers that will cover up your PICC so that you look, you know, not 
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like a medical refugee when you walk down the street.” Her own investigations helped her to 
address “issues around appearance…that really weren’t mentioned” in her clinical consultations. 
When participants had to ‘sell’ their caregivers on what they had found in their 
investigations, they often positioned themselves as ‘advocates,’ a special type of heroes of force. 
They talked about having to be strategic, charming, or manipulative in order to win a war of 
words with their physicians. More necessary than brawling with their care providers was oratory 
persuasion and use of medical knowledge to achieve the best care possible. For example, Lorena 
wanted to change the “face of lung cancer” as perceived by her care providers and the public at 
large. She combated this image with critical statistics: “Not many people know that up to 25% of 
new [lung cancer] diagnoses are never smokers, but we have to live with the stigma all the 
same.” Her use of medical knowledge against medical and public perceptions of her cancer is 
typical of many initiatives undertaken by the young adults in order to protect and preserve their 
lives. 
Social conflict sometimes had the wrong connotation for participants’ struggles. Instead, 
they placed themselves as ‘athletes’ pushing to the limit their resources and abilities in order to 
overcome adversity. Linda, for example, felt uncomfortable talking about cancer as a battle, but 
found it quite helpful to imagine herself as running a marathon: “you just keep your eye on the 
ball, you just keep going and going and going and it’s painful and it’s exhausting and it’s 
unpleasant but you have a lots of people around you.” The struggle was redirected internally, as a 
test of strength and will to surpass her own self-limitations.  
Whether heroes of perseverance or of force, or both, people made use of mythic figures 
to make sense of the demands of particular situations. They produced what philosopher of 
autonomy Catriona MacKenzie (2008) described as “practical identities,” temporary selves 
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serving certain needs and performing selective praxes. There are important differences in 
“agentivity” (Bruner, 1990, p. 118-119) here, which demarcates who needs to act and in what 
ways. Survivor, patient, warrior, and detective figures were all performances of less liminal 
moments of being, in their own ways trying to preserve selves-in-crisis through narratives of 
endurance, patience, or resistance. Whether the participants were disputing claims that cancer 
forever changes a person or were trying to salvage what remained from the chaos, less liminal 
identities expressed both the need for and the prospect of protecting selves-in-crisis from further 
disruptions.  
B) More Liminal Moments of Non-Being: Tragic and Transcendent Figures 
Sometimes the young adults’ identities embodied moments more reflective of non-being 
or transitional being. Tied to mythic figures of transformation, they expressed episodes of change 
and, in some instances, desires for change. These more liminal moments of non-being affirmed a 
foundational vulnerability of lives, worlds, and especially selves. We may think of them as 
‘decentered’ or de-positioned selves (Heidt, 1991) constructed to communicate selves-out-of-
order or selves-in-the-midst-of-rebirth. It may help to discuss two different ways in which mythic 
identities foregrounded people’s expressions of liminality: tragic and transcendent figures.  
The first and most familiar were ‘tragic figures.’ Not surprisingly, cancer was often 
portrayed as an agent of destructive change, inflicting mischief upon participants’ self-
perceptions, alienating them from their bodies and from others, and demanding critical 
evaluations of things they took advantage of in life. In more extreme situations, cancer was 
constructed as more malevolent and deliberate in its intrusiveness, a mysterious and threatening 
‘thief’ who came in one heavy swoop or in a series of calculated returns to take fleshy bits of 
their being. As Rose described of her cervical cancer and treatments (first introduced last 
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chapter), she was left feeling “robbed,” “damaged,” and “not whole.” In such moments of 
inspecting participants positioned themselves as ‘victims’ who had lost treasured parts of 
themselves to a conniving villain. 
In more tragic moments of non-being people portrayed themselves as being at the mercy 
of their life circumstances, pushed and pulled in different directions until stretched out. They 
sometimes became hapless ‘exiles’ uprooted from their homes and banished to foreign lands, 
initiating moments of sojourning neither invited nor desired. The young adults talked about being 
“disconnected from society,” “physically and socially isolated,” in an “other world,” and 
sometimes literally relocated to an unfamiliar place closer to cancer care centres. With each new 
telling of disruption, these tragic figures appeared as more and more fragmented, dissociated 
from themselves by erratically “undisciplined bodies” (Frank, 1995, p. 104-108) and by social 
segregation. 
Other identities expressed moments of non-being without being necessarily upsetting 
transformations. These ‘transcendent figures’ referred to liminal forms of being that seemed to 
overcome, alleviate, or convert into good the violence cancer experiences inflicted upon them. 
For example, when emphasis was placed more on self-involvement in recovery narratives—and 
less on being compliant ‘patients’—people often positioned themselves as ‘self-healers’ or co-
healers. They constructed more intimate bonds between their bodies and selves, where the latter 
were seen as responsible to the well-being of the former. Over half of my participants suggested 
their cancers signified a need to change some part of themselves and they felt an urge to 
“engage” with their experience or participate in its process. This often came out of recognition 
that their former identities were already destabilized by illness and suffering, but with a hope that 
their involvement would transform them.  
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The ‘work’ of self-healing involved peeling away extraneous layers of the self, coming to 
what Hunsaker-Hawkins (1993) described as an image of a “real self” (p. 34), a perceived 
spiritual awakening or discovery after an arduous trial or travel. Like an onion molding on the 
outside, the discarded parts of selves were considered corrupt or tainted. Some people spoke to 
even deeper transformations of self, rebirths often metaphorized as a “phoenix”5 (Frank, 1995, p. 
119-124, p. 135; Rimmon-Kenan, 2002, p. 24). Whether facilitated by invasive and intense 
cancer treatments or by personal attempts at “conversion” to instigate change (like those of Eve 
Ensler above), selves would undergo a process of purification.  
In order to be purified, the flaws of the past had to be confessed. Some participants saw 
being “selfish,” “careless,” “naïve,” or a “workaholic” as factors leading either directly to cancer 
(e.g., not taking care of their health) or to later regrets and emotional turmoil (e.g., not spending 
enough time with family). At least two-thirds of the participants mentioned evolving or wanting 
to evolve into a “better,” more “authentic” or “organic” self. For instance, a married man in his 
forties, George, spoke of being profoundly altered by his experiences of acute lymphoblastic 
leukemia. He believed that it is “virtually impossible” to leave cancer behind and “pretend it 
never happened.” Claiming that cancer transformed him into a more compassionate person with 
a very different set of values and priorities, he confidently asserted: “I am pretty fond of who I 
am now.” Martha also touched on the continuance of liminality and how it is not necessarily a 
demoting process:  
It’s also taking me a lot longer to sort of move through the transformation to a point—
like I’m still constantly changing, and that’s not necessarily, like in many ways (pause) in 
many ways, with the exception of some of the longer term health issues, it’s really for the 
better. Like I, I’m definitely a better person.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 While Rimmon-Kenan (2002) describes the phoenix in terms of recovery narratives, Frank (1993) assigns them to 
quests (p. 123-124). It is fair to say that they may come in a variety of forms within a diversity of narrative forms; as 
with prototypical plots, narratives identities may leak into one another.  
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Martha maintained, as did many others, that her moments of non-being led ultimately to 
moments of transcendent being and, in that way, she cherished her liminal experiences.   
 On the other hand, some moments of de-positioning involved a more deliberate effort to 
deconstruct singular or unifying notions of self. We could refer to such elusive characters as 
tricksters, who often in myth (see Hyde, 1998) and in illness narratives (see Frank, 2010) subvert 
a cultural order in order to expose its limits and lies. Whereas tragic figures in cancer stories 
usually showed intercepted desires to achieve consummation, tricksters often exposed 
consummation as an ideological concept that fails to recognize the messiness and uncertainty of 
selfhood in illness.  
Tricksters are sometimes desired for the relief they provide to exceedingly orderly 
presentations of life. They seem to be the kinds of characters Kairol Rosenthal (2009) sought out 
in her study of young adult cancer, as she had an intentionally critical desire to break out of 
cancer patient stereotypes. She wrote, “I had grown tired of images of cancer patients smiling 
with gratitude. I cringed when I heard stories of strength and hope, not because they aren’t 
important or real, but because I experienced a flip side that is never spoken about” (p. 90).  
Rosenthal is surely not alone in calling for other voices in dominant discourses, with the 
aim of illuminating more liminal moments of non-being during illness. Lung cancer patient 
Lorena used herself as a saboteur of common assumptions about her disease: “What does the 
face of Lung Cancer look like? Well it looks a lot like me, young, non-smoker, asymptomatic, 
and healthy—well, except for the cancer…Gone are the days that we can associate Lung Cancer 
to only smokers or those who have been exposed to second hand smoke, because it is an injustice 
to those like me who were neither.” In this and other situations, young adults used tricksterly 
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figures to position themselves as de-positioned selves, disrupting common myths about who gets 
a particular disease by bringing attention to the limits of understanding.  
More chaotic characters like those described within this section often rub against our 
expectations and hopes; they serve as challenges to narrators and audiences alike, both of whom 
are grappling to understand what is going on and to whom it is happening. Tricksters, for 
instance, have been noted for their critical function in deconstructing dominant discourses about 
illness (e.g., Frank, 2010). In many ways, these tragic and transcendent figures issue a note of 
caution to audiences—myself included—who sometimes err in expecting to see stable or 
consummated moments of being. Even thinking of narrative identities as ripples or waves can 
presume a patterned flow of selfhood, which may only apply when the seas of life are at ease, the 
winds calmer, the currents weaker. Liminal selves may be steeped in waters at the roughest times 
of day, or in locations that are never completely at rest.  
Conclusion: Mythic Identities in Illness Narratives 
 Many different identities can be constructed out of cancer patients’ applications of 
cultural forms onto their experiences (see Figure I3). They communicate experiences as well as 
expectations of illness, lived selves as well as ideal selves. Expectations are not a single image 
but changing horizons, and as such are manifested in different colourations of selfhood over the 
course of each narrative. These mythic identities could be used to position oneself within the 
stages of liminality, bringing to light how each person confronts and refigures the experiences of 
shock, struggle, and/or consummation.  
In her study of adolescents with cancer, nursing researcher Roberta Woodgate (2005) 
described an array of ways of being among adolescents with cancer, some of which parallel the 
above identities: perceptions of being a “klutz” seems similar to trickster identities in 
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destabilizing order and balance in life; reports of feeling like an “invalid,” “zombie,” or “alien” 
express some patient-like identities, where their bodies prevented them from doing much beyond 
resting and waiting to get better; and the sense of “renewal” from feeling like a “kid” again in 
post-treatment resonates with phoenix identities in their similar imageries of rebirth. In her 
research, as in mine, the need to recognize diverse and fluid moments of (non)being is key, for 
they communicate an array of biographical and existential challenges brought on by living with 
cancer. Furthermore, we must take into account how these mythic identities are socially 
negotiated or co-authored with other important characters in the young adults’ life stories. Let us 
enter these intersubjective spaces. 
Narrative Intersubjectivities: Negotiating Emplotments of Being and Meaning 
Peaceable and Hegemonic Lived Relations 
I have lent a great deal of attention to the cultural materials young adults used to 
construct moments of being (and meaning), but here I take into account the many specific hands 
that assisted in building their identities, the more and less cooperative “lived relations” between 
people that partially define individual “lived experiences” (e.g., Good, 1994; Scheper-Hughes 
and Lock, 1986). I place the young adults’ moments of (non)being within contexts of these 
different ‘narrative intersubjectivities,’ demonstrating the co-authorship involved in expressing 
their existential and biographical challenges.  
The challenge lies in how to portray these interactions. Philosopher of social science 
Michael Crotty (2003) described two dominant ways of representing intersubjectivity, as a 
“peaceable” world of cooperative exchanges versus a “battleground of hegemonic interests” (p. 
63). These two positions amount to a hermeneutics of understanding and a hermeneutics of 
suspicion, respectively (see Ricoeur, 1976). I display both moments of ‘working together’ and 
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‘working in opposition,’ making the case that the hinging factor seemed to be the extent to which 
people were able to bridge their different horizons of expectation about young adult life with 
cancer (see Figure I4). I relate such moments to three important intersubjectivies within the 
young adults’ narratives: clinical relationships, local social worlds, and cancer communities6. 
These analyses should strengthen the image of being (and meaning) as negotiations between 
stakeholders and with a range of outcomes.  
A) Clinical Relationships: Mutual and Disputed Emplotments of Being 
In an essay titled “The patient examines the doctor,” literary critic and prostate cancer 
patient Anatole Broyard (1992) placed high expectations on the person chosen to treat his illness, 
demanding he or she “combine the role of the priest, the philosopher, the poet, the lover” (p. 54). 
He weighed his expectations against his initial urologist, and came to the conclusion he was 
“such an innocuous-looking man that he didn’t seem intense enough or willful enough to prevail 
over something powerful and demonic like illness” (p. 37). Broyard admitted the unrealistic 
standards he and many other patients placed on doctors, but that did not stop him from insisting 
upon such a ‘heroic’ ideal because “whether he wants to be or not, the doctor is a storyteller, and 
he can turn our lives into good or bad stories, regardless of the diagnosis” (p. 53). Medical 
professionals contribute to patients’ stories in a big way, with the potential to help or hinder their 
efforts to construct meaning and being.  
The reality of clinical practice is that it is defined by patients’ and doctors’ “horizons of 
expectation” (Ricoeur, 1985, p. 208-209). Clinical practice follows what anthropologist Cheryl 
Mattingly (1998) called “therapeutic emplotment,” within which patients and caregivers “create 
story-like structures through their interactions” that, she believed, are “integral to the healing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 A fourth intersubjectivity requires mention, that between the participants of this study and myself, the researcher 
interviewing them. However, I withhold discussion of this important social context until the concluding chapter, as 
part of a larger overview of some of the limitations and implications of this research project.  
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power of [therapeutic] practice” (p.2). In theory, this is a collaborative effort of constructing a 
shared story of illness including a projected plot toward recovery; according to Broyard (1992), 
both patients and physicians have ‘authority’ on illness, a knowledge base built on experience, 
and “there should be a place where our respective superiorities could meet and frolic together” 
(p. 45). In terms of the above mythic identities, this could mean co-constructed moments of 
being and meaning where both parties agree that, for instance, they are ‘warriors’ engaged in a 
collaborative battle against cancer, bringing their respective strengths and ‘weapons’ to the fight.  
A number of young adults talked about such exchanges, when their doctors served as 
supportive casts to their mythic identities. Doctors often appeared (in my words) as allies in 
young adults’ fights against cancer, guides along their otherwise lonely exiles, co-investigators 
in their searches for answers, technicians working on their bodily repairs, and so on. High praises 
were given to medical staff who were able to meet the young adults in the intersections between 
their different horizons, responding to their desired constructions of themselves and their 
illnesses. Sometimes the young adults humanized their care providers as everyday people, saw 
them as having “a lot on their plates” and “doing the best they can” already, and appreciated 
them for all they did. They relieved medical staff of the mythic ‘heroic doctor’ image Broyard 
put forward, and they were met with more patience when they made mistakes or admitted their 
limits.  
 At other times, the young adults reinforced the heroic image. They constructed their 
doctors and nurses as angelic guardians along their travels7, saviours in their pursuits of 
recovery, beacons of knowledge among clouds of mystery, warriors leading the battles, etc. In 
reference to living with brain cancer, Johnny abrasively put it this way, “Somebody said to me !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Broyard described an appropriate image for this more authoritative figure: “I want [my doctor] to be my Virgil, 
leading me through my purgatory or inferno, pointing out the sights as we go” (p. 42).!
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‘Was it your faith in God that got you through this?’ And I said ‘No! It’s my faith in surgeons 
and chemotherapy, you idiot!’” Among Johnny and many others was an unequivocal trust and 
“faith” in modern medicine—befitted to patient identities—that often led to a less combative 
relationship with their care providers. 
In less ‘peaceable’ moments, the young adults spoke also of break down when divergent 
interests got in the way of an agreed-upon therapeutic plot. Often these clashes were spurred on 
by repelling horizons of expectation, and often manifested as moments of inspecting their 
illnesses independently, moments of fighting with care providers, or moments of advocating for 
self-interests (described in the previous chapter). With regard to moments of inspecting, disputes 
were over how to read the young adults’ symptoms prior to diagnosis. When they entered their 
doctor’s office for the first time, they exhibited more and less vague signs of cancer: general 
fatigue, enduring colds or flus, visible lumps around lymph nodes, constant bleeding, severe 
pain/pressure, etc. Very often the young adults said these symptoms were dismissed or 
misdiagnosed as imaginary conditions, physical manifestations of stress, or hyperbolic responses 
to innocuous symptoms, and were offered anxiety medications or psychologist referrals.  
Physicians were said to perpetuate the mysteriousness of symptoms by making hasty and 
questionable assessments; even worse, they sometimes accused patients of manufacturing their 
symptoms. It seemed to be a popular recourse to explain medical uncertainties as strictly mental 
phenomena that are not really ‘real’ or only ‘in their heads.’ These emplotments often 
constructed young adults’ identities as self-healers, bestowing responsibility upon them to ‘get 
over’ the allegedly mental causes of their distress. By contrast, the young adults often saw 
themselves in these moments as victims to the will of some malicious, unknown virus or entity 
and entrusted their physicians to solve the puzzle of their ailments. Not satisfied with such 
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constructions, many young adults sought out online information to find more personally fitting 
stories.  
The young adults talked more about fighting and advocating during treatment time. 
Physician Rita Charon (2006) noted that very often care providers and patients disagree on the 
contexts and causality of illness (p. 19); for example, tensions may arise between medical 
Cartesian discourses that reduce illness to biological processes and phenomenological discourses 
defining illness as part and parcel to people’s being-in-the-world. Medical Cartesianism often 
emplots recovery as the responsibility of medical personnel and constructs those who are ill as 
having patient identities—without moral culpability for the origins or treatment of their disease. 
While sometimes relieving, medical Cartesian horizons of expectation can disregard existential 
questions and denounce moral explorations8. Some young adults wanted to engage in these 
processes and expressed frustration over feeling deprived of choice and a voice, saying their 
oncologists’ preferences were “narrow” and restricted the available plots toward healing.  
These are just a few of many examples of arrangements between patients and doctors, 
some of which worked well and others that generated conflict. The larger point is that the 
patient-doctor relationship can be divided by obstinate expectations that resist other horizons. 
Given the differences in dominant genres between young adults’ narratives and medical rhetoric 
(see ch.4), it should not be a huge surprise that they often have different ideas about how to 
emplot cancer experiences. A common barrier to collaborative therapeutic emplotment was 
flawed medical assumptions that young adults do not get cancer, leading to an overzealous 
hermeneutics of suspicion around even the most alarming symptoms and legitimate concerns. 
The fault is no one’s in particular, as these cases demonstrated a breakdown of understanding 
and communication rather than a malicious attempt to deny care. What we may rightfully !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 I provide further analysis of moral disputes around responsibility in the following chapter. 
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challenge, among physicians and patients alike, are preconceptions of medicine as an impeccable 
discipline and medical statistics as a “technology of presencing” cancer (Jain, 2007) for they may 
blind people to the existence of alternative and concealed horizons—in this case, the presence of 
statistically rare cancers among young adults.  
Contested emplotments of identity came out of very different narrative preferences, not 
just between patients and doctors but also between different patients. For example, some young 
adults wanted more proactive help (or agency) from their oncologists (e.g., a “never give up” 
attitude) and some wanted more leniency and patience (e.g., being less “forceful”). They also 
differed in terms of whether they desired more lateral communication involving collaboration or 
more hierarchical communication where doctors’ voices carry more authority. It is likely very 
hard for medical professionals to tailor the process of therapeutic emplotment to these different 
horizons of expectation. The young adults I studied constructed a wide range of meanings and 
ways of (non)being as they went through cancer, and it has been no easy task even to make sense 
of them, never mind apply them in clinical practice. 
Medical professionals often get criticized for their contributions to less peaceable 
relations with patients, and the young adults I interviewed continued this trend with many more 
examples of conflict than of cooperation. While we may recognize these limitations, care 
providers must also be given their due when tensions appeared low. The young adults credited 
collaboration less often to medical knowledge of young adult cancer (though they frequently 
called for such) and more to simply being heard above the noise of medical statistics that conceal 
young adult cancer. Among the most cherished clinical practices were: suspending disbelief 
about the rarity of young adult cancer in diagnostic assessments and enabling the young adults to 
be participants in therapeutic emplotment when they asked to be.  
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B) Local Worlds: Inclusion in and Alienation from Home Communities 
 Clinical relationships were, for obvious reasons, important intersubjectivities to the 
young adults as they lived through their illnesses. However, the young adults also sought 
cooperation and support from their home communities or “local worlds”9 (Kleinman and 
Benson, 2006, p. 1674). These significant others not only provided relief (or not) in times of 
crisis; they also participated in defining crises—for example, shaping expectations of life with 
cancer as a more temporary disruption or as an extended and indefinite illness; by extension, they 
contributed to the young adults’ self-perceptions, as future survivors, perpetual victims, etc. 
Depending on the extent of overlapping expectations between the young adults and their 
significant others, the resulting interactions sometimes led to a stronger sense of being part of a 
community and at other times a further sense of alienation or “unhomelike being-in-the-world” 
(Svenaeus, 2000).  
The majority of participants saw their loved ones predominantly as guides along their 
journeys; typically a parent though sometimes a partner or friend, they cared for the young adults 
at their most vulnerable, intervened in times of crisis, or offered inspiring wisdom that enabled 
them to carry on. Their constructions of their loved ones were heavily steeped in journey 
metaphors, but such images were not limited moments of sojourning—just as with care 
providers, they were sometimes portrayed as allies fighting alongside the young adults, 
caregivers helping them heal, and so on. In these moments, the young adults’ emplotments 
stretched beyond an individual living with cancer to include a community of grievers and 
supporters.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!These worlds for the most part included family and friends, but they sometimes went beyond home life to include 
work life (i.e., employers and co-workers) and public life (i.e., people associated through volunteer organizations, 
community engagement, etc.).!
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Timothy, first introduced in chapter 4 as a brain cancer patient in his early twenties, 
constructed his local world as a loving and instructional family: “I’ve always been close with my 
family. I always listened to what they said and their advice the best I could.” He talked most 
specifically of his father as a moral and emotional compass. Tim said, “[he’s] always told me 
that, like, you have to start at the bottom and no matter where you are you’re always going to 
have stuff you have to stick through and keep going.” In moments of disordering, when his 
throbbing skull induced screams of pain and nausea, Tim seemed to look to these teachings and 
use them to emplot his suffering as moments of sojourning. In this way, his father helped to place 
an existential framework around his pain, where Tim read himself as a hero of perseverance—a 
narrative identity emphasizing endurance and resolve. For his part, Tim’s dad appeared to be 
constructed as a guide or perhaps a shepherd, helping him down the hall when the swelling in his 
head affected his balance, driving him every time to the nearest city for his treatments.  
 The young adults talked about how their loved ones suffered along with them, not as 
observers in close proximity but as extensions of the young adults’ pain beyond their lived 
bodies. In other words, their distress rippled outward, infecting their local worlds, becoming an 
illness of social bodies. The young adults often said they thought their families suffered much 
more than they did, having to face the possibility of losing a loved one and often feeling helpless 
to prevent it. Family members sometimes took on the burdens of being healers or co-healers to 
the young adults, and though sometimes seen as “overbearing” they provided needed financial, 
emotional, spiritual and practical support. A great many familial relationships and friendships 
strengthened as the weight of illness was distributed across caring shoulders.  
On the other side of these intersubjectivities, the young adults often experienced a double 
sense of alienation: first from their local worlds by people who would not or could not hear their 
 ! 226 
existential challenges and, in turn, from their own suffering by not being able to speak of it. In 
terms of the first form of alienation, which expresses moments of banishment, some friends or 
family disappeared right away after finding out about the diagnosis. Lindsay, who was a 
Hodgkin’s lymphoma patient in her late twenties, spoke about how having cancer “opened my 
eyes up to the type of relationships I had.” Seeing the evasion and awkwardness among many of 
her friends, she said, “I kind of said what I needed to say to everybody that was driving me crazy 
or that I really appreciated and they could take it or leave it…the way I refer to it is I cleaned out 
my friend closet.” Expressed as a form of self-healing, Lindsay spoke of ‘purging’ herself of 
unwanted or inert relationships in order to continue on toward recovery. Her story shows that 
banishment can be to some extent imposed by others and to some extent self-imposed by 
confronting (or, for some, segregating oneself from) others.  
In terms of alienation from their pain, many of the young adults’ complaints seemed to 
emerge from divergent lived experiences between them and others. More than that, certain 
ideologies seemed to be at stake during these interactions, where, for example, being young 
adults with cancer seemed to threaten taken-for-granted assumptions about young adulthood. 
People who were still present (i.e., not “cleaned out”) sometimes pressured the young adults to 
tell certain kinds of stories, especially recovery narratives involving survivors. More liminal 
identities were often discouraged as they did not always promise happy endings or “redemptive 
selves” (McAdams, 2006).  
While they sometimes wanted to be seen as ‘different’ in the sense of having some 
unconventional experiences of young adulthood, the young adults were often considered strange 
in ways they did not intend. For example, their ‘delayed’ recoveries were moralized as having 
psychological causes; a friend or family member told them being “positive” would lead to 
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recovery, and saw their lingering anxieties, frustrations, and doubts (believed to be under their 
control for the most part) as catalysts for further suffering, recurrences, or death. Peers were 
unaware that existential challenges can come after treatment and assumed that when treatments 
were finished it was all “over.”  
The young adults said they struggled to negotiate their identities with these horizons of 
expectation. They claimed to feel they were “not allowed to cry” and had to appear “positive,” 
feigning composure, optimism, or confidence they did not feel; these veils were for “protecting” 
and appeasing others who seemed to be unable to handle the more difficult or controversial 
moments of meaning and (non)being: being near-death, living with tragedy and loss, floating in 
liminal spaces, contradicting assumptions about health, etc. In these moments, people’s local 
worlds shaped their identities by encouraging (and listening to) more conventional narratives of 
illness, and discouraging expressions of alternative, subversive, or less ‘redemptive’ selves. 
Being alienated from others and from their distress, the young adults talked about having “no 
safe place” to have uncensored conversations about their experiences.  
In sum, the young adults had mixed encounters with their loved ones during their time 
with cancer. In moments of community, they constructed their local worlds as support networks 
that helped them to live with and to understand their illnesses. In moments of alienation, their 
distress did not seem to be cared for or considered legitimate —they were exiled from social life. 
As with clinical relationships, rigid horizons of expectation made the difference, imposing 
dubious meanings and identities upon the young adults. The power of discourses of recovery, in 
particular, seemed to estrange young adults from the people they needed to understand and 
validate their ongoing disruptions. Unless mystery and chaos narratives gain wider recognition 
in public discourses, forced isolation may continue to be a strong theme in cancer narratives.  
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C) Cancer Patient Communities: Shared Needs and Discriminatory Rhetoric 
 Young adults sought out communities other than their local worlds to help make sense of 
life with cancer. People from very different walks of life, who had no other line of connection 
outside of having diseases lent a common name, entered into conversations with each other about 
how to emplot their illness experiences. These communities of cancer patients took a number of 
forms: local support groups, telephone or email correspondence, online forums, etc. Local groups 
were available only in larger city centres, but online communities such as Young Adult Cancer 
Canada and Cancer Fight Club served urban and rural young adults alike, linking people across 
and within the country’s provinces and territories. At times these connections produced social 
identities that help contextualize individuals’ suffering, while at other times they contributed to a 
politics of identity that divided and excluded certain people with cancer. 
 Because of their different locations and needs, the young adults I studied had varying 
degrees of connection with cancer patient communities. Over half were heavily involved in local 
and regional/national communities, a third had some contact with other young adult patients, and 
only a couple had had little to no interaction. With this in mind, perhaps my interviewees 
represent only those cancer patients who proactively seek out support and information and not 
those who prefer not to be part of a community of patients, for whatever reason. In any case, the 
young adults’ stories of cancer communities illuminate some of their needs as they negotiated 
meaning and (non)being. Lorena, mentioned above, talked most perceptively about the values 
and drawbacks of cancer communities and below I use her rich reflections for examples.  
The young adults listed several reasons for building cancer patient communities. 
Typically, they formed in response to a common need to find other young adults with cancer, 
others who hopefully understood what such a life was like, who had experienced similar 
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situations (i.e., diagnoses, treatments, side effects, etc.). In a sense, many of the young adults 
were looking for mirrors into their own crises, wanting to see themselves in the lives of other 
cancer patients—ideally, those who lived beyond treatment. The ‘counsel’ of these stories 
seemed to inform the young adults’ therapeutic emplotment, identifying tips and tricks toward 
medical healing (i.e., information for them to pass onto their caregivers) or self-healing (i.e., 
ways of taking charge of their own care)10.  
Sharing stories also established what many of the young adults saw as an intimate bond 
or union. Other young adults “connected” with them in a way that medical professionals, family 
members, or friends possibly could not. In fact, these unions provided an “outlet” for venting 
frustrations in those other intersubjective spaces. The young adults reported feeling more 
comfortable and ‘at home’ with other young adult cancer patients, sometimes described as 
“cancer friends,” taking the place of other friends who had left or who no longer shared the same 
world. Lorena said she found it consoling to know “I really did have this community of others 
that were not family or friends that knew me really, really well, but on some level there was this 
incredibly deep, genuine connection because of what they had also been through.” Cancer 
communities often combated moments of banishment, making new social identities after being 
exiled from others and redefining their personal journeys through cancer as collective 
emigrations.  
These communal identities enabled formulation of common purposes for which the 
young adults became advocates, such as more awareness, support, funding, and recognition of 
young adult cancer. Together the young adults co-constructed ‘distinct’ needs (especially 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Sometimes others’ stories served, critically, as a counterweight to the stories told by doctors, providing alternative 
images of life with cancer. Above all, they took cancer out of the anonymous statistical language that some young 
adults found frustrating about their medical teams’ narratives, and steeped it within concrete lived experiences that 
assisted the young adults in imagining their own futures.  
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survivorship care, fertility consultations, and social support) that they found wanting across 
Canada. Sometimes they used ‘celebrity patients’ to strengthen their cause, most of the time 
referring to athletes Lance Armstrong11 and Terry Fox, though occasionally mentioning former 
leader of the New Democrat Party Jack Layton (not a young adult but a high profile case) and 
author of Crazy Sexy Cancer Tips Kris Carr. Referring to familiar figures could be seen, like use 
of incidence statistics, as a kind of “technology of presencing” (Jain, 2007), a way of revealing 
that young adult cancer has a public existence beyond individuals and, in turn, is of public 
interest. 
The young adults observed several limits to this kind of intersubjectivity, though they 
were mentioned much less frequently than its advantages. Sometimes the young adults simply 
did not want to be a “part of that world,” which would bring them back to their past suffering, 
instigate existential questioning and labours to make meaning again, and resurrect faded distress. 
Some suggested that defining themselves as cancer survivors or patients or advocates years 
beyond their treatment stalled their personal desires to “move on” from their illnesses and keep 
their pasts in the receding distance.  
Another common limitation was the fact that the young adults did not share certain 
experiences. Cancer is an umbrella term for over 200 kinds of disease (Buckman, 2006) and 
though there are some parallels, each type of cancer—breast, testicular, Hodgkin’s, non-
Hodgkin’s, cervical, brain—is distinct in many important respects, including but not restricted to 
growth rates, physical effects, cultural meanings, treatment options, and impacts on quality of 
life. Some participants said because each cancer is “unique” or “individual,” it was “hard to fit 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 These interviews were before the recent scandal around Lance’s use of performance-enhancing drugs while 
cycling. Prior to this hermeneutics of suspicion over his achievements, his story was often told with metaphors of 
conquering adversity, winning competitions, and (with the not-for-profit LiveStrong Foundation) empowering 
others, inspiring many athletic identities among the young adult narratives. 
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in” into one community, or to feel ‘fully’ understood. In Lorena’s case, she stated that her lung 
cancer had a worse prognosis, made her feel more exhausted, and was more heavily moralized as 
self-inflicted in comparison to some of her friends’ cancers. Varying ages, cancers, judgments, 
challenges, and life situations seemed to be barriers to a sense of sharedness.  
While dominant discourses within oncology talk about the ‘distinctness’ of young adult 
cancer, there are experiential borders that to some extent preclude a cohesive community of 
young adults. Multiple communities of cancer patients seemed to be needed in order to, in 
Lorena’s case, deal with moralization of a particular kind of cancer. She said, “even though I had 
[young adult cancer support] I still always felt there was something that was missing and it was 
sort of this piece about being a lung cancer survivor and as someone living with lung cancer.” 
She described how, when she met other lung cancer patients—regardless of their age—she 
acquired a different “sense of identity” that related to the distinct challenges of lung cancer: 
“breast cancer survivors find immense power being together with other breast cancer 
survivors…And so I derive inspiration and hope from these women who are battling the same 
thing and the same kind of stigma that I’m also battling.”  
Lorena was convinced that moral judgments also had created hierarchies of support, 
where ‘more deserving’ (i.e., less moralized) communities were provided more financial, social, 
and emotional assistance. She argued that, “lung cancer is very underfunded even though it’s 
deadly” because of public perceptions that “you must have done something to deserve this.” In 
these comments, she revealed some of the possible politics of cancer identities, where “ribbon” 
campaigns (yet another ‘technology of presencing’) hides away other forms of cancer that are—
by the statistics—more severe, stigmatized, life-threatening, and in need of improved outcomes. 
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In sum, moments of advocacy can be, contrary to intentions, a divisive strategy for raising 
awareness, drawing attention to selective truths and needs while concealing others.  
At their worst, cancer communities risk becoming ideological and discriminatory, 
breeding their own forms of alienation. For example, a woman in her forties who had a low-stage 
breast cancer and uncomplicated treatment, Lee lamented over some tensions within her cancer 
community:  
I was kind of like stuck in the middle of things, in the sense that I wasn’t given some, 
like, perhaps legitimacy by the cancer group…I got away with not having to go through 
the worse of it sort of, uhm I never had to lose my hair, so I didn’t have to go through the 
whole body image of all that. 
 
Recall from the previous section that some young adults reserved survivor identities for those 
who suffered the most; on the flip side of that perception, Lee said a similar principle was 
applied to her, that perhaps she did not suffer ‘enough’ to be able to talk as a survivor.  
One prejudice I noticed across several of the narratives, and yet was never externalized as 
such, was a skewed juxtaposition of younger and older cancer patients. Lorena summarized this 
judgment best, in her rhetoric of young adult cancer: “A 65 year old might be worried that they 
can’t vacation because of treatment; a 30 year old is worried about loss of independence, 
fertility, career change and other psychosocial and financial needs due to treatment.” Often older 
adults were portrayed as having more luxurious life circumstances and being relatively 
unaffected by a diagnosis of cancer. Retirement and pension may alleviate some of the concerns 
expressed by young adults, but having cancer at an older age is not necessarily easier than at a 
younger age12.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 For example, Sinding and Wiernikowski (2008) showed that there is a wide spectrum of responses to cancer 
among older adults, ranging from “biographical disruption” to “biographical continuity.” They also mentioned that 
expressions of disruption were often “foreclosed” by cultural expectations, also seen in the young adults’ narratives, 
that illness is part of the due course of aging and, therefore, of comparatively little consequence.  
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As members of young adult cancer communities continue to spread this divisive 
discourse, whatever the intended purposes they minimize the suffering of older cancer patients 
who share, if not the same age and cohort-related concerns, then similar existential challenges of 
isolation, loss of meaningful activities, and death (e.g., Hammond et al., 2012). Comparative 
language, in these situations, became ageist rhetoric for the purpose of directing attention to the 
crises of young adult cancers.  
 Cancer communities can be opportunities for young adults to work together and support 
one another where no other occasions exist. In some ways, they are grassroots movements 
rallying toward more acceptance and understanding of a population in Canada given relatively 
little attention or support. In no way do I condone their dissolution, so essential they can be to 
combating alienation and isolation. Nevertheless, a variety of controversies come to light when 
we apply to them a critical lens. By identifying and advocating select causes, these communities 
may do violence to the diverse and marginal voices within their own communities, or they may 
inadvertently depreciate the suffering of others (e.g., aging cancer patients) who must also 
compete for limited funding and resources. Whenever we encounter moments of advocacy, we 
should always be careful to consider for whom these promotions are serving and for whom they 
are doing injustice. 
Conclusion: “Our Lives Are Not Our Own” 
In a beautifully written and ambitious novel about human suffering and oppression, 
novelist David Mitchell (2004) wrote that “Our lives are not our own. From womb to tomb we 
are bound to others, past and present, and by each crime and every kindness, we birth our future” 
(p. 221). In their social interactions with healthcare providers, families and friends, and other 
cancer patients, the young adults reported both vindications and violations of their personal 
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emplotments of being and meaning. These ‘peaceable’ and ‘hegemonic’ intersubjectivities all 
seemed to give birth to future identities, the former enabling shared visions of selfhood beyond 
cancer and the latter disabling expressions of socially unsanctioned or deviant horizons of 
expectation. It seems apparent that the young adults’ moments of (non)being and meaning were 
not entirely their own, that they formed in collusion with or in resistance to prevailing horizons 
of expectation within local collectives. When we talk about mythic identities, we must take into 
account their endorsement and opposition among the casts of important characters within 
people’s narratives. 
The next section expands upon the dialectics of myth and experience, including narrative 
environments around identity development. We thus come to what has dominated discourses of 
young adulthood in narrative identity development and AYA oncology, the idea that cancer stalls 
and sometimes reverses young adult development.   
Moving Milestones: Expected Life Courses and Developmental Identities 
Developmentalist Discourses as Cultural Myths 
Discourses about identity development may be seen as a subspecies of ‘cultural myths’ 
putting forth an ideal evolution of identity over the life span (Baddeley and Singer, 2007; 
Burman, 2008, p. 117; Randall and McKim, 2008 p. 51; Rogoff, 2003, p. 161-177). 
Developmentalist discourses make up one of many narrative environments under which young 
adults’ identities may be emplotted. Just as with other mythic identities—survivors, warriors, 
phoenixes and the like—these developmental identities are socially negotiated and contested 
within individuals’ narratives.  
Among a variety of other myths we could discuss, of most relevance are the ‘traditional 
milestones’ (i.e., independence, partnership, parenthood, and career) often branded as markers of 
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young adult identity development. As introduced in chapter 2, the overarching myths governing 
these milestones are the developmental expectations of self-authorship and narrative coherence 
within young adult narratives (see e.g., Baddeley and Singer, 2004; McAdams, 2013; McLean 
and Pratt, 2006). These expectations are myths in the sense that they idealize and order young 
adult life; although they may give direction and purpose to many lives, they also disregard the 
many ways in which people depart from these ideals. Within this section I analyze young adults’ 
engagement with these expected life courses and the developmental identities that embody them. 
 Resistant to the normativity involved in these myths, I conceive of development 
differently. In chapter 2, I adopted psychologist Barbara Rogoff’s (2003) definition of 
development, as “changing participation in sociocultural activities” (p. 50). Her definition 
seemed to be based on four justifiable premises for thinking of illness and narrative identity 
development. First, development is above all a process of on-going transformation; in other 
words, negotiation is at its centre. In the telling of their narratives, the young adults often 
produced new ways of understanding themselves and their worlds, adjusting their conceptions of 
development according to available life trajectories and personal desires. Second, development 
demands use and manipulation of cultural tools to deal with what is at stake in people’s personal 
and social lives. Myths about young adulthood are among these tools, possessing a certain utility 
that cannot be ignored; nevertheless, there may be circumstances where other cultural tools (such 
as the mythic trickster figure) are more capable to the task of emplotting identity while ill.  
Rogoff’s definition contains a third premise that worships no universal standard (e.g., 
self-authorship) as the ‘purpose’ or ‘end’ to identity development, thus moving away from 
“deficit models” that enable moral judgments on difference. Instead development is evaluated in 
terms of its contributions to cultural narratives and practices (i.e., as perpetuating, transforming, 
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or resisting them). We may say that negotiations of being and meaning are developmental 
movements in terms not of where they arrive, but rather how they open up spaces of experience 
and colour horizons of expectation. Placed on equal footing are the various ways in which young 
adults may make sense of themselves and may talk about having ‘developed’ or ‘matured’ after 
having cancer.  
Fourth, which was discussed above in terms of narrative intersubjectivities, development 
also involves negotiation within various communities of which individuals are a part. For 
example, therapeutic emplotment is the process of co-constructing a developmental narrative of 
sorts, a projected evolution of illness experience toward an improved state of being. This vision 
may crumble as hegemonic horizons of expectation stand in the way of cooperative exchanges. 
In this way, the liminality of cancer can be as much about being in-between the discourses of 
different local collectives (e.g., healthcare teams, local social worlds, cancer communities, etc.) 
as about being in-between childhood and adulthood or in-between life and death. What we find 
with the young adults I interviewed is a notion of development dependent upon negotiating being 
and meaning with other people.  
I interpreted the developmental movements of narratives according to the liminal stages 
above with an additional narrative sequence included at the beginning, hence the following order 
of discussion: a) developmental identities before cancer, b) separation from identities with the 
onset of cancer, c) struggle with identities during and after treatment, and d) (un)consummated 
identities in the present. Let us explore them in turn. 
A) Developmental Identities before Cancer  
This sequence provides a historical context for the effects of cancer on identity 
development. I ascertained pre-cancer identities predominantly by asking participants how they 
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would describe what young adulthood was like for them before the onset of illness. I received an 
overabundance of meanings of young adulthood both across and within individual narratives, 
typically expressed in enriching stories and metaphors. The categorizations below are of 
meaning and not necessarily of people, as a single narrative usually contained a multitude of 
identities.  
To rather varying extents people spoke about the ‘traditional milestones’ of adulthood. 
Around half of the participants talked about striving to attain independent, work-related, and 
familial identities. For example, Martha said she was on the “right track” until her late twenties, 
before being diagnosed with NHL:  
I went to university, like I moved away from home when I was 19…I was able to sort of 
go through those major life markers and sort of gaining those life skills pretty 
uneventfully, right…I started building a career and, you know, thinking about family.  
 
Some individuals were more specific about these “markers,” believing them to be passed at a 
certain age, almost as though they are preordained or determined. Recall from the last chapter 
that Rose said: “growing up you always have like these time lines, so mine was like 25 I’d be 
married and like 27 I’d have kids.” These “time lines” represented a relatively structured view of 
young adulthood. 
Aside from independence, career and family, health was identified as another cultural 
ideal, often measured in terms of dietary contents, commitment to exercise, and absence of 
ailments. Thinking about before he was diagnosed with testicular cancer, Richard said: “I was 
pretty carefree. Um, I pretty much thought like, you can’t get sick at all. Like you’re invincible 
(laughs). You get that, especially when you’re young.” Youth was often equated with health, and 
in retrospect most of the young adults saw this as a dubious connection that fooled them along 
with their family physicians.  
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The other half of my participants expressed relatively more doubt and less interest in 
‘completing’ the gamut of traditional milestones prior to having cancer. Among them, a few 
admitted to feeling “pressured” by others to get married, build a career, or buy a house—
identities that were not personally meaningful to them. They described themselves as living 
“unconventional” lives, and sometimes this was construed as a personal choice, sometimes as a 
result of indecision or feeling lost in the world. They said they were “carefree” or “careless,” 
committed mostly to “exploring” life by dating, socializing with friends, touring the globe, and 
not being “settled” down to a structured home life.  
 Exploring different identities, what psychologist James Marcia (1973) called moratoria, 
was perhaps the most dominant theme across the board. With or without achievement of 
developmental ‘milestones,’ and with or without desiring such, most participants talked about 
young adulthood as a liminal experience of trying on an array of selves, dabbling in both 
moments of being and moments of non-being. This theme was more prominent in narratives 
asserting “carefree” attitudes toward life and harbouring few, if any, expectations about 
adulthood. For instance, Laura attributed her lax attitudes about young adulthood to few social 
expectations placed on her: “honestly, like, I mean I never felt any pressure to, to do anything or 
be a certain way… I guess I didn’t really have expectations.” 
The sheer number of transitional metaphors used across most narratives suggests the 
prominence of liminality in young adulthood. The time of life was characterized as 
“experimentation,” being “carefree,” “always kind of in transition,” a “search” or “quest” to 
“find yourself,” a “rebellious” or “unconventional” time, having “no grand plan,” encountering 
“unpredictable” or “constant change,” “learning” who you are, and “setting up” for a future plan. 
According to some developmental psychologists, these explorations should be on the way toward 
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self-authorship, the purported task of narrative identity development (e.g., Baddeley and Singer, 
2004; McAdams, 2013). While self-authorship seemed to be an important part of these liminal 
stories, the young adults also valued receptivity or openness to being taken in different directions 
by the unexpected. In other words, the reported transitions in young adulthood included a blend 
of self-directed and contingent shapings of selfhood.   
Co-authorship of young adult life also emerged in many forms: social pressures made 
explicit by few, criticized by some, and internalized by many; parents who permitted moratoria 
by allowing their children to live at home into their 30s; spouses who obviously contributed to 
the realization of some developmental milestones like marriage and childbirth; friends who were, 
as a younger woman with leukemia summarily put it, “an alternative to having a family”; and 
many others.  
 I would, therefore, temper the emphasis within developmental psychology on ‘taking 
control’ of one’s narrative, as contingency and sociality were often recognized as a necessary 
part of life. Dwelling narrowly upon the individual as self-creator is like arguing that a fish only 
moves itself, and the currents of the ocean or synchronized movements of schools serve only as 
distracting scenery.  
Before cancer came into these young adults’ lives, they expressed complicated 
trajectories of development, rich with idiosyncratic interpretations, alternative visions, and mixed 
reviews of the freedom afforded by moratoria (see Figure I5 in Appendix I). Taking into account 
the time before cancer helps us place the biographical and existential disruptions of illness into 
the context of life histories. Seeing how divided the participants were in terms of their 
expectations and desires, we can better appreciate the diverse ways that having cancer may have 
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affected the visions they held of their futures. We can see some of this diversity right from the 
initial liminal stage of separation in their narratives. 
B) Separations from Identities with the Onset of Cancer 
 Cancer almost unanimously produced destabilization (or further uncertainty) of narrative 
identities, leading to “unhomelike being-in-the-world” (Svenaeus, 2000): separation or alienation 
from former selves, bodies, relations, and values. However, the reported degree of disruption, the 
areas of life most affected, the longevity of disruption, and people’s responses to it varied 
considerably. Angie, for instance, echoed the titled of Kairol Rosenthal’s book on young adult 
cancer and simply said “everything changes.” As illuminating as that totalizing comment may 
be, we need to further pinpoint the developmental changes that were most at stake in the young 
adults’ narratives. In sum, the dominant identities at issue were around bodily health and 
appearance, social perceptions of ‘normality,’ sexual and familial relationships, and 
work/financial stability (see Figure I6).  
First and foremost, perhaps the most perceptible alterations were problematized 
relationships between selves and bodies, putting into doubt cultural assumptions of health. These 
forms of alienated embodiment first began when mysterious symptoms emerged. Then, 
participants’ body-images underwent radioactive singeing, chemical poisoning, and/or surgical 
atrophy. With enduring health complications like mouth sores, ulcerative colitis, recurring 
infections, seizures, chronic pain and fatigue, paralysis, lymphedema, memory loss, arthritis, 
visual impairment, even a case of foot-and-mouth disease, peoples’ bodies became strange to 
them for a second time.  
Feeling “vulnerable,” losing their independence, and being encumbered by pains or 
mobility problems, participants’ bodily ailments translated into selves deflated in confidence and 
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fragile to the elements. Some participants constructed victim identities in response, seeing 
themselves as “damaged goods,” thinking “less” of themselves, and feeling “betrayed” by their 
bodies. Those with more severe diagnoses (e.g., Stage 4) felt they were “wasting away,” a 
“skeleton in the mirror,” seeing encroaching signs of death upon or underneath their skins. 
Bodily dysfunctions sometimes corrupted the young adults’ perceptions of themselves, and they 
“grieved” the abilities and selves they no longer had as a result of their estranged bodies.  
The sense of separation or alienation encountered by the young adults went beyond felt 
experiences of their lived bodies, such as pain and side effects. They reported another form of 
separation within social evaluations of their bodies, what may be called their social bodies 
(Scheper-Hughes and Lock, 1986). Nearly all felt judged at some point by the people around 
them—strangers or familiars—for their tricksterly or iconoclastic nub at cultural expectations of 
health (whether they intended it or not). They often did not seem to “fit in” because of the selves-
in-crisis they projected into public spheres. As a result, isolation and exile came out as a 
recurring theme, labeled with some harsher self-descriptions like “anomaly” or “mutant,” “freak 
show,” or simply “Other.” Embarrassed or frustrated with others’ lack of understanding, as well 
as feeling too ill to be in public, they would often stay home and suffer further social isolation.   
To be fair, not everyone described a radical departure from their relational identities, and 
this seemed to be a feature of having supportive family and friends who preserved their place 
within the local social world. However, the vast majority of people internalized the alienating 
distance that cultural critic Susan Sontag (1978) said divides the ill and the well into two 
segregated “kingdoms” (p. 3). They saw themselves as no longer “normal,” an ideal that usually 
meant being more social, not sick, working, and having a routine outside of the hospital—in 
liminal terms, being more integrated or consummated into common, everyday social structures.  
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Furthermore, unpromising prognoses seemed to prevent people from imagining a future 
return to normal. Jerry, for instance, said his “prognosis is hard to plan around.” He was given a 
25% chance to live five years beyond his glioma diagnosis. He resented that portentous statistic 
for preventing him from living; it held a dismal sign over his head, of which he could not help 
but be aware. He expressed frustration that his oncologist used that number, as he was sure it was 
not based on samples of young adult patients: “it was maybe based on 100 guys that were 80 
years old and were in the war and smoke.” He may or may not have been accurate in that 
suspicion, but he demonstrated how future lives and projects can be caught, tugged and pulled 
between seemingly deterministic medical stats and patients’ notably more hopeful narratives.   
A third significant tribulation among the young adults was ambivalence and uncertainty 
toward becoming parents. Close to half of the participants faced possible or actual fertility 
complications. For example, prospects of having spouses or kids were strained by chemo 
treatments that people came to believe made them unattractive, infertile, and de-sexualized. 
Some felt “robbed” of parenthood as their fertility was taken away and struggled with sexual 
practices that had become increasingly more difficult to perform. Even those who could possibly 
procreate were unsure if they wanted kids, fearing genetic transmission of the disease or dying 
on their children from a fatal recurrence.  
That said, not all of the young adults personally valued parent identities. Catherine, for 
instance, touched on some common concerns around self-worth in light of not being able to 
achieve dominant ideals of parenthood. Chemotherapy for her colon cancer put her into 
premature menopause and she said she contended with whether to see herself as less of a person 
or a person different but equal to others. She eventually leaned more to the latter as she placed no 
particular significance on having children; the milestone was more of an external “pressure” than 
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a personally meaningful pursuit. Nevertheless, across men and women, whether parenthood was 
important to them or not, many said they were disappointed that the option of bearing children 
was foreclosed—possibly in case, post-moratoria, parenthood become a valued identity. 
A fourth set of identities disrupted by cancer related to work. The time and effort required 
to receive treatment, and to treat the side effects of treatment, demanded time off work or away 
from school. In some cases, this was not a subject of contention: employers were sympathetic, 
disability insurance was adequate, and a hefty savings account or wealthy family mediated 
financial costs. However, those without proper financial or employer support struggled to make 
ends meet. Parents’ homes became a necessary respite as self-subsistence was tough with little 
income. Furthermore, some people described feeling “guilty” for taking leave and going on 
disability support, as though they would be judged as lazy or unproductive for not working while 
sick. 
Beyond finances, identities tied to a particular career were also at stake. Disability leave 
represented delayed or even foiled advancement. For example, Richard was preparing to move 
away from home for school just before he was diagnosed with testicular cancer. He said: “I was 
just pissed” and “I was just so depressed. I was so down. Um, cuz I found out I couldn’t go to 
[school] anymore.” Above all he dreamed of developing a career of which he was very fond. He 
risked spending his university savings on healthcare costs not covered by his insurance, but was 
fortunate in having a family who paid for most of the exorbitantly priced prescription drugs. 
After an extended delay Richard was able to commence his studies, a happier ending than most 
among the young adults’ stories. Vocational goals often had to be juggled with needed 
convalescent time, always with resentment toward the ‘career interruption’ of illness. 
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 In sum, with regard to the above identities, the young adults drew social comparisons 
with others, seeing themselves as both delayed and disadvantaged. Martha talked about watching 
others living “normal” lives uninterrupted by illness:  
I hit this wall and there was no growth from then till pretty much now. You know, um, in 
terms of you know, like—and everybody else in my life sort of kept on moving along, 
like having babies and getting married, whereas I just sort of—you know, the natural way 
I would’ve progressed and you know, who knows, met someone and got married and 
stuff. That stuff, it stopped completely, like just, it really, it’s really hard to describe but 
it’s like I hit a wall (claps) and everything just stopped. !
 
Stuck in what she called “arrested development,” she admitted some jealosy toward those 
‘passing’ her on the race toward certain milestones. She repeated a common story of cancer 
treatment as a standstill, no longer moving toward that which they valued. Up until this point, 
participants told “narratives of decline” or “death discourses” of cancer that are commonly told 
within oncological narrative environments (e.g., Hammond et al., 2012). However, this is but one 
side of illness narratives that were quite multifaceted, and a narrative of decline does not usually 
account for the ways in which developmental crises are sometimes managed by renegotiating 
personal and social identities. Though some felt nothing really got accomplished during this 
time, more saw it as a kind of detour or process required in order to continue on with (the same 
or a new) life. These “struggle” or meaning-making phases of the young adults’ liminality are 
expanded upon next. 
C) Struggles with Identities during and after Treatment 
 The young adults faced an array of struggles during and after treatment: trying to 
reconcile past, present, and future selves; dealing with one foot in the hospital and one foot in the 
community; facing foreclosed or fading ‘milestones’ while reflecting on new and emerging 
goals; and, perhaps most resonating across all the narratives, straddling the knowledge of what 
was normal before cancer and what was currently normal. Their ideas about young adulthood 
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and development required negotiation, which led to creative solutions to existential questions 
like “what next?” and “who am I now?”  
They constructed practical identities tailored to changed and changing circumstances. 
The young adults said that while old selves and lives were generally cherished and grieved when 
first threatened, as time passed and they became more immersed in their illnesses they responded 
in a number of different ways. Below I discuss three of their most notable struggles: striving to 
retain or recover disrupted identities, reevaluating and reinventing their senses of self, and 
‘finding’ themselves among other young adult patients. In these narrative sequences we see how 
being and meaning were remade in order to reaffirm the possibility of developmental growth and 
purposeful activity. In these transitional sequences—moving from disruptive times of diagnosis 
and treatment to life after intervention—identities began to be reconsidered, reworked, and 
reworded.  
 With regard to the first struggle, about half of participants seemed to be most invested in 
‘returning’ to some pre-cancer sense of self. Among the most desired returns included body-
images restored (back to “healthy” bodies), careers put back on track, and entrance back into the 
social life of their peers. They talked about these changes in terms of wanting to be ‘normal’ 
again, or at least to appear normal if they could not totally recover their old lives. As an 
example, even while saying she had no therapeutic image to help her through treatment, Lindsay 
associated her recovery narrative with the seasonal change from cold, dead winter to blossoming 
spring: 
L: I’d have to say, because my treatment ended in May, spring was all I could think about 
at the time, just because I knew that was the finish line. Um, but I couldn’t say there was 
a symbol or anything that kinda that would have helped me get through it. 
 
C: What was it about spring that you were looking forward to? 
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L: Well, then things went back to normal (laughs). Done treatment, and I can go outside 
again and it wasn’t winter and everything was just kind of in the past. 
 
Spring signified a time of the year when life is renewed, when one’s energy and exuberance are 
restored, and the outdoors become less threatening again. The bad weather of winter melts into a 
forgotten history and the future brightens with longer days. Though a new year and a new 
season, what Lindsay seemed to desire was the familiarity of spring, its repetition of predictable 
patterns. She dwelt upon a hope that the past may be recycled into a recognizable future. She 
also evoked athletic images, crossing the “finish line” of a race, constructing her treatment time 
as a trial of perseverance. We may see this as an example of less liminal moments of being that 
strive to erase traces of liminality, affirming that the thread of selfhood remains intact across life 
with illness.  
 A second struggle came out of the narratives, an expression of liminality in which the 
selves of yesteryear would never meet those of the present. Seeing some developmental identities 
lost to the past, the young adults questioned the relevance of certain traditional milestones to 
themselves. Catherine, for example, came to perceive what was at stake quite differently over 
time. Recall from above that losing her fertility was a minor challenge; on the other hand, losing 
her momentum toward a profession was a “difficult lesson” for her:  
 I was really obsessed, like I said, about going back to school and getting a university 
education and I mean I think I’ve kind of led myself to believe that I was, I had no worth 
if I didn’t have that university education and a good career…there’s no point in getting so 
worked up and oh, ‘I have no self-worth because I didn’t go and achieve a university 
education and I didn’t do this or I didn’t do that and I don’t have my masters’… I guess 
I’m just a lot, feeling like I’m gonna be a lot easier on myself and not so (pause) so 
determined to achieve you know, these big lofty goals but just to you know, it’s just the 
small things and just do what’s within my ability…And, that, that’s been a big one, is 
identifying that my, my self-worth is not tied to any of those things. 
 
Catherine saw a major personal life path foreclosed and she subsequently reevaluated whether it 
was important to her identity; if readers recall philosopher Galen Strawson’s (2004) language of 
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self-experiences, she constructed a self that was more “episodic,” day-to-day, unconcerned with 
a “lofty” or grand narrative thread running continuously through past, present, and future. In 
these reevaluations the young adults sought out ways to understand how cancer had altered them 
and what those alterations meant for the rest of life. Some read cancer as a “sign” that they 
needed to change themselves or change the way they were “engaging” with their cancer 
experiences—evoking healer and phoenix identities of facilitated self-transcendence. In these 
interpretive pursuits they came to shift their priorities, prefer different lifestyles, and recognize 
themselves as exceptions to dominant cultural narratives of how young adulthood should unfold.  
 A third and related struggle to reevaluating identities was to find social worlds within 
which the young adults’ new identities made sense. Illness, disability, and mortality are all issues 
that young adults typically do not expect to confront until later in life. Having sat in uneasily 
close proximity to usually deferred questions, many of the young adults said they could not 
pretend to share many of the same thoughts, preoccupations, experiences, or values as their 
peers. This often led to frustration with others of similar age; Martha’s comments above about 
being in “arrested development” relative to others shifted in tone over the course of her narrative, 
to the point where she began to criticize the banality of her friends’ major concerns: 
We don’t get each other, and I don’t really want to. Like it’s, it’s just easier if I sort of 
isolate myself. Um, not that it’s hard to talk to people. I just don’t really have the patience 
for it. Um, cause in the back of my head I’m like “Are you fucking, are you joking me 
that this is a concern of yours? Are you joking me?”  
  
For Martha and for most of the young adults, their transformed being was not always simpatico 
with others in their age cohort, making their struggles typically lonely and misunderstood. !
 In search of a home for their new lives, nearly all participants sought guidance, 
information, or just stories from other patients, wanting advice and validation for their negotiated 
identities. Their reevaluations became collaborative undertakings, each person shaping the other 
 ! 248 
as they distributed experiences and meanings. Living with ALL, Dani (from chapter 4) described 
some of his contact with other young adults with cancer as a chance of “just being together and 
in that space of being young again.” In other words, contact with other cancer patients created a 
safe community for living out both old and new identities without being judged.  
Wherever their struggles took them, the participants started to critically engage with 
developmental identities expected of young adults. What came out of their searches and 
dialogues, according to their narratives, were sometimes reconstituted identities and reaffirmed 
commitments to certain ideals, and sometimes deferred identities and sometimes ambiguous 
feelings about who to be (see Figure I7). In the final narrative sequence of this analysis, we see 
the most current status of the young adults’ struggles as they talk about (un)consummated 
identities in the present. 
D) (Un)Consummated Identities in the Present 
 As mentioned earlier in the chapter, participants’ narratives did not always culminate in a 
“consummation” of stable identities; their negotiations were often carried into the present tellings 
of their stories. That does not mean their senses of self did not ‘develop’; even those who 
continued to struggle with their post-treatment identities demonstrated some syntheses of 
disruptive circumstances with personal desires. These creative projects catalyzed movement in 
their perceived trajectories in life and modified their participation in cultural discourses around 
young adulthood. In their stories of the present, the young adults expressed three different 
narrative movements of identity from the above struggles: return to a ‘normal’ life, entrance into 
a “new normal,” and perpetual liminality (see Figure I8).  
 In terms of return, perhaps one of the most ubiquitous statements I encountered was that 
cancer was a part but not the whole of people’s identities. The young adults worried about being 
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pigeonholed as cancer ‘patients’ or ‘survivors,’ thereby having their identities totalized around 
their illness13. When asked whether life with Hodgkin’s lymphoma had changed her 
expectations, Linda said, “I don’t think that they’re really different than they were before, um I 
expect to start a family, I expect to, you know, um, continue in my chosen profession… I really 
did have a sense of where I was going before and I’m continuing on that same path now.” With a 
urostomy bag Penny knew some areas of life were going to be complicated: “I’ve been to the 
hospital several times, with infections and blockages and that kind of stuff.” Yet, over time she 
had become used to the device and felt it could become part of a ‘normal’ routine: “I don’t even 
notice my bag, I have leaks occasionally, but I deal with it. I’m trying to do more and more 
things, um, getting my confidence back and getting my old life back.” These two examples show 
efforts to maintain or restore some sense of continuity from before cancer.  
 It was seen as sometimes useful to employ patient or survivor identifiers, but only as 
practical identities befitting particular circumstances (e.g., at support groups or fundraisers, with 
other younger patients, etc.). Mandy, who was living with Hodgkin’s lymphoma in her thirties, 
described these situational selves most clearly: 
I would say sometimes I feel like I have the need to be a survivor and then other days I 
don’t want to be. You know, I don’t want anything to do with it. I just want to be normal 
like everyone else. You know, and then there’s, and then—most of the time probably I’m 
somewhere in between, you know. It’s a bit of a struggle between, you know, I want to 
be, but I don’t know. Like I want to be able to incorporate that into my identity in a way, 
but still maintain some sense of normalcy, if that makes any sense. 
 
Hers was a common challenge among the interviewees: wanting times of integration into their 
local social worlds while also allowing times to see themselves (and be seen) as different. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The young adults seemed to suggest that throughout their cancer experiences some identities held fast and some 
faded away; to talk of total continuity or total discontinuity would be to oversimplify just how complicated, 
tentative, and partial their narrative identities appeared. This is why it can be more appropriate to ground their 
identities in transient moments of being and non-being instead of unified, enduring narrative selves. Here I am 
highlighting expressions of continuity, not essentializing them. 
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Besides a “need to be connected to that world” of survivorship, as Mandy said, people also could 
not always escape from that world when they wanted to. Mandy added: “I feel closer to it when I 
have to go for CTs or, you know, I’m at the, I’m at the oncologist’s office or if I’m having like, 
if I’m having any health problems…They aren’t always positive ways of relating to it.” These 
moments of being a survivor took Mandy and others out of their ‘normal’ lives when it became 
important to reconnect with cancer-related identities.  
Thus, we see a dialogue between two consummated identities; on the one hand are 
‘preserved’ and ‘normal’ identities from the past and on the other are ‘new’ identities from 
having gone through cancer. The majority of participants talked about the latter as a “new 
normal,” a concept drawn upon more and more in discourses around cancer survivorship (see 
e.g., Katz, 2011). ‘Normal’ and ‘new normal’ were not used as mutually exclusive or opposite 
notions but rather as situational identities; like Mandy, a lot of people used both to refer to 
specific post-treatment experiences. A new normal indicated that cancer had irreversibly changed 
them and it had become, as breast cancer survivor Beth described, “hard to unweave cancer from 
life.”  
 For the most part the new normal was constructed as a redirected life course, sometimes 
intersecting with the ‘old’ normal but never quite parallel to it. Living with a new normal was 
seen almost as an alternative lifestyle or unconventional mode of being, and was frequently 
asked to be respected as equal in value. People talked about perceiving young adulthood in some 
atypical ways, having different expectations and desires, and not being as committed to cultural 
norms of young adulthood.  
Among traditional milestones, orientation toward a strong career was among the most 
rejected cultural ideals—often forsaken in favour of increased attention on more familial selves 
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(e.g., paying more attention to kids, finding or maintaining spouses, etc.). For example, Lorena 
admitted to being a “workaholic” before getting lung cancer, and she said she no longer coveted 
career advancement to the same degree she had before:  
Definitely [now] spending time with the people I care about is really important to me and 
I make that time now, kind of no matter what. Versus before it was like, ‘Oh, well, I’m 
really tired’ or ‘Oh man, I’m so busy,’ and now it’s just like, ‘Ah, you know what, the 
work will be there when I get home.’ So, it’s that, I have more time for myself and really, 
like I said, it’s more about what makes me happy and fulfilled versus what other people 
perceive as fulfillment.  
 
These shifts of desire marked a deviation from certain discourses that places more emphasis on 
work and financial identities. Thinking back to pre-cancer identities, most participants made 
(positive or negative) reference to identities related to labour and income, including the 
importance of having financial security, possessing a home of one’s own, etc. What seems to be 
at stake here is redefining what it means to be ‘generative’; Lorena challenged a homo 
economicus model of generativity, wherein accumulation of money and property ownership are 
considered markers of productivity.  
The majority of young adults seemed to side with Lorena, only valuing money to the 
extent of paying bills incurred during treatment or preparing financially in the event of a relapse. 
Perhaps such rejections of work and financial selves come from an emerging disillusionment 
with capitalism among the ill and disabled (e.g., Oliver, 1989, 1999). Perhaps they come on the 
wings of economic recession, where it is relatively harder to achieve financial stability today 
than for the last few generations (e.g., Carrick, 2013; Coates, 2012; Henig, 2010; Lunau, 2012). 
This may sound counterintuitive but in their narratives, when the young adults’ ideals got too far 
out of reach, many of them began to reevaluate whether the goal was worthwhile.   
Lorena is an excellent case in point, as she went on to assert other marked deviations 
from traditional milestones of adulthood. She said: 
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L: I no longer subscribe to the mentality of I need to meet societal norms in order to have 
a fulfilled life…like the whole, um, you know, buying a house and getting married and 
having like the 2.5 kids…  
 
C: (laughs) 2.5. 
 
L: …and the picket fence, like that whole ideology. 
 
She questioned the necessity to her sense of self-worth of marrying her current spouse, having 
children, or buying a house. To be sure, her experiences with cancer possibly foreclosed some of 
these milestones; her chemo inhibited fetal development and she could not qualify for house 
insurance with a pre-existing condition. Thus, some social spaces and horizons no longer 
inhabited the geography of her experience. Nevertheless, whether a retrospective response or a 
predisposition, she interpreted the closing of these life paths as of little relevance to her 
“fulfillment.” 
 We see in these ‘new normal’ moments of being a critical edge to the narratives, 
revealing and often challenging dominant assumptions about young adult life. The young adults 
rarely talked about their new normal as strictly a ‘deficit,’ a failure, or an abnormal way of living 
(these sentiments were more prevalent during the narrative sequences of separation and 
struggle); rather, the new normal seemed as though both a burden and a blessing at the same 
time, with difficult but also meaningful praxis. Some innuendos even opened it up as a more 
enlightened or mature experience of the world, thus, in a tricksterly way, reversing discourses 
about cancer as a barrier to development. After Martha pointed out what she saw as the banality 
of her friends’ lives, she observed:  
I condensed basically into 2 years a lifetime of experiences of like getting sick, 
addressing your own mortality, coming back. Um, so in some ways, like, my 
development has been very arrested, but in other ways, sort of like emotional maturity, 
ability to connect, um, uh, coping mechanisms, things like that, I am much closer to 
people in their mid-60s…in some ways I’m sort of like even farther behind in that sort of 
young adult normal process, but in some ways I’m like light years ahead. 
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Martha seemed to qualify, or perhaps even reverse, her earlier claims about having “no growth” 
while living with cancer. Her words serve as a challenge to narratives of decline during young 
adult cancer. Playing both the part of a trickster and a phoenix, she repositioned perceived 
failures as life lessons by describing the “emotional maturity” she believed she gained from her 
experiences. Many of the participants called out cultural myths about young adulthood; while in 
some cases they were refitted into the new normal (e.g., choosing adoption to preserve 
parenthood identities when no longer fertile) in other cases the new normal was asserted as a 
kind of ideal itself (e.g., in Martha’s case, a fast-tracked education in dealing with life 
disruptions). However closely they identified with traditional milestones of development, the 
participants engaged in critical and negotiative work in coming to their current identities. 
 A third set of developmental identities emerged in this narrative sequence, perhaps best 
understood as unconsummated moments of non-being caught in perpetual liminality. The young 
adults provided a number of reasons for continued liminality in post-treatment: being weighed 
down by late or long-term complications with bodies and body-images, being fraught with the 
emotions they put aside during treatment, lacking social support or recognition, and waiting to 
pass the 3- or 5-year goal post. Thus, even in post-treatment time they were still quite involved in 
the management and surveillance of their diseases. Their desires for ‘normality’—the old or new 
normals—were thrust into the future as hopes or surrendered as unlikely prospects. 
Many people talked of still being in transition, living with uncertainty, and not knowing 
how to see themselves, which broke up the repetitive rhythms of narrative identity into 
cacophony. Most of the time non-being was construed unfavourably; people talked about the 
lives they wanted now being deferred into the distant future or foregone to the accelerating past. 
They saw themselves as “not living,” still “recovering,” still “struggling with emotions,” 
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watching opportunities “dwindling,” seeing “nothing” happen after treatment and not sure what 
to do, facing questions of “what happens next,” “second guessing” their decisions, holding their 
breath that they “may die.” They often hoped for normality or new normality, wishing for a 
meaningful routine. 
 On the other hand, ongoing liminality was sometimes perceived as liberating from 
oppressive routines and social structures, in the way phoenix or trickster identities claim to 
transcend or escape suffering. People talked about being “carefree,” no longer “conforming” to 
others’ demands about how to be, having “no vision” of the future, being resigned to the 
unpredictability of life. Others simply stated they were still in a mode of reevaluating themselves 
and their priorities. The oldest of the interviewees, Johnny, had come to see stability as futile and 
he basked in the freeing potential of the unexpected. His motto was, “life is what happens when 
you’re busy making plans.” With a love for the ironic, he referred to his own personal 
philosophy as a trite platitude but one with significant resonance in his life. He told of getting 
unexpectedly involved in the life and death of a much younger boy with terminal leukemia:  
I was trying to get my life back together, get a job again, and [David] came into my life. 
Hit me again. Busy making plans and life happened again. Thank Christ. I’m not 
religious but uh, I just hope that keeps going on with me—that life keeps happening 
while I’m busy making plans. And other bumper stickers. !
Johnny welcomed these serendipitous moments that demanded him to become lovingly involved 
in the lives of others in crisis. He seemed to suggest that ‘life’ is not ‘planned,’ it ‘happens’ to a 
person without their intention or volition.  
For Johnny and a notable minority of young adults, stasis and normality were seen as 
expectations placed on them by people naïve about cancer and uncomfortable with serious illness 
and death. For example, Penny said that while she personally felt in a liminal space, her local 
social world did not validate or permit it: 
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P: I never had chemo and I never had radiation, uh, so I think that was my downfall just 
because everyone just sees, oh, you don’t need this and so, um, they just expect you to go 
back to normal. But, you’re not.  
 
C: Who, who is ‘they’? 
 
P: Um, everyone in society, like, all your friends and family and everything, they just 
expect, “Oh, your cancer’s gone, you’re clear, um, you know, you can go back to the old 
thing.” 
 
This point is relevant to the theorization of liminality, often conceived as a socially sanctioned or 
ritualized experience of uncertain statuses and identities (e.g., Turner, 1966); such is often the 
case with moratoria in young adulthood (Henig, 2010; Marcia, 1973) and with cancer 
experiences (e.g., Little et al., 1998; Thompson, 2007). Consummation is traditionally considered 
to be the end point of liminality, entailing the integration back into society, and we may see this 
when participants talked about about returning to their former selves.  
By contrast, many participants felt their struggles and searches became deviant, even 
illegitimate, after treatments finished. It is as though there are certain social markers of the 
expected end of liminality, an expiry date as it were, in this case, no longer being strongly 
affiliated with a care centre and no longer exhibiting observable ‘signs’ of illness. This may go 
for Penny and others whose sense of liminality continued beyond treatment, as well as for those 
who talked about the new normal—which often required the support of other cancer patients in 
lieu of validation from friends and family. Lack of recognition seemed to frustrate both more 
distressing and more therapeutic moments of non-being. During these times, liminality and the 
new normal were reconfigured as social transgressions, violating dominant values and 
expectations that cancer is a disease of the aging and even if it appears in the young, modern 
medicine will make it temporary. It seems that in these contexts the expected narrative sequence 
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of consummation can sometimes be a pawn to the imperative of narrative coherence, placing 
normative demands upon people who may or may not return from liminal spaces.  
Conclusion: Rethinking Generativity and Development  
The matter of unsanctioned liminality in cancer, along with the critical engagement with 
traditional milestones, seems to point to another issue at stake, what is often defined in 
developmental psychology as “generativity” (e.g., Baddeley and Singer, 2007; Erikson, 1968; 
McAdams, 2006). According to McAdams (2006), in order to be generative in a narrative 
context one must “salvage a good self from the past” and “integrate the person into a productive 
and caring social niche for the future” (p. 233). This working definition may seem reasonable, 
but in his language of recovery (“salvage”) and order (“integrate”) he seems to show little 
appreciation for the productive power of non-being, which may be potentially healing assertions 
of elusive selves or of the folly of socially defined paths of productivity.  
Indeed, McAdams (2006) associates chaotic or “contaminated” narratives—which may 
contain tricksterly or tragic figures—with “lower generativity” and defines them as the opposite 
of redemption (p. 211-216). In keeping with his ideas about self-authorship, he suggested that the 
mottos of people with “low generativity” are often “living for the moment” or “going with the 
flow” (McAdams, 2006, p. 218), that is, people who externalize agency, speak of contingency 
and serendipity, or see the future as a rather bold assumption. I hope to have demonstrated that 
moments of non-being can be ‘productive’ in their own right, especially as deconstructions of 
normative expectations of the life course and as escapes from entrapping social niches. The 
young adults in this study put into question discourses of generativity!that emphasize 
independence, sexual reproduction, marriage, and stable employment, and that remain silent 
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about more reflective journeys of development, such as life review and meditation on death 
(often assumed to be issues of the aging). 
Given these critical responses to how young adulthood is typically conceived, we may 
need to broaden our understanding of what it means to be generative. Interestingly, pioneering 
developmental psychologist Erik Erikson (1980) offered a way into thinking about the concept in 
new ways. He described generativity simply as “primarily the interest in establishing and guiding 
the next generation” (p. 103), but went on to write that “there are people who, from misfortune or 
because of special and genuine gifts in other directions, do not apply this drive to offspring but to 
other forms of altruistic concern and of creativity, which may absorb their kind of parental 
responsibility” (p. 103). It seems to me that within this qualifying statement Erikson 
acknowledged a wide range of generative praxes, including any creative expression that in some 
way “guides” others.  
Randall and McKim (2008) expanded on Erikson’s notion of generativity, using earthly 
metaphors to define generativity as “the need…to harvest the wisdom that has been silently 
amassing inside us across the years, and…to mix it in with the soil of the world, for the benefit 
of others’ growth as well” (p. 276). Randall and McKim included in this wisdom “the peculiar 
collection of questions and wonderings, of untold stories and thus unlived lives that constitute 
our particular existence” (p. 276). From my understanding, this invites the infusion of existential 
quandaries and biographical disruptions into the “soil of the world,” enriching it not only with 
normative solutions to life’s problems but also with a plethora of uncertainties. Instead of a threat 
to cultural ideals, expressions of liminality, non-being, and the new normal may serve as fodder 
for changing the composition of discourses about young adulthood and, in turn, the spaces of 
experience and horizons of expectation for future generations. Such an image of generativity 
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may enable young adults with cancer to see themselves as thriving regardless of their 
‘achievements’ of cultural ideals.   
There appears to be an easy parallel between this inclusive definition of generativity and 
Barbara Rogoff’s (2003) definition of development as “changing participation in sociocultural 
activities” (p. 50). In sum, they invite us to think about these matters in terms of social 
‘engagement’ or, in the language of my dissertation, ‘negotiation’ and ‘performance.’ Instead of 
some pre-defined endpoint, like consummated or orderly identities, independent authorship of 
one’s life, robust careers and estates, etc., generativity may be defined by people’s participation 
in co-shaping the worlds of thought and action within which they live.  
Development, in turn, may be understood as the product of negotiations, resulting in 
transformations of personal and social life. As philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1960/1968) argued, 
people “make their history on the basis of real, prior conditions” like dominant discourses, “but 
the movement of human praxis” including performances of narrative “goes beyond [their 
conditions] while conserving them” (p. 87; original text). For example, the young adults 
discussed in this chapter sometimes endorsed deficit models of development, expressing 
moments of feeling ‘behind’ and of feeling ‘ahead’ of their peers. While operating under these 
discourses, they also created avenues for thinking differently about illness and development, as 
alternative lifestyles, “new” and yet “normal” ways of living. It is through these negotiations of 
being and their social effects that, according to existentialist scholar Stuart Charme (1984), 
“individual human development is thus related to the development of history” (p. 4). 
Narratives may be seen as a form of engagement, as sociocultural activities that make 
sense for oneself and for “guiding” others. They may be seen as generative in the sense of being 
‘participants’ in the forming and reforming of discourses about young adulthood and chronic 
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illness. In their critical negotiations, the young adults’ stories articulated ways of (non)being that 
are often unnoticed or marginalized within their narrative environments. Thinking of narratives, 
Paul Ricoeur (1984) said, “we owe a large part of the enlarging of our horizon of existence to 
poetic works” (p. 80); indeed, young adults’ narratives about unconventional being and the new 
normal widened the range of possible lives for themselves and for those willing to listen. Their 
generativity is represented by the meanings and ways of (non)being they projected into public 
discourses, appropriating and reworking them and, in turn, potentially changing the courses of 
their evolution. 
Chapter Conclusion: Young Adults’ Manifold Identities 
The young adults’ narratives expressed a wide range of identities tied to mythic 
conceptions of illness and young adulthood. They talked often about being resilient, self-
authoring their lives, and taking charge of their healing and post-treatment adjustments. 
However, they also spoke of the authoring power of other persons: as external pressures to be a 
certain way, as supports for mediating disruption, as collaborators in constructing meaningful 
lives. They included other forces as agents of change as well, most obviously cancer as a 
transformative experience, fortunate social and material circumstances (e.g., having family 
support and/or wealth) that eased the burdens of illness, and less explainable moments of 
serendipity or miracle (e.g., acts of God, fate, or randomness). While these different co-authors 
sometimes helped put the “narrative wreckage” of “selves-in-crisis” back together again, at other 
times they resisted reconstruction in ways people found despairing, frustrating, or refreshing. 
Within the narratives were plenty of co-occurrences of normality and new normality, and 
of liminal and consummated selves. Because of their back-and-forth movement, it does not seem 
to make sense to identify a linear progression into stable, independent selves as registers for 
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development. Without necessarily ‘achieving’ tasks that some dominant discourses pitch as 
essential for young adults, they told of identities we could conceive as ‘developing’ in their 
changing participation in cultural activities.  
The young adults negotiated cultural myths in a wide range of ways, producing practical 
identities in response to needs, desires, and available ways of being. While it is helpful to 
conceive of what they were doing as praxis—performing narratives toward meaningful ends—it 
does not follow that this was a unifying activity that created a single narrative identity. Mythic 
identities did not always serve the function of integrating experiences or asserting agency; some, 
in fact, accentuated the liminality of cancer and the fragility of selfhood during and after cancer 
treatment. Instead of looking for grand markers of self-understanding and development we 
should look to the sophisticated symbolism of mythic identities are their many uses in producing 
moments of being and non-being. 
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CHAPTER 6: MORAL QUESTIONING, EXPLORING, AND LIVING                                                                     
 
Moments of Meaning and Questions of Morality 
What crime, what sin, had those young hearts conceived, 
That lie, bleeding and torn, on mother’s breast? 
Did fallen Lisbon deeper drink of vice 
Than London, Paris, or sunlit Madrid? 
In these men dance; at Lisbon yawns the abyss. 
… 
What is the verdict of the vastest mind? 
Silence: the book of fate is closed to us. 
Man is a stranger to his own research; 
He knows not whence he comes, nor whither goes. 
 
—Voltaire, “An examination of the axiom ‘All is well’” 
 
Introduction  
In 1755, the devoutly Roman Catholic city of Lisbon, Portugal, was utterly demolished by 
a severe earthquake, a subsequent tsunami, and fires spreading across the rubble. This single, 
brutal event promulgated widespread doubts about and criticisms toward the prevailing theodicy 
of the times, the Leibnizian doctrine that “this is the best of all possible worlds,” that the world is 
justly and divinely ordered. Among the most vocal critics was Voltaire, a poet, playwright, and 
philosopher at the centre of Europe’s Enlightenment who vehemently opposed theological 
explanations of suffering. The above poem (1756/1912) used the earthquake at Lisbon to 
challenge moralistic assumptions that only the pious are rewarded and only the corrupt are 
punished. By contrast, Voltaire asserted that questions about where suffering comes from and 
how to avoid or alleviate it are unresolvable mysteries that are “closed” to us, and so we must 
forsake efforts to compartmentalize our pains into a moral order.   
The kinds of moral explanations that Voltaire reacted against 250 years ago are still with us 
in modernity. Often expressed as the popular adage “everything happens for a reason,” these 
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theodicies propose that no suffering is without purpose. Anthropologist Gay Becker (1997) 
witness this ideology of “rational determinism” (p. 110) in her study of “disrupted lives,” 
including, among others, people who were living with chronic illness. She saw these 
interpretations as attempts to restore a sense of meaning to chaotic situations. In this chapter, we 
will look at this and other moralized images of suffering. 
Like the surviving inhabitants of demolished Lisbon after the earthquake, and the rest of 
Christian Europe watching, having a chronic illness can rattle and shake even the most solidified 
assumptions about life, demanding people to rethink their views of reality. Psychiatric 
anthropologist Arthur Kleinman (1988) wrote that, “Cancer is an unsettling reminder of the 
obdurate grain of unpredictability and uncertainty and injustice—value questions, all—in the 
human condition” (p. 20). In sum, disruption to moral understandings can be an existential 
challenge to people in crisis, weakening their structures of meaning and sense of direction in life. 
It is a matter of dispute the extent to which people make moral claims about the shaky 
ground upon which they find themselves. Some theorists of narrative suggest that simply by 
making meaning of experience, people are making morality. For instance, historian Hayden 
White (1981) argued that storying life is driven by a desire to “moralize reality” (p. 14), and that 
narratives participate in a “discourse of the imaginary” distinct from a “discourse of the real” (p. 
19). Similarly, but in a less critical tone, Arthur Kleinman (1988) wrote that having cancer 
ignites “our need to make moral sense of ‘Why me?’” (p. 20; my emphasis), which can be 
answered through a therapeutic process he called “remoralization” (p. 245). Within these camps 
of understanding, morality is threaded into the fabric of meaning; in other words, moments of 
meaning are seen as, by necessity, moments of morality.  
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I am not sure I would collapse the two concepts, for fear that I may begin to prescribe 
moral explanations of illness without warrant. I would agree that morality is often at issue in 
making sense of illness but is not inherent to it. Anthropologist Jarrett Zigon (2008) was doubtful 
that “all narratives take a moral stance,” and seeing “competing and contested moral 
perspectives” in stories he suggested that narratives are more like “public debate[s] on local 
moral issues” (p. 147). Similarly, social worker Lars-Christer Hyden (1995) stated, “The 
question of whether to accept moral responsibility for one’s illness seems to be central to most 
conceptions of illness” (p. 69-70; my emphasis). Note that it is the “questions” and “debates,” 
not the concluding answers or moral positions, that may characterize stories of illness. Like 
Voltaire in his poem, some people attend more to “life’s fundamental contingency” and the 
“unmaking” of moral order (see e.g., Frank, 1995, p. 102-103), usually highlighted in journey, 
mystery, and chaos narratives. Such moments of meaning are often critical of or quiet about 
highly moralized depictions of illness, thereby indicating, “a moral interpretation is just one 
aspect of most everyday talk” (Zigon, 2008, p. 119). 
Within this chapter I study how and to what extent the young adults emplotted their 
cancers along moral histories and ethical imperatives. I discuss, first, a range of dominant 
cultural discourses about morality in relation to illness, described by cultural psychologist 
Richard Shweder (1997) as “causal ontologies.” Second, I review different moments of meaning 
along what I saw as “moral quests” (Hyden, 1995) within the young adults’ narratives, including 
their use of causal ontologies. Finally, I consider the difficulties of serving as “witness” (Frank, 
1995) to the contentious moral claims and challenges posed by cancer patients. Throughout the 
chapter I interrogate whether remoralization is inherent to the young adults’ stories of illness , 
which may be seen as under the ideology of young adulthood in its pursuit of moral order 
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(narrative coherence) and personal responsibility (self-authorship). In conclusion, I consider how 
we may best respond to moral accounts of cancer as health researchers: what ethical practices, if 
any, should be our guiding star?  
Moral Experiences, Moral Quests, and Causal Ontologies 
 In everyday being-in-the-world people often encounter, dispute, and live out certain 
values; they have what Arthur Kleinman (2006) called “moral experiences.” This is how he 
defined them: “Just carrying on our existence, negotiating important relations with others, doing 
work that means something to us, and living in some particular local place where others are also 
passionately engaged in these same existential activities” (p. 2). In other words, part of our 
being-in-the-world is applying our moral compasses to everyday actions. In liminal spaces, such 
as during a disruptive illness, moral experiences may have to be reevaluated as a new set of 
questions, dilemmas, and choices may arise.  
           As people who are ill narrate their existential challenges, they may initiate what could be 
called “moral quests” (Hyden, 1995), stories in which their values and ethics are disrupted and 
reevaluated. I use a journey metaphor deliberately, as their explorations are most often expressed 
as moments of sojourning (though they may also be at the same time moments of fighting, 
inspecting, healing, etc.). These quests may emplot past and present in terms of “moral lives,” 
defined by Kleinman (2006) as ideal futures formed out of people’s sense of right and wrong (p. 
2). Moral lives are those that people imagine or desire for themselves, the lives that “[embody 
their] own moral commitments” (p. 2). However, contrary to some of the journeys images I 
discussed in chapter 4, moral quests may never end, unfolding in an iterative process of 
reflection, exploration, and commitment.  
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 Moral concerns in illness narratives are often regarding the causes and effects of a given 
event.  Causality, in everyday stories of health and illness, is related to assessments of normality, 
responsibility or blame, and future control or predictability (Shweder, 1997, p. 123). Narratives 
of suffering often interact with what may be called “causal ontologies” (Shweder, 1997) or 
“explanatory models” (Kleinman, 1988), cultural discourses that reconstruct personal suffering 
within a larger, moral order of predictable events. Causal ontologies are affirmations of a certain 
reality in order to explain peoples’ presents in terms of their pasts (i.e., give etiological models) 
and identify ethical directives for proceeding into ideal futures (i.e., provide reconciliatory 
models). In other words, they provide spaces of moral experiences and horizons of moral lives 
that inform people’s moral quests. Within these ontologies are proposed ‘lessons’ of suffering 
that offer “responses to urgent life circumstances” and “justifications for practical action” 
(Kleinman, 1988, p. 121).  
 I use these different concepts—moral experiences, moral quests, and causal ontologies—to 
study how the young adults interacted with larger moral orders as they faced myriad existential 
challenges. See Figure J1 for a representation of these concepts within my theoretical framework 
(Appendix J). Throughout the following section, I explore the interactions between dominant 
causal ontologies, personal moral experiences, and moral quests as the young adults made sense 
of their pasts, presents, and futures.  
Moral Quests: Making and Unmaking Moments of Morality 
Dominant Causal Ontologies  
 P eople may interpret their illnesses in a wide variety of ways, and they may do so by 
drawing upon cultural explanations of the origins and effects of disease. Any number of these 
causal ontologies may be constructed around illness. Shweder (1997) outlined seven notable 
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varieties—astrophysical, biomedical, socio-political, environmental-stressful, interpersonal, 
psychological, and moral (p. 119-123)—that may be part of the narrative environments available 
to the young adults I interviewed.  Below I reconfigure these ontologies in relation to the young 
adults’ narratives, as well as put them into historical contexts. See Figure J2 for the hierarchical 
dominance of the different causal ontologies within the young adults’ narratives1. 
 Astrophysical explanations are perhaps not as well-known, but at least from the ancient 
Egyptians to modern astrologists the arrangements of cosmic entities have been analyzed to see 
how they may be related to the fortunes and misfortunes of people on Earth. Their unfamiliarity 
is reaffirmed by their absence within the young adults’ stories. It seems that despite the 
omnipresence of horoscopes in many daily newspapers, despite one of the Zodiac signs being 
cancer (the Latin word for “crab”), and despite “medical astronomy” having a small following of 
respected practitioners into the 20th century (Harrison, 2000), astrophysical discourses have not 
leaked into mainstream, contemporary conceptions of cancer.  
The closest expressions of a cosmic ontology within the young adult narratives would be in 
reference to fate or divinity (oddly, not singled out in Shweder’s causal ontologies). “Rational 
determinism” (Becker, 1997, p. 110) was relatively common with assertions that cancer 
“happens for a reason”; much less common but still somewhat present were references to “God’s 
will.” These claims share with astrophysical explanations a concept of destiny or of cosmic logos 
and they often imply an agentic mover of the universe who intends to inflict illness, for whatever 
reason.  
 Most familiar to the world of cancer care is a biomedical ontology of cells, bodily fluids, 
organic processes and so on. All of my participants employed a biomedical vernacular at some !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 This hierarchy was developed in a parallel way to the hierarchy of moments of meaning in chapter 4, namely, by 
studying the frequency and overall significance of these moral meanings within the narratives. 
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point in their narratives, discussing cell toxicity, biomedical diagnostic labels (e.g., “acute 
lymphoblastic leukemia,” “anaplastic astrocytoma,” etc.), “biopsies,” “CT scans,” “stem cell 
transplants,” chemotherapy drugs (e.g., “doxorubicin,” “cisplatin,” etc.), and other procedures 
used and justified within the contexts of medical oncology.  
As obvious and natural as these descriptors may be to the average cancer patient, they are 
neither universal nor ahistorical; according to cultural critic and teratoma patient Jackie Stacey 
(1997), they emerged out of the “medical patriarchy” of the last three centuries, during which 
time cultural notions of causation and responsibility shifted radically (p. 207-208). While prior 
ontologies associated suffering with divine punishment for moral failures (p. 229), dominant 
discourses moved toward more ‘naturalistic’ explanations. They also endowed medical experts 
with both the power and responsibility to heal, moving the attention away from patient-divinity 
relationships and toward healer-disease relationships (p. 224).  
More interpersonal ontologies of suffering usually interpret illness through relationships 
of abuse and hostility, cross-culturally encompassing everything from harassment and online 
bullying to sorcery and curses (Shweder, 1997, p. 126-127). Having more ‘microsocial’ foci, 
including intimate relationships between friends, families, or lovers, these discourses suggest that 
malicious intent and abusive treatment may maim, afflict, or kill another person. A few of my 
participants talked about the influence of bad relationships in the development of their illnesses; 
often these were seen as exacerbating factors, making it more difficult to cope with or recover 
from cancer. Only a couple people suggested more direct interpersonal impacts, including 
spouses or bosses who “made cancer grow” by heightening their distress. Interpersonal 
ontologies paled in comparison to the use of biomedical ontologies within the young adults’ 
stories. 
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  Socio-political ontologies often trace illness to more ‘macrosocial’ matters of oppression, 
domination, and other adverse social conditions. In modernity, these discourses may be loosely 
associated with the patient empowerment movement that began in the 1970s, in which among 
other demands there was a collective call for medicine to broaden its scope (Stacey, p. 208-209). 
Physicians were criticized for treating symptoms in individuals but not the presumed larger 
social causes; medicine was often seen as making a dehumanizing separation of disease from its 
ties to personal suffering, political oppression, and power imbalances in the doctor-patient 
relationship (Stacey, p. 208-209). Yet, these origin stories are almost entirely absent in the 
sample of young adults, with a couple of exceptions; however, as discussed in the two previous 
chapters, issues of empowerment, self-advocacy, and political conflict tended to arise more 
frequently when patients and care providers did not see eye to eye. Similar to interpersonal 
explanations, these were typically narrated as exacerbating, not originary, factors.  
Discourses of “environmental stress” seem to share interest in macrosocial issues, 
suggesting illnesses are external afflictions from one’s physical and social atmosphere, including 
traffic noise, light and car pollution, busy lifestyles, radio waves, etc. (Shweder, 1997, p. 123; 
Stacey, 1997, p. 127). These discourses have emerged quite recently, as criticisms of the 
supposed “evils of modernity” (Shweder, p. 217), such as capitalist exploitation, industrial 
pollution, excessive consumption, and so on. Interestingly, there are many more moments of 
environmental-stressful explanations than of socio-political explanations, drawing more attention 
to adjusting personal “lifestyles,” reducing “work” stresses, balancing “yin” with “yang” or 
tranquility with busyness, eating “organic” and following a strict “diet,” and maintaining overall 
“physical health.”  
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Psychological ontologies explore repressed or lived out desires, fears, fantasies, or 
emotions as the cause of illness. More than most other ontologies, these place responsibility 
heavily upon the person experiencing suffering (Sontag, 1978, p. 55-56).  Cultural critic Susan 
Sontag (1978) observed that, “there is a peculiarly modern predilection for psychological 
explanations of disease, as of everything else” (p. 54). Thus emerged in the early 20th century 
cultural discourses of a “cancer personality”: someone who was said to repress his or her urges, 
had an apparent “inability to feel,” and was considered “one of life’s losers” (Sontag, p. 48).  
The cultural associations between cancer and psyche may have waxed and waned with the 
prevalence of certain ideologies. Stacey (1997) wrote of the presence of psychological ontologies 
within “hyper-individualistic” conservative political parties that took power in 1980s Britain 
(and the U.S. and Canada), who defunded medical care and argued each person is responsible for 
his or her own illness and wellness (p. 209-211). Self-health and self-help approaches of the last 
few decades also tend to locate the origins of disease “within the individual,” often as an 
“expression of that person’s lifestyle,” a “physical manifestation of psychic distress,” rather than 
a “malfunction of the ‘natural’ regulation of the cell system” according to biomedicine (Stacey, 
p. 217).  
Such discourses were produced in the young adult narratives, often interwoven into 
environmental-stressful ontologies. For example, “stress” was largely seen as a psychological 
concept among the young adults, though tied to external factors; many of the suggested changes 
to lifestyle included “calming” down, “thinking positively,” altering their “perspectives,” 
“reducing stress,” etc. Not necessarily references to cancer personalities, they implied that 
thinking and feeling a certain way enhanced the probability of cancer and, by extension, death.  
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 Shweder (1997) wrote of a seventh set of moral ontologies that locate suffering within 
moral transgressions or failures to uphold some obligation or ethical duty (p. 127). I appreciate 
that there may be nuanced differences between moral and other ontologies, but the former does 
not seem to stand on its own. Moral ontologies seem implicit in all the others: an interpersonal 
ontology in cases of transgressions, a socio-political ontology in circumstances of human rights 
violations, a psychological ontology in situations of personal responsibility, and so on. They all 
seem to propose moral imperatives and ethical practices, whether of reconciliation, 
environmental movements, societal revolutions, or lifestyle changes.  
 Shweder admitted as much when he concluded that, in the world of lived experiences, no 
causal ontology is an isolated silo (p. 140). Like narrative genres, these causal ontologies are not 
mutually exclusive and in an individual narrative may bring several into dialogue2. For instance, 
anthropologist Linda Hunt (1998) found 48 moments of moral explanations (including emotions, 
sexual activities, lifestyle, environment, heritage, etc.) within the narratives of 25 Mexican 
women with either breast or cervical cancer—showing that often more than one cause is 
suggested. Causal ontologies are often intermixed, negotiated or challenged, rendering 
explanatory models of illness that are intricately complex and not always morally relevant. There 
were also moments of resisting causal ontologies, what we could call amoral or absurdist3 
positions on suffering. Many of the young adults were at one time uncertain about how to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 That said, causal ontologies may be unequally distributed across the globe (Shweder, 1997, p. 120-123); for 
example, illness tends to be diagnosed in Western nations as a disease of biological and ‘natural’ origins, while in 
many traditional tribes in Africa sorcery and spirit attack are much more familiar explanations (p. 122-123). !"!I am not sure the term ‘amoral’ is the best way to talk about resistance to causal ontologies. To say illness is 
amoral, for instance, is that not a moral way of talking, in so far as one is saying 'this is the state of the 
world'? Furthermore, notions of “chance” and “randomness” and “chaos” that follow from allegedly amoral 
accounts are themselves cultural categories, not without historical origins. I prefer to link these metaphors with 
‘absurdist’ beliefs in the “benign indifference of the universe” (Camus, 1942/1946, p. 76) to human affairs, shared 
by not only Voltaire in his criticism of Leibnizian theodicy, but also many modern existentialist philosophers, 
natural scientists, medical professionals, and atheists in response to religious explanations of suffering. Statements 
about the amorality of cancer may, in fact, be a cultural expression of certain secularized traditions or mores (which 
is the etymological root of “moral”) regarding a capricious world.!
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explain their cancers; they said they had “no clue” about its origins, it could be a “potpourri of 
things,” “maybe in the environment, technology, or our food.” Sometimes they said that their 
cancers were an indeterminate “mystery,” and that perhaps there was “no reason” or “no final 
answers.” 
Moments of negotiating and resisting ontologies show that a singular moral order may not 
always be sought. Producing multiple causal stories may, quite the contrary, be essential to 
understanding illness experiences and directing actions. Narrative psychologist Mark Freeman 
(2010b) wrote that, “causation in history is a plural matter…a given outcome is often 
‘overdetermined’” (p. 40). Shweder persuasively argued that “it is often advantageous to have 
more than one discourse for interpreting a situation or solving a problem” and this may be “the 
most effective method to meet the vicissitudes of human ethical experience” (p. 140-141). As we 
will see below, the young adults’ causal ontologies were often overdetermined, expressed as 
several possible (and rejected) answers to where cancer may come from and how in spite of it 
one may lead a moral life. 
Moral Meanings as Quests: The Cases of Jeanine and George 
 Creating meaning of suffering is often seen as a cross-cultural, perhaps even universal 
phenomenon. Richard Shweder (1997) proposed that “wherever one looks on the globe it appears 
that human beings want to be edified by their miseries” and have a “desire to make suffering 
intelligible” (p. 119). But, can we presume that edification and intelligibility are always pursued 
and desired? I have made the case against this presupposition in the previous two chapters; in 
particular, I wrote of moments of disordering as well as moments of non-being that sometimes 
provide release from overburdening or unconvincing cancer discourses. I proposed that these 
moments are commonplace across my participants’ narratives, and not just a characteristic of a 
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particular kind of story (e.g., a chaotic narrative). I concluded that these moments communicate 
the on-going instability of meaning and being within illness narratives, the chronic possibility of 
disruption and disorder in the lives of young adults with cancer.  
 It may be that orderly moments of meaning and being are more so horizons of expectation 
than universal truths about storying illness (see e.g., Rimmon-Kenan, 2002). It may be that, 
contrary to what they want to say, many people who are ill are compelled to tell coherent stories, 
present restored selves, and provide moral lessons. A common trope around chronically and 
terminally ill people is that they are beacons of moral education. For instance, Dr. Morrie 
Schwartz, the famed sociologist who became the dying sage and protagonist in Tuesdays with 
Morrie (1997) and a series of television interviews for ABC’s Nightline, has become the 
exemplary image of the instructive patient. Imparting moral wisdom about life and death seemed 
to come easy for Dr. Schwartz, neatly packaged in pithy aphorisms and informative parables.  
But, he was quite aware that he had an audience and often seemed to tell his story in a way 
that appeared satisfying and digestible to them; in the book written about him, he was quoted as 
saying, “I’m on the last great journey here - and people want me to tell them what to pack” (p. 
33; my emphasis). Not everybody who encounters chronic or terminal illness takes on the 
confident didactic role that befitted the retired professor, and it may be that he was inhibited by 
dominant expectations to tell less inspiring or less orderly narratives of dying. Voices expressing 
struggle or ambiguity around moral issues are often eclipsed by such dominant images as 
presented by Dr. Schwartz.  
 I wanted to avoid reifying the young adults as sages of moral wisdom, by attending to their 
doubts and queries along with their assertions of moral meanings. In order to do this, I re-plotted 
their stories as moral quests, that is, expeditions into and sometimes away from moral sense. I 
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divided their quests into three different, non-sequential moments of meaning: a) moments of 
existential questioning when taken-for-granted assumptions were shaken to their core; b) 
moments of moral explorations when the young adults engaged and negotiated different 
explanations of cancer; and c) moments of moral living when they considered the directions of 
their future in light of their understandings of the past and present. I expand in turn on each of 
these moments of meaning within the young adults’ stories. I delve further into the complexity of 
these explorations by drawing on two exemplary narratives, in their self-reflexivity revealing 
most effectively the diverse and complex moral quests that the vast majority of participants also 
traversed. Let me first introduce them before entering into their moral quests.  
 Jeanine  
When I met Jeanine, she was in her late twenties, three years post-treatment, and suffering 
inexplicable abdominal pains. Her story of becoming ill began just after having her first child 
with her husband, when she went in for a routine postpartum pap test. The test results came back 
with abnormal cells, which perplexed her and her gynecologist. The results of a biopsy came in 
three days before Jeanine was to receive life insurance: she had cervical cancer. She was 
subsequently refused her insurance. Over the next several months she had appointments with 
oncologists and healthcare staff to get more information about her cancer.  
 She was initially treated with a trachelectomy, a surgical procedure in which the cervix is 
removed while the uterus is left. This procedure is done in order to preserve the person’s fertility, 
in case she wished to be pregnant again. Unfortunately, it was discovered later that the cancer 
had spread to her lymphnodes and she would require 5 weeks of chemotherapy and radiation 
therapy. All of this rendered the trachelectomy unnecessary as Jeanine became infertile from the 
other therapies. In fact, her surgery created more complications than it solved, as it brought her 
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enduring pain and prevented her from lifting anything heavy, including her newborn child, lest it 
caused internal tearing and hemorrhaging. In terms of moral challenges, she said she was 
struggling to make sense of her cancer’s origins as well as find her place in the world around her. 
 George 
George was in his late thirties and was three years post-treatment from his second cancer 
when we began our interview. He found a lump on his groin in the midst of planning his 
wedding. His blood tests initially came back negative, but a few months later he was diagnosed 
with acute lymphoblastic leukemia (after being misdiagnosed with Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma). 
He had three rounds of chemotherapy, with three years of maintenance treatments (i.e., lighter 
doses of chemo). He and his wife were married six months into his experience with cancer. 
 He was without symptoms for seven years, but after experiencing pain and pressure in his back 
and head, cancer cells were found in his spine and cerebrospinal fluid. At this time, George and 
his wife were preparing for their second child. He was treated with three more cycles of 
chemotherapy, a stem cell transplant, then radiation and more chemotherapy. As a result of the 
cancer and its treatment, he had some reduced vision but otherwise had few late effects. George 
was also having trouble finding his place as he searched for moral visions to guide his actions.  
A) Moments of Existential Questioning 
Overview: Questioning Pasts, Presents, and Futures  
Moments of existential questioning often expressed disruptions to participants’ ways of 
living and taken-for-granted values, instigating their struggles. These were often, though not 
always, moments of crisis and confusion leading to what Arthur Frank (1995) saw as a 
“departure” from everyday life and onto journeys toward understanding (p. 117). However, the 
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degrees of intensity and the aspects of life permeated by doubts varied notably at different times 
in people’s narratives.  
Almost all of the people I interviewed noticeably expressed existential questions, many of 
which were in search of causal ontologies. They phrased questions along the past, how did I get 
here? Often these kinds of questions were framed generally, in two very simple words: “Why 
me?” In these moments, people spoke about not being able to “process” or “digest” their 
diagnosis, not being able to emplot it within their accounts of their life histories. Diagnosis 
radically challenged their perceptions of the past, producing what anthropologist Sarah Lochlann 
Jain (2007) called a “counterfactual,” a former life history that does not seem to match up with 
the emerging story of having cancer. A common example would be believing one lived a 
‘healthy’ life (e.g., exercising, dieting, etc.) only to find later that under the surface one was ill4.  
At other times people asked more specific queries about whether they were being 
“punished,” whether they were “guilty” of some transgression or crime, or whether it was the 
will of “God.” A few people claimed there is a discrepancy between their lived experiences and 
discourses that promise healthy eating and frequent exercise will prevent cancer; these frustrated 
individuals said they “thought” they were “healthy,” they “tried to be fit,” and, yet, they “still got 
cancer” and all their “hard work was undone.” During these moments of questioning, people said 
they had “no clue” about where their cancer came from and felt that it was possibly 
“purposeless,” having no bearing on the (im)morality of the past. The origins of their disease 
seemed to be mysterious and elusive, perhaps even absurd or arbitrary.  
Adrian, a brain cancer survivor in his twenties, described the difficulties in pinpointing the 
origin of his disease in this way: “you just got to realize, um, that these things come up and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 This is also an example of how different sources may thrust individuals into “unhomelike being-in-the-world” 
(Svenaeus, 2000); instead of a phenomenological experience of feeling themselves getting ill, some young adults 
entered into unhomelike being through a social experience of being told they were ill.  
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unless you’re in an environment where, um, like maybe a mine or something, generally you 
don’t know why these diseases develop but you just got to deal with them as they come…[The 
oncologists] don’t know why, they know that sometimes, um, these things happen with genetics, 
but that’s just shooting in the dark.” Even though genetics is an available way of ‘tracing back’ 
his brain tumour, he struggled to come to a satisfactory answer.  
Another series of questions arose quite frequently around the present, where am I now? In 
reflecting upon their current situations—their treatments and time after treatments—people often 
talked about being in a “crisis” or “grey period,” “flying without a net,” with “no answers.” 
Some described feeling “numb,” “overwhelmed,” “demoralized,” “unsettled,” or in “disbelief,” 
caught in a number of “catch 22s” and confused about their “place” in the world . They seemed 
lost within an unhomelike present, a place of exile, alienated from where they used to be.  
Finally, an array of questions sprung up from my participants with regard to the future, 
where am I going? Simply stated as “now what?” or “what’s going to happen?” these questions 
often articulated that there was “so much uncertainty,” “anxiety,” and “moments of panic” about 
the future beyond treatments. Some young adults said they “don’t know what life has in store” 
for them; they sometimes saw “no finite end” to their illness, suspected pains or symptoms as 
“signs” of “possible relapse,” and thought they “might die” from their cancers. In these moments 
they questioned their “expectations” about life and became convinced they were “not returning” 
or “going back” to “normal.” They constructed their illnesses as distant journeys away from 
home. The narratives of Jeanine and George relate these experiences of alienation in more 
personal ways to the worlds of importance to them. 
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1. Jeanine’s Questions: Reflecting on Regrets and Suspicions   
 Let’s look first at Jeanine, who talked about two distinct phases in her cancer experience: 
first, what she called the “survival” or “denial” phase, which prefaced her moral quests; and a 
second “reality” phase during which many existential questions started to emerge. She saw the 
first phase as a response to feeling overwhelmed by her unexpected diagnosis: “I felt very lost 
[initially]…You feel a total loss of control.” She reported frantically searching for something to 
focus onto, a crutch to keep her balanced.  
 She said her sense of control was restored by developing a “plan of action” with her 
medical team to conquer her cancer. Her attentions honed in on getting through her treatments 
and little else. It may seem strange that she would talk about this period as a “denial” phase, 
given that the term is often used to denote a refusal to recognize the life and death gravity of a 
situation. However, what she claimed to have denied was not death itself, but rather the 
existential questions and emotional weights that awareness of mortality can bring.  
 Her commitment to survival was buttressed by what she saw as a moral duty to her child: 
“[I] told [my husband] I would do whatever it took to be here for our daughter…I didn’t need 
more children, I just needed to be there for the one we already had.” Despite survival being more 
at stake than the ability to bear children, her and her husband agreed to the trachelectomy 
because they “had always planned on having a larger family.”  
 Three years without a recurrence, her survival phase appeared to give way to “reality” and, 
peculiar though it may sound, she said, “dealing with the aftermath of having cancer is a lot 
worse than dealing with the cancer itself.” According to her, the first concern to haunt her was 
her treatment decisions. She says, “I question everything; I want to know why this route of 
treatment was chosen for me…I have regret to the decisions that I’ve made with my treatment.” 
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She described “feelings of anger, regret, and bitterness” toward her choices, sometimes 
suggesting she was not given a fair weighing of the pros and cons of a trachelectomy over a 
hysterectomy. This doubt and frustration contributed to what she called the “emotional strain” of 
cancer. Of special difficulty was the inability to carry her child while she recovered from the 
surgery and its complications. She says, “not being able to lift my daughter was the hardest of 
anything I had to deal with. Everything with my cancer being surrounded around my maternity 
leave made me feel robbed of the first year of my daughter’s life.”  
 Jeanine also ruminated anxiously over the origins of her illness. She asked herself, “Why 
me? What made me get cancer over anybody else?...This is something we’ve all asked ourselves 
at some point, ‘What did I do to deserve this?’” She reported struggling with contradictory 
discourses about where young adult cancer comes from. On the one hand, she said she 
encountered a dominant discourse of personal responsibility for cervical cancer: “Everything 
I’ve been told by the research is that the choices I’ve made in my life are what led to me getting 
cancer.” Cervical cancer research tends to emphasize human papillomavirus (HPV) as the 
highest risk factor for the disease by a wide margin, with 99% of cervical cancer patients also 
having HPV (see e.g., Walboomers et al., 1999); HPV is considered a sexually transmitted 
disease and, as such, is subject to moral judgments about the sexual practices of those infected. 
This is an example of how biomedical rhetoric can evolve into “medico-moral” discourses 
(Harris, 1989) as they intermingle with other discourses, in this case, of sexual transgressions. 
Jeanine was somewhat swayed by this discourse, indicating in her written narrative that, “I 
feel there were events that happened prior to my diagnosis that may have resulted in me getting 
cancer.” However, she questioned her own inclinations. In a conversation with herself, she 
admitted, “that is debatable, however, especially when some ‘cancer theologists’ say there is 
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nothing at our age we could’ve done to get cancer.” Who she saw as “cancer theologists” is 
unclear, but Jeanine was trying to sort out whether she was culpable in some way for her cancer. 
Some of her ideas come out in her moral explorations, which I return to in the next section.  
 Another contentious issue for Jeanine was her place in the world once she had recovered 
from her cancer. She says, “I question where I’m supposed to be and what I’m supposed to be 
doing with my life…feeling a bit more urgency to find answers.” Much like her initial feeling of 
disorientation when she was first diagnosed, she expressed being lost within her moral quests, 
alienated from both a meaningful present and a valuable future. This sense of loss comes back to 
her emotional turmoil, where she says, “I am also finding myself feeling pity for my situation at 
times, or rather I feel sorry for myself. I also feel like I have no control over situations.” These 
moments, spread throughout her narrative, communicated moral struggles oriented toward the 
past (i.e., why she had cancer), the present (i.e., where it had brought her), and the future (i.e., 
where she was “supposed” to be heading in life).  
2. George’s Questions: Searching for a Place in Many Worlds 
 George had his own set of moral struggles, some of which paralleled Jeanine’s.  During his 
treatment, George witnessed friends who died of their cancers while he remained. He said this is 
what began his existential questioning. He suffered from what is often seen as ‘survivor 
remorse,’ or the “culpability of the survivor” according to philosopher Emmanuel Levinas 
(1993/2000, p. 12); he asked not “Why did I get sick?” but “Why am I still here?”  
Similar to Jeanine, he began to ask about his “place in the world as a survivor” (my 
emphasis). Life with cancer changed his relationship to the world around him, manifesting an 
unhomelike sense of being, and he sought out a new home. It is perhaps more accurate to refer to 
worlds in the plural, as George’s notion of “the world” seemed to expand and shrink throughout 
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his narrative. Sometimes he spoke concernedly about his familial world, especially his children. 
He says: 
I’m very conscious of the legacy I’m leaving for my kids…in the sense of like  ‘Who is  
my dad?’ If I’m dead in two years or ten years, what are they going to  remember about  
me? Am I going to be just another guy who just worked a job,  you know…Or is there  
going to be something special about me? Are they going  to be proud of me? (my  
emphasis) 
 George’s play on past and present tense throughout this quote (see italics) shifted the temporal 
positioning of his story from ‘now’ to a possible future when he doesn’t exist. This may reflect 
some ambiguity on George’s part about whether he will be alive when his children grow up. Yet, 
it was not the death of the self that worried him most; his image in the eyes of his children 
seemed to be more at stake in his existential concerns. He wanted to build a “legacy” that his 
children would find worth living and would thus commemorate. As both George and Jeanine 
addressed their futures, what seemed to concern them most was a generative project, that is, 
locating prospective contributions they could make to the lives of their local social worlds (refer 
back to the previous chapter for more detail on struggles with generativity). 
 At other times, the social sphere of relevance to George ballooned. For instance, he wrote, 
“[I have a] strong desire to do what I can to make my community and the world a better place” 
(my emphasis). Here the “community” (vaguely identified) is a broader local world than family, 
while the “world” in this excerpt signifies an even wider, perhaps global, range of stakeholders. 
He wrote about feeling compelled toward contributing to all three of these worlds, wanting to 
find a way to juggle them in harmony. No easy task to sort out, George seemed to be 
understandably at a loss for how to go about performing his various commitments.  
Conclusion: The Unpredictable Timing of Existential Questioning 
Along the meandering and foggy roads that can be chronic illness are many encounters 
with doubts and uncertainties (see Figure J3 for a summary of the above existential questions). 
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George and Jeanine came across shared existential questions around their purposes and places 
within larger social worlds, especially their families. What was predominantly at stake for both 
of them was being there for their children and contributing to their futures, as was the case for 
other parents in my study. Despite this grounding intersection in their narratives, George and 
Jeanine shared very few other paths along their moral explorations.  
We see the extent of their differences as we go through other sequences of their narratives 
below, but here one crucial point needs to be made: moral quests can start at various times in the 
lives of cancer patients. George and Jeanine told of two different catalytic events in the 
“departures” (Frank, 1995, p. 117) on to their moral quests. George said he started to ask himself 
more questions in the rooms of dying and dead friends he had met while in treatment. This was a 
common statement, where participants said they discovered the gravity of their own situations 
upon witnessing the deaths of those considered to be in comparable circumstances. Jeanine’s 
“survival” phase, where moral and existential issues were ‘set aside’ until the possibility of death 
became less imminent, was also a familiar narrative among other participants. Once treatment 
was finished, the threat was more distant, and people exited the routines of their medical 
institutions, then all that couldn’t be dealt with in the midst of treatment suddenly ruptured into 
an emotional crisis.  
 Whether due to the shock of being diagnosed at a younger age, the demanding 
commitments of appointments and treatments, or the unclear space of post-treatment (e.g., not 
knowing if a relapse is in the future), any of these encounters may lead people back to troubling 
moments of questioning. In any case, their moral quests did not necessarily correspond to 
biomedical quests of treatment and remission. George saw his beginnings in the middle of 
treatment, while Jeanine saw hers at the end of treatment. This can be problematic, as mentioned 
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in chapter 5, when medical staff and/or patients’ communities assume that once treatment is 
finished the questioning and uncertainty should stop.   
 On the contrary, many of the young adults I interviewed expressed a sharp disconnect or 
sense of abandonment as soon as their treatments ceased, being thrown out into a world and left 
to make sense of their new liminal statuses and emerging moral questions by themselves. Their 
explicit criticisms of post-treatment care—not to mention several confessions within oncological 
research (see e.g., Ramphal et al., 2011; Paul et al., 2011)—indicate that much is lacking in 
practice and understanding of young adults’ challenges. That said, most of the young adults 
seemed to find answers to their many questions, not an answer but many answers through 
exploring different possible realities. It is this process of moral exploration to which I now turn.  
B) Moments of Moral Explorations 
Overview: Provisional Endings 
Moral explorations often serve as “initiations” (Frank, 1995, p. 117-118), the first steps 
away from existential questions and toward emplotting moral experiences within causal 
ontologies. Moments of moral explorations in the young adults’ narratives built upon the 
questions how did I get here? and where am I now?, constructing possible plots of the past and 
present. Moral explorations often involve a “dialogical” activity of engaging with what Lars-
Christer Hyden (1995) called “platforms” (p. 75) or “various possible standpoints, perspectives, 
and options” within people’s narrative environments, in order to produce “tentative versions of 
the life narrative” (p. 70).  
 This reflective or experimental activity may be seen as a form of “subjunctivization” 
(Good, 1994), cultivating several possible versions of reality in order to answer existential 
questions around one’s illness.  There are various ways we may understand what is going on in 
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engaging different ‘platforms.’ On the one hand, they may be for the purpose of what Arthur 
Kleinman (1988) referred to as “remoralization,” the construction of an “illness narrative that 
will make sense of and give value to the experience” (p. 54). Remoralization may instill hope, 
understanding, and direction into a life suffering from a receding sense of coherence. In the 
process the suffering person is re-positioned within the frames of moral actions—mistakes and 
corrections, good and bad judgments, responsibilities and vindications—as well as moral 
agents—villains, heroes, victims, caregivers, conspirators, tricksters, etc. In sum, the process of 
imbuing actions with moral meanings could be a movement toward narrative coherence and 
assigning agency to oneself as a method toward self-authorship. 
About half of my participants talked about their moral explorations in this way. They 
claimed they were seeking “purpose,” “redemption,” “something good,” or “a sense of clarity” 
about their illnesses. Some asked for “guidance” about what “lessons” to take away from their 
experiences, or “demanded answers” from others. Others “sought out” their own answers from 
“meditation,” “philosophy,” or the guidance of others, initiating a change in their “perspective,” 
“priorities,” sense of “hope,” etc. Finding “humour,” “gratitude,” and personal “strengths” were 
commonly raised as avenues toward remoralization. What seemed to be emphasized in these 
descriptions of moral struggle was a need for order and direction, visible paths from people’s 
pasts to presents in hopes of leading to desirable futures.  
On the other hand, exploring different platforms may also be seen, under the rubric of a 
“pluralizing hermeneutics” (Marquard, 1981/1989), as an activity of producing multiple 
interpretations of one’s illness without defining one of them as the truth. Surely some realities 
may be preferred over others, but subjunctivization is not simply the production of a pleasing or 
preferable interpretation, it often entertains a variety of favourable and unfavourable 
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possibilities. Sometimes moral explorations may not be moving toward “sense” and “value” in 
the singular, but rather opening up its meanings to an array of senses and values, some in 
contradiction to others but all in some ways plausible. In some cases, they may be disputing or 
disrupting certain causal ontologies, in a sense amoralizing disease or making it appear absurd.   
A sizable minority of young adults talked about their explorations in ways that suggest 
opening up or problematizing the available ways of making moral sense of their lives. These 
individuals talked about wanting to “take a step back,” “reevaluate” their assumptions and 
desires, “shift focus,” “doubt” previously held beliefs (e.g., that diet and exercise will prevent 
cancer), and “abandon” those that are questionable. These moments of moral exploration seemed 
to articulate less certainty or less desire in discovering a singular moral meaning, in a way 
parallel to moments of non-being discussed last chapter that resist singular narrative identities.  
When I asked a young woman in her twenties, Lorena, to write about her experiences of 
lung cancer, she mentioned at length the “stigma” and “injustice” of dominant moral associations 
between lung cancer and smoking: “If I could have a dollar for everyone who’s asked if I 
smoked, I’d be able to take a pretty nice vacation. I realize people are curious and don’t 
understand how someone my age can get something like this, but it is frustrating, especially 
when asked by medical professionals.” Lung cancer is a particularly moralized form of cancer, as 
Lorena noted, and this may be partially due to the extensive media attention it has received in the 
past (e.g., the intentionally grotesque images of cancerous bodies on Canadian packs of 
cigarettes). Lorena vehemently challenged these associations: “I want people to realize that the 
face of lung cancer is changing. It’s not just smokers or older people, but it’s someone like 
me…No one deserves cancer, whether one smoked or not.” In a tricksterly way, she did not seem 
to offer an alternative explanation as to who gets lung cancer and why; she only pointed to the 
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fact that causal ontologies can unjustly imply that people ‘deserve’ their suffering. That moral 
origins were absent in her story suggests that remoralization may not always be a possible or 
desirable part of constructing illness narratives.  
It may be better to interpret moral quests not as linear paths toward coherent, remoralized 
narratives, but rather as iterative negotiations that are fraught with difficulty and never quite 
completed. According to Mark Freeman (2010b), our life stories are “always provisional and 
revisable” (p. 85), and moral struggles may be one of many catalysts for revising and 
reevaluating our stories. At any point in life a new experience may (somewhat or completely) 
transform the meaning of an earlier one (Freeman, p. 85), possibly challenging presumed causal 
ontologies.  
Illness narratives, in particular, often contain a “provisional ending” (Hyden, 1995, p. 72), 
open to more travels, adventures, doubts, and discoveries. For instance, journalist Joyce Wadler 
wrote a revised edition of her cancer memoir My breast (1994), and later contemplated writing a 
whole new book in response to a later diagnosis of ovarian cancer (Teucher, 2001a, p. 170-171; 
Teucher, personal communication, February 11, 2013). She eventually gave up this project, 
possibly because new changes and challenges made it quite difficult to write a final ending. 
Relapses, among other turning points in life, can convert what was initially assumed to be a 
concluded journey into a more indefinite affair. Stories must then be re-plotted, explorations 
continued, moral orders revised. Jeanine’s and George’s explorations entertained many different 
causal ontologies and moral responsibilities at the same time, expressing unsettled, “tentative 
versions” (Hyden, 1995, p. 70) of their moral understandings.  
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1. Jeanine’s Explorations: Family Duties, Tough Decisions, and Multiple Origins 
 Recall that Jeanine was most concerned about her place in her social world after having 
cancer, the emotional turmoil she felt from the treatment path she took, and the events within her 
life history that may have caused her cervical cancer. In terms of her place in the world, she 
spoke of being self-centred before cancer and how she saw that as a kind of moral flaw. She said 
that before cancer “life was about me,” young adulthood was about “paving your own path,” and 
during such times “you think you’re invincible.” Comparing her past to present, she said that 
now her daughter is, “the centre of my life.” She also expressed the need to share her experiences 
with others, to help others going through cancer, or simply raise awareness about cervical cancer. 
Her explorations first communicated a new ethic of caring for others. 
However, these plans, she said, “[have] been put on the back burner, and the main focus 
has become to first deal with my own physical and emotional health, as my third year following 
my diagnosis has been my hardest year so far.” Her trachelectomy caused a lot of late 
complications, including some ambiguous abdominal pains that neither she nor her physician 
could explain. As she was telling her story Jeanine said she worried, above all, about a relapse: 
was she going to die because she made the “wrong decisions” the first time? Her physician had 
suggested getting a full hysterectomy to alleviate the pain, a recommendation that she also 
received with suspicion. She felt she had gone “full circle” since her first treatments, as she 
struggled to decide on what to do and whether the medical advice she was given was the best. 
 Another area of contention for Jeanine was her cancer’s causal ontologies. Jeanine saw 
tensions between common biomedical explanations of young adult cancer and her personal 
reflections. At odds with dominant discourses of cervical cancer and Jeanine’s own inclinations, 
discourses of young adult cancer tend to promote a genetic origin story, based on the assumption 
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that young adults have not had enough “exposure” to “environmental” carcinogens to develop 
cancer (see e.g., CCS, 2006, 2009). She attended a presentation on young adult cancer and 
listened to the speaker repeatedly say: 
There is nothing you have done at your age to deserve getting cancer”…You know, and I  
think he was doing it to make us feel positive and empowered and  that, so I don’t disagree  
with what he was doing. But, I have trouble agreeing with it 100%. 
 
Jeanine was somewhat dissatisfied with this biomedical causal ontology, though not without 
understanding what it serves for many patients. Jeanine did not want to dismiss these claims 
outright, but she said time and again she could not accept that her illness came from nowhere.  
She proceeded to construct a narrative of her own about her cervical cancer’s origins, 
which blended personal experiences, conjecture, and dominant discourses of cervical cancer: 
My theory…because you think of this stuff, is the abusive relationship I was in in high  
school…I was monogamous and I thought my partner was monogamous but he wasn’t.  
And he was actually very promiscuous. And when I was with him,  I did get diagnosed with  
an STD…Part of me wonders if those cancer cells were there at that time and they just laid  
dormant until my pregnancy. And in pregnancy your hormones go like crazy and that  
activated the cancer cells that were already there…There’s no reason why I should, but I  
hold my ex-partner responsible for my cancer. 
 
We can see here that her story seems to remoralize her illness, to place it within moral actions, 
but this is a subjunctive activity involving an array of different causal ontologies, particular 
multiple biomedical origins. To begin with, she resisted genetic discourses around young adult 
cancer in favour of a germ theory of disease, a discourse more specific to cervical cancer5. She 
thought she may have developed cancer from a sexually transmitted disease her ex-partner 
transmitted to her and later in the interview she specifically named the human papillomavirus as 
a possible candidate. Jeanine also evoked a hormonal theory of illness as well, which also has !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 These two discourses are both rooted in biomedical rhetoric of cancer, but the latter is notably more moralized. 
Neither Jeanine nor any of the other young adults I talked to were expressly or totally against biomedical ontologies; 
rather, they were often critical of what they saw as depersonalized, oversimplified and reductionist explanations that 
tore experiences of illness out of the life histories within which they occurred. In this case, Jeanine preferred 
discourses that could be weaved into her sexual, relational, and reproductive history. !
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some bearing in biomedical discourses. She suggested the cancerous cells created by her STD 
may have been “activated” by the hormones produced when pregnant, what in oncology are 
called hormone receptor-positive cancers (see e.g., Piccart-Gebhart, 2010).  
Of course, there are things she said that would not be well received by her physicians and 
oncologists. Her moral explorations extended beyond loosely biomedical theories to include 
interpersonal and psychological ontologies, particularly around her former relationship. These 
origins were validated when she talked with other cervical cancer patients: “There’s a lot of 
diagnoses after divorce or pregnancy…obviously a hormonal level and an emotional level.” 
Coinciding with HPV transmission and hormonal “activation” is a proposed somatic 
manifestation of emotional distress produced in relational disputes6. Jeanine talked about 
suppressing her distress during and after her “abusive” relationship, which she believed 
contributed in an unspecified way to her illness.   
 Jeanine’s cancer was overladen with subjunctive explanations, as any of those causes could 
have been used to fully explain where her cancer came from. Some of her ‘platforms’ were 
explicitly moralized accounts (e.g., spousal abuse, contracting an STD, suppression of emotion) 
while others were less so (e.g., hormone production during pregnancy), but they were entangled 
in each other, complicating any conclusions we may make about her attempts at remoralization. 
Her moral explorations provided some sense of meaning, not by singling out a particular orderly 
story but by multiplying the possible factors that may have in part or in whole caused her cancer. 
Furthermore, she described her origin “theory” as not “rational” and gave similar 
disclaimers throughout the interview, and later admitted, “it makes me feel maybe like I have 
more control over it and more understanding.” While she said she was compelled toward these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Outside of emotional suffering I make no inferences about the kinds of “abuse” Jeanine suffered in her 
relationship, for she never mentioned any other. 
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causal ontologies, she also seemed to deconstruct them herself, showing them to be suspect in 
their ‘irrational’ and conciliatory nature. She was also aware of contradictory oncological 
discourses that provided relief from feeling personally responsible. In a complicated and 
inconsistent way, then, Jeanine resisted her own efforts to remoralize her cancer. 
2. George’s Explorations: Solidarity and Exploitation 
 George used some similar and some different platforms for the construction of his 
narrative. He spoke about life before cancer as a time when, “I just want[ed] to work and have 
stuff and do things that normal people do.” He saw his post-secondary education as “a means to 
an end” and regretted that he did not “just enjoy the journey.” Like Jeanine, he pitted his 
unreflective past against his cancer experiences and an emerging concern for where he was going 
in life. Before cancer, he said he had vague ideas about “settling down and having a family,” but 
he did not quite take them seriously. After being diagnosed and then witnessing two friends with 
cancer die, he admitted rethinking his life, saying to himself “I really needed to not take my life 
for granted,” and thereby ‘initiating’ his explorations for finding his “place” in the world.  
 One of the primary moral struggles he encountered was around being with his family. He 
felt that he “never appreciated enough” the support from his wife and the fact that they had lived 
with cancer together longer than they had been married. He said after his relapse he took on a 
mission of creating “solidarity” within his family, bringing them closer together. Sadly, he and 
his wife were not able to reconcile the conflicts that had materialized from over a decade of 
dealing with cancer; they eventually separated. However, they agreed to preserve some “sense of 
family” for their children by cooperating with childcare. This sustained involvement with and 
effort for his family reframed his moral explorations within a more local sphere.  
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Juxtaposed against this more local moral order, George also considered cancer within the 
context of contemporary, globalized society. He says, “I’m convinced that a significant amount 
of the cancers in the world are environmental or social-environmental.” Included under the 
umbrella of “social-environmental” origins were poverty, pollution, and natural environment 
degradation, perceived to result from exploitation of people and resources. Threaded into his 
story was a critique of industrialization and consumerism, two modern forces that George saw as 
moral violations to our collective obligations: “We’re so reckless and materialistic…and we 
never pause to think about the linkages with everything.” In other words, according to George, 
through abusive treatment we have estranged the people and the land we depend on, are 
responsible for, and are affected by. George felt that modern medicine is complicit in treating 
each case of cancer individually and ignoring these social and environmental causes. He 
challenged the medical system to “instead of treating these problems in isolation, well, it’s just 
like putting a band aid on something. If you’re not dealing with the rest of the system the 
problem’s just going to keep cropping up.”  
Within these moments of moral exploration, George seemed to be engaging socio-political 
and environmental-stressful causal ontologies, with an added criticism of biomedical ontologies 
that fail to grasp the “linkages with everything.” There are some elements of interpersonal (i.e., 
familial) ontologies in there as well, but less as an etiological model for explaining the causes of 
his suffering and more as a reconciliatory model for relieving his suffering (more on this in the 
following section on moral living). He seemed fairly comfortable within these ontologies, in 
comparison to Jeanine who doubted even her own moral claims. It may thus be said that 
remoralization was a key project in George’s moments of moral exploration—again, through 
subjunctive assertions about the various worlds at play.   
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Conclusion: Medical Cartesianism and Overdetermined Causes 
 Both Jeanine’s and George’s narratives expressed a multitude of influences in the 
development of cancer. Jeanine interpreted spousal abuse, emotional distress, hormonal changes, 
and sexually transmitted diseases as all having parts to play in her cervical cancer. George, on 
the other hand, blended sociopolitical and environmental explanations with moralizing 
metaphors of pollution, corruption, greed, and carelessness, a symbolic fall out of grace with 
nature, each other, and ourselves. These platforms for interpreting their illnesses negotiated and 
resisted an array of causal ontologies, in turn producing complex moral positions.  
 Both narratives expressed criticisms of biomedical discourses, though in different ways. 
Jeanine was reluctant to reduce her cancer’s origins to genetics despite it being a readily 
available explanation that would absolve her of blame. George saw fewer merits in a biomedical 
model, as he perceived gross ignorance within medicine of underlying social and environmental 
causes. In either case, the object of critique was the medical Cartesianism strong in form today, 
maintaining that bodily processes are separate from, perhaps even unaffected by, other processes 
going on in the mind, in social conflict and abuse, and in our surrounding physical worlds.  
The amoral implications of medical Cartesianism did not always serve these two 
participants well, as it threatened to further their sense of “unhomelike” alienation from their 
bodies, selves, relations, and worlds. Not only do these biomedical discourses abstract illness 
from the personal and social lives within which they occur, but they also suggest there is nothing 
people can do outside of patiently receiving their surgeries, chemotherapies, or radiations. 
Shweder (1997) explained that this may not help many people who “feel as though their illness 
was a meaningful intervention in an intended course of action” initiated either by their own or 
another’s doing (p. 161). In many of their moral explorations, Jeanine and George among others 
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within this study criticized biomedical discourses they saw as empty of moral understandings 
and, consequently, stripped suffering of any purpose.  
On the other hand, there were moments in the young adults’ narratives in which medical 
Cartesianism was validated, as can be seen in Jeanine’s tense relation (in the previous section on 
existential questioning) with the claim that there is “nothing at our age we could’ve done to get 
cancer.” She conceded that this perception may actually “empower” some people. As noted in 
chapter 5, taking personal culpability out of cancer can be a favourable proposition to some 
narrative identities (e.g., patients, victims, tragic figures, etc.) and a contentious one to more self-
assertive identities (e.g., warriors, healers, advocates, etc.). Though on a philosophical level I 
criticize medical Cartesianism for abstracting disease out of personal and social life histories, on 
the level of individual narratives the discourse may sometimes relieve people of blame for their 
own suffering. Perhaps it is more accurate to refer to the discourse in these moments as patient 
Cartesianism, seeing as it may be put forth by patients’ own initiative without (or against) the 
suggestion or pressure of any medical staff.  
Finally, biomedical discourses were not always in opposition to other causal ontologies. 
There were times in the narratives when medical and other explanations were expressed together, 
in “medico-moral” terms (Harris, 1989), as in Jeanine’s multifaceted story. Biomedicine does not 
always promote a discourse of ‘you’ve done nothing wrong.’ Disease may be constructed as 
arbitrary, but recovery or management of it may be perceived as patients’ responsibility7. 
Medical discourses can also reify estimated ‘risk factors’ as indubitable causes, especially 
around lifestyles. Remember Lorena, who said healthcare providers often wrongfully accused 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Recall, for example, the oncological discourses around young adult cancer I criticized in chapter 2, which 
concluded that their poorer outcomes are disproportionately due to patient procrastination and non-compliance. We 
can see here how the ideology of young adulthood within oncology may enter into a medical Cartesianist 
framework, emphasizing personal responsibility despite maintaining ‘amoral’ or ‘arbitrary’ origins of disease. 
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her of being a smoker, which answered their questions about her lung cancer but did not satisfy 
her. Medical discourses may not always keep causality removed from patients’ personal and 
social lives, and when they don’t, they tend to emphasize personal responsibility.  
Thus, the young adults toed the line between moral order and disorder, with their 
overdetermined origin stories and persistent existential questions. “The central moral quest,” 
noted Hyden (1995), is not necessarily to assign responsibility to one’s illness, but to “find out to 
what extent the illness event is a result of the kind of life the person has led” (p. 82; my 
emphasis). Moral explorations, as I have described them, do not definitively make moral sense of 
cancer and may be regularly characterized by multiplicity, uncertainty and impermanence (see 
Figure J4). We shall see below that these ambiguous moral meanings have important 
implications for the young adults’ ideal moral lives.   
C) Moments of Moral Living 
Overview: Ethical Directives toward Moral Lives  
 With overdetermined etiologies often comes an array of reconciliatory models for undoing 
or resolving moral suffering. These may be seen as ethical directives for living “moral lives” 
(Kleinman, 2006), or as answers to existential questions about where am I going? Though there 
may be innumerable cultural discourses around what constitutes a ‘moral life,’ I want to confine 
my analyses to what Shweder (1997) called the “Big Three” that are most common throughout 
the globe: ethics of divinity, ethics of community, and ethics of autonomy (p. 138).  
 An ethics of divinity constructs morality in terms of “regulative concepts such as sacred 
order, natural order, tradition, sanctity, sin, and pollution” (p. 138). Seldom did the young adults 
make strong references to moral lives involving divinity or the sacred. They spoke of needing 
“faith,” “prayer” and “God” to get through their illnesses and back onto personally meaningful 
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life paths. For instance, Martha spoke of her Catholicism as a guiding light to dealing with her 
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma: “my faith gave me a context to understand my mortality.” The phrase 
“everything happens for a reason” was often appended to statements about what was ‘learned’ 
from cancer that could be put into everyday being-in-the-world, like how to be “grateful,” 
“thankful,” or have “appreciation” for each day.  Some talked—in a more subtle way—about 
being “blessed,” suggesting they were ‘given’ certain tools, people, and circumstances that 
would protect them and ease their pursuit of moral lives.  
Within an ethics of community, emphasis is often placed on the “moral integrity of the 
various stations or roles” that are of importance to one’s local social world (Shweder, p. 138). 
Duties to others and membership obligations take front and centre.  About half of participants 
constructed their moral lives as communal responsibilities, emphasizing their desires to 
“contribute” in some way to society, being more concerned about the well-being of “others” 
(e.g., other patients, friends, or families), and placing “connection” or “family” first above all 
other obligations. They talked about wanting to be a “good example”—embodying heroic figures 
that inspire others who are in crisis—and of feeling they have more “empathy,” “compassion,” 
“patience,” and “appreciation” for the people around them as a result of living through cancer. In 
these moments of communal ethics, moral lives centred on alleviating suffering in local (and 
global) social worlds.  
In an ethics of autonomy, according to Shweder, directives are usually aimed at 
maintaining individual freedom and asserting personal responsibility, protection of one’s rights 
and from harm, and care for the self (however defined). Within these discourses, a major 
instruction is “to promote the exercise of individual will in the pursuit of personal preferences” 
and “the point of moral regulation is to increase choice and personal liberty” (Shweder, p. 138). 
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The young adults’ narratives had far more moments of self-oriented ethics than any other ethical 
discourse. Most of the time moral lives were constructed around perspectival changes, such as 
seeing the world with a “new set of glasses,” finding “light” or gaining “perspective” on 
suffering, acquiring a different, usually more “positive,” “outlook” on life, and so on. Typically, 
having cancer was talked about as an edifying experience, “teaching” people to “make the best of 
it,” “live for the day” or “live life to the fullest,” see “life as a gift” or “treasure,” “focus on what 
you have,” see recovery from cancer as a “second chance,” “reevaluate priorities” in search of 
“what matters,” and many other succinct prescriptions.  
 Many of the directives toward autonomy encouraged preparatory action for future life 
disruptions. These moments included suggestions to “deal with each day” as it comes, to “take 
control” of one’s care and advocacy, “grieve and move on” from past suffering, “take care” of 
oneself, and “prepare” for unexpected challenges (e.g., save up for financial security). The oldest 
of the interviewees, Johnny, made a similarly practical suggestion for living with cancer: “Be 
aware of what’s next and what’s plan B, what’s plan C, you know? Cause you know what plan D 
is...The funeral.” In talking about how to live with breast cancer, Beth drew up the poem 
“Advice to my son” by Peter Meinke (2001), which, according to her, insisted on preparing for a 
future that may or may not happen. She said:  
 Sure live in the short, like live every day like it’s your last but for goodness sakes plant  
 vegetables, because chances are you’re gonna survive, you know. And don’t just drink 
 wine,  you know, have bread too because you can’t just live on beauty, like you have to 
 sustain  yourself, you have to, you have to make sure that you think long term while you’re 
 enjoying every day.!
  
Beth was arguing for what could be called a more active mode of care, inviting people with 
cancer to take charge of their own recoveries. These ethics of autonomy seemed, for the most 
part, to encourage individual responsibility for illness and its moral struggles, in a way repeating 
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dominant discourses about independence and personal culpability, as discussed in chapters 2 and 
5 in relation to young adult oncology and narrative identity (see e.g., McAdams, 2013; 
McGoldrick et al., 2011). In sum, the imperative of self-authoring one’s life, including one’s 
responses to disruption, seems to operate within an ethics of autonomy.  
Each of the three aforementioned ethics tend to assume the existence of certain cultural 
entities (i.e., gods, social collectives, or selves, respectively), for whom one must care in order to 
achieve moral living. Within the young adults’ narratives, these assumptions were sometimes 
doubted or criticized. Instead of living for God, another person, or oneself, existential questions 
about how to live and who to live for were not quite answered. A fair minority of young adults 
said they “try not to think about” their cancer or what it meant for the rest of their lives; they felt 
“very lucky” to still be alive, but admitted that they “can’t predict or control much” of the future, 
seeing that there are “no guarantees” that any moral action will assure a better or longer life. 
They believed that “life sucks” and there is “no reason” to their suffering, that their cancers 
“won’t ever go away” or “can come back anytime” and “quickly.”  
In these moments of ethical uncertainty, it became quite a task to affirm some moral 
standards for living. When we look at specific narratives we often see subjunctive moments 
exploring multiple moral lives—lives with oneself, lives with others, and lives with the great 
beyond (i.e., fate, God, and the unknown); in Jeanine’s and George’s cases, ethics of autonomy 
and ethics of community were in frequent dialogue. Between these different paths is an implicit 
recognition that any moral life may be pointless, mistaken, or foreclosed, for past paths have not 
always turned out well and it can never be known what lies ahead.  
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1. Jeanine’s Moral Lives: Caring for Oneself before Others 
 Jeanine concluded that cancer can “hit anybody, everybody,” that there are “so many 
different faces to cancer” the disease seems to hold little rhyme or reason, including her personal 
causal ontologies. In the face of this unpredictability, she held herself primarily accountable for 
the effectiveness of her treatment. She spoke of wanting to take charge of her own care, making 
more meticulous decisions. She said, “the best I can do for myself is take action and 
responsibility for the decisions I am going to make for my future treatment.”  This dictum came 
out of the history of treatment choices she later regretted. She said her moral involvement in 
cancer was to become an authority on her care and a source of knowledge about her body. There 
is a current of reconciliation under the following statement: “while I maybe didn’t make the right 
decisions, I am going to take those decisions and make them right.” 
 Note that for Jeanine the past was couched in terms of moral decline—she says she did not 
make the “right decisions” before—while the future was positioned as moral resolution—she 
will “make them right.” Many young adults’ moral quests expressed these hindsights, implying 
that past illness and suffering could have been prevented, and future suffering may be avoided 
with certain life adjustments. In the following statement, Jeanine indicated what adjustments 
would lead her to a more moral life:!
I wouldn’t say that it has made me want to go sky diving, or live life to the fullest – take  
that ‘carpe diem’ approach everyone describes. Cancer has more just made me appreciate  
the small moments I have in my life like getting to spend time with my daughter, and  
family and friends, and brought me to a place where I can slow down the fast paced, people  
pleaser life I previously lived, and live a little more for myself. 
 
 Beyond her treatment decisions, Jeanine saw for herself a more general program of self-care in 
order to heal her emotional wounds and protect against future suffering. She rejected what she 
saw as a cliché “everyone” uses to refer to the life not taken for granted. Some moral quests, she 
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reminds us, are traveled without leaving home, as people come to “appreciate” what is in their 
lives already. Furthermore, she says, “[I’m] wanting to live my life differently…I don’t want to 
waste my time not being happy because I don’t feel I have a lot of time to waste not being 
happy.” “Being happy” means “follow[ing] my own expectations,” “enjoy[ing] the time I have 
with friends” and maintaining “healthy and positive” relationships with others (i.e., not getting 
into situations of abuse).  
 We can see a strong reference to both ethics of autonomy and community in Jeanine’s 
moments of moral living. She saw her ideal “place” in the world as an advocate and supporter of 
others, but could not achieve that moral life quite yet: “My role in life was to take this experience 
of having cancer, was to turn it into something to help other people…but I need to care for 
myself first.” The emotional distress Jeanine said she experienced in her former relationship as 
well as during her cancer treatment seemed to be on-going, a daunting relic of her “survival” 
phase that she had only begun to address. She wanted to get involved in care for other cancer 
patients, but had to put it on the “back burner” because her own needs had not yet been provided 
for. In a sense, for Jeanine an ethics of autonomy may enable an ethics of community—one 
moral life may open the door to another.  
2. George’s Moral Lives: Individual and Collective Change 
 George had his own moments of ethical uncertainty, recognizing that “I’m going to be 
limited” in abilities in the future: “I’m not going to pretend I’m like perfectly healthy…that’s 
‘mental gymnastics.’” His cancer returned after an extended period of remission, which George’s 
doctors believed “doesn’t ever happen in that length of time apparently.” His rare circumstances 
notwithstanding, he felt that cancer is not a thing of the past and will be with him (in memory, in 
side effects, perhaps in relapse) for the rest of his life. 
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Though doubtful that he would be rid of cancer no matter what he did, he echoed some of 
Jeanine’s feelings around “fast paced” life and its trappings. He recalled feeling the “pressure, 
responsibility and time commitment” of having a “high-paying job.” After living with cancer, 
which likely slowed down his career life and chilled his rise in income, he described moving 
away from these goals. He had become, in his words, more drawn to “real problems” in the 
world, having to do with the social inequities and environmental injustices to which he traced his 
cancer.  
 George spoke of his cancer as a “sign” not only that he personally needed to change his 
lifestyle, but also that the world around him needed changing. In terms of the former, one of the 
most salient issues for him was his perspective. By this he appeared to mean that he did not want 
to see cancer and its treatment as a “war” or battle. He said this frame of mind might get people 
caught up in notions of winning, of overcoming cancer, and leaving it behind. By contrast, 
chronic diseases like cancer can be unfazed by aggressive attempts to destroy them, can come 
back several times, or can leave lifelong scars and crippled bodies. Underlying these statements 
George seemed to be asking, what chance do people have of conquering such adversaries?  
George argued that cancer should instead be seen as a “journey,” not a “fight,” one in 
which patients meet “fellow travelers” and other kind souls along the way (see chapter 4 for 
more elaborate distinctions between these two tropes). For himself, this shift in metaphor 
allowed him to “embrace” his cancer: “If you were going to get it anyway, and you embrace it 
and the lessons you learn  from it, I mean, it teaches you a lot about what’s important in life.” He 
described acquiring a sense of “calm” from taking on this attitude of ‘listening’ to cancer. He had 
also become, as he says, “pretty fond of who I am now.”  
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 For George, ‘embracing’ his cancer meant an ethical practice of evaluating what may be 
gleaned from harmful suffering. Thinking of Lance Armstrong’s claims about being grateful for 
having cancer, he says, “If you had to choose to not have cancer, you would. Don’t be an idiot.” 
Following along his pedagogical metaphor, I might say: people would be better off if they did 
not have to go to a class on life disruption, but for those who are already in session they might as 
well take notes.   
 Given his concern for local and global worlds, George believed also in an ethics of 
community: addressing “social determinants of health,” creating “community cooperatives,” 
cleaning up “toxic environments,” reducing “economic disparities,” and so on. Moral living for 
George meant a modified social structure within which people acted more cooperatively 
together, and were more attentive to the “linkages with everything.” Though he understood 
moral life on a conceptual level, he struggled to “operationalize” his roles and objectives within 
such collective actions. He admitted feeling too “tired” and lacking “more discipline” to actually 
engage in advocacy work: “I know these things, I just haven’t done them yet.” He indicated that 
he wanted to “make a difference” and “to be useful” to others, but he needed “clarifying” of what 
he could do.  !George’s difficulties in identifying a concrete plan for a future moral life ring true of many 
other young adults’ ethical directives. Their existential questions about life purpose continued for 
years after treatment and into their interviews. Their moral quests did not necessarily route back 
to where it began in a complete circle, but instead continued indefinitely into the open horizon. 
That future work needed to be done, from their perspectives, precluded a neat resolution to their 
moral struggles.  
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Conclusion: The Limits of Remoralization 
It seems that, like etiological models of causal ontologies, reconciliatory models in the 
young adults’ narratives may also be overdetermined, coexisting within their moral quests (see 
Figure J5). We may suggest from these observations that remoralization, that is, re-positioning  
suffering within moral terms, is an on-going and unstable process of interpreting pasts, presents, 
and futures; remoralization sometimes may be desired as people seek order and direction, while 
at other times may be resisted or disrupted when people sense the potential uncertainty and 
futility of moral living. Exploring multiple ethical directives may open up a variety of moral 
lives for young adults, enabling pursuit and critique of different hopes and futures.  
 These propositions rub against more familiar, and more prescriptive, understandings of 
moral quests that seem to fuel the imperatives of narrative coherence and self-authorship. 
According to Arthur Frank (1995), for example, a quest narrative “recognizes ill people as 
responsible moral agents whose primary action is witness; its stories are necessary to restore the 
moral agency that other stories sacrifice” (p. 134). In this conception of quests, not only is 
remoralization asserted as a necessity to witnessing suffering, but also an ethics of autonomy is 
thrust onto narrators through Frank’s assertions of personal “responsibility” and “moral agency.” 
Other critical assessments of moralized illness narratives seem to prefer remoralization as 
well. Shweder (1997), for example, defended moralizing discourses that attribute personal 
responsibility to illness because they give people direction in how to address and heal their 
suffering (p. 160-165). He suggested that moral discourses of illness are preferable to discourses 
in which illness is portrayed as “chance” or an “accident” (p. 160). In fact, he had some harsh 
words for attempts to minimize responsibility and blame within biomedical discourses: 
 Suffering is decontextualized and separated from the narrative structure of human life. It  
is viewed as a kind of ‘noise,’ an accidental interference with the life drama of the  sufferer.  
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It is as though suffering had no intelligible relation to any plot, except as a  chaotic  
interruption. This image of suffering is most congruent with a theodicy that  asserts that  
suffering is and must remain a mystery because it has no existential meaning  or purpose  
(p. 159). 
 
Shweder suggested that these discourses, which seem to express medical Cartesianism, can steal 
away hope, value, and focus from people’s stories of illness, and are inadequate to the 
remoralizing task of portaying illness “as a meaningful intervention in an intended course of 
action” (p. 161). Arthur Kleinman (1988) agreed that biomedicine may take away moral 
considerations and “cannot provide” for the “need to make moral sense of” patients’ existential 
concerns (p. 20, 29). We can see here a dominant academic discourse in favour of reconstructing 
moral orders in the midst of crisis.  
If, as I have shown, moral quests only sometimes lead to affirmations of certain moral 
orders, and the whole process has only a “provisional ending” (Hyden, 1995, p. 72), then how 
can we justifiably make it an imperative?  I do not believe we can. Remoralization is not 
inherently beneficial, but can sometimes be dangerous, encouraging stigmatization, deceptive 
myths, victim-blaming, and related forms of distress among patients. Sometimes a moral stance 
is not possible or, more often, not desired; recall that some of the young adults themselves 
cultivated Cartesian views of disease. In their challenges to and doubts about causal ontologies, 
many of my participants sometimes went against remoralization. In these moments of meaning 
their moral quests were put on hiatus or steeped in mystery, and I would disagree with Shweder 
that mystery plots are all bad. Destabilizing or deviating from remoralized accounts of illness can 
be an empowering form of resistance, when moral orders seem oppressive and suffocating in 
their assignments of blame.  
Sometimes the above narrative scholars recognize the limits to remoralization, and I want 
to draw attention to these admissions. Frank’s (1995) chaotic narratives, for instance, may 
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exemplify stories that are somewhat lacking in moral orders, and on his own accord he pleaded 
for an “enhanced tolerance for chaos as a part of a life story” (p. 111). Shweder (1997) also 
admitted, rightfully so, that, “It is probably advisable to avoid a dogmatic preference for any one 
discourse of health, suffering, and well-being” (p. 165), even while he flagged his own 
preferences. Kleinman (1988) also noted that one way to transform or transcend one’s illness 
experience is to realize the “chaotic” and “capricious” aspects of life (p. 55). In a later book, he 
referred to any discourse asserting orderliness to suffering as a “big lie,” a reckless “denial of 
existential vulnerability and limits,” and ultimately a damaging ideology (Kleinman, 2006, p. 7).  
Perhaps making moral sense of illness is not the sole task of moral explorations. Moments 
of possibly absurd or uncertain realities are important and frequent productions within people’s 
narratives. It may be that, as best put by Kleinmen (2006), “when the denial [of chaos] becomes 
so complete that we live under what amounts to a tyranny of not seeing and not speaking the 
existential truth, it becomes dangerous itself” (p. 8). There is a truth to mysteries and chaotic 
narratives as well, to moments of meaning lacking moral certainties, as they speak of the dangers 
of moralizing what very well could be arbitrary suffering.!
Chapter Conclusion: Critical Witnessing of Moral Quests 
 Moral quests sometimes remoralize people’s lives, placing them into larger contexts of 
causal ontologies. So far we have looked at the significance and limits of remoralization; 
underlying my conclusions is an important ethical issue, requiring a shift of attentions from 
narrators to their audiences8. Philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1988) once noted that reading or 
listening to a narrative “turns up as an interruption in the course of action and as a new impetus 
to action” (p. 179); in other words, stories of suffering may instigate reflection among audiences !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Although social scientists were the main intended audiences of the narratives, the participants said they hoped their 
stories would reach other audiences as well, including other cancer patients, their significant others, care providers, 
and the general public. 
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on their own moral experiences and lives, affecting their meanings and actions. Given the wide 
range of causal ontologies and ethical directives constructed in the young adults’ narratives, 
audiences inevitably come into contact with contradictory moments of meaning. How, then, do 
they proceed? What do they do with conflicting stories of suffering that strive to instill them with 
an “impetus to action?” 
There is a wide spectrum of ways to ‘receive’ illness narratives among academic 
audiences. We may plot these different responses along a continuum between what Paul Ricoeur 
(1976) called “appropriation” and “distanciation” (p. 43). Some camps lean more toward the 
former, prescribing audiences to listen empathically and to appropriate the ‘lessons’ of illness 
narratives into our understanding. Arthur Frank (1995) seemed to advocate this approach, 
claiming that audiences have a “moral duty” to bear “witness” to and become recipients of 
others’ causal ontologies; in other words, seeing patients’ moral lives as possible ideals for 
themselves (p. 128). Unlike his imperative for narrators, his expectations of audiences are 
heavily anchored in an ethics of community, where their responsibilities are to ‘honour’ the 
stories—and their possible causal ontologies—of others.  
Frank and others encourage audiences to be “witnesses” to stories of suffering, for they 
believe illness narratives speak the narrator’s personal truths and need to be recognized and 
legitimated (e.g., Charon, 2006, p. 53; Frank, 1995, p. xii-xiii; Kleinman, 1988, p. 10). This 
ethics is founded upon a reader response theory of narrative as testimony: “The moral genius of 
storytelling is that each, teller and listener, enters the space of the story for the other…Thus all 
stories have an element of testimony” (Frank, 1995, p. 18; original text). There is an alleged 
therapeutic effect to taking on the role of witness: “people can only be helped out when those 
who care are first willing to become witnesses to the story” (Frank, p. 110).  
! 305 
 For other camps of reading, maintaining some critical distance from illness narratives 
serves a very different imperative, namely, to challenge base generalizations and unjust moral 
claims, for they may perpetuate suffering in spite of offering instructions against suffering (e.g., 
Good, 1994, p. 56-62; Jureric, 2012, p. 3-16). Literary theorist Anne Jureric (2012) saw an 
undergirding assumption to this approach: “we need critics in order to understand how 
ideological constraints transform sympathetic readings of others’ suffering into acts of 
complicity with the systems that produce that suffering” (p. 14). Distance, it is believed, prevents 
audiences from being sucked into an ideological world explaining suffering in moralized terms—
just as Voltaire’s poem at the beginning of the chapter pleaded ‘witnesses’ of the Lisbon 
earthquake to step away from prevailing theodicies. 
According to these ethics of critique, honouring moralized stories may actually turn a blind 
eye to oppressive dogmas. For instance, sympathizing with distress caused by an arm amputation 
may implicitly support dominant ideologies that construct amputation as a form of deficiency: 
cultural expectations of productivity and efficiency in work ethics; ableist ideas about bodily 
integrity equaling personhood; dominant aesthetical judgments about what constitutes beauty or 
other ideal body types; and so on. By criticizing these cultural biases, and how they are evoked 
in the narratives of people who suffer from them, we are participating in a larger, socially 
transformative project of breaking down oppressive ideologies. By extension, moments of 
meaning that do not seem to remoralize illness or espouse particular causal ontologies may be 
praised as resistance to burdensome and pejorative moral discourses.  
 How do we proceed in the face of these competing imperatives? Perhaps a conversation is 
possible between them through what could be called critical witnessing, an ethical practice of 
recognizing a multitude of moral quests that take off in different directions and arrive at an array 
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of ‘provisional endings.’ Recall in chapter 3 that my response to the ‘crisis in illness 
representation’ was to use a dialogical methodology—critical phenomenology—that maintains a 
conversation between multiple distanciating and appropriating perspectives. ‘Critical witnessing’ 
could be seen as an extension of that practice into ethical disputes over moralization, admitting 
that while remoralization may sometimes provide hope and direction, its absence may also 
sometimes alleviate moral pressures and social judgments.  
While our participants may promote an objective, moral realism in their stories, we may 
need to maintain a moral relativism in our reception of their stories (Shweder, 1997), meaning 
each moral claim is situated within local contexts of personal desires and intersubjective 
meanings, with a more or less internal logic to it and some insight into human experience, but 
not necessarily possessing any external logic beyond it. In Shweder’s (1997) words, a certain 
“casuistic flexibility” is required of professional listeners in order to attain “a general awareness 
of possibilities for expanding our discourses of health and responsibility” (p. 165).  
 I demonstrated the practice of critical witnessing throughout this chapter. On the one hand, 
I placed the young adults’ moral quests within their personal life histories and in relation to 
dominant causal ontologies. In a sense, I attempted to take their journeys with them, paying just 
as much attention to moments of questioning, exploration, and uncertainty as to seemingly 
certain moral meanings about life during illness. These interpretive practices enabled some 
appreciation of where the young adults’ (resistance to) remoralization came from. On the other 
hand, my encounters with local meanings and subjunctivity opened a certain distance from them, 
seeing in them expressions of circumstances that are not universal and cannot be extended to 
other young adults with cancer. This distance exposed remoralization as an overgeneralized 
imperative sometimes operating on people who are ill and those who listen to them, leading me 
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to challenge some basic assumptions about moral quests on the basis that moral order is not 
always at stake in people’s stories. In this way, we can see that appropriation and distanciation 
may build upon one another, that, in Ricoeur’s (1986) words, “we can no longer oppose 
hermeneutics” as the avenue toward witnessing and “the critique of ideology” (p. 88).. 
 By focusing on local contexts and multiplicity does not mean we forsake any attempts at 
generalization; what it means is being extra-sensitive to the specificity of stories, finding the 
limits of the worlds they construct, before working our way to their broader appeal and relevance 
to others. Moral discourses need not be met with an ‘either/or’ attitude, either witness or dismiss 
them; through an ethical practice of dialogue room may be made for a wide spectrum of stories 
to be heard, shared and validated but not generalized beyond the circumstances of their 
production.  !
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION           
 
The Polysemantics of Illness Narratives: Living with Complexities and Chronicities  
My research began by critically evaluating much of the previous research literature on 
young adult cancer; not simply a literature review, this evaluation was defined predominantly by 
a “hermeneutics of suspicion” (Ricoeur, 1970), intended to create a critical distance between 
some of the most basic assumptions held within certain dominant discourses and, correlatively, 
open doorways to alternative ways of thinking and listening to stories of cancer. Inspired by 
Kairol Rosenthal’s book on young adult cancer, Everything changes (2009), my primary 
objective was to reveal multiplicity of meanings and ways of being that I did not find represented 
in the discourses.  
My analytic chapters brought forth the “polysemanticism” (Ricoeur, 1984) of illness 
narratives, the power and flexibility of individual stories to signify a plurality of existential and 
biographical challenges. I begin this chapter by summarizing these diverse symbols of lived 
experiences. The next step is to elevate my findings into discussion of some derived implications 
of this study. Finally, I would be naïve if I did not direct my hermeneutics of suspicion inward; I 
end my dissertation by noting some of the limitations of the research and proposing what may be 
done in the future to further our understanding of cancer in young adult lives. 
Summary of Findings 
I tried to embody in this dissertation the complexities that I saw in the young adults’ 
narratives. I covered a lot of ground in not a short span of pages, striving to achieve a critical 
phenomenology of what Rita Charon (2006) perceived as clinically relevant features of illness 
narratives: time, frames/forms, characters, ethics, and teller-listener relationships (p. 40). I 
 ! 309 
modified these categories into narrative genres (ch.4), identities (ch.5), and moralities (ch.6). Let 
me briefly resurrect the liveliness of meaning and being within the young adult cancer narratives.  
In chapter 4, I showed that the young adults shaped or formed their narratives in dialogue 
with, on the one hand, prototypical plots they had encountered in their lives and, on the other 
hand, their own personal purposes for telling their stories. Most frequently in their narratives 
they expressed moments of sojourning, describing physical journeys to the hospital, mental tours 
of personal and social expectations, banishments from life as it was previously known, and 
travels into the land of the dead. Second most common were moments of healing, whether from 
medical interventions, serendipitous circumstances, or self-transformations. Moments of fighting 
emerged less often than I had expected, but they were still quite noticeable, speaking to battles 
with cancer itself, political struggles with people who seemed to get in the way of recoveries, and 
athletic obstacles toward self-transcendence.  
Two other, less known narrative forms also emerged from my reading of the young 
adults’ stories. Moments of inspecting included stories of mysterious symptoms, criminal plots to 
rob or kill protagonists, and breached borders between selves and enemies. Finally, moments of 
disordering produced chaotic narratives that exposed lapses of meaning and coherence in the 
young adults’ stories. The array of narrative forms, as well as their many ‘enabling’ and 
‘disabling’ effects (e.g., emotional, hermeneutical, relational, and practical), suggests a plethora 
of ways and purposes to express illness experiences, more than is recognized in the relative 
emphasis on narrative coherence in dominant discourses of young adult cancer. We may 
conclude from this analysis that while attending to the inspirations of prototypical plots helps to 
contextualize illness narratives, our understanding depends on seeing how they are innovatively 
negotiated within individual stories for personal purposes. 
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In chapter 5, I discussed the multiplicity of narrative identities performed in the young 
adults’ narratives. Fundamental to this diversity is the notion of liminality, a narrative process of 
shedding old selves, living in-between different selves, and sometimes acquiring new selves. The 
identities at stake related to cultural ‘myths’ around illness and young adult development. Within 
the various moments of meaning from chapter 4 were expressed moments of (non)being: in less 
liminal moments of being the young adults emplotted themselves as survivors, patients, warriors, 
detectives, and advocates, and in more liminal moments of non-being they emplotted themselves 
as victims, exiles, self- or co-healers, phoenixes, and tricksters. Sometimes the latter were 
emphasized or even favoured, suggesting that identity ‘consummation’—often expected to 
follow liminal experiences like cancer treatment—is not always possible or, more importantly, 
not even desired while living with a chronic illness. Looking to myth, it seems, may illuminate 
how people interpret themselves during periods of crisis.  
I also supplied additional contexts to the young adults’ narratives, highlighting different 
forms of intersubjectivity that co-constructed their moments of meaning and (non)being. I 
studied the varying negotiations with others, both more “peaceable” and more “hegemonic” 
interactions (Crotty, 2003) between involved horizons of expectations. Clinical relationships 
contained moments of mutual and of disputed therapeutic emplotments, while the young adults’ 
local worlds were sometimes inclusive and other times alienating. Cancer patient communities 
often filled the gaps created by this alienation, taking in individuals who felt lost and isolated. 
Nevertheless, created under the pretence that young adult cancer is ‘distinct,’ these communities 
risked becoming ideological and divisive by glossing over diversity within them and minimizing 
similarities outside of them. These different intersubjectivities were threaded into the young 
adults’ narratives, essential to their composition and difficult to tease out from the young adults’ 
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own voices. I made the case that before we make conclusions about the young adults’ 
perceptions of their cancers or themselves, we need to consider how the people within their 
stories may be writing in their perceptions as well. 
With regard to developmental identities, the young adults engaged with some cultural 
tasks of adulthood—such as health, independence, marriage, children, property ownership and a 
stable career—tasks that are built upon assumptions that generativity is inherently linked to 
narrative coherence and self-authorship. Some of these milestones were foreclosed to the young 
adults and some were not wanted, even before cancer. The narratives seemed to wrestle with 
developmental identities in order to determine which were both possible and practical, often 
requiring revaluation and renegotiation of dominant meanings of generativity. This shift suggests 
we must rethink our concepts of development, identifying less with markers of ‘achievement’ 
and more with changing participation in social life, such as contributing critical voices to 
dominant discourses and the practices they encourage. I proposed that, instead of looking for 
‘grand’ identities that presuppose narrative order or self-authorship, it may be more informative 
to study the diverse and critical identities that occur in temporary moments of illness narratives. 
In chapter 6, I took into account issues of morality. Often told as journeys or moral 
quests, these moments of meaning reasoned through dominant causal ontologies of suffering. 
Often initiating their moral quests were moments of existential questioning, during which they 
expressed feeling lost and confused about who and where they were in life. These moments came 
at unpredictable times, sometimes in the midst of treatment, sometimes well into post-treatment. 
The young adults spoke also of departing upon moments of moral explorations where they 
traversed multiple platforms for emplotting their experiences, sometimes arriving at provisional 
endings about where their cancers came from. They entertained a number of different causal 
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ontologies, rooting cancer variously in the interpretive frameworks of biomedicine, interpersonal 
relations, socio-political conflicts, environmental stresses, rational determinism, psychosomatic 
mechanisms, and absurdity.  
During moments of moral living, their explorations turned toward possible futures, and 
engaged with ethical directives for coming out of their suffering. These directives were most 
often framed in terms of personal autonomy, communal responsibility, and (much less so) divine 
obligations. Across the different moments of meaning reflecting on the past and the future, the 
young adults constructed overdetermined positions on the morality of cancer. At times they were 
resistant to moral explanations, and other times frustrated by explanations not explicitly moral. 
This diversity makes it difficult to follow through with the ethical imperatives often placed on 
audiences of illness narratives, for how do we witness contradictory ‘truths’ at the same time? 
My answer to this question was that critical witnessing, a dialogue between distancing from and 
appropriating moral meanings, may enable audiences to situate young adults’ stories within local 
personal and social contexts, thereby recognizing (resistance to) local moral orders without 
extending those orders into the lives of others. 
The recurring motif of my analyses was that the ideological construction of young 
adulthood meets its limits in the realities of young adult cancer, whether we’re looking at the 
construction of meanings, selves, or moralities. Thus concluded my critical phenomenological 
analysis of the young adults’ narratives. What may we derive from these findings? What may we 
say more generally about young adult cancer or, indeed, cancer across the ages? Let us enter into 
discussion of the broader implications of this study. 
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Implications in Research and Healthcare 
Throughout this dissertation, I tried to juggle recognition of young adults’ performances 
of meaning and (non)being with critical evaluation of their stories’ social implications. Above 
all, I tried to avoid essentialist language that would reduce the stories I heard to immobile genres, 
identities, and moral positions. Nor did I wish to talk in the mechanical language of psychosocial 
‘adjustment,’ as though all that was at stake for them was adapting to life disruptions. 
Adjustment is an outcome of particular interest in some oncological discourses inside and out of 
young adult cancer (see e.g., Cella and Tross, 1986; Mumma, Mashberg, and Lesko, 1992; 
Roberts, Piper, Denny, and Cuddeback, 1997; Vickberg et al., 2001). However, as anthropologist 
Michael Jackson (2005) wrote, “human wellbeing involves far more than simple adjustment to a 
given environment, natural or cultural; it involves endless experimentation in how the given 
world can be lived decisively, on one’s own terms” (p. xii). Sometimes the most convenient 
routes, the most readily available plots, the most coherent answers, were not seized upon; 
sometimes the young adults’ main desires were not to hastily return to ‘normal,’ but to push the 
boundaries of what they considered a meaningful life—what we may see as efforts to expand 
social spaces of experiences and horizons of expectation.  
Taking language as the illumination of what is at stake during illness and, in turn, the 
basis of diverse meanings and identities, I interpreted complexities to the young adults’ 
metaphors and narratives that were admittedly overwhelming at first. I cannot even assure 
readers I’ve done justice to the rich, wide ranging moments of meaning and (non)being, but I 
believe I have laboured enough to make the case that there is “endless experimentation” in how 
the given worlds of young adults who have cancer “can be lived decisively.” Below I outline 
three major implications to the analyses I conducted in my research, namely, that negotiations of 
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meaning and being in contexts of cancer narratives are incredibly complex, under chronic 
revision, and in need of critical witnessing. These suggestions are all made with the hope of 
cultvating sensitivity in how language is used to emplot suffering and pursue healing. 
1. The Complexities of Living with Cancer 
First of all, as reviewed above, the existential and biographical challenges of young adult 
cancer are manifold and complicated. Through innovation and desire, each story modifies 
sedimented meanings and myths into personally relevant emplotments of experience. Very few 
of the reviewed studies of young adult cancer represent their participants in this way, tending 
instead to essentialize them, portray them without contextual considerations, leaving readers to 
infer they are void of history or culture. Ideological readings of cancer and young adulthood 
helps us to talk about shared experiences and concerns, but they conceal local purposes and 
contexts under their more simplistic representations. One of my explicit purposes was to shake 
the pillars of narrative coherence and self-authorship, and I believe I succeeded in showing that 
integration of experiences and selves were but two among many other stakes, including critiques 
of order, subversion of expectations, expressing chaos and mystery, displacing blame, and so on.  
In addition, cancer survivorship was but one of a plethora of coexisting lives to which they were 
tied. At various times they also narrated themselves as ‘normal’ twentysomethings; as part of a 
family of spouses, parents, and/or children; as students or workers participating in career 
development; and so on. Many of the participants said that cancer may be a continual part of 
their existence but it did not consume the whole of it. This should serve as a reminder to health 
researchers that for people who are ill there is much more at stake and much more to their life-
worlds than simply coping with the travails of disease (Kleinman, 1988). 
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It is likely, furthermore, that the discourses discussed may reach beyond just young adults 
with cancer. Some narrative environments overlap across pediatric, young adult, and older adult 
cancers. I would say, for example, that narratives of battle and recovery, and the identities they 
tend to construct, span all ages as a more general mode of oncological discourse. Such crossover 
patterns may pertain to gender as well; though specific cancers can affect gendered forms of 
meaning and being—such as when cervical or testicular cancers threatened maternal and paternal 
identities, respectively—the men and women in the study seemed to share many of the narrative 
forms (e.g., moments of fighting and sojourning), developmental concerns (e.g., with regard to 
career and health), and moral meanings (e.g., the languages of biomedicine and environmental 
stress). In this way, across age and gender, participants often contended with and operated under 
similar symbolic systems of meaning.  
2. The Chronicities of Existential and Biographical Challenges 
A second major implication to my work is that issues of meaning, being, and morality in 
the face of chronic illness can be indefinite, possibly life-long endeavours. Recall that liminality 
typically continued years beyond treatment, whether it was sanctioned or unsanctioned by 
people’s local social worlds. This may not even be limited to experiences of chronic illness, as 
we consider more widespread young adult experiences as moratoria. The applicability may go 
even further, as researchers of aging Randall and McKim (2008) wrote, “Right up to our death, 
we can continue remembering, reinterpreting, and reading our lives, and thus reworking our 
identity” (p. 62). That reading oneself continues throughout life may be another reason my 
conclusions extend beyond young adults. Narrative disruptions and reconstructions possibly 
never come to an end, less so for people dealing with long term effects, remissions, and relapses. 
Whether a person is 18 or 80, living with cancer can be a chronically liminal experience.   
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This conclusion is perhaps one of strongest indications that we should question the 
applicability of concepts of ‘adjustment,’ ‘return,’ or even ‘survivorship’ in contexts of cancer. 
Recall that the young adults’ moments of meaning and being were often tentative, temporary, 
and concurrent with alternative or contradictory moments. Words of certainty, including 
references to being cured, completing developmental tasks, or attaining narrative order and self-
authorship, do not seem to adequately represent the chronic experiences of cancer in young 
adulthood (or cancer in general). At the very least, they do not recognize the enabling effects—
the prospects for healing, empowerment, or self-understanding—offered by symbols of the 
unknowable (e.g., chaotic narratives, tricksterly identities, absurdist ontologies, etc.).  
I do not mean researchers of cancer narratives ought to dismiss expressions of recovery, 
order, and stasis. To do so would disenfranchise most of the people I interviewed and likely the 
majority of people living with cancer. Rather, I suggest that in our interpretations we should not 
take such expressions as the last word. We should temper our “willingness to listen” to the 
suffering of others with a “willingness to suspect” that life is as clear-cut and resolute as our 
language sometimes makes it appear (Ricoeur, 1970); hence, expanding Frank’s (1995) 
imperative to hear the truths of stories, I proposed a practice of ‘critical witnessing’ that 
minimizes the extent to which these truths apply on a more global scale. 
3. Critical Witnessing in Contexts of Care 
The third and final implication is the potential role critical witnessing may play in the 
helping professions as well. As demonstrated in chapter 5, those who work with cancer patients 
are involved in intersubjective negotiations of meaning and being. They read patients’ stories in 
search of “pathognomic signs” (Kleinman, 1988, p. 16) and, at least among my participants, they 
often read through a lens of suspicion; for instance, distrusting claims of physical suffering and 
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offering psychological ontologies in their place (see chapter 4). The chronicities of suffering and 
felt alienation can be exacerbated by such breakdowns in negotiation. Without sensitive readings 
of their distress, people have no home for their plethora of existential questions and catalogues of 
answers. The following implications are directed mainly toward my intended audiences of 
providers of healthcare and psychosocial support for young adults with cancer. 
The therapeutic adjunct of critical phenomenology, critical witnessing maintains a level 
of suspicion towards narratives of illness, but without disenfranchisement of patients’ desires, 
meanings, and praxes. We could say that critical witnessing entails three clinical practices, the 
first of which is a reduction of alienation by way of listening. Many of the young adults 
experienced a heightened sense of unhomelike being because they felt unable to converse with 
those around them; they were cast out due to the uncomfortable truths they signified simply by 
being younger persons with chronic illness. A practice rooted in psychotherapy but argued for 
elsewhere (see e.g., Charon, 2006; Frank, 1995; Kleinman, 1988), non-judgmental listening is 
tantamount to allowing the expression and eventual healing of distress—that includes the chaotic 
narratives that are so fringe within oncological discourses.  
The second practice is tracking the local therapeutics of meaning and (non)being, that is, 
their ties to dominant narrative forms, identities, and moral meanings along with the purposes 
they serve for individual patients. Providing support to people who are ill accomplishes little 
without having an idea of what is therapeutic to them, that is, the personal contexts of meaning 
and being (see e.g., Kleinman, 1988). This accomplishes a hermeneutics of understanding, while 
consideration of broader cultural and critical contexts (i.e., of internalized, resisted, and 
negotiated hegemonies of meaning and being) maintains a hermeneutics of suspicion as well 
(Ricoeur, 1970).  
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The third task is to utilize these empathic and suspicious readings to facilitate dialogue 
and negotiation toward “therapeutic emplotment” (Mattingly, 1998). Together these readings 
may situate people’s stories in such a way that their personal ‘truths’ can be honoured but not at 
the expense of ignoring their dangerous implications if writ large. Thus, again at the local level, a 
practice of critical witnessing facilitates negotiation by entertaining even the most suspicious 
meanings while at the same time noting their limitations (e.g., the slippery slope of 
remoralization toward victim blaming). To be sure, meaning and being are always contested—
there are simply too many competing intersubjective spaces to traverse—and no amount of 
negotiations will come to a resolution. But, perhaps within a ‘safe place’ to have ‘controversial’ 
conversations people may be able to explore possible ways of living with such tensions.  
I see this task as restricted by certain dominant discourses within oncology. In 
psychosocial oncology, therapeutic emplotment seems to be set within a deficit model of 
development, where narrated independence and coherence are idealized. In biomedical 
discourses of oncology, the stakes of young adult cancer have been similarly narrowed down to 
‘simply’ survival. Furthermore, reliance on statistical representations to interpret young adult 
cancer, which pitch it as relatively rare, can get in the way of picking up on signs of cancer 
within seemingly healthy bodies. Finally, medical Cartesianism can, with exceptions, create a rift 
between doctors’ and patients’ horizons of expectation as they may situate disease in quite 
different ways. These selective attentions may inhibit healthcare providers from understanding 
and working with the diverse array of people who may come under their care, in turn threatening 
the efficacy of their communication and the prospects of negotiating treatment protocols.  
Rita Charon (2006) argued, “a scientifically competent medicine alone cannot help a 
patient grapple with the loss of health and find meaning in illness and dying” (p. 3). Indeed, from 
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the perspectives of my participants, scientific knowledge of young adult cancer (including the 
psychosocial concerns seen to be most common to the age group) is very important but it can 
also impede clinical judgment and proper care because of its reductive representations. The 
implications above encourage an additional, complementary practice to reading young adults’ 
stories through the registers of developmentalist and biomedical discourses, namely, by taking a 
more phenomenological perspective. Charon situated this perspective within what she called a 
“narrative medicine,” based on the following premise: 
To know what patients endure at the hands of illness and therefore to be of clinical help 
requires that doctors enter the worlds of their patients, if only imaginatively, and to see 
and interpret these worlds from the patients’ point of view (p. 9).  
 
Entertaining patients’ horizons may minimize barriers to hearing their stories, seeing their 
interpretations of symptoms and disease, and negotiating a therapeutic plot that makes sense to 
them. It may also, on the other hand, cultivate critical evaluation of therapeutic emplotment, as 
“the reader categorizes, analyzes, measures up successes and failures, and deploys critical 
judgments” throughout the process of care (Charon, p. 112).  
 Other emerging healthcare discourses have also drawn attention to the life-world of 
patients. Discourses of “patient- and family-centered care” (see e.g., Dowling, Manthorpe, and 
Cowley, 2006; Feinberg, 2012) argue that patients’ distress and sense of alienation may be 
exacerbated if care teams do not integrate the “individual’s needs, goals, preferences, cultural 
traditions, family situation, and values” into care planning and implementation (Feinberg, p. 1). 
The principles of this approach parallel Charon’s above: respect and dignity for patients and their 
loved ones, caring for the “whole” person not just the ‘patient,’ attending to personal experiences 
and needs, and facilitating patient empowerment through dialogue and collaboration.  
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Whether under the banner of narrative medicine, phenomenological medicine, or person- 
and family-centred care, the quality of oncological care may be enhanced by deliberate attempts 
to negotiate the different horizons of expectation of those involved in care. I do not mean to say 
that the above practices are absent in the clinical work of medical and psychosocial oncologists. 
Indeed, Cheryl Mattingly’s (1998) research on therapeutic emplotment effectively demonstrated 
that it is a common (albeit implicit) activity between patients and their caregivers. My intention 
is to make these practices more explicit as essential elements to cancer care and, in turn, subject 
them to critical evaluation, self-reflective use, and improvement.  
My research adds to this narrative medicine by bringing into sharper focus some of the 
implicit (or latent) meanings and identities that are communicated in cancer patients’ stories. The 
moments of meaning and (non)being I have discussed could serve as anchoring points within the 
process of therapeutic emplotment; in particular, caregivers could use the visuals I have 
constructed as tentative interpretive frameworks for reading patients’ stories, perhaps helping 
caregivers to sort out what is at stake for them and how they may be counseled.  
I have laboured to show that a sense of narrative order and self-authorship are not always 
the main priorities among people who live with chronic illness, and the terms by which I open up 
the multitude of stakes in illness narratives may be used to interpret and respond appropriately to 
those stories. The many moments of meaning I explored could be used to identify the symbolism 
in patients’ stories and the potential frames by which healing and empowerment are emplotted. 
For example, moments of sojourning may accentuate personal self-reflection and perspective as 
necessary processes toward mending disruption, while moments of disordering may demand 
what Michael Ignatieff (1988) called an “ethic of ironic struggle” (p. 33), a resigned 
confrontation with the contingencies, absurdities, and mysteries of life during illness.  
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In a parallel way, caregivers may gain a sense of the extent to which self-authorship is 
important to their patients by how they construct agentivity; preferences for patient identities 
often suggest that agency is entrusted to those who are treating the disease, while use of warrior, 
advocate, or athlete identities tend to signify desires for personal control over one’s own healing. 
Caregivers may use knowledge of these different languages of self and the needs they represent 
to design a personally relevant course of treatment and support. Application of these 
representations need not pigeonhole patients’ narratives into essentialized plots or identities; 
therapeutic emplotment is forever a dynamic and ‘momentary’ process, a negotiation requiring 
sensitivity to its own evolution over time. For localized moments of meaning and (non)being 
there can only be localized conclusions and solutions.  
Limitations and Recommendations 
 In this final section to my dissertation, I provide a few notable limitationst o my 
interpretations of the narratives followed by propositions for future research to improve or 
expand upon my study. I categorized these limitations into three sets of issues: 1) narrative truths 
and inventions, 2) Underrepresented and self-selected voices, and 3) the participant-researcher 
relationship1.  
1. Narrative Truths and Inventions 
Recall the words of the Personal Narratives Group (1989): “when talking about their 
lives, people lie sometimes, forget a lot, exaggerate, become confused, and get things wrong. Yet 
they are revealing truths” (p. 261; original text). In the previous chapter, I expressed concern 
over the dangers of allowing these truths to grow beyond their specificity precisely because they 
conceal other possible truths at the same time as revealing important details about life with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 These may also be seen, from a social constructionist perspective, as the conditions of possibility for understanding 
others’ stories. As such, these limitations may be argued to be necessary and unavoidable.  
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cancer. In the words of deconstructionist Ed Heidt (1991), narratives often do “violence” to the 
complexities of truth in their impositions of order and coherence (p. 222). No matter how 
carefully we try to tease out the merits of narratives, we are continually confronted with their 
potential to deceive and distort. 
The young adults’ narratives must be tempered by this consideration. They were 
retrospective accounts of events, sometimes from many years ago, and therefore subject to 
inventions of memory. This is the other side to the “innovation” involved in personal narratives 
(Ricoeur, 1984, p. 68); people may take creative licence to tell their stories in easily digestible, 
self-enhancing, or duplicitous ways to serve their current needs. The entangled desires and 
politics implicit in the young adults’ stories make them suspect to any conclusions I make about 
their ‘genuine’ needs and experiences. That said, I typically took these considerations into 
account and, as a result, the extent to which I contextualized their stories was somewhat at odds 
with how they understood themselves and their illnesses.  
Let me provide an example to make this point clearer. Many of the interviewees 
positioned themselves as “universal subjects” or as a member of the transcultural category 
‘humanity’ (Smith, 1993, p. 154-155) when, in fact, they were situated in particular social, 
cultural, and political locations. For instance, when I asked questions about their ethnicity, they 
often received the questions with perplexity, as though the questions were odd or irrelevant in 
contexts of illness experiences. Furthermore, in the aforementioned moments of community with 
other cancer patients, “cancer” was talked about as a singular, general disease, glossing over its 
plural forms, meanings, and effects. When subject and disease get displayed as universal (or 
historically neutral), they can have widespread positive effects; for instance, they may resonate 
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with many people and lead to united social efforts such as AYA task forces in Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.  
But, they also blur important distinctions and divisions in experiences, hide biases and 
assumptions, and make moral claims that cannot and should not be applied to others’ 
experiences. This can lead to a misguided assumption, “If I can do it, so can you,” that is naïve 
of difference: between persons, life circumstances, cancers, cultures, socioeconomic statuses, 
health access, etc. If we professional readers treat each person as a “universal subject” with a 
“universal truth,” we are at a loss with how to support contradictory universal truths. By treating 
truth as plural and locally situated, my reading and reproduction of their stories neutralized the 
dangers of their more dogmatic expressions, but in the process cooled some of the fervor with 
which they affirmed their views.  
In sum, the potential for narrative truths and narrative deceptions continues to hang over 
my head, holding me back from taking a strong stance on the certainty of my conclusions. The 
methodology of narrative analysis is forever burdened by this limitation. My remedy (or, more 
accurately, my consolation) throughout this project was to place personal narratives against the 
backdrops of their narrative environments, thereby situating their truths/inventions within local 
spaces of experience and horizons of expectation. 
Perhaps these limitations could be properly addressed through future mixed method 
research on young adult cancer. Especially fruitful would be participant observation methods—
as are common in ethnographic research—as people go in for treatment and, later, for follow-up 
appointments. This would, among other things, enable researchers to see the many ways in 
which meaning and being are constructed in everyday life, possibly broadening our 
understanding of the existential challenges of illness. Furthermore, researchers would be able to 
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get a look at numerous intersubjectivities at work (e.g., clinical relationships) and perhaps gain a 
better understanding of the negotiative exchanges between young adults and those around them. 
In terms of acquiring an even richer representation of young adult life with cancer, going beyond 
interview and narrative techniques seems to be the next step.  
2. Underrepresented and Self-Selected Voices 
The second limitation of the study has to do with who was involved in the study. On the 
one hand, I could not have asked for a more diverse group of individuals. They lived across 
Canada, from the East to West Coasts, and ranged in age from late teens to early forties. I had 
more representation of men than most other samples of young adults. They lived with an array of 
forms of cancer, diagnosed from Stages 0 to 4, and for quite different periods of time.  
On the other hand, the sample was composed of particular ‘clusters’ of people. Nearly all 
were Caucasian and middle-class individuals, which illuminates a selection of cancer 
experiences from certain perspectives. I did not encounter experiences tied more specifically to 
racial and ethnic minorities, for example, such as discrimination or racial tensions within 
healthcare systems, or engagement with dominant discourses of meaning, self, and morality 
outside of a North American context.  
In addition, some demographics were relatively more represented than others, possibly 
producing a skewed representation of the whole sample’s experiences and concerns. Perhaps the 
most significant of these is the fact that Saskatchewan and Ontario residents are overrepresented, 
while half the provinces and territories had no representation; this limitation is particularly 
important because provincial differences in healthcare quality and coverage may lead to very 
different experiences of treatment across the country. Also, two-thirds of the participants had not 
passed the 5-year mark since diagnosis, which I noted as a significant milestone for many 
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patients. Perhaps the extent of uncertainty, liminality, and chaos within the narratives has to do 
with being ‘behind the finish line’ and lacking the temporal distance that may be needed to put 
life disruptions into a more orderly account. I do believe this to some extent, although the 
chronicity of existential challenges people a decade out of treatment suggests time does not 
always unify experiences.  
My participants were, for the most part, rather comfortable sharing their stories with me, 
even some of the more difficult moments of their lives. Not anything to complain over, this level 
of comfort does distinguish them from many other people with cancer who are not at ease talking 
about their experiences, do not have the time to join a study, or struggle to compose an ‘account’ 
of life with cancer. In fact, despite the variety of narratives I encountered in my research, many 
(kinds of) stories were out of reach: the stories left untold or edited out by my participants, the 
stories of people who cannot or chose not to voice their experiences, and the stories of those who 
have died. The narratives I heard were self-selected by a minority of cancer patients who seek 
out more public avenues for disseminating their stories, like research projects, media interviews 
and releases, online forums, etc. 
A final but significant concern regarding the participants is their involvement in each 
others’ discourses. The majority of participants were deeply connected to young adult cancer 
patient communities and familiar with their rhetoric. It is difficult to know how much contact 
each person had, as well as its effects on how they told their own stories; for example, two 
people (i.e., Tim and Dani from ch. 4) from very different areas of the country and with different 
levels of interactions with other young adults held very similar ideas about returning to normal in 
post-treatment. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that perceptions of young adult cancer patients as a 
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‘community,’ as a distinct group of people with shared needs, solidified with extended 
correspondence with one another.  
I recall a story from Ron, a Hodgkin’s lymphoma patient in his late twenties; told when 
the tape recorder was turned off, the story referred to a young man at a support group who said 
he didn’t even know he was a young adult with distinct needs until he had attended their 
meetings, that is, from a critical perspective, until he had entered into their discourse and was 
shaped by it. As mentioned in chapter 5, communal identities may provide a safe haven for 
existential questions and answers where few others exists, and one danger they bear as a result is 
breeding ideological constructions of meaning and being. Thus, I face the possibility that shared 
themes across the participants’ narratives were little more than artifacts of their indoctrination 
into the rhetoric of their cancer communities. 
 Small samples tend to suffer for their lack of diversity. The voices in my chapters were 
representative of select cancer experiences, life circumstances, and narrative preferences, to the 
neglect of any number of other silenced or marginalized voices. The purpose of my study was 
ambitious to the extent of including as many perspectives as I could given the restraints of time, 
sample size, and volunteer participation.  
Future studies could employ several different strategies to improve on this research. 
People of lower socioeconomic status and ethnic minorities continue to be underrepresented in 
cancer discourses and may benefit from more targeted studies in search of their voices2. With 
regard to the issue of temporal distance from diagnosis and treatment, a longitudinal study of 
young adults’ narratives from diagnosis to the 5-year mark (and beyond) may help us to answer a 
number of important questions: (How) does the liminality and chronicity of cancer change over !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 My postdoctoral research on the experiences of cancer survivorship among First Nations, Inuit, and Métis peoples 
will be an attempt to address some of these limitations. 
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time? Do cancer narratives become more orderly over the passage of time? (How) do horizons of 
expectation change as people live more than 5 years beyond their diagnosis? Finally, I was 
graciously invited to work with several cancer communities while I recruited participants; 
because they seemed to be crucial sources of support and guidance for the young adults, they 
could be the subject of future psychosocial research, including the discourses formed, resisted, 
and negotiated within their spaces.  
3. The Participant-Researcher Relationship: A Fourth Intersubjective Negotiation 
In chapter 5 I discussed three important intersubjectivities in the young adult narratives: 
clinical relationships, local worlds, and cancer communities. My analyses must be considered in 
light of another intersubjectivity, between each participant and me within the interview space. 
Physician Rita Charon (2006) believed that, alongside narrative forms, identities, and ethics, the 
relationships between narrators and audiences are primary features of stories; according to her, 
the meaning of a narrative “arises from and is created by the meeting between teller and listener” 
(p. 52). The influences their situational telling had on the young adults’ narratives can be gleaned 
from exchanges that appeared to be negotiations between the participant’s and my horizons.  
Because of the self-reflection demanded of this analysis it is difficult even to begin, but I 
find inspiration in the work of French journalist and writer Emmanuel Carrère. He wrote a 
touching account in Lives other than my own (2011) of the deep sense of loss felt by family and 
friends as his sister-in-law, Juliette, passed away from advanced cancer. Part biographical and 
part autobiographical, Carrère sensitively explored the distance between those most affected by 
loss and the people on the periphery of their anguish. He once said to Etienne, a dear colleague 
of Juliette’s and former cancer patient, “I didn’t know Juliette, I have no place mourning her, 
nothing authorizes me to write about this”; in response, Etienne said, “That’s what gives you the 
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authority, and in a way it’s the same for me. Her illness wasn’t my illness…I was facing her, 
near her, but in my place” (p. 218; original text). Both men’s words resonate with me: doubting 
whether I did justice to the young adults’ complex stories, and at the same time knowing that the 
distance between our lives enabled me to critically engage with the larger contexts of their 
stories.  
Bringing my horizons of expectation—my pursuit of a “pluralizing hermeneutics” 
(Marquard, 1981/1989)—into the interviews produced moments of collaboration as well as 
moments of dispute. As an example of the former, when controversial or non-medical causal 
ontologies emerged (e.g., in the previous chapter, Jeanine implicating her former lover in the 
emergence of cervical cancer), I was respectfully attentive and invited elaboration on them. More 
frequently, when the young adults talked about death, fears of recurrence, or what their loved 
ones dubbed ‘negativity’—typically mystery or chaotic narratives that tend to gain less 
recognition than more redemptive or ‘positive’ narratives—I verbally legitimated these moments 
of meaning, believing they deserve more attention and validation.  
On the other hand, there were times of tension when I cultivated the critical side of my 
enquiries. For example, I would try to contextualize certain dogmatic or generalized statements 
like “everything happens for a reason” by asking, “what does that mean?” Never asked in an 
offensive or combative way, still these questions sometimes put interviewees on the defensive, 
having to justify statements that, in their local social contexts, would likely be received without 
comment or contention. During these exchanges, my hermeneutics of suspicion stood out, 
perhaps making participants more cautious about what they said next. It is not that I explicitly 
encouraged any one moment of meaning or (non)being, even though I have my own personal 
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inclinations3; rather, I took an approach of enquiring further into brief but rich metaphors that 
came out unexpectedly—like cancer is a “monster” or a “gift”—in order to facilitate expansion 
on these packed “kernels” of meaning and plot (Teucher, 2003).  
Any teller-listener relationship involves tensions between different spaces of experience 
and horizons of expectation—a dialectic between seeing others’ lives as other and seeing them as 
one’s own (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 43)—but they may redouble when moral explanations of illness are 
on the line. Emmanuel Carrère (2011), for instance, observed that he was “walking on eggshells” 
when talking about etiology with Etienne. He wrote about the difficulty in respecting that 
Etienne “refuses all psychosomatic interpretations of his disease” while, at the same time within 
himself, feeling that “cancer is not a disease that hits you from outside, by accident (not always, 
anyway, and not necessarily)” (p. 107-108). Putting these tensions on the page was his way of 
honouring Etienne’s steadfast perceptions of his illness while still delicately providing his 
hermeneutics of suspicion. I may have been less forthright than Carrère in sharing my personal 
opinions of cancer’s origins, but I worked toward juxtaposing different perspectives without 
placing one on a higher pedestal. 
Discussing the young adults’ stories in terms of ‘moments’ is itself a critical language, in 
a sense, a foreign language to the young adults, a language brought into the co-construction of 
their narratives through my horizons of understanding. I could not talk about their narratives 
outside of their ‘partial translation’4 into my discourse, thereby erasing some of what made their 
narratives ‘other’ to my understanding. Let me include a brief example. Several of the young 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For example, I tend to side with Rimmon-Kenan (2002) and others who suggest that chaotic experiences are often 
unjustly marginalized, and that the popularity of recovery narratives is possibly due to the social pressures to tell 
happy endings. Furthermore, I harbour slightly more suspicion toward battle metaphors, particularly when deaths 
are judgmentally constructed as ‘lost fights.’ That said, I have become much less certain of my biases as a result of 
studying young adults who found value and direction in these moments of meaning and being.  
4 I argue it is partial because I employed the young adults’ own words and statements whenever possible.!!
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adults said that they were telling me feelings, thoughts, and stories that no one else had heard 
before—including their spouses, closest friends, and families. Though I admit a certain pride in 
being told they were entrusting me with their most private, ‘untold,’ narratives, I received those 
claims with some skepticism. Maybe they marked privileged access to the young adults’ mental 
meanings, or perhaps they marked a sly ploy to let down my guard of critical thinking. From my 
perspective, they signified a change in the social contexts of the young adults’ expressed 
meanings. Their comments made me aware that the intersubjectivity between us differed from 
other intersubjectivities affecting their stories. I was told different stories, not necessarily truer or 
more authentic stories.  
I could not always say how they differed, though I did sometimes have access to stories 
told to other audiences (e.g., in blogs). When I could compare, the tone almost always seemed 
somewhat lighter, more optimistic, and more situated within narratives of recovery than in the 
interviews. These ‘other’ stories were still rich with expressions of meaning and (non)being, but 
more chaotic moments of disordering and moments of non-being were certainly fewer and less 
prominent, giving credence to the young adults’ statements about being expected to tell more 
coherent and redemptive narratives. Within a research context, with a ‘stranger’ and advertised 
Psychology graduate (which alone may have sparked all sorts of expectations), slightly different, 
less publicly familiar narratives may have been performed.  
The participant-researcher relationship can shape stories in a variety of different ways; I 
have tried to portray how horizons of expectation lead us down different paths than may have 
been taken in the meeting of other horizons at different times and contexts. Because of the 
influences of the research context, and the other intersubjectivities discussed above, it seems a 
dubious venture to assume the young adults’ narratives were entirely ‘their own.’ Though 
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creative in their construction, the narratives were partially shaped by the characters within them 
and the audiences responding to them.  
For future research I would recommend only more reflexivity on the researcher’s role in 
negotiating meaning and being. I would not suggest possible ways of removing the influence of 
the researcher from the stories produced by participants. It is certainly a limitation on the 
conclusions we can make (especially when our questions are leading), but from another 
perspective it is a condition for the possibility of narration. People’s stories somewhat depend on 
their audiences, as they are tailored to the situation of their telling. Different stories may be 
produced for different audiences, but each telling contributes in a larger way to the many 
possible meanings people hold to their lives while wandering the endless paths of chronic illness. !
! 332 
References 
Albom, M. (1997). Tuesdays with Morrie: An old man, a young man, and life’s greatest lesson.  
New York, NY: Doubleday.  
Alschuler, L. & Gazella, K. (2010). The definitive guide to cancer: An integrative approach to  
prevention, treatment, and healing (3rd edition). Berkeley, CA: Celestial Arts.  
Aristotle. (1987). Poetics. (R. Janko, Trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. (Original work written  
335 B.C.). 
Arnett, J. (1999). Adolescent storm and stress, reconsidered, American Psychologist, 54(3), 317- 
326. 
---. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the 
 twenties. American Psychologist, 55(5), 469-480. 
---. (2002). The psychology of globalization, American Psychologist, 57(10), 774-783. 
---. (2011). Chapter 12: Emerging adulthood(s): The cultural psychology of a new life stage. In L.  
Arnett Jensen (Ed.), Bridging cultural and developmental approaches to psychology (pp. 
255-275). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Attig, T. (2001). Relearning the world: Making and finding meanings. In R. Neimeyer (Ed.),  
Meaning reconstruction and the experience of loss (pp. 33-53). Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association.  
Audi, R. (Ed.). (1999). Cambridge dictionary of philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge  
University Press.  
Baddeley, J., & Singer, J. (2007). Charting the life story’s path: Narrative identity across the 
 life span. In D.J. Clandinin (Ed.), Handbook of narrative inquiry: Mapping a 
 methodology (pp. 177-202). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
! 333 
Baldwin, J. (Ed.). (1957). Dictionary of philosophy and psychology (Vol. 1). New York, NY: P. 
Smith. 
Banks, J., & Prior, L. (2001). Doing things with illness: the micro-politics of the CFS clinic,  
 Social Science and Medicine, 52, 11-23. 
Barr, R. (2011). Adolescents, young adult, and cancer—the international challenge, Cancer,  
117(Suppl. 10), 2245-2249. 
Barr, R., Rogers, P., & Schacter, B. (2011). Commentary: Preamble, Cancer, 117(Suppl. 10),  
2239-2240. 
Barthes, R. (2000). Introduction to the structural analysis of narratives. In M. Mcquillan (Ed.),  
The narrative reader (pp. 109-114). (S. Heath, Trans.). London, UK: Routledge. (Original 
work published 1966).  
Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York, NY: The Free Press. 
Becker, G. (1997). Disrupted lives: How people create meaning in a chaotic world. Berkeley and 
  Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 
Bell, K. (2010). Cancer survivorship, mor(t)ality and lifestyle discourses on cancer  
prevention, Sociology of Health and Illness, 32(3), 349-364. 
Benjamin, W. (2000). The storyteller: Reflections on the works of Nikolai Leskov. In M.  
Mcquillan (Ed.), The narrative reader (pp. 46-53). (H. Zohn, Trans.). London, UK: 
Routledge. (Original work published 1955).  
Blackburn, S. (2005). Oxford dictionary of philosophy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
Blank, T., & Bellizzi, K. (2008). A gerontologic perspective on cancer and aging,  
Cancer, 112 (11), 2569-2576.  
 
 
! 334 
Bleyer, A., Barr, R., Hayes-Lattin, B., Thomas, D., Ellis, D., & Anderson, B. (2008). The  
 distinctive biology of cancer in adolescents and young adults, Nature Reviews Cancer, 8, 
 288-298. 
Blinderman, C.D. & Cherny, N.I. (2005). Existential issues do not necessarily result in  
existential suffering: Lessons from cancer patients in Israel, Palliative Medicine, 19, 371-
380. 
Bolmsjö, I. (2000). Existential issues in palliative care—interviews with cancer patients.  
Journal of Palliative Care, 16(2), 20-24. 
---. (2002). Meeting existential needs in palliative care—who, when, and why? Journal of  
Palliative Care, 18(3), 185-191. 
Breitbart, W., Gibson, C., Poppito, S., & Berg, A. (2004). Psychotherapeutic interventions at  
the end of life: A focus on meaning and spirituality, Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 49, 
366-372.  
Breitbart, W., & Heller, K. (2003). Reframing hope: Meaning-centred care for patients near the  
 end of life, Journal of Palliative Medicine, 6(6), 979-988. 
Bronfen, E. (2000). Spectral stories. In M. Mcquillan (Ed.), The narrative reader (pp. 192-197).  
London, UK: Routledge. (Original work published 1992).  
Broyard, A. (1992). Intoxicated by my illness. New York, NY: Fawcett Columbine. 
Bruner, J. (1986). Actual minds, possible worlds. Cambridge, UK: Harvard University Press. 
---. (1990). Acts of meaning. Cambridge, UK: Harvard University Press. 
Buckman, R. (2006). Cancer is a word, not a sentence. Toronto, Canada: Key Porter Books.  
Burgess, A. (1962). A clockwork orange. London, UK: Penguin Books.  
Burman, E. (2008). Deconstructing developmental psychology. London, UK: Routledge.  
 
! 335 
Bury, M. (1982). Chronic illness as biographical disruption, Sociology of Health and Illness,  
4(2), 167-182. 
Butler, J. (2004). Undoing gender. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Camus, A. (1946). The stranger. (S. Gilbert, Trans.). New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Original  
work published 1942).  
Cancer Care Ontario. (2006). Cancer in young adults in Canada. Retrieved from the  
CCO website on June 12, 2013 http://www.cancercare.on.ca. 
Canadian Cancer Society. (2009). Canadian cancer statistics 2009. Toronto, Canada: Canadian  
Cancer Society.  
---. (2012). Canadian cancer statistics 2012. Toronto, Canada: Canadian Cancer Society.  
---. (2013). Canadian cancer statistics 2013. Toronto, Canada: Canadian Cancer Society. 
Canadian Institute of Health Research. (2009). Paediatric/adolescent/young adult cancer: A pan- 
Canadian initiative. Ottawa: Retrieved on the CIHR website on July 29, 2013: 
http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/40559.html. 
Canadian Partnership Against Cancer, (2010). Cancer in adolescents and young adults (15-29  
years): Fact sheet. Retrieved from the CPAC website on June 12, 2013 
http://www.partnershipagainstcancer.ca/2010/03/11/cancer-in-adolescents-and-young-
adults-15-29-years/. 
Carr, D. (1986). Time, narrative, and history. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana  
 University Press. 
Carr, K. (2007). Crazy sexy cancer tips. Guilford, CT: Globe Pequot Press.  
Carel, H. (2008). Illness. Stocksfield, UK: Acumen.  
Carrère, E. (2011). Lives other than my own (L. Coverdale, Trans.). New York, NY: Metropolitan  
Books. (Original work published 2009).  
! 336 
Carrick, R. (2013). Young adults really do have it tougher. The Globe and Mail, March 25, 2013.   
Cart, M. (2011). Young adult literature: From romance to realism. American Library  
Association.  
Carter, H., MacLeod, R., Brander, P., and McPherson, K. (2004). Living with a terminal illness:  
Patients’ priorities, Advanced Nursing, 45(6), 611-620. 
Cella. D., & Tross, S. (1986). Psychological adjustment to survival from Hodgkin’sdisease,  
Journal of Consulring & Clinical Psychologv. 54, 616-622. 
Chapple, A., Ziebland, S., & McPherson, A. (2004). Stigma, shame, and blame experienced by  
patients with lung cancer: A qualitative study, British Medical Journal, 328, 1470-1474. 
Charme, S. (1984). Meaning and myth in the study of lives: A Sartean perspective. Philadelphia,  
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Charmaz, K. (1992). Good days, bad days. Chapel Hill, NC: Rutgers University Press.  
Charon, R. (2006). Narrative medicine: Honoring the stories of illness. New York, NY: Oxford 
 University Press. 
Chouinard, V. (1994). Geography, law and legal struggles: Which ways ahead? Progress in 
Human Geography, 18(4), 415-440.  
Clausen, M. (2010). Fateful embrace: Lived body and identity among young adults with cancer. 
Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Publishing. 
Clarke, J., & James, S. (2003). The radicalized self: The impact on the self of the contested  
nature of the diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome, Social Science and Medicine, 57, 
1387-1395.  
Coates, K., & Morrison, B. (2012). The uses and abuses of university: Canada’s post-secondary  
education system is failing our students, and our economy. The Walrus Magazine, 
September 24, 2012.  
! 337 
Cohn, S. (1999). Taking time to smell the roses: accounts of people with chronic fatigue  
syndrome and their struggle for legitimization, Anthropology and Medicine, 6(2), 195- 
215. 
Cole, M. (2006). Culture and cognitive development in phylogenetic, historical, and 
ontogenetic perspective. In W. Damon and R. M. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of child 
psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 636-683). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Corrigan, K. (2008). The middle place. New York, NY: Hyperion.  
Coupland, D. (1991). Generation X: Tales for an accelerated culture. New York, NY: St. 
Martin’s Press. 
Couser, G.T. (1997).  Recovering bodies: Illness, disability, and life writing. Madison, WI:  
University of Wisconsin Press. 
---. (2005). Genre matters: Form, force, and filiation, Life Writing, 2(2), 139-156.  
Coward, D. (1997). Constructing meaning from the experience of cancer, Seminars in Oncology 
Nursing, 13(4), 248-251. 
Crawshaw, M.A., Glaser, A.W., Hale, J.P., & Sloper, P. (2009). Male and female experiences 
 of having fertility matters raised alongside a cancer diagnosis during the teenage and 
 young adult years, European Journal of Cancer Care, 18, 381-390.  
Crotty, M. (2003). The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in the  
research process. London, UK: Sage. 
Csordas, T. (1994). Embodiment as a paradigm for anthropology, Ethos, 18(1), 5-47. 
D’Agostino, N., Penney, A., and Zebrack, B. (2011). Providing developmentally appropriate 
 psychosocial care to adolescent and young adult cancer survivors, Cancer, 117(Suppl.  
10), 2329-34. 
 
! 338 
De Beauvior, S. (1983). A very easy death. (P. O’Brian, Trans.). Great Britain: Penguin Books.  
(Original work published 1964).  
De Munck, V. (2000). What (or who) is the self? In Culture, self, and meaning, (pp. 31-59).  
Prospect Height, IL: Waveland. 
Decker, C. (2006). Coping in adolescents with cancer: A review of the literature, Journal of 
 Psychosocial Oncology, 24(4), 123-140. 
Decker, C., Haase, J., & Bell, C. (2007). Uncertainty in adolescents and young adults with 
 cancer, Oncology Nursing Forum, 34(3), 681-688. 
Delvecchio-Good, M.J., Good, B., Schaffer, C., & Lind, S. (1990). American oncology and the  
discourse of hope, Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 14, 59-79. 
Derrida, J. (1976). Of grammatology. (G.C. Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins 
 University Press. (Original work published 1967).  
---. (2000). The law of genre. In M. Mcquillan (Ed.), The narrative reader (pp. 220-227). New  
York, NY: Taylor and Francis. (Original work published 1980).  
Devaney, J. (2012). My leaky body: Tales from the gurney. Fredericton, Canada: Goose Lane.  
Dexter, G. (2008). Why not Catch-21? The stories behind the titles. London, UK: Francis 
Lincoln. 
Diamond, L. (1998). Development of sexual orientation among adolescent and young adult 
women, Developmental Psychology, 34(5), 1085-1095.  
Dowling, S., Manthorpe, J., and Cowley, S. (2006). Person-centred planning in social care: A 
scoping review. London, UK: Kings College.  
Dumit, J. (2006). Illnesses you have to fight to get: facts as forces in uncertain, emergent 
illnesses, Social Science and Medicine, 62, 577–590. 
! 339 
Dunn, J., & Steginga, S. (2000). Young women’s experience of breast cancer: defining young 
and identifying concerns, Psycho-Oncology, 9, 137-146.  
Eagleton, T. (2007). The meaning of life: A very short introduction. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
Egan, S. (1999). Mirror talk: Genres of crisis in contemporary autobiography. Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press.  
Engelke, M., & Tomlinson, M. (2006). Meaning, anthropology, Christianity. In M. Engelke  
& M. Tomlinson (Eds.), The limits of meaning: Case studies in the anthropology of 
Christianity (pp. 1-37). New York, NY: Beghahn Books. 
Erikson, E. (1968). Identity, youth, and crisis. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company. 
---. (1980). Identity and the life cycle. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company. 
Ettinger, R., & Heiney, S. (1993). Cancer in adolescents and young adults: Psychosocial 
concerns, coping strategies, and interventions, Cancer, 71(Suppl. 10), 3276-3280. 
Feinberg, L. (2012). Moving toward person- and family-centred care. Washington, DC: 
American Association of Retired Persons. 
Fife, B. L. (2005). The role of constructed meaning in adaptation to the onset of life-threatening 
illness, Social Science and Medicine, 61, 2132-2143. 
Fischoff, S., Antonio, J., & Lewis, D. (1998). Favorite films and film genres as a function of race,  
age, and gender. Journal of Media Psychology, 3(1), 1-9. 
Forster, E.M. (2000). ‘The story’ and ‘the plot’. In M. Mcquillan (Ed.), The narrative reader (pp.  
44-46). London, UK: Routledge. (Original work published 1963).  
Foucault, M. (1978). The history of sexuality: An introduction (Vol. 1). (R. Hurley, Trans.).  
New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1976).  
 
! 340 
---. (1990.). The history of sexuality: The use of pleasure (Vol. 2). (R. Hurley, Trans.). New  
York: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1984).  
Frank, A. (1995). The wounded storyteller: Body, illness, and ethics. Chicago, IL: University of 
 Chicago Press. 
Frank, A. (2010). Tricksters and truth tellers: Narrating illness in an age of authenticity and  
appropriation, Literature and Medicine, 28(2), 185-199.  
Frankl, V. (1984). Man's search for meaning. (I. Lasch, Trans.). New York, NY: Pocket Books.  
(Original work published 1946).  
Freeman, M. (2007). Performing the event of understanding in hermeneutic conversations with  
narrative texts, Qualitative Inquiry, 13(7), 925-944. 
Freeman, M.P. (2010a). Afterword: ‘Even amidst’: Rethinking narrative coherence. In M.  
Hyvarinen, L-C. Hyden, M. Saarenheimo, and M. Tamboukou (Eds.), Beyond narrative 
coherence (pp. 167-186). Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamin. 
---. (2010b). Hindsight: The promise and peril of looking backward. New York, NY: Oxford  
University Press.  
Friedan, B. (1994). The fountain of age. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. 
Freud, S. (2011). Beyond the pleasure principle. (G. Richter, Trans.). Peterborough, Canada:  
Broadview. (Original work published 1920).  
Furstenberg, F. (2010). On a new schedule: Transitions to adulthood and family change, The  
Future of Children, 20(1), 67-87. 
Gadamer, H-G. (1989). Truth and method (2nd edition). (J. Weinsheimer and D. Marshall,  
Trans.). New York, NY: Continuum. (Original work published 1960).  
Gafni, A. (2011). Treatment of cancer in adolescents and young adults: Is affordability a  
concern? Cancer, 117(Suppl. 10), 2258-2261.  
! 341 
Gamut, L. T. F. (1991). Logic, language, and meaning: Introduction to logic (Vol. 1). Chicago,  
IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1982).  
Garden, R. (2012). Telling stories about illness and disability: The limits and lessons of narrative,  
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 53(1), 121-135. 
Gavaghan, M.P., & Roach, J.E. (1987). Ego identity development of adolescents with cancer, 
 Journal of Pediatric Psychology, 12(2), 203-213. 
Geertz, G. (1973). The interpretation of cultures. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
---. (1986). Making experience, authoring selves. In V. Turner & E. Bruner (Eds.), The  
anthropology of experience (pp. 373-380). Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois 
Press. 
Gendlin, E. (1997). Experiencing and the creation of meaning: a philosophical and  
psychological approach to the subjective. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Gergen, M., & Gergen, K. (2007). Narratives in action. In M. Bamberg (Ed.), Narrative: State  
of the art (pp. 133-143). Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins. 
Gillespie, R. (2000). When no means no: disbelief, disregard and deviance as discourses of 
 voluntary childlessness, Women’s Studies International Forum, 23(2), 223-234. 
Good, B. (1994). Medicine, rationality, and experience: An anthropological perspective.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Good, B., & Delvecchio-Good, M. (1994). In the subjunctive mode: Epilepsy narratives in  
Turkey, Social Science and Medicine, 38(6), 835-842.  
Gough, A. (2005). Body/mine: A chaos narrative of cyborg subjectivities and liminal  
experiences, Women’s Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 34(3-4), 249-264. 
Green, J. (2012). The fault in our stars. New York, NY: Dutton Books. 
 
! 342 
Griffiths, C., Norton, L., Wagstaff, G., & Brunas-Wagstaff, J. (2002). Existential  
concerns in late stage cancer, European Journal of Oncology Nursing 6(4), 243- 
246. 
Grinyer, A. (2007). The biographical impact of teenage and adolescent cancer, Chronic Illness, 
 3, 265-277.  
---. (2009). Life after cancer in adolescence and young adulthood: The experience of 
 survivorship. London, UK: Routledge.  
Grinyer, A., & Thomas, C. (2004). The importance of place of death in young adults with  
terminal cancer. Mortality, 9(2), 114-131. 
Grossman, L. (2012). Top 10 fiction books. TIME Magazine, December 4, 2012.  
Gullette, M. (2004). Aged by culture. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Habermas, J., & Bluck, S. (2000). Getting a life: The emergence of the life story in adolescence,  
Psychological Bulletin, 126(5), 748-769.   
Halldorsdottir, S., & Hamrin, E. (1996). Experiencing existential changes: The lived experience 
 of having cancer, Cancer Nursing, 19(1), 29-36. 
Hammond, C., Teucher, U., Duggleby, W., & Thomas, R. (2012). An “unholy alliance” of 
 existential proportions: Negotiating discourses with men’s experiences of cancer and 
 aging. Journal of Aging Studies, 26, 149-161. 
Handler, E. (1996). Time on fire: My comedy of terrors. London, UK: Souvenir Press. 
Hanisch, C. (1970). The personal is political. In S. Firestone & A. Koedt (Eds.), Notes from  
the second year: Women’s liberation, major writings of the Radical Feminists (pp. 76-
78). New York, NY: Radical Feminism.  
Harris, G. (1989). Mechanism and morality in patients’ views of illness and injury, Medical  
Anthropology Quarterly, 3(1), 3-21. 
! 343 
Harrison, M. (2000). From medical astrology to medical astronomy: sollunar and planetary  
theories of disease in British medicine, c. 1700–1850, The British Journal for the History 
of Science, 33(1), 25-48. 
Havighurst, R. (1972). Developmental tasks and education. Philadelphia, PA: D. McKay.  
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). San Francisco,  
CA: HarperCollins. (Original work published 1927).  
---. (2001). The Zollikon seminars. (R. Askay & F. Mayr, Trans.). Evanston, IL:  
Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1987).  
Heidt, E. (1991). Conclusion: A philosophy of autobiographical writing: A metaphysics of 
 presence. In Vision voiced: Narrative viewpoint in autobiographical writing (pp. 219- 
238). New York, NY: Peter Lang. 
Heilbrun, C. (1988). Writing a woman’s life. New York, NY: Bellantine Books. 
Henoch, I., & Danielson, E. (2009). Existential concerns among patients with cancer and  
interventions to meet them: an integrative literature review, Psycho-Oncology, 18(3), 225-
236. 
Henig, R. (2010). What is it about 20-somethings? New York Times, 20.  
Henig, R., & Henig, S. (2012). Twenty something: Why do young adults seem stuck, New York,  
NY: Hudson Street Press.   
Howe, N., & Strauss, W. (2000). Millenials rising: The next great generation. New York, NY:  
Vintage Books. 
Hunsaker-Hawkins, A. (1993). Reconstructing illness: Studies in pathography. West 
 Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press. 
Hunt, L. (1998). Moral reasoning and the meaning of cancer: Causal explanations of oncologists  
and patients in Southern Mexico, Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 12(3), 298-318. 
! 344 
Hunter, B. (2004). Staying alive: Life-changing strategies for surviving cancer. New York, NY:  
Doubleday.  
Hyde, L. (1998). Trickster makes this world. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.  
Hyden, L-C. (1995). In search of an ending: Narrative reconstruction as a moral quest, Journal  
of Narrative and Life History, 5(1), 67-84. 
Hyvarinen, M., Hyden, L-C., Saarenheimo, M., & Tamboukou, M. (2010). Chapter 1. In M.  
Hyvarinen, L-C. Hyden, M. Saarenheimo, & M. Tamboukou (Eds.), Beyond narrative 
coherence (pp. 1-15). Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins.  
Ignatieff, M. (1988). Modern dying, The New Republic, 199(26), 28–33. 
Jackson, M. (2005). Existential anthropology: Events, exigencies, and effects. New York, NY, 
and Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books.  
Jacobsen, B., Jørgensen, S.D., & Jørgensen S.E. (2000). The world of the cancer patient from an 
existential perspective, Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis, 11(1), 122-135. 
Jain, S.L. (2007). Living in prognosis: Toward an elegiac politics, Representations, 98, 77-92. 
Jenkins, J., & Valiente, M. (1994). Bodily transactions of the passions: el calor among  
Salvadoran women refugees. In T. Csordas (Ed.), Embodiment and experience (pp. 163-
182). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Jureric, A. (2012). Illness as narrative. Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press.  
Kadar, M. (1992). Coming to terms – from genre to critical practice. In M. Kadar (Ed.), Essays  
 on life writing: From genre to critical practice (pp. 3-16). Toronto, Canada: University of 
 Toronto Press. 
Kameny, R., & Bearison, D. (2002). Cancer narratives of adolescents and young adults: A 
 quantitative and qualitative analysis, Children’s Health Care, 31(2), 143-173. 
 
! 345 
Katz, A. (2011). Surviving after cancer: Living the new normal. Lanham, MD: Rowman and  
Littlefield. 
Keller, P. (1999). Husserl and Heidegger on human experience. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge  
University Press.  
Kellerman, J., & Katz, E.R. (1977). The adolescent with cancer: Theoretical, clinical and 
 research issues, Journal of Pediatric Psychology, 2(3), 127-131. 
Kelly, D., Pearce, S., & Mulhall, A. (2004). ‘Being in the same boat’: Ethnographic insights 
 into an adolescent cancer unit, International Journal of Nursing Studies, 41, 847-857. 
Kleinman, A. (1988). The illness narratives: Suffering, healing, and the human condition. 
 Basic Books. 
---. (2006). What really matters: Living a moral life amidst uncertainty and danger. New York,  
NY: Oxford University Press.  
Kleinman, A., & Benson, P. (2006). Anthropology in the clinic: The problem of cultural  
competency and how to fix it, PLOS Medicine, 3(10), 1673-1676. 
Kleinman, A., & Kleinman, J. (1991). Suffering and its professional transformation: Toward an  
 ethnography of interpersonal experience, Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 15(3), 275-
 301. 
Klem, P., Miller, M.A., & Fernsler, J. (2000). Demands of illness in people treated for  
 colorectal cancer, Oncology Nursing Forum, 27(4), 633-639. 
Kuhl, D. (2003). What dying people want: Practical wisdom for the end of life. Toronto, Canada: 
Doubleday Canada.  
Kyngas, H., Mikkonen, R., Mousiainen, E., Rytilahti, M., Seppanen, P., Vattovaara, R., Jamsa, 
T., (2000). Coping with the onset of cancer: coping strategies and resources of young 
people with cancer, European Journal of Cancer Care, 10, 6-11. 
! 346 
Lachman, M. (2004). Development in midlife, Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 305-331. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press.  
Landmark, B., Strandmark, M., & Wahl, A. (2001). Living with newly diagnosed breast cancer—
the meaning of existential issues, Cancer Nursing, 24(3), 220-226. 
Lazarus, R. (1998). The trivialization of distress. In Fifty years of the research and theory of R.S.  
Lazarus: An analysis of historical and perennial issues (pp. 251-271). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Elrbaum. 
Lee, V. (2008). The existential plight of cancer: Meaning making as a concrete approach to the 
intangible search for meaning, Support Care Cancer, 16, 779-785. 
Leder, D. (1990). The absent body. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Lerner, M. (1991). Wrestling with the angel: A memoir of my triumph over illness. New York,  
NY: Simon and Schuster. 
Levinas, E. (2000). God, death, and time. (B. Bergo, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University  
Press. (Original work published 1993).  
Levinson, D. (1986). A conception of adult development, American Psychologist, 41(1), 3-13. 
Lifton, R.J. (1993). The protean self: Human resilience in an age of fragmentation. New York,  
NY: Basic Books.  
List, M., Ritter-Sterr, C., & Lansky, S.B. (1991). Cancer during adolescence, Pediatrician, 
 18(1), 32-36. 
Little, M., Jordens, C., Paul, K., Montgomery, K., & Philipson, B. (1998). Liminality: A major  
category of the experience of cancer illness, Social Science and Medicine, 47(10), 1485-
1494. 
 
! 347 
Little, M., Paul, K., Jordens, C., & Sayers, E-J. (2002). Survivorship and discourses of identity,  
Psycho-Oncology, 11, 170-178. 
Lunau, K. (2012). Campus crisis: The broken generation: Why so many of our best and brightest  
students report feeling hopeless, depressed, even suicidal, Maclean’s Magazine, 
September 5, 2012.  
Lyon, M., & Barbalet, J. (1994). Society's body: Emotion and the “somatization” of social  
 theory. In T. Csordas (Ed.), Embodiment and experience: The existential ground of 
 culture and self (pp. 48-66). Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press.  
MacKenzie, C. (2008). Introduction. In C. MacKenzie & K. Atkin (Eds.), Practical identity  
and narrative agency (pp. 1-28). New York, NY, and London, UK: Routledge.  
Marcia, J. (1973). Ego-identity status: Relationship to change in self-esteem, ‘general  
maladjustment’, and authoritarianism. In M. Argyle (Ed.), Social encounters: 
Contributions to social interaction (pp. 340-354). Chicago, IL: Aldine.  
Marquard, O. (1989). Farewell to matters of principle: Philosophical studies. (R. Wallace,  
 Trans.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1981).  
Matthews, C. (2007). Reflections on the c-word: At the centre of the cancer labyrinth. North  
Saanich, Canada: Hedgerow Press.  
Mattingly, C. (1998). Healing dramas and clinical plots: The narrative structure of experience. 
 Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Mauss, M. (1985). A category of human mind: The notion of person: The notion of self.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
McAdams, D. (1993). The stories we live by: Personal myths and the making of the self. New  
York, NY: The Guilford Press.  
 
! 348 
---. (2006). The redemptive self: Stories Americans live by. New York, NY: Oxford University  
Press.  
---. (2013). Life authorship: A psychological challenge for emerging adulthood, as illustrated in  
two notable case studies, Emerging Adulthood, 1(2), 151-158.  
McAdams, D., & Logan, R. (2004). Chapter 2: What is generativity? In E. De St. Aubin, D.  
McAdams, & T-C. Kim (Eds.), The generative society: Caring for future generations (pp. 
15-31). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.  
McDermott, R.P., & Varenne, H. (1996). Culture, development, disability. In R. Jessor, A.  
Colby, & R.A. Shweder (Eds.), Ethnography and human development: Context and  
meaning in social enquiry (pp. 101-126). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
McGoldrick, D., Gordon, P., Whiteson, M., Adams, H., Rogers, P., & Sutcliffe, S. (2011).  
Awareness and advocacy for adolescents and young adults with cancer, Cancer, 
117(Suppl. 10), 2311-2315. 
McKenzie, H., & Crouch, M. (2004). Discordant feelings in the lifeworld of cancer survivors, 
 health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the Social Study of Health, Illness, and Medicine, 
 8(2), 139-157. 
McLean, K., & Pratt, M. (2006). Life’s little (and big) lessons: Identity statuses and meaning- 
making in the turning point narratives of emerging adults, Developmental Psychology, 
42(4), 714-722.  
Mead, M. (1963). Coming of age in Samoa. New York, NY: Mentor Books.  
Mehl-Madrona, L. (2007). Narrative medicine: The use of history and story in the healing  
process. Rochester, VT: Bear and Company.  
Meinke, P. (2001). Greatest hits 1964-2000. Columbus, OH: Pudding House Publications. 
 
! 349 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002). The phenomenology of perception. (K. Paul, Trans.). London, UK,  
and New York, NY: Routledge. (Original work published 1945).  
Middlebrook, C. (1998) Seeing the crab: A memoir of dying before I do. New York, NY: Anchor  
Books. 
Middlemiss, J. (2008). What should I tell you? A mother’s final words to her infant son. Brechin,  
Scotland: Printmatters.  
Mishler, E.G. (1995). Models of narrative analysis: A typology, Journal of Narrative and  
Life History, 5(2), 87–123. 
Mitchell, D. (2004). Cloud atlas. London, UK: Sceptre.  
Moadel, A., Morgan, C., Fatone, A., Grennan, J., Carter, J., Laruffa, G., Skummy, A., & Dutcher,  
J. (1999). Seeking meaning and hope: self-reported spiritual and existential needs among 
an ethnically-diverse cancer patient population, Psycho-Oncology, 8, 378-385. 
Morita, T., Tsunoda, J., Inoue, S., & Chihara, S. (2000). An exploratory factor analysis of  
existential suffering in Japanese terminally ill cancer patients, Psycho-Oncology, 9, 164-
168. 
Morris, D. (1998). Illness and culture in the postmodern age. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA:  
University of California Press.  
Mosack, K., Abbott, M., Singer, M., Weeks, M., & Rohena, L. (2005). If I didn’t have HIV, I’d  
be dead now: Illness narratives of drug users living with HIV/AIDS, Qualitative Health 
Research, 15, 586-605.  
Mount, B., Boston, P., & Cohen, S.R. (2007). Healing connections: On moving from suffering 
 to a sense of well-being, Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, 33(4), 372-388. 
Mount, E. (1993). Can we talk? Contexts of meaning for interpreting illness, The Journal  
of Medical Humanities, 14(2), 51-65. 
! 350 
Mumma, G., Mashberg, D., & Lesko, L. (1992). Long-term psychosexual adjustment of acute  
leukemia survivors: Impact of marrow transplantation versus conventional chemotherapy, 
General Hospital Psychiatry, 14, 43-55.  
Mundorf, N., & Brownell, W. (1990). Media preferences of older and young adults, The  
Gerontologist, 30(5), 685-691. 
Murphy, R. (1987). The body silent. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company. 
Nathan, P., Hayes-Lattin, B., Sisler, J., & Hudson, M. (2011). Critical issues in transition and 
 survivorship for adolescents and young adults with cancers, Cancer, 117(Suppl. 10),  
2335-2341. 
Neugarten, B. (1987). The changing meaning of age, Psychology Today, 21(5), 29-33. 
Neuman, S. (1992). Autobiography: From different poetics to a poetics of difference. In M.  
Kadar (Ed.), Essays on life writing: From genre to critical practice. Toronto, Canada: 
University of Toronto Press.  
Nisbett, R. (2003). The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently--and  
why. New York, NY: Free Press. 
O’Murchadha, F. (2003). Book review: Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience, Husserl  
Studies, 19(1), 93-100.  
Odo, R., & Potter, C. (2009). Understanding the needs of young adult cancer survivors: A 
 clinical perspective, Oncology, 23(11), 23-33. 
Ogden, C., & Richards, I.A. (1927). The meaning of meaning: A study of the influence of  
language upon thought and of the science of symbolism. London, UK: K. Paul, Trench, 
Trubner.  
Olney, J. (1998). Memory and narrative: The weave of life-writing. Chicago, IL: University of  
Chicago Press. 
! 351 
Oliver, M. (1989). Disability and dependency: a creation of industrial societies. In L. Barton  
(Ed.), Disability and dependence. London,UK, and New York, NY: The Falmer Press.  
---. (1999). Capitalism, disability, and ideology: a materialist critique of the normalization  
principle. In R. Flynn & R. Lemay (Eds.), A quarter-century of normalization and social 
role valorization: Evolution and impact (pp. 163-173). Ottawa, Canada: University of 
Ottawa Press. 
Orwell, G, (2004). Nineteen eighty-four. Fairfield, IA: 1st World Library. (Original work  
published 1949).  
Ots, T. (1994). The silenced body—the expressive Leib: On the dialectic of mind and life in  
Chinese cathartic healing. In T. Csordas (Ed.), Embodiment and experience (pp. 116-
136). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Overboe, J. (1999).  'Difference in itself': Validating disabled people's lived experience, Body and  
Society, 5(4), 17-29. 
Park, J. (2006). Chapter 1: Naming the unnameable. In Buddhisms and deconstuctions (pp. 9-20).  
Oxford, UK: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Park, C., & Folkman, S. (1997). Meaning in the context of stress and coping. Review of General  
Psychology, 1(2), 115-144. 
Personal Narratives Group. (1989). Interpreting women’s lives: Feminist theory and personal  
narratives. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press.  
Piccart-Gebhart, M. (2010). New developments in hormone receptor-positive disease, The  
Oncologist, 15(5), 18-28. 
Plato. (1956). The republic. In E.H. Warmington & P.G. Rouse (Eds.), Great dialogues of Plato  
(pp. 118-422). (W.H.D. Rouse, Trans.). New York, NY: The New American Library. 
(Original work written 380 B.C.).  
! 352 
Polkinghorne, D. (1983). Methodology for the human sciences: Systems of inquiry. Albany: State  
University of New York Press.  
Prince, G. (2000). On narratology (past, present, future). In M. Mcquillan (Ed.), The narrative  
reader (p. 129). London, UK: Routledge. (Original work published 1990).  
Pritchard, S., Cuvulier, G., Harlos, M., & Barr, R. (2011). Palliative care in adolescents and  
young adults with cancer, Cancer, 117(Suppl. 10), 2323-2328.  
Radner, G. (2009). It’s always something. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.  
Rajan, T. (2002). Deconstruction and the remainders of phenomenology: Sartre, Derrida,  
Foucault, Baudrillard. Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press. 
Ramfelt, E., Severinsson, E., & Lützen, K. (2002). Attempting to find meaning in illness to  
achieve emotional coherence: The experiences of patients with colorectal cancer, Cancer 
Nursing, 25(2), 141-149.  
Ramphal, R., Meyer, R., Schacter, B., Rogers, P., & Pinkerton, R. (2011). Active therapy and  
models of care for adolescents and young adults with cancer, Cancer, 117(Suppl. 10), 
2316-2322. 
Randall, W., & McKim, A.E. (2008). Reading our lives: The poetics of growing old. New  
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Reese, W. (1980). Dictionary of philosophy and religion: Eastern and Western thought. Atlantic  
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.  
Richer, M-C., & Ezer, H. (2000). Understanding beliefs and meanings in the experience of  
cancer: a concept analysis. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 35(5), 1108-1115. 
Ricoeur, P. (1970). The conflict of interpretations. In Freud and philosophy: An essay on  
Interpretation (pp. 20-36). (D. Savage, Trans.). New Haven and London, UK: Yale 
University Press. (Original work published 1965).  
! 353 
---. (1976). Speaking and writing. In Interpretation theory: Discourse and the surplus  
of meaning (pp. 25-44). Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian University Press.  
---. (1984). Time and narrative (Vol. 1). (K. McLaughlin & D. Pellauer, Trans.). Chicago, IL:  
University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1983).  
---. (1985). Time and narrative (Vol. 2). (K. McLaughlin & D. Pellauer, Trans.). Chicago, IL:  
University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1984).  
---. (1986). From text to action: Essays in hermeneutics II. (K. Blamey and J. Thompson, Trans.).  
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.  
---. (1988). Time and narrative (Vol. 3). (K. McLaughlin & D. Pellauer, Trans.). Chicago, IL:  
University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1985).  
Riessman, C. (2008). Narrative methods for the human sciences. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.  
Riley, B., Manske, S., & Cameron, R. (2011). Youth excel: Towards a pan-Canadian platform  
linking evidence and action for prevention, Cancer, 117(Suppl. 10), 2281-2288.  
Rimmon-Kenan, S. (2002). The story of ‘I’: illness and narrative identity, Narrative,  
 10(1), 9-27. 
---. (2005). “In two voices, or: Whose life/death/story is it, anyway?” In J. Phelan & P.  
Rabinowitz (Eds.), A companion to narrative theory (pp. 399-412). Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell.  
Roberge, J. (2011). What is critical hermeneutics? Thesis Eleven, 106(5), 5-22.  
Roberts, C., Piper, L., Denny, J., & Cuddeback, G. (1997). A support group intervention to  
facilitate young adults’ adjustment to cancer, Health and Social Work, 22(2), 133-141. 
Roberts, C., Severinsen, C., Carraway, C., Clark, D., Freeman, M., & Daniel, P. (1997). Life 
 changes and problems experienced by young adults with cancer, Journal of 
 Psychosocial Oncology, 15(1), 15-25. 
! 354 
Rogoff, B., (2003). The cultural nature of human development. New York, NY: Oxford  
University Press. 
Rothe, J. (2000). Undertaking qualitative research: Concepts and cases in injury, health and  
social life. Edmonton, Canada: University of Alberta Press. 
Rosen, L., Carrier, L.M., & Cheever, N. (2010). Rewired: Understanding the iGeneration and  
the way they learn. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Rosenthal, K. (2009). Everything changes: The insider’s guide to cancer in your 20s and 30s. 
 Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
Rowland, J. (1990). Chapter 3: Developmental stage and adaptation: Adult model. In J.  
 Holland & J. Rowland (Eds.), Handbook of psychooncology: Psychological care of 
 the patient with cancer (pp. 25-43). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
Salliant, F. (1990). Discourse, knowledge and experience of cancer: A life story. Culture,  
Medicine, and Psychiatry, 14, 81–104. 
Sand, L., & Strang, P. (2006). Existential loneliness in a palliative home care setting, Journal of 
 Palliative Medicine, 9(6), 1376-1387. 
Sarbin, T. (Ed.). (1986). Narrative psychology: The storied nature of human conduct. New York 
 and Westport, NY: Praeger. 
Sartre, J-P. (1968). Search for a method. (H. Barnes, Trans.). New York, NY: Vintage Books.  
(Original work published 1960).  
---. (1988). “What is literature?” and other essays. Cambridge, UK: Harvard University Press.  
Savage, S., Collins-Mayo, S., Mayo, B., & Cray, G. (2006). Making sense of Generation Y: The  
world view of 15-25-year-olds. London, UK: Church House.  
Scarry, E. (1985). The body in pain: The making and unmaking of the world. New York, NY:  
Oxford University Press.  
! 355 
Scheper!Hughes, N., & Lock, M. (1987). The mindful body: a prolegomenon to future work  
in medical anthropology, Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 1(1), 6-41. 
Seale, C. (2002). Cancer heroics: A study of news reports with particular reference to gender,  
Sociology, 36, 107-126. 
Shweder, R. (1991). Thinking through cultures: Expeditions in cultural psychology. Cambridge,  
UK: Harvard University Press. 
Shweder, R., Much, N., Mahapatra, M., & Park, L. (1997). The “Big Three” of morality  
(autonomy, community, divinity) and the “Big Three” explanations of suffering. In A.M. 
Brandt & P. Rozin (Eds.), Morality and health (pp. 119-169). New York, NY: Routledge.  
Sinding, C., & Gray, R. (2005). Active aging—spunky survivorship? Discourses and  
experiences of the years beyond breast cancer, Journal of Aging Studies, 19, 147- 
161.  
Sinding, C., & Wiernikowski, J. (2008). Disruption foreclosed: older women’s cancer  
narratives, Health, 12, 389-411. 
Smith, B., & Sparkes, A. (2011). Exploring multiple responses to a chaos narrative, Health,  
15(1), 38-53. 
Smith, S. (1993). Subjectivity, identity, and the body: Women’s autobiographical practices  
 in the twentieth century. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Smith, S., & Watson, J. (2010). Reading autobiography: A guide for interpreting life  
narratives (2nd edition). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work 
published 2001).  
Snobohm, C., Friedrichsen, M., & Heiwe, S. (2010). Experiencing one’s body after a diagnosis 
 of cancer, Psycho-Oncology, 19, 863-869. 
Sontag, S. (1978). Illness as metaphor. New York, NY: Vintage Books. 
! 356 
Sormanti, M. (2010). Facilitating women’s development through the illness of cancer:  
Depression, self-silencing, and self-care, In D. Jack & A. Ali (Eds.), Silencing the self 
across cultures (pp. 363-381). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Stacey, J. (1997). Teratologies: A cultural study of cancer. London, UK: Routledge.  
Statistics Canada. (2009). Leading causes of death in Canada. Retrieved from the Statistics  
Canada website on July 29, 2013: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/84-215-x/84-215-
x2012001-eng.htm  
Stefaniuk, O. (2009). A rose grows: Fighting cancer, finding me. Regina, Canada: Your Nickel’s  
Worth.  
Strawson, G. (2004). Against narrativity, Ratio XVII(17), 428-452. 
Struber, M., & Kazak, A. (1999). Chapter 8: The developmental impact of cancer diagnosis and  
treatment for adolescents. In M. Sugar (Ed.), Trauma and adolescence (pp. 143-162). 
Madison, CT: International Universities Press.  
Sun, S., Schiller, J., & Gazdar, A. (2007). Lung cancer in never smokers: A different disease,  
Nature Reviews Cancer, 7, 778-790.  
Sutcliffe, S. (2011). A review of Canadian health care and cancer care systems, Cancer,  
117(Suppl. 10), 2241-2244.  
Svenaeus, F. (2000). The body uncanny: Further steps toward a phenomenology of illness,  
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 3, 125-137. 
---. (2009). The phenomenology of falling ill: An explication, critique and improvement of  
Sartre’s theory of embodiment and alienation, Human Studies, 32, 53-66.  
Tang, V., Lee, A., Chan, C., Leung, P., Sham, J., Ho, J., & Cheng, J. (2007). Disorientation and 
 reconstruction, Journal of Psychosocial Oncology, 25(2), 77-102. 
 
! 357 
Teucher, U. (2001a). Writing the unspeakable: Metaphor in cancer narratives. Dissertation  
 Abstracts International Section A: Humanities and Social Sciences. 62:1-A. Jul 2001. 
Teucher, U. (2001b). Writing in the face of death: Norbert Elias and autobiographies of cancer. In  
T. Salumets (Ed.), Norbert Elias and human interdependencies (pp. 159-174). Montreal, 
Canada: McGill-Queens University Press.  
Teucher, U. (2003). The therapeutic psychopoetics of cancer metaphors: Challenges in  
 interdisciplinarity, History of Intellectual Culture, 3(1), 1-15. 
Thomas-Maclean, R. (2004). Understanding breast cancer stories via Frank’s narrative types,  
Social Science and Medicine, 58, 1647-1657. 
Thompson, D., Jensen, A., & Bonde, A. (2007). Memories and narratives about breast cancer,  
Narrative Inquiry 17(2), 349-370. 
Thompson, K. (2007). Liminality as a descriptor for the cancer experience, Illness, Crisis & Loss,  
15(4), 333-351.  
Todorov, T. (1981). Introduction to poetics. (R. Howard, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University  
of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1968).  
Towsley, G., Beck, S., & Watkins, J. (2007). “Learning to live with it”: Coping with the  
 transition to cancer survivorship in older adults, Journal of Aging Studies, 21, 93-106. 
Tonorezos, E., & Oeffinger, K. (2011). Research challenges in adolescent and young adult  
cancer survivor research, Cancer, 117(Suppl. 10), 2295-2300. 
Turner, V. (1969). The ritual process: Structure and anti-structure. Chicago, IL: Aldine.  
---. (1981). Social dramas and stories about them. In W.J.T. Mitchell (Ed.), On narrative (pp.  
137-164). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1980).  
 
 
! 358 
---. (1986). Dewey, Dilthey, and drama: An essay in the anthropology of experience. In  
V. Turner & E. Bruner (Eds.), The anthropology of experience (pp. 33-45). Urbana and 
Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.  
Twenge, J. (2006). Generation Me: Why today’s young Americans are more confident, assertive,  
entitled—and more miserable than ever before. New York, NY: Free Press. 
Tymieniecka, A-T. (2001). The complex phenomenon of illness. In A-T. Tymieniecka & E.  
Agazzi (Eds.), Life: interpretation and the sense of illness within the human condition: 
Medicine and philosophy in a dialogue (pp. xi-xiii). Dordorecht, Netherlands, and Boston, 
MA: Kluwer Academic.  
Van der Kolk, B., & Van der Hart, O. (1995). The intrusive past: The flexibility of memory and  
the engraving of trauma. In C. Caruth (Ed.), Trauma: explorations in memory (pp. 158-
182). Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. 
Van Gennep, A. (1960). The rites of passage. (M.B. Vizedom & G.L. Caffee, Trans.).  
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1909).  
Van Kaam, A. (1966). Existential foundations of psychology. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne  
University Press.  
Van Manen, M. (1998). Modalities of body experience in illness and health, Qualitative Health  
Research, 8(1), 7-24. 
Velleman, J.D. (2006). The self as narrator. In Self to self: Selected essays (pp. 203-223).  
Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
Vickberg, S., Duhamel, K., Smith, M., Manne, S., Winkel, G., Papadopoulos, E., & Redd, W.  
(2001). Global meaning and psychological adjustment among survivors, Psycho-
Oncology, 10, 29-39.  
 
! 359 
Voltaire. (1912). Poem on the Lisbon disaster; Or, an examination of the axiom, “All is well”. In  
Toleration and other essays (pp. 255-263). (J. McCabe, Trans.). New York, NY: G.P.  
Putnam’s Sons. (Original work published 1756).  
Wadler, J. (1997). My breast. New York, NY: Pocket Books.  
Walboomers, J., Jacobs, M., Manos, M., Bosch, F., Kummer, J., Shah, K., Snijders, P., Peto, J.,  
Meijer, C., & Munoz, N. (1999). Human papillomavirus is a necessary cause of invasive  
cervice cancer worldwide, Journal of Pathology, 189, 12-19.   
Wahrman, D. (2004). The making of the modern self: Identity and culture in eighteenth-century  
England. New Have and London, UK: Yale University Press.  
Weeks, C. (2011). Jack Layton didn’t lose a fight: He died of cancer, The Globe and Mail,  
August 22, 2011. 
White, H. (1981). The value of narrativity in the representation of reality. In W.J.T. Mitchell  
(Ed.), On narrative (pp. 1-23). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Whitehead, L. (2006). Quest, chaos and restitution: Living with chronic fatigue  
syndrome/myalgic encephalomyelitis, Social Science and Medicine, 62(9), 2236-2245. 
Whyte, S. (1995). Epilogue: Disability between discourse and experience. In B. Ingstad & S.  
Whyte (Eds.), Disability and culture (pp. 267-292). Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: 
University of California Press.  
Williams, B. (2004). Dying young, dying poor: A sociological examination of existential  
suffering among low-socioeconomic status patients, Journal of Palliative Medicine, 7(1), 
27-37. 
Woodgate, R. (2005). A different way of being: Adolescents’ experiences with cancer, Cancer 
 Nursing, 28(1), 8-15. 
 
! 360 
Woolf, V. (1985). A sketch of the past. In Moments of being. London, UK: Hogarth Press.  
(Original work published 1938).  
---. (2002). On being ill. Ashfield, MA: Paris Press. (Original work published 1926). 
---. (2012). The waves. London, UK: Urban Romantics. (Original work published 1931).  
Yalom, I. (1980). Existential psychotherapy. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
---. (2008). Staring at the sun: Overcoming the terror of death. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Young-Eisendrath, P. (2009). The self-esteem trap. New York, NY: Little, Brown and  
Company.  
Zammett, E. (2005). My (so-called) normal life: How I learned to balance love, work, family,  
friends…and cancer at 23. New York, NY: Overlook Duckworth.  
Zebrack, B. (2008). Information and service needs for young adult cancer patients, Support 
 Cancer Care, 16, 1353-1360.  
---. (2011). Psychological, social, and behavioural issues for young adults with cancer, Cancer,  
117(Suppl. 10), 2289-2294. 
Zickuhr, K., Rainie, L., Purcell, K., Madden, M., & Brenner, J. (2012). Younger Americans’  
reading and library habits. Retrieved from the Pew Internet and American Life Project 
website on July 4, 2013: http://libraries.pewinternet.org/2012/10/23/younger-americans-
reading-and-library-habits/  
Zigon, J. (2008). Morality: An anthropological perspective. Oxford, UK: Berg. 
! 361 
Appendix A: Theoretical Concepts 
Figure A1: Diagrammatic Overview of Theoretical Concepts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lived Experiences 
! Being-in-the-World 
! Liminality 
Narratives 
! Expressed Meanings 
! Emplotted Experiences 
Cultural Discourses 
! Narrative Environments 
! Spaces of Experience 
! Horizons of Expectation 
Negotiations of 
Meaning & Being  
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Appendix C: Recruitment Pamphlet 
Additional Information 
Your participation will help 
us to learn about the specific 
challenges facing young 
adults with cancer so that 
health care may be improved. 
There is no cost for you to 
participate in this research 
except your time. 
 
Your participation is entirely 
voluntary. All information 
will be kept fully confiden-
tial. This research project has 
been approved by the Ethics 
Board at the University of 
Saskatchewan. 
 
Thank you very much for 
thinking about helping in 
this research project! 
 
 
 
How to Contact Us: 
Please feel free to contact Dr. 
Teucher, Devon Andersen, or 
Chad Hammond at any time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo of researchers  
to be placed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telephone:  
(306) 966-2529   
                
E-mails: 
Ulrich.Teucher@usask.ca 
Devon.Andersen@usask.ca 
Chad.Hammond@usask.ca  
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Invitation to Participate              
in a Research Project  
We would like to talk to you 
about your experiences with 
cancer. We believe this will 
help others to understand the 
specific challenges of life with 
cancer in young adult-hood. 
As part of this project, we may 
ask you to write a short story 
or journal entry of your 
experience.  
 
The Lead Researcher 
Dr. Ulrich Teucher,  
Department of Psychology, 
University of Saskatchewan 
Phone: 966-2529 (office) 
ulrich.teucher@usask.ca 
  
The Research Team 
Devon Andersen  
Chad Hammond 
(Both are PhD students at the 
University of Saskatchewan) 
Meeting With You 
If you are between age 18 and 
45, have or have had cancer, 
and are not currently in the 
middle of a cancer treatment 
cycle, please phone or e-mail 
us.  We will gladly answer any 
questions you may have or 
provide you with additional 
information. Upon request, we 
will send you a full invitation 
and description of the research 
project.  
 
With your consent to be part of 
our study, we will invite you to 
participate in an individual 
person-to-person interview. 
This 90 minute meeting will be 
held in downtown Saskatoon at 
the comfortable “Community 
Village” on 25th Street. We 
will provide transportation and 
refreshments.  
 
You will also be given a gift as 
a token of our sincere 
appreciation for your time and 
involvement. 
 
If you wish to participate, 
please sign the consent form 
that will come along with the 
invitation package and mail it 
to us in our prepaid return 
envelope. We will then contact 
you and ask some basic 
questions such as your age, 
gender, and ethnic 
background, and arrange a 
convenient meeting time with 
you. 
 
The meetings may be audio-
taped so that we can tran-
scribe more accurately what 
has been said. However, you 
may request that recording 
devices be turned off at any 
time.  
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Appendix D: Letter of Invitation 
Letter of Invitation to Join Research Project 
CANCER AND YOUNG ADULTHOOD: MAKING SENSE OF LIFE WITH ILLNESS  
 
We would like to ask for your help so that we can learn more about the specific challenges facing young 
adults who have or have had cancer. Cancer is a difficult illness to have at any time in life but it seems 
that one is faced with different challenges depending on the time of life when one is ill. Very little is 
known how cancer and its treatment affect your life through young adulthood. This research project 
invites you to share with us some of these challenges, for the purpose of improving the quality of care 
provided to young adult patients with cancer.  
 
The research project is led by Dr. Ulrich Teucher, Department of Psychology, at the University of 
Saskatchewan, together with his doctoral students Chad Hammond and Devon Andersen. We are inviting 
young women and men to participate who have experienced or are experiencing cancer and who fit the 
following criteria. You: 
• are between 18 and 45 years of age; 
• are willing to share personal experiences of cancer and cancer treatment in audio recorded 
interviews and/or in written form.  
 
 
In particular, we would like to learn how cancer and its treatment  
• can affect your personal life, ideas of health and illness, your sense of who you are, and your 
plans for life as lived through young adulthood,  
• can affect your personal goals, beliefs, social supports, family life, and independence, and what 
these changes, if any, may mean for you.  
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Short Written Account 
If you would like to engage in writing, then we would ask you to send us a short story about your 
experiences. Writing can provide an opportunity to gather your thoughts and give your experience some 
form; indeed, some researchers suggest that writing can be helpful in illness. You may want to share 
whatever you find interesting or important and/or what you think people should know about. In general, 
we are interested in learning how you think about your illness, its treatment/healing, and its broad impacts 
on your life. Please write a few pages about your experiences (hand- or typewritten). Please enclose your 
narrative in the self-addressed, stamped envelope and bring it along to our conversation or please send it 
to us.  
 
One-on-one Conversation 
If you would like to speak with one of us in person then we would ask you to consent to an approximately 
90 minute recorded conversation about your experiences with cancer. The conversation could take place 
at the University of Saskatchewan in the interview room of the Qualitative Research Centre (Arts 285), or 
at the “Community Village” at 506 25th Street East in downtown Saskatoon, or at another comfortable 
place. If you live outside of the Province of Saskatchewan, we would be glad to have a recorded 
conversation with you over the phone. 
 
We would be delighted to have you take part in both activities (written account and conversation) if you 
so choose. We can provide you with transportation (on request), refreshments, and a gift as a token of our 
appreciation. 
 
Your confidentiality will be kept strictly: you will be assigned a pseudonym and you will give yourself an 
identity code (for example, the first three letters of your mother’s maiden name and your age) for the 
purpose of linking your audio data  and/or written materials. All data will be kept in locked storage, and 
all recordings will be deleted beyond recovery after transcripts have been completed. A final report will 
be made available upon request.  
 
Sometimes, the topic of cancer may evoke an emotional response. Should this happen, we hope that it 
will not upset you more than usual. If it does, counselling services at the Saskatchewan Cancer Agency at 
(306) 585-1831 will be made available to you. While your participation in this research project is hoped 
to help us learn about the challenges of living with cancer in young adulthood, your participation is in 
itself not a part of your medical therapy and is not explicitly intended to have therapeutic benefits. Your 
participation is entirely voluntary. If you have any concerns you need not answer questions that you might 
feel uncomfortable about, or you may withdraw from the study at any time and/or you may withdraw 
information at any time (until the final report is written up), without fear of any negative repercussions. 
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Your choice to participate or not will not be communicated to your physicians or anybody else and will in 
no way affect your medical care.  
 
It is hoped that this research project will help healthcare professionals and caregivers to better understand 
the specific challenges facing young adult patients who live with cancer. If you have any questions, please 
contact Chad Hammond, Devon Andersen, or Dr. Ulrich Teucher by telephone at (306) 966-2996 or 
email us at illness.stories@gmail.com. If you wish to participate, please sign the enclosed Consent Form, 
keep one copy for yourself, and mail the other copy to us by using the self-addressed and stamped 
envelope. We will then make contact with you and set up a meeting time that is convenient for you. 
 
We thank you for your time and look forward to hearing from you! 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Ulrich Teucher, Associate Professor 
Program for Culture and Human Development, Department of Psychology 
Co-Director QRC Qualitative Research Centre, College of Arts & Sciences  
University of Saskatchewan, 9 Campus Drive, Saskatoon SK S7N 5A5, Canada  
Phone (306) 966-2996   Fax (306) 966-6630  Email: illness.stories@gmail.com 
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Appendix E: Consent Form 
 
Consent Form to Join Research Project 
CANCER AND YOUNG ADULTHOOD: MAKING SENSE OF LIFE WITH ILLNESS 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project entitled “Cancer and Young Adulthood: Making Sense 
of Life with Illness.” Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you might have. 
 
Research Assistant: Research Assistant: Research Leader: 
Chad Hammond   Devon Andersen Dr. Ulrich Teucher  
Dept. of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan   Phone: (306) 966-2996   E-mail: illness.stories@gmail.com 
   
Purpose and Procedure: We are asking for help from young adults between 18 and 45 years of age who 
have or have had cancer, for the purpose of learning more about the specific challenges facing young 
adults at this time of your lives. We would be very grateful if you would be willing to share some of your 
personal experiences in a one-on-one conversation (about 90 min) and/or in written form. We are hoping 
that what we learn from you will help us better understand the experience of life with cancer so that 
cancer care for younger patients can be improved for the future.  
Short Written Account: If you would like to engage in writing, then we would ask you to send us a short 
story about your experiences. Writing can provide an opportunity to gather your thoughts and give your 
experience some form; indeed, some researchers suggest that writing can be helpful in illness. You may 
want to share whatever you find interesting or important and/or what you think people should know 
about. In general, we are interested in learning how you think about your illness, its treatment/healing, 
and its broad impacts on your life. Please write a few pages about your experiences (hand- or 
typewritten). Please enclose your narrative in the self-addressed, stamped envelope and bring it along to 
our conversation or please send it to us.  
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One-on-one Conversation: If you would like to speak with one of us in person then we would ask you to 
consent to an approximately 90 minute recorded conversation about your experiences with cancer. The 
conversation could take place at the University of Saskatchewan in the interview room of the Qualitative 
Research Centre (Arts 285), or at the “Community Village” at 506 25th Street East in downtown 
Saskatoon, or at another comfortable place. If you live outside of the Province of Saskatchewan, we 
would be glad to have a recorded conversation with you over the phone. 
We would be delighted to have you take part in both activities (written account and conversation) if you 
so choose. We can provide you with transportation (on request), refreshments, and a gift as a token of our 
appreciation. 
Potential Risks and Benefits: Talking about cancer can sometimes be upsetting. If this happens to you 
during the interview, or in the case that you might be writing about your experience, and you find yourself 
becoming unduly upset, please let us know. Please feel free to contact a counsellor at the Saskatchewan 
Cancer Agency Counselling and Support Services at (306) 585-1831. While your participation will 
inform us about the challenges of living with cancer in young adulthood, and may help improve cancer 
care, your participation is in itself not part of your treatment and has no direct benefits as a therapy. 
Confidentiality: All the information gathered during this research project will be STRICTLY 
CONFIDENTIAL. We will use a pseudonym instead of your name and random identity codes to link any 
data together. Your name, and the fact that you attended the interview and/or wrote about your experience 
will not be revealed to anyone. The final report will contain general ideas only and we will NOT include 
your name or any other identifying information. As well, we want to assure you that your participation or 
non-participation will not affect your standing with your Health Region in any way, even if you tell us 
you want something changed, or want to withdraw from the study. 
Storage of Data: We will NOT be putting your name or any personal identifying information about you 
anywhere in the write-up of the research. The notes that we make from our discussions, any other data, 
and a copy of this consent form will be stored separately in locked cabinets in Dr. Teucher’s office in the 
Department of Psychology at the University of Saskatchewan for at least five years after the completion 
of the study. After that time, everything will be destroyed beyond recovery.   
Right to Withdraw: You may choose not to answer individual questions that you might feel 
uncomfortable about, and you may withdraw from the study at any time and/or may withdraw information 
at any time up until the final report is written, without fear of any negative repercussions. Should you 
decide to withdraw, your services through your Health Region will not be affected. Upon withdrawal, all 
data including any recordings and/or written materials, will be destroyed beyond recovery and NOT 
included in the research. You are free to choose how you would like to answer the questions that we will 
be discussing. If you feel uncomfortable with the recording device, you may request that it be turned off. 
In the case that you agree to write a short written account of your experiences, and you do send us a 
personal account of yours, we will view your written text as a sign of your consent to participate in this 
part of the study.  
Questions: If you have any questions or concerns about anything discussed in the interview, or about 
writing something about your experience, please feel free to ask us at any time during the meeting or at a 
later date. This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
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Behavioural Sciences Ethics Board on 28 July 2010. Any questions about your rights as a participant in 
this research may be addressed to that committee through the Office of Research Services at (306) 966-
2084. If you would like to receive a summary of the final report, please contact us at (306) 966-2669. 
Identity Code: Our study has two parts (should you also participate in the writing) and we would like to 
put these parts of your contributions together. Therefore we ask that you make up a personal identity code 
(for example, the first three letters of your mother’s maiden name and your age). In this way your 
confidentiality will be preserved. See next page: 
 
Your Identity Code: 
1. Please fill in your personal identity code   [    ][    ][    ] 
(first three letters of your mother’s maiden name) 
2. Your age: 
 
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided above; I have been provided 
with a chance to ask questions and my concerns have been answered satisfactorily. I consent to participate 
in the research project described above and understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time 
before the final report has been written; upon withdrawal, all information provided by me will be 
destroyed beyond recovery. A copy of this form has been given to me for my records. 
 
 
________________________ _______________                 _______________________ 
(Signature of Participant)                   (Date)    (Phone number) 
 
________________________ _______________ 
(Signature of Researcher)   (Date) 
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Appendix F: Interview Protocol 
 
Questions for C&YA Individual Interview  
 
Date: _______________________Time:   _________________          
Location: ___________________________________________ 
Consent Form Reviewed and Signed: ___________________ 
Age: _______________________________________________ 
Ethnicity: __________________________________________ 
Pseudonym of Participant(s):__________________________ 
Interviewer: ________________________________________ 
 
Legend for Pseudonym:  
• P Participant # 
• CYA (Cancer & Young Adulthood) 
• M/F Male/Female) 
• AGE (In years) 
• S (Saskatoon), PA (Prince Albert)                           
• Example: Jack Black aged 28 from Moose Jaw: P1CYAM28MJ 
 
 
1. Introductory Considerations 
 
 
Introduction 
Morgan (1997) 
 
 
• Overview and Context:  The interviewer will introduce 
himself/herself  
  
• Welcome & thank participant for volunteering to be part of 
the study 
• Explain the consent form.                                               
• Inform participant will be assigned a pseudonym  
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2. General Discussion About Young Adulthood 
 
 
Images  
of Young 
Adulthood 
 
• Talking about Young Adulthood, would you have an image or 
metaphor or two, that could illustrate for somebody else what 
you personally think young Adulthood is like? 
• What would you say Young Adulthood is like? 
 
Challenges 
of Young 
Adulthood 
• Please let me say a few words before we begin. When 
  we ask you to tell us about your experiences, there is  
  no right or wrong response.  
• Cancer and its treatment can affect different persons in very 
different ways, during different stages of their lives. 
• In order to better understand how cancer affects us when we 
are in young adulthood, it would be good if we could first talk 
for a moment what the experience of young adulthood itself 
is like, compared to when we were younger or when we might 
be older 
• Life in young adulthood can affect us in many ways: 
o our bodies,  
o our ability to think,  
o how we feel,  
o how we relate with or may depend on others,  
o our expectations about the rest of our lives, and 
o the activities we find important in our lives. 
• So I would like to ask you to please tell me first what your 
experience of young adulthood has been like. 
 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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3. Introductory Questions 
 
4. General Discussion About Cancer 
 
Type  
of Cancer & 
Treatment 
 
 
• Before we begin to speak about the challenges of cancer when 
we are in young adulthood I would like you to please describe 
in your own words  
o What kind of cancer you have or have had  
o what kind of medical treatments you have or have had 
o and what other non-medical treatments you may have 
used  
 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Challenges  
of Cancer 
 
• We have now talked about life in young adulthood. 
• I would like to ask you now to please tell me how life with 
cancer has been affecting you as you are living through young 
adulthood  
• Life with cancer can affect us in many ways; for example, it 
can affect  
o our bodies 
o our ability to think,  
o how we feel,  
o how we relate with or may depend on others, 
o our expectations about the rest of our lives, and 
o the activities we find important in our lives. 
• How has cancer been affecting you at this stage of your life, 
being in young adulthood 
 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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5. Supplementary Questions (if not answered in Interview earlier) 
 
5a.  
Bodily 
changes 
 
 
• Another aspect that we would like to learn about is how cancer might 
affect our bodies as we are in young adulthood now - and how we think 
about those changes.  
• Has your experience with cancer affected your body as you are a young 
adult now and what do you think about these changes? 
 
 
5b.  
Thinking 
 
 
• Another aspect that we would like to learn about is how cancer might 
affect our ability to think as we are now in young adulthood - and what 
we might make of those changes.  
• Has your experience with cancer affected your ability to think as you have 
entered young adulthood and what do you make of these changes? 
 
 
5c.  
Emotions 
 
 
• Another aspect that we would like to learn about is how cancer might 
affect our emotions at this time of our lives - and what we might think of 
those changes.  
• Has your experience with cancer affected your emotions, being a young 
adult, and what do you think about these changes? 
 
 
5d.  
Relations 
 
 
• Another aspect that we would like to learn about is how cancer might 
affect our relations with others, for example, our dependence or 
independence - and what we might think of those changes.  
• Has your experience with cancer affected your relations and how you may 
depend on others as you are now a young adult and if so, what do you 
think about these changes? 
 
 
5e.  
Expectations 
 
 
 
 
 
• Another aspect that we would like to learn about is how cancer might 
affect our expectations about our future life as we are young adults. 
• Has your experience with cancer affected your expectations about the 
future of your life as you are in young adulthood and what do you think 
about those changes? 
5f.  
Activities 
• Another aspect that we would like to learn about is how cancer might 
affect our activities as we are young adults. 
• Has your experience with cancer affected activities you find important or 
meaningful in your life, and what do you think about those changes? 
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 6. Images 
5g.  
Life’s 
Limitations 
• Another aspect that we would like to learn about is how cancer might 
affect our perceptions of life’s limitations as we are young adults. 
• Has your experience with cancer affected your perception of life’s 
limitations, and what do you think about those changes? 
 
6a. 
Images of 
Cancer 
 
 
 
 
• Earlier I asked you about images that might illustrate what Young 
Adulthood is like. 
• Sometimes it can be difficult to explain to others what the 
experience of cancer or its treatment are like. We then use images 
(or metaphors), as a likeness for that which is difficult to explain. 
• Here is an unrelated example of an image. Say, you want to 
illustrate what happiness is like. You then might say “Happiness 
is like . . . a deep well.” 
• Based on your own personal experience, what image or images 
might help to understand what your experience of cancer is like? 
• What would you say: Cancer is like … 
 
 
Prompt 1, if needed:  
• Let me explain this with an example from another illness. 
• How do we explain, e.g., what the experience of Alzheimers is like? 
• It turns out that some patients compare it to snow softly falling, or leaves 
softly falling, to illustrate in a way how the pieces of memory are slowly 
falling. They might say Alzheimer’s is like slowly falling leaves. 
• Based on your own personal experience, what image or images might help 
to understand what your experience of cancer is like?  
• What would you say: Cancer is like … 
 
Prompt 2, if needed: 
• There are actually many ways how cancer patients have imagined the 
experience of cancer. 
• Interestingly these images can differ widely form each other. They may 
work for one patient but not another.  
• E.g., one might say that cancer is, say, somewhat like an enemy. Another 
might say cancer is more like a teacher or even a friend.  
• Another, again, might say cancer is like a journey where you have choices, 
while another feels there is no choice, rather, cancer is like, say, rolling the 
dice. 
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Cancer is like . . . _________________________________________________________________________-
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
• As you see, these examples are all very different, and there are many other 
examples possible.  
• Based on your own personal experience, what image or images might help 
to understand what your experience of cancer is like?  
• What would you say: Cancer is like . . . 
 
6b. 
Cancer 
Treatment 
Images 
 
 
• In a similar way, based on your own personal experience, what 
image or images might help to understand what your experience 
of cancer treatment  is or was like? 
• What would you say: Cancer Treatment is like . . . 
 
Cancer Treatment is like . . . 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6c. 
Comforting 
Images 
 
 
• Aside from images for cancer or its treatment, we might also 
have other images that might help us find some general comfort 
or support or help us find some resolution in a time of illness and 
treatment. 
• What image would you say provides you with comfort or support 
in a time of illness and treatment? 
Comforting Image: ________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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7. Other Questions 
 
 
7a.  
Time 
 
 
 
• Another aspect that we would like to learn about is the matter of 
time 
• Different people can have different ideas about time in their lives, 
particularly if they have cancer when they are young. 
• Has your sense of the passage of time changed as you have 
become a young adult? How has the experience of cancer further 
influenced that experience?  
• Has this perhaps changed sense of time had an influence on your 
expectations about life? 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7b.  
Sense of 
Identity 
• Has cancer affected your sense of identity, or who you are as a 
person? How so? 
 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7c.  
Lead Life 
• Has cancer affected how you feel about or lead your life? How 
so? 
 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7d.  
Control 
• Has cancer affected your sense of control over your life? How so? 
 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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8. Closing 
 
7e.  
Doctors, 
Nurses 
• How were you treated by your doctors and nurses?. 
 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7f.  
After Life 
• Some people believe in the hope that something in us might live 
on in some way after this life, perhaps in the work we have 
accomplished, or through the family we may have raised, or in the 
form of a soul. 
• Do you share such ideas in some way?  
• If so, have such ideas been useful as you have been dealing with 
illness and growing older? 
 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Closing 
Question 
 
 
• Is there anything you want to add to this discussion that you feel is 
important for us to know? 
 
Notes ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Closing Remarks    
Reminder for those who wish to write and do so after the interview that there will 
be information how to do so  
Presentation of gift, and thanks for participation in session 
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Appendix G: Sample Characteristics 
Figure G1: Summary of Participants’ Demographics 
Demographic N     
Residence 
British Columbia 
Alberta 
Saskatchewan 
Manitoba 
Ontario 
     Nova Scotia 
 
1 
3 
6 
2 
8 
1 
 
Age in Years 
! 20 
21-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
     " 40 
 
1 
2 
5 
6 
4 
3 
Gender 
Female 
     Male 
 
13 
8 
 
 
 
Figure G2: Summary of Participants’ Cancers  
Illness Information N     
Cancer Type 
ALL 
Brain 
Breast 
Cervical 
Colorectal 
Hodgkin’s 
Lung 
Non-Hodgkin’s 
Testicular 
     Urachal 
 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
4 
1 
1 
2 
1 
 
Cancer Stage 
Stage 0 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
Stage 3 
Stage 4 
     Unknown 
 
1 
3 
2 
4 
2 
9 
 
Time since Diagnosis 
0-2 years 
3-5 years 
6-10 years 
> 10 years 
 
11 
5 
1 
4 
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Appendix H: Narrative Genres 
Figures H1: Narrative Genres within Theoretical Framework 
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Figure H2: Different Moments of Meaning 
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Figure H3: The Hierarchical Dominance of Moments of Meaning 
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Appendix I: Narrative Identities 
Figure I1: Narrative Identity within Theoretical Framework 
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Figure I2: Narrative Sequences of Liminality 
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Figure I3: Mythic Figures from Prototypical Plots 
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Figure I4: Intersubjectivies shaping Being and Meaning 
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Figure I5: Developmental Identities before Cancer 
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Figure I6: Separations from Identities because of Cancer 
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Figure I7: Struggles with Identities during and after Treatment 
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Figure I8: (Un)Consummated Identities in the Present 
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Appendix J: Moral Quests 
Figure J1: Moral Quests within Theoretical Framework 
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Figure J2: The Hierarchical Dominant of Causal Ontologies 
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Figure J3: Moments of Existential Questioning 
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Figure J4: Moments of Moral Explorations 
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Figure J5: Moments of Moral Living 
 
 
 
 
 
